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Abstract	  
This thesis is about young second-generation Somali women in London who, in 
recent years, have begun to practise Islam. Based on over 16 months of ethnographic 
fieldwork, it investigates their everyday experiences of piety in a range of contexts 
across London. I argue that an analysis of these young women’s pious pursuits needs 
to account for the connections between the broader socio-political and economic 
context, and the affective, embodied, discursive, and cognitive dimensions of ethical 
self-fashioning.  
First, I demonstrate how these young practising women are drawing on forms of 
knowledge derived from the Islamic discursive tradition, liberal discourses and 
Somali history. I explore how these women’s ethical changes are initiated by current 
shifts in policies and discussions around the failures of multiculturalism, which have 
brought into sharp focus the questions of what it means to be Somali, Muslim, and 
British. Second, by extending a Foucaultian understanding of ethical change, I 
approach their practise of Islam by analysing the forms and means through which 
these young women imagine novel relations to themselves and to others including kin, 
friends, potential husbands, and God. I contrast these women’s experiences with those 
of the first-generation in order to trace historical changes. An ethnographic 
investigation into their everyday lives in a range of contexts beyond Islamic places of 
learning, reveals the multi-constituted, relational, and constantly shifting nature of the 
practising self. Ultimately, through the concept of hope I investigate the forces that 
animate these young practising women’s quests and account for their continuous, 
albeit fragmentary and often incoherent, attempts to transform themselves. This 
analysis moves beyond the anthropological literature on Islam and piety, which 
prioritises coherent, discursive traditions and often bounded models of piety. It further 
offers a challenge to current public and political representations of Muslim women in 
the UK, which tend to problematize Islam. Young practising Somali women, this 
thesis reveals, are intervening within, and transforming these contemporary debates 
around the Muslim subject.  
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Glossary	  
Somali 
Aros – Wedding  
Ceeb – Shame 
Daqaan iyo hadeed – Culture and tradition 
Dibaab – Dowry 
Dirac – A loose, long dress that has become increasingly popular amongst Somalis in 
the diaspora  
Diya-paying group – lineages or groups united collectively by means of paying or 
receiving blood compensation. 
Garbasaar – A shawl that is worn with a dirac or guntiino 
Guntiino – A nomadic-style dress that wraps tightly around the torso and is tied on the 
left shoulder 
Qabyl – Clan 
Yarad – Bridewealth 
 
Arabic 
Abaya – A loose and ankle-length black robe or dress 
Adab – Etiquette    
Akhira – Next world, hereafter 
Deen – Religion 
Du’a – Supplicatory prayers 
Dunya – Earthly realm, world of the senses 
Fiqh – Jurisprudence 
Hadith (plural: ahadith) – The authoritative scriptures which contain a record of the 
Prophet’s speech and actions 
Halal – Permissable and legal 
Haram – Forbidden and unlawful 
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Halaqa – Islamic circle 
Hubb – Love 
Hijab – Veil, often used to refer to the headscarf. 
Ikhlas – Sincerity 
Ilm – Knowledge 
Iman – Faith 
Jahannam – Abode of punishment 
Janna – The Garden 
Jilbaab – An Islamic style of clothing consisting in a head wrap, a head cover that 
drapes of the chest, and a long skirt or dress. 
Niyyah – Intention 
Niqab – Face veil 
Raja – Hope, anticipation  
Salat – Islamic prayer 
Sheikh (fem: Sheikha) – Islamic scholar 
Sunna –Way of thr Prophet. Considered the second most important source of Islamic 
knowledge. 
Sura – Chapter of the Quran 
Tafsir – Explanations of Quranic verses 
Tajweed – Knowledge and application of the rules of recitation of the Quran 
Ulama – Islamic legal scholars 
Umma –Community  
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* * * * 
I have avoided scare quotes as much as possible, particularly around the words culture, religion, 
authentic Islam, or tradition in order to ease the flow for the reader. As shall become apparent, I am not 
interested in these terms as analytical concepts, but I explore how they are appropriated, interpreted, 
and understood in various instances as means of engaging with the world. 
I have chosen to italicise my informants’ direct speech throughout the text in order to prioritise and 
emphasise their words and their perspectives above those of scholars, politicians, or media and public 
commentators. 
Names and identities have been altered to protect the anonymity of individuals concerned. 
All the photos are my own unless stated otherwise. 
    * * * * 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
1.1 Introduction 
I was sitting with a small group of female Somali friends in a Syrian restaurant in 
West London in the summer of 2010 when Muneera made a flamboyant entrance. She 
was dressed fashionably in jeans, sandals, and a loose, frilly top, with a designer bag 
hanging from her right arm. She wore her small hijab tied under her chin, a style she 
had assumed while in France, she later explained.1 Confident, vibrant, and vivacious, 
her arrival interrupted our conversations; she smiled, exchanged kisses the Somali 
way – three times on the cheeks – before she sat down to order her food, allowing the 
conversation to resume. But before her order had even reached the kitchen, she 
announced her plan to leave her job as a sales manager in a large multinational firm. 
“I want to start focusing on the deen (religion)” she explained, “and it’s impossible to 
do it in this job.” Her ensuing explication revealed two clear catalysts: the sudden 
death of one of her cousins, the gruesome details of which she also disclosed to a 
wincing audience, and the unexpected death of her boss, which came within a week of 
the former. “I was so shocked. I couldn’t believe it… that really did it for me. I started 
thinking so much, realising things… that young people could die and that would be 
it”. 
Muneera explained how her boss had had everything he could have wished for in this 
world: a nice family, a big house, several cars, and luxurious holidays. Suddenly, it 
had all been taken away from him. She continued as we sat still waiting to hear more. 
“I took a week off work, I couldn’t do anything… It was at that point that 
I started questioning everything… what is the purpose of life? Why are we 
here? At some point in our lives we need to start thinking about these 
things. I have always worked, studied, tried to be successful, done my 
                                                
1 Hijab is used in this context to refer to the head covering. Although Muneera was wearing trousers 
and a top, practising women often also wear the abaya, a long black loosely fitted dress covering the 
whole body except head, hands and feet, or occasionally a jilbaab, a dress that covers the head, wraps 
around the face and drapes over the chest. Only some women wear the niqab or face-veil. 
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best… but never thought about these things. Now I want to focus on my 
deen.” 
Soon after this conversation, Muneera gradually began implementing her five daily 
prayers, wearing the hijab regularly to work, and seeking Islamic knowledge. She also 
asked her 30-year old friend Zaynab to introduce her to other practising Somali 
women in London. By meeting like-minded friends her age, she hoped to be 
counselled and assisted in her practice of Islam and to be invited to talks, lectures, and 
events. In fact, it was precisely for these reasons that she had joined us for dinner that 
evening. 
Muneera and her Somali friends are the daughters of refugee parents who migrated to 
the UK in the last 20-25 years as a consequence of civil strife across the Somali 
regions. Their mothers, now in their 40s-60s, were raised mostly in urban areas in 
post-independent Somalia. Since settling in the UK many have become the single 
carers of large families, and although several are highly educated, they have struggled 
to find employment, or if they have, work in low-skilled, low-paid jobs, and are 
heavily reliant on state-support.2 The second-generation, including Muneera and her 
friends, are in their mid-20s and 30s, and most were born abroad but have been raised 
in the northern and eastern areas of London.3 Unlike their parents, many have 
university degrees from British universities and aspire to improved employment 
opportunities, financial security and independence. They work as teachers, 
community-workers, social workers, nurses, therapists, managers, and other 
occupations. At the time of my fieldwork most were unmarried and continued to live 
with their families, contributing to household expenses, which included sending 
monthly remittances abroad. 
                                                
2 In only 5 of the 21 homes I frequented were one or both parents employed full-time, illustrating the 
difficulties first-generation Somalis face with seeking employment in the UK. Seven of the women in 
the 21 households had completed secondary school or university degrees in Somalia. However, 
language barriers, childcare and domestic responsibilities, and the fact that Somali qualifications are 
not recognised in the UK, have reduced their access to stable employment. 
3 I employ the label second-generation to refer to both young Somali teenagers and women in their 20s-
30s, who were either raised in the UK or arrived when they were very young and have been described 
elsewhere as the one-and-half generation (Portes 1996). 
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This thesis is about young second-generation Somali women in London who, like 
Muneera in recent years, have begun to “focus on the deen”. It explores their 
everyday experiences of practising Islam in a range of contexts across the city. This 
phenomenon has become increasingly common amongst Muslim, Somali youth in 
London in the last few decades, as a consequence of their engagements with global 
Islamic reformist discourses and teachings. My informants frequently announced that 
friends, who had previously no interest in religion, had suddenly turned to 
“practising”. Muneera’s experience was far from exceptional, and similar narratives 
of change, often repetitive in form and content, circulate amongst second-generations 
Somalis. Friends and relatives are often bluntly categorised in two camps: those who 
“practise” and those who don’t. What is particularly striking about these radical shifts, 
is not only that they tend to coincide with a particular stage in these women’s lives, 
but also, as we shall see, that they are markedly different from the religious changes 
experienced by first-generation Somali women.  
This heightened popularity of reformist Islam unfolds in the current social and 
political context of the UK, where discussions and policies addressing minority issues 
have centred on the alleged “problems” of multiculturalism. The phrase 
“multiculturalism is dead” has become ubiquitous in recent years – brandished, 
debated, and contested from a range of actors across the political spectrum and across 
Europe. This retreat from multiculturalism has become rhetorically inseparable from 
the issues of cultural diversity, integration, migration, Islam and national identity. 
Under the shadow of the 1989 Rushdie Affair, and increasingly following the July 
2005 bombings in London, the UK has witnessed a growing anti-Muslim sentiment as 
well as a public rhetoric that has linked Islam with the perceived problems of security, 
integration, and social cohesion. The figure of the burqa-clad Muslim woman has 
come to stand as a visible sign of difference, and as a symbol of Islam’s 
incompatibility with universal liberal values and with British national identity.  
Furthermore, Somalis have also been treated as a socially problematic community in 
London. Frequently, mainstream media and policy associates Somalis with youth 
gangs, crime, unemployment, khat abuse, and Female Genital Mutilation (FGM), 
portraying Somali culture as violent, “backwards”, and oppressive towards women. In 
December 2009, the tabloid newspaper The Sun featured the following headline about 
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a Somali refugee: “We must be rental: Formal asylum seeker lives in luxurious £1.8 
million home fitted out with the latest mod-cons – all paid for by housing benefits”, 
reinforcing the negative construal of Somalis as welfare fraudsters. The state is also 
complicit in this simplistic portrayal of Somalis. Throughout the autumn of 2012, MI5 
advertised a job for Somali Language Analysts. These adverts were published, 
amongst other places, in the East London paper. On a sand-coloured spreadsheet, the 
text of the advert was accompanied by a set of traditional Somali drums. Many of my 
informants were offended by the British government’s aim to recruit “insiders” to 
supposedly “spy” on potential Somali terrorists; to them it promoted the negative 
construal of Somalis as violent Islamist militants. Beyond these possible latent 
motives, they were even more critical and bemused by the visual representations in 
the advert. The use of a set of drums in a recruitment campaign targeting bi-lingual 
second-generation Somalis symbolised a traditional, nomadic, pastoral Somali society 
and culture. For these young women, it revealed the government’s excessive emphasis 
on visible signs of difference, and a stereotypical and un-informed understanding of 
Somali culture, and of the lives of second-generation Somalis in contemporary 
Britain.  
As I demonstrate in the original vignette, young Somali women who turn to “focus on 
the deen”, begin to appropriate and grapple with Islamic discourses, practices, and 
models of self-fashioning, with the aim of applying them to themselves. These 
processes have been investigated in the anthropological literature on Islamic piety, 
which explores the fashioning of religious dispositions, and which has dominated the 
study of Islam in the past decade (Hirschkind 2006; Mahmood 2005). This thesis 
builds on this work by following recent scholarship on Islam in Europe, and focusing 
on how practising Islam in London partly involves drawing on the global, long-
standing discursive tradition of Islam (Amir-Moazami & Salvatore 2003; Fadil 2008; 
Jacobsen 2011b).4  
However, this ethnography argues that the piety literature portrays a coherent, 
bounded, and unilinear course of self-fashioning that fails to fully account for the 
                                                
4 Following Asad (1986: 14) I treat Islam as a discursive tradition: “a tradition of Muslim discourse 
that addresses itself to conceptions of the Islamic past and future, with reference to a particular Islamic 
practice in the present”.  
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experiences of young practising Somali women in London. As in Muneera’s case, 
there are more factors involved than a simple embracing of Islamic teachings and 
discursive traditions: the context within which the narrative unfolds, the broader 
socio-political climate, her changing relationship with family and friends, her 
struggles at work, and so on. In short, my work suggests that Muslim women’s pious 
pursuits cannot be explained solely through Islamic discursive models of self-
fashioning. It therefore diverges from this literature in several, interconnected ways.  
First, I stress the importance of attending to the contextual specificities and historical 
contingencies of these young women’s practice of Islam. I point to the importance of 
multiple discourses and practices that impact on these young women’s practice of 
Islam in the British context (section 1.4). Young second-generation women’s 
experiences draw on discursive fields that emerge out of the following intersecting 
historical trajectories: the global Islamic revival (section 1.2), recent shifts in policies 
and practices around multiculturalism in the UK (Appendix B) and the last 60 years 
of Somali history spanning from post-independence to the present day diaspora in 
London (Appendix A). Whilst these broader historical circumstances provide the 
socio-historical backdrop of this thesis, I have placed them in the appendices in order 
to prioritise the individual narratives of my research informants, which bring to light 
their own experiences of this historical change. 
Second, in contrast to the piety literature, this ethnography does not focus solely on 
discourse or on forms of argumentation and reasoning. Instead, it prioritises the 
embodied, and affective experiences of piety in a range of contexts, both within, and 
beyond, the mosques or other Islamic places of learning. It captures the multifaceted 
texture of these women’s everyday lives, to reveal the fragmented, unstable, and 
frequently incoherent nature of practising Islam (section 1.5). 
Finally, this thesis builds on these two considerations, in order to approach young 
women’s everyday experiences of piety from a different theoretical angle – one that 
accounts for broader processes of social and ethical change. By extending Foucault’s 
work on ethics, it engages with the concepts of the ethical imagination, 
problematization, and hope (Foucault 2000; Moore 2011). These theoretical tools 
inform an analysis of the forms, and means, through which young Somali women 
imagine novel relations to themselves and to others, through their practice of Islam. 
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They provide a different way of observing the historically specific dynamics of 
ethical change experienced by these women as they turn to practise Islam, accounting 
for what drives these shifts and how they unfold in the contemporary moment in the 
UK (sections 1.6 & 1.7). Ultimately, this theoretical lens will offer a more 
comprehensive and complex understanding of practising women’s subjectivities, 
moving beyond the implementation of models of piety, to enrich the anthropological 
literature on Islam.  
My work will also critically intervene within the current academic and political 
debates around multiculturalism, and religious and cultural change.5 It does not treat 
multiculturalism, culture, or religion as descriptive terms, or as theoretical or 
analytical entities or concepts (Modood 2007; 2010; Parekh 2000; Taylor 1994).6 I am 
not concerned with issues of diversity, integration or assimilation, or with providing 
answers to the questions that have emerged in debates around the demise of 
multiculturalism (Vertovec & Wessendorf 2010; Meer & Modood 2009; Joppke 
2004). Rather, following the work of Bracke and Fadil (2012: 40), who draw on 
Foucault, I analyse the “multiculturalism debates” as creating “distinctive fields of 
problematization” – areas of knowledge that have come to pose a problem for 
contemporary politics. 7 I trace a series of rhetorical and policy shifts around the 
retreat of multiculturalism (see appendix B) to unravel the ways ni which these 
debates have politically charged questions of what constitutes Somali culture, and 
what it means to be Muslim and British. The latter have become “problematized”; 
they have emerged as objects of thought that invite reflection and elaboration.  
                                                
5 Equally the thesis departs from the literature on the Somali Diaspora on cultural and religious change 
and diversity (see section 2.2). 
6 Modood (2007; 2010) is arguably one of the most vocal advocates of multiculturalism in the UK. His 
approach is both descriptive and prescriptive, as he argues for current policies to embrace a 
“multicultural citizenship”, which recognises individual rights, but is evolutionary and multi-faceted, 
and recognises and incorporates the views of different kinds of groups based, for example, on race, 
colour, and religion. 
7 Fadil and Bracke (2012) explore some of the “discursive contours” of European “multiculturalism 
debates” that have problematized the multicultural society by weaving together migration, integration, 
cultural identity, Islam, and secularism. They argue that debates about cultural difference ineluctably 
implicate discussions about nationalism and national identity. 
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I further address the particular forms of solutions articulated by a range of actors, 
including politicians, academics or public commentators to these “problems” 
concerning multiculturalism. Throughout I prioritise the solutions offered by young, 
practising, Somali women who similarly intervene within these areas of 
problematization. Whilst their solutions are shaped by these debates, they also rework 
the elements of these problematizations. Their ethical imaginations develop the 
conditions in which various responses to the “problems” of multiculturalism, culture, 
and Islam, can find form (Moore 2011: 21). 
To these ends, I conducted ethnographic fieldwork amongst 21 Somali households in 
London between September 2009 and January 2011, and then sporadically throughout 
the writing-up phase of this dissertation (see section 1.8).8 These households were 
based in the boroughs of Camden, Tower Hamlets and Newham (Map 1) and included 
Somalis from different clans, places of origin, and socio-economic backgrounds.9 
Within these households, my focus was primarily on young second-generation women 
and their mothers, the majority of whom were practising. In contrast to much of the 
literature on the Somali diaspora that tends to focus around interviews, or is based in 
specific spaces such as community organisations, mosques, and schools (McGown 
1999; Griffiths 2002; Hopkins 2010), I followed individual women’s trajectories 
across – and occasionally beyond – London. This approach enabled me to delve into 
the everyday fabric of these young women’s lives and to gain a textured 
understanding of both generations’ ideas of ethical self-fashioning in relation to kin, 
friends, or non-Muslims, and in a range of different contexts such as mosques, cafés 
and restaurants, homes, cars, and public transport. I conducted participant observation 
with both generations of Somali women, but also carried out narrative interviews on 
everyday life experiences and life-history interviews with 18 first-generation Somali 
women10 who originate mainly, but not exclusively, from urban areas of the Somali 
                                                
8 There are an estimated 70,000 Somalis residing in London (Hopkins 2006: 366). See Appendix A for 
a historical account of Somali migration to the UK. 
9 The clan-based system that traditionally structures Somali society has also determined patterns of 
migration and settlement in London. Whilst earlier migrants from present day Somaliland settled in 
Tower Hamlets and Newham, new migrants, predominantly from southern Somalia, have settled in 
other areas of north, south, and west London, including Camden (Griffiths 2000: 287).  
10 This includes some of the older women from the 21 households. 
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regions (Map 2).11 I also interviewed non-practising Somali women and non-Somali 
practising women.  
In the remainder of the introduction I situate the current Islamic reform within its 
historical context, and then proceed to review and critically appraise the 
anthropological literature on piety. I focus particularly on Mahmood’s (2005) 
ethnographic monograph, which has become a key reference point for anthropological 
discussions on Islam, piety and subjectivity. In subsequent sections I engage with the 
broader anthropological literature on Islam to elaborate on the limitations of the piety 
literature and explore the debates arising from this work. In sections 1.6 and 1.7 I 
outline the theoretical concepts – ethical imagination, problematization and hope – 
that will be used to frame this ethnography. I conclude with a reflection on my 
fieldwork. 
Map 1: London Boroughs 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This content has been removed for reasons of copyright. 
 
                                                
11 Although some of these women were not necessarily born in urban environments they moved to 
Mogadishu or to other large cities including Hargeysa, Burco, Berbera, Erigavo, and Galkayo for 
education or employment purposes or with their spouse following marriage. This urban-bias in my data 
may be due to the fact that urban Somalis were the first to seek asylum abroad thanks to superior 
financial resources (Lindley 2010: 117). It was easier for me to converse with these more established 
Somali women, given their superior English skills. 
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Map 2: The Somali Regions 
 
(Balthasar & Grzybowski 2012: 148).12  
 
                                                
12 The map excludes the Somali areas of the Ogaden and northeastern Kenya.  
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SETTING THE STAGE: SMALL ARMS AND (IN)SECURITY IN SOMALILAND
In contrast to conflict-ridden south-central Somalia, the northern breakaway Republic of Somaliland is often consid-
ered ‘an island of relative peace’ (Mengisteab, 2009, p. 189) with ‘one of the most stable polities in the Horn’ 
(Bradbury, 2008, p. 1).1 Nevertheless, Somaliland’s history has been far from peaceful. The Somaliland state has its 
roots in a decade-long civil war between the Somali National Movement (SNM) and the regime of Gen. Mohamed 
Siad Barre. And even in the years following its declaration of independence, Somaliland suffered several bouts of 
violent conflict.
Following the defeat of Somalia’s armed forces in the 1977–78 Ogaden war with Ethiopia, Somalia’s military regime 
became increasingly repressive, leading to the formation of several resistance groups. The SNM, which was among 
the first armed opposition movements of the early 1980s (see Box 5.1), grew to become a principal challenger to 
Barre’s rule. Towards the end of the decade the guerrilla organization became a mass movement engaged in a fierce 
civil war with the Somali National Army (SNA). The civil war not only contributed to the removal of the military dicta-
torship, but also informed the establishment of the Somaliland state, its institutions and identity.2
An alliance of clan-based militias, which included the SNM, Somali Salvation Democratic Front, and United Somali 
Congress, overthrew Barre in January 1991. Four months later, north-western Somalia unilaterally declared independence 
as the sovereign Republic of Somaliland. In subsequent years, the territory saw numerous rounds of violent conflict 
between competing political factions largely 
mobilized along (sub-)clan lines. Yet since the 
late 1990s Somaliland has followed a trajec-
tory that has diverged sharply from that 
observed in other parts of the former Somali 
Republic. Not only has it progressively man-
aged to put major violent conflict behind it, but 
Somali land has also built a central administra-
tion, including a nascent security apparatus. 
Awash in arms
With the declaration of independence, the 
SNM transferred its powers to a two-year 
transitional government under the leadership 
of Abdirahman Ahmed Ali ‘Tuur’ (‘hunch-
back’). Initially, the government’s authority 
hardly reached beyond the capital of Hargeisa 
(Gilkes, 1993; Spears, 2010, p. 155); as a 
result, kinship-based militias and deydey 
groups3 mushroomed. Although they pro-
vided security to their own communities, 
they frequently demanded safe passage fees 
at provisional roadblocks, contributing to 
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1.2 Islamic Reform  
The current global Islamic reform movement originates in the 1970s in the Middle 
East and is part of a longer tradition of renewal (tajdid) and reform (islah) of Islamic 
faith and practice (Voll 1983). Following Osella and Osella (2008a: 1-2) reformism 
will be employed broadly in this thesis, to refer to a wide variety of traditions and 
“projects whose specific focus is the bringing into line of religious beliefs and 
practices with the core foundations of Islam, by avoiding and purging out innovation, 
accretion and the intrusion of ‘local custom’”. Universalist in its orientation, as we 
shall see, it is simultaneously embedded in local social, political and historical 
contexts (ibid 2008a: 7; 2008b). I therefore position the ethical changes experienced 
by both generations of Somali women in London within this global movement, and 
within an Islamic discursive tradition that has been constantly subjected to internal 
interventions since its inception (Amir-Moazami & Salvatore 2003: 55; Asad 1986). 
As Amir-Moazami and Salvatore (2003) demonstrate, this conceptualisation avoids 
depicting changes amongst Muslims in Europe as solely a consequence of migration 
to the West, or the result of an encounter with secular, Western societies (see section 
2.2). 
The resurgence that swept the Muslim world from the 1970s to the present day 
developed in opposition to Islamic modernism and in response to the crises of modern 
post-independent nation-states, neo-colonialism, and the disintegration of Islam as an 
integral part of society (Abu- Rabi‘1996: 262). The movements were led by religious 
or lay leaders who gathered mass support and were opposed to the traditional ulama 
and state intelligentsia. Drawing on themes originally expounded throughout the 19th 
century, this movement was intensified by mass education and electronic media, 
which have since generated competing movements, groups, and individuals (Amir-
Moazami & Salvatore 2003: 56; Eickelman & Piscatori 1996).13 
                                                
13 Reformers including public intellectuals, educators and government advisors throughout urban areas 
of the Ottoman Empire applied traditional forms of reasoning to public activities with the aim of 
articulating a public discourse of a distinctive Muslim moral being (Amir-Moazami & Salvatore 2003: 
56-57). 
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The contemporary resurgence, influenced by this renewalist tradition, nevertheless 
responded to new opportunities for reform that arose out of contemporary society. At 
least in some of its aspects it utilises “tones and symbols that have deep roots within 
Islamic traditions” (Voll 1983: 43). As Amir-Moazami and Salvatore (2003) point 
out, 20th century movements share two similarities with previous Muslim reformers. 
First, even though they were inspired by a variety of sources, they have maintained “a 
sense of belonging to a tradition”. Second, they embarked on a critique of local 
customs, “situated mostly in the politics of authenticity, and the call for a 
revivification of the sacred core texts” (ibid 2003: 57).  
Across the Muslim world the revival has been primarily a phenomenon of the young, 
urban, educated, middle-classes (Huq 2010; Osella & Osella 2008b; Brenner 1996). 
Its success amongst these classes has been a result of its ability to embrace a 
modernising, rationalising impulse, by supporting socio-religious reform and 
education (Osella & Osella 2008b), and thus combining “material and spiritual 
progress” (Deeb 2006: 5). Across urban areas in the Somali regions, revivalist 
movements had already begun to spread throughout the 1980s impacting on the lives 
of some of the first-generation Somali women (see Appendix A). They manifested 
themselves through the growth of political groups, Islamic welfare organisations, and 
groups aiming to deliver Islamic knowledge or da’wa, and more generally a growing 
sense of religious ethos, or piety (taqwa) in everyday life.  
In Europe, the literature has emphasised the involvement of predominantly second-
generation migrants, whose search for an authentic, universal Islam has also entailed a 
critique of the “backwards” cultural attitudes and practices of the older generations 
(Roy 2004; Schmidt 2002; Jacobson 1998).14 As elsewhere, this new religiosity has 
been manifest in the growth of institutions of learning, and spaces of worship 
(Metcalf 1996). It has given rise to a recent surge in “public piety” (Deeb 2006) with 
the adoption of embodied practices and rituals – most notably the donning of the hijab 
and the implementation of prayer – as well as the embracing of new ethical 
sensibilities (Dwyer 1999; 2000). Young Muslims are increasingly engaging with 
                                                
14 As we shall see, these generational divides are far from clear-cut, and reformist discourses have also 
been appropriated in different ways by first-generation Somali women (Chapters 2 & 5). 
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scholarly Islamic texts and modes of reasoning that were previously reserved for 
those trained at traditional religious institutions (Hirschkind 2006). This new form of 
religiosity is characterised by a “heightened self-consciousness” of textual knowledge 
(Eickelman & Piscatori 1996: 39), but with the aim of applying it to the self in order 
to cultivate a pious disposition. Emphasis is placed on organising one’s everyday life 
in accordance with Islamic standards of virtuous conduct. 
1.3 Pious self-formation 
Whilst much of the earlier sociological and anthropological work on the revival 
focused on identity politics and identity formation (Roy 2004; Haenni 2002; Dwyer 
1999), more recent scholarship has explored the formation of embodied forms of 
piety, and the acquisition of Islamic knowledge for the formation of religious 
dispositions and sensibilities (Henkel 2007; Deeb 2006; Hirschkind 2006; Mahmood 
2005). It is this latter perspective to which I now turn in order to elaborate on the 
inner logic of the Islamic tradition, as well as the historically specific forms of 
subjectivity which my own informants draw upon in their quests to practise Islam.  
The work of Saba Mahmood (2001; 2005), in particular her monograph The Politics 
of Piety, is exemplary of this shift. Since its publication, it has been a catalyst for 
much of the subsequent discussions on the Muslim subject in anthropology (Jones 
2010; Haniffa 2008; Pandolfo 2007; Deeb 2006) and for recent work on Muslim 
women in Europe and processes of ethical self-fashioning on which this thesis draws 
(Jacobsen 2011a; 2011b; Fadil 2008; 2009; Jouili 2008; 2009; Jouili & Amir-
Moazami 2006). Mahmood’s ethnographic monograph marked an important shift in 
the literature on the Islamic revival. It moved away from a focus on Islamic practices 
as signifying practices and markers of identity, to an analysis of embodied religious 
practices as disciplines centred on realising Islamic virtues and fashioning a pious self 
by transforming one’s everyday life and one’s relationship to God.  
Mahmood’s ethnography (2005) is based around the women’s piety movement, 
da’wa, which is part of the Islamic Revival in Cairo and offers an alternative to 
secular modernity. Her analysis focuses on the argumentations, reasoning, dilemmas, 
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and struggles of her female informants, when implementing a virtuous self in Egypt.15 
The aims of her book are twofold: first, to unravel the conceptions of self, moral 
agency, and politics that underpin the practices of the piety movement; and second, to 
rethink the assumptions at the heart of a secular-liberalism of which feminism is a 
part. Detaching the concept of agency from the progressive politics of feminism, she 
argues, that the desire for freedom and for an autonomous will is not innate and 
universally applicable. This latter argument must be seen in light of feminist 
poststructuralist critiques of a transcendental subject and the on-going discussion of 
the incorporation of contextual and historical particularities into an understanding of 
the agentive subject (McNay 1992; Moore 1988). 
The conundrum around which Mahmood frames her study is the apparent 
inconsistency as to why educated women would want to participate in Islamist 
movements, when the latter require their submission to patriarchal norms. Why would 
women submit to feminine virtues of shyness, modesty, and humility? Or, in relation 
to this thesis, how do we understand young second-generation Somali women’s desire 
to submit to God and to Islamic structures of authority? The problem with these 
questions, Mahmood argues, is that they rely on a concept of agency that assumes a 
refusal to submit and an innate desire for freedom.  
Through an analysis of the Islamic virtue of modesty (al-haya), Mahmood criticises 
two prevalent forms of feminist theory: the first seeks to expose the negative 
valuations of modesty and recuperate submerged representations of the feminine 
body, and the second denies any possibility of recuperating the voices of the subaltern 
(Mahmood 2005: 158-160). Instead she asserts the need to explore the logic of the 
discourse of piety and, influenced by Asad (1993; 2003), to investigate the concepts 
and practices by which it is constituted. The idea that women should desire to oppose 
patriarchal norms lies at the heart of a liberal feminist concept of agency that relies on 
the binary of docility versus emancipation or submission versus subversion. 
Mahmood does not deny that patriarchal norms govern the piety movement, but she 
                                                
15 Although Mahmood’s interlocutors are not engaged in formal political movements and their 
practices may appear to be apolitical due their sole concern with self-discipline and self-fashioning, 
Mahmood argues that the movement is political in that it seeks to realise and transform aspects of 
social life. 
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maintains that an analysis which focuses on submission versus emancipation would 
be misplaced, precisely because this is not a motivating factor or a desire for her 
informants. Rather, she points to an analysis of the different modalities of agency, and 
the different grammars or concepts from which particular affects and sensibilities 
derive. In doing so, she adopts a Foucaultian understanding of the self, which also 
informs this thesis: a self which does not exist a priori but comes into existence 
through power relations, by relating to particular norms and structures. 
One of Mahmood’s important contributions is her juxtaposition of feminist theories, 
which understand agency as occurring through processes of reiteration and 
resignification (e.g. Butler 1997), with her own informants’ techniques of self-
formation. The women from the piety movement do not fashion themselves through 
the notions of subversion, change, and disruption. Mahmood pays attention to how 
norms are lived and inhabited, not on how they are enacted and subverted: to the 
multiple ways in which women relate to particular norms. For the participants of the 
piety movement, the body is not a sign, but serves as a means through which they 
realise their pious dispositions. For example, the performance of modesty should not 
be understood as a significatory practice, but as the means through which a pious self 
is fashioned, as well as the ultimate endpoint of this ethical work. 
 “Transgressing gender norms may not be a matter of transforming 
‘consciousness’ or effecting change in the significatory system of gender 
but might well require the retraining of sensibilities, affect, desire, and 
sentiments – those registers of corporeality that often escape the logic of 
representation and symbolic articulation” (Mahmood 2005: 188).  
Ultimately, Mahmood’s separation of the concept of agency from progressive politics 
is a necessary step for understanding religious sensibilities outside of a secular liberal 
framework. 16  It enables her to understand pious women’s desire to submit to 
patriarchal structures, to God, and to structures of authority. It presents a different 
                                                
16 This is particularly pressing, Bangstad (2011) argues, at a time when Western politicians and public 
intellectuals have appropriated the language of feminism to portray Muslim men and women as the 
embodiments of non-Western norms and values. These representations have often been employed as 
justifications for the brutalities of military interventions in Islamic countries (see Hirschkind & 
Mahmood 2002). 
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way of relating to the self, which does not necessarily accord with a liberal-secular 
one. 
Mahmood elaborates on these pedagogical processes of ethical self-fashioning and the 
ways they rely on a particular alignment between interior and exterior dimensions of 
the self (emotions, body, reason etc.). For example, she emphasises how prayer 
cultivates ethical dispositions and serves as both a means of inculcating piety and its 
ultimate endpoint. Ritualised behaviour, such as prayer, is an instrument or a practice 
of self-formation. For participants of the mosque movement, learning and training 
oneself to embody the “right attitudes” is central; through prayer one learns to instil 
the virtuous emotion of fear. This requires a reorientation of emotions so that they are 
not only motivating forces but also integral to pious action. Virtuosity lies in an 
ability to spontaneously perform conventional practices in both ritual contexts and 
ordinary life, thereby making an “a priori separation between individual feelings and 
socially prescribed behavior unfeasible” (Mahmood 2001:844). Hence, ritual 
behaviour is enacted through, and is productive of, intentionality. The ultimate aim is 
that these emotions will arise naturally along with the inclination to pray. Bodily 
gestures are therefore essential for achieving piety and also become necessary 
attributes of the self. External practices create inward dispositions and the 
implementation of a moral virtue requires the coordination between external and 
internal dimensions of the self.  
This ethical work also destabilises the liberal assumption that emotions are assumed 
to arise spontaneously from the “true” desires of an individual, and exist in opposition 
to religious conventions. According to Mahmood, the relationship between desires 
and obligatory social conventions, within Islamic piety, cannot be assumed. True 
feelings ought to be cultivated through external behaviour such as prayer but are also 
the endpoint of an ethical self. Ultimately, mimetic reproduction does not subvert, but 
leads to the successful accomplishment of norms. 
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1.3.1 Interlude: Foucault and the ethics of the self17 
Like Mahmood, my own analysis of my informants’ processes of ethical self-making 
is indebted to Foucault’s ethics of the self. Here, I turn to discuss this work first, to 
demonstrate the ways Mahmood draws on it in theorising her informants’ processes 
of self-fashioning. I subsequently show the ways my work similarly builds on 
Foucault’s ethics but departs from Mahmood’s exclusive focus on the Islamic 
discursive tradition, to consider the ways ethical practices are informed by a range of 
intersecting discourses. I elaborate further on my theoretical approach to ethical 
change in section 1.6. 
Anthropological scholarship on ethics and morality has recently moved beyond an 
understanding of ethics as the following of socially sanctioned rules or moral 
imperatives (Zigon 2007; Laidlaw 2002; Faubion 2001). This has partly been the 
result of a recent engagement with Foucault’s work on ethics. In his later work, 
contained mostly in the last two volumes of The History of Sexuality and in numerous 
lectures and interviews, Foucault (1985; 1990) develops the Aristotelian concept of 
positive ethics, which interprets ethics as practical activities that further a particular 
way of life. Thus, for Foucault, studying ethics is not about observing how a subject 
conforms to, or self-consciously reflects on rules, but entails an exploration of how 
human beings shape themselves into ethical subjects. It involves the relation of the 
self to itself, and the creative strategies “that individuals in their freedom can use in 
dealing with each other” (Foucault 2000: 300). In contrast to his earlier work on 
technologies of domination, Foucault shifts his attention to technologies of 
subjectification: practices and techniques through which individuals actively fashion 
themselves. Individuals are conceptualised as agents who are self-determining and 
capable of challenging and resisting structures of domination and power relations 
(Foucault 2000: 299-300).18  
                                                
17 This thesis adopts a Foucaultian understanding of the self. For a review of anthropological 
approaches to the self, subjectivity, and the subject see Moore (2007: Chapter 2) and Ortner (2005). 
18 Foucault theorises autonomy as divorced from self-consciousness and the rational ego. He claims, 
however, that some models of ethics (such as the Classical one which is not based on rules and codes) 
allow more space for autonomy. 
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By undergoing a genealogy of the desiring subject, in his second volume, The Use of 
Pleasure, Foucault (1985) highlights the differences between Christian and Classical 
moralities, which offers an insight into the processes of social change (see section 
1.6). He argues that the differences lie not in the content of moral norms and 
prescriptions but in the ways in which norms are lived, and the kind of relationships 
that one sets up in relation to these norms – the relationship between codes of 
behaviour and forms of subjectification which may vary from era to era (ibid 1985: 
25-32). Foucault identifies four dimensions to ethics. First, the ethical substance 
refers to a part of the self or mode of behaviour upon which the individual works. 
Second, the mode of subjectification refers to the way in which an individual 
establishes her relationship to the rule. Because the subject is formed within the limits 
of a historically specific set of practices, this dimension recognises the ways in which 
power summons a subject to constitute itself in relation to its moral codes. Third, the 
forms of elaboration of ethical work or the techniques of the self refers to the means 
by which a subject works on the ethical substance and changes itself in order to 
become ethical. Finally, the telos of the ethical subject denotes the type of moral 
being to which one aspires. It is through the practices or techniques of the self that 
individuals give meaning to, and interpret, their experiences (ibid 1985: 26-28).  
In her work, Mahmood explores how these four ethical dimensions might apply to her 
informants’ virtuous conduct. By viewing the ethical substance as an outward form of 
religiosity, and divine law as the mode of subjectification, she analyses the specific 
techniques of the self (i.e. prayer) that require the coordination of outer and inner 
parts of the body. Such coordination is practised in order to accomplish the telos as 
the perfect model of piety based on the exemplary behaviour of the Prophet and a 
submission to God (Mahmood 2005: 28-29).  
This concern with how individuals shape themselves into ethical subjects will guide 
my understanding of self-transformation throughout this thesis. On the one hand, as I 
demonstrate throughout, Mahmood’s explication of Islamic pedagogical projects of 
ethical self-fashioning, her exploration of the concepts and assumptions underlying 
the Islamic discursive tradition, and her understanding of the Muslim female subject 
as constituted through the grammars and logics of piety, offers a partial insight into 
my own informants’ understandings of themselves and their relations to others. 
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Throughout this thesis, Somali women’s appropriations of this tradition will be 
evident in the ways they stress the importance of acting with the aim of “pleasing 
God”, submitting to textual and religious authorities, and to Islamic modes of 
reasoning, and training oneself to embody a pious disposition through various 
techniques of self-fashioning.  
On the other hand, my work shows how Mahmood’s model of pious self-fashioning 
does not sufficiently capture the complexities of my informants’ subjectivities. As I 
elaborate in the following sections, the work on piety largely neglects the broader 
socio-economic context in which these projects unfold; it focuses on the coherence of 
a particular discourse and overlooks the lived experiences of piety, as well as the 
ways that it intersects with other models of selfhood. My emphasis, therefore, will be 
on self-transformation, but on the ways both generations of Somali women draw on 
multiple, intersecting discourses, practices, and models to reconfigure the ethical 
substance, the modes of subjectification, or the techniques that constitute their ethical 
projects. In what follows, I elaborate on recent critiques of the piety literature, and 
then expand on how my work builds on these in the final sections of the Introduction. 
1.4 Muslim piety in Europe 
How are these pious projects of ethical self-fashioning enacted in Europe, within a 
heterogeneous, and majority secular public sphere? Mahmood’s work on piety 
presumes that these practices of self-discipline are enacted in an idealised, 
homogenous, and unproblematic Muslim public sphere, away from the conflicts in 
social relations governing heterogeneous public spaces (Jouili 2009: 456).  
Accordingly, Mahmood’s ethnography lacks a coherent account of the wider socio-
economic context within which the discourses and practices she explores circulate. 
The lives of her informants outside of the mosque and their socio-economic 
backgrounds, or other spheres of life within which they are embedded, remain largely 
unseen. Bangstad (2011: 6) notes that by limiting ethnographic work to the mosque 
and ignoring socio-economic status, Mahmood’s work produces a dehistoricised and 
decontextualised study. As Van der Veer (2008: 812) elaborates, “her focus on the 
micro-practices inside the mosque seems to prevent her from looking at the micro-
practices outside the mosque”. Consequentially, she fails to relate religious practices 
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to the social fabric of Cairo or to situate the piety movement within the wider arena of 
Cairene politics.  
Furthermore, the work on piety presents Islamic pursuits as monolithic in Muslims’ 
lives. This captures only one model of selfhood – the pious Muslim subject. 
Accordingly, an enclosed, bounded notion of the moral self, defined by the discourses 
of piety is presented as the only moral discourse available for, and the sole defining 
feature of, her informants’ lives. Both the pious “counterpublic” (Hirschkind 2006) 
and the pious self are juxtaposed with the secular public sphere and with a secular-
liberal model of selfhood respectively. The secular is conceptualised as a hegemonic 
force governing the public sphere, and hence this juxtaposition reifies knowledge and 
power as domination by the West on the non-West (Bangstad 2009: 192). Often, the 
Islamic tradition is employed in these analyses simply to offer an alternative non-
secular, embodied dimension of political subjectivity, in order to highlight secular-
liberal concepts.  
Recent scholarship on piety in Europe, builds on Mahmood’s work to theorise the 
ways in which Islamic projects of self-discipline are enacted and negotiated in 
secular, European contexts (Bracke 2011; Jacobsen 2011b; Jouili 2009; Fadil 2008).19 
Focusing on the experiences of young Muslims in Europe, several authors have 
shown how pious projects of self-discipline are entangled with secular ethics (Bracke 
2011; Fadil 2009; 2011; Jacobsen 2011a; 2011b; Fernando 2010; Jouili 2009; 2011; 
Salih 2009). 
 Jacobsen’s (2011a) analysis of young Muslims in Norway, draws on Foucault’s 
ethics to demonstrate how the “shaping and moulding of subjectivities takes place at 
the intersection of several internally heterogeneous and contested discursive 
traditions” (ibid 2011a: 76). By focusing on freedom, autonomy and choice as modes 
of subjectification, Jacobsen demonstrates how a liberal understanding of freedom is 
intertwined with pious concerns. For example, her informants stress the importance of 
choice in legitimising their religious practices and their obedience to God. The hijab 
is conceived of as a practice shaping the self that is “working for God” but 
                                                
19 In Chapter Five I engage with the scholarship on Islam in Europe that investigates the changing 
nature of Islamic knowledge in Europe (Bowen 2010; Mandaville 2007; Peter 2006; Roy 2004).  
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simultaneously assessed according to an ethic of personal authenticity and autonomy. 
Piety, Jacobsen claims, should not be conceptualised in opposition to a liberal ethic, 
rather analysis should focus on the intersections, convergences, and tensions of 
people’s relationships to these norms of ethical conduct (ibid 2011a: 79). Jouili’s 
(2011) article in the same volume explores the ways in which devout women speak 
about gender norms in terms of both virtue and piety as well as through liberal norms. 
She positions her informants’ discourses amongst a range of interventions within the 
larger discursive field, including current debates on gender and Islam, as well as 
governmental practices. She argues that devout Muslim women “critically intervene” 
and are partially shaped by the secular liberal discursive space (ibid 2011: 49). 
This work contributes to an emerging field of study that builds on Asad’s (2003) work 
on the secular20 in order to explore the idea of a secular or liberal ethics that has its 
own techniques of self-fashioning, modes of subjectification and teleologies. Fadil’s 
work (2009; 2011) seeks to denaturalise some of the practices of non-Orthodox 
Muslims such as eating during Ramadan and unveiling. She suggests these practices 
constitute secular-liberal techniques of self-fashioning, based on liberal modes of 
subjectification of freedom and choice which aim to fashion liberal moral subjects. 
Most of this work relies on the narratives of the women themselves – on the ways 
they talk about themselves and their engagements with Islam. It privileges discourse 
above Muslims’ everyday lived experience of piety. In contrast, Jouili (2009) explores 
the tactics of young Muslims in France and Germany, who are forced to negotiate 
self-disciplinary practices of prayer and donning the hijab. For example by praying in 
university basements Muslims visibly resist restrictions, turning prayer into a signifier 
of defiance. Alternatively, under more restrictive circumstances they may be forced to 
render their practices invisible, for example by praying whilst seated in the library. By 
resignifying these practices, by wearing hats instead of the hijab, for example, Jouili 
suggests these young Muslims subvert the constraints of secular public spaces. 
                                                
20  Asad defines the secular as an epistemic category, secularism as a political doctrine and 
secularization as a historical process. The secular is an innately unstable “concept that brings together 
certain behaviours, knowledges, and sensibilities in modern life” (Asad 2003: 25). It is conceptually 
prior to secularism and, as an enactment of power, defines certain practices of the self and particular 
forms of knowledge and practice. 
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In Chapters Two and Three, I trace, on the one hand, the particularities of recent 
political and public debates on multiculturalism, and Islam in the UK (see also 
Appendix B). I engage with recent scholarship that explores forms of public and 
political reasoning around the visibility of Islam in Europe (Moors 2009; Bowen 
2008). On the other, I explore how my informants, like those of Jacobsen (2011a; 
2011b), Bracke (2011) and Fadil (2008) draw simultaneously on intersecting Islamic, 
secular, and liberal discourses in their practice of Islam. Bringing together these two 
analytical approaches, my analysis reveals how my informants’ processes of ethical 
transformation are partially shaped by these changing discussions around 
multiculturalism, but equally, how these young women critically intervene and 
transform these debates through their everyday practices. 
1.5 Everyday experiences of piety: beyond the mosque 
A further theoretical problem with the work on piety, on which this project builds, is 
its emphasis on the coherence of the discursive tradition of Islam. Schielke (2010b) 
maintains that the piety literature studies Muslims' involvement with religion as an 
outcome of a process of engagement with Islamic ideals. This bias has led to a 
privileging of “pious pursuits”, and a focus on how individuals argue, rather than how 
they live. This has resulted from an anthropological preoccupation with concepts and 
rationalities rather than with people, and a concern with defining what Islam “is” 
(Schielke 2010b: 2). Much of this work has also focused on the discourses of religious 
elites or activists rather than everyday Muslims, thereby producing a distorted picture 
of everyday members of the revival. A series of interrelated problems have arisen as a 
result. 
First, pedagogical processes are depicted as straightforward and coherent. By 
emphasising the ways norms are lived, for example, Mahmood explores what her 
informants say they will do and hence how they all seek to construe themselves as 
pious. 21 The actual experiences of her informants are only used to illustrate their 
                                                
21 In a similar fashion Henkel (2007) investigates piety as a coherent process that leads to the 
acquisition of a pious disposition. He explores the ways in which Turkish Muslims transform 
heterogeneous spaces into Muslim places through their religious practices. His concern with his 
informants’ quests for coherence sidelines the ways in which individuals actually implement and 
experience these projects. 
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work within these dominant pedagogical forms – their efforts in striving to achieve a 
pious disposition. Therefore, little is known about what her informants actually do: 
how they struggle or work to achieve a pious disposition, whether they ultimately 
succeed, and how they negotiate piety with other models of selfhood or other ideals. 
As observed by Cooper (2008: 29), Mahmood’s work functions on an iterative level 
as her informants’ experiences are only conveyed through her narration. Although her 
emphasis is not on subversion, her discussion appears static as she excludes any 
analysis of social change. Her informants appear captured within the disciplining 
dynamics of an Islamic tradition. This homogenous conception of piety, as well as a 
failure to see fragmentation, results in a form of cultural essentialism (Bangstad 2011: 
30). Mahmood’s ethnography falls into the trap of the “illusion of wholeness” (Ewing 
1990) in its understanding of subjectivity as coherent (Schielke 2010a: 26). 
Second, the actual implementation of these pedagogical processes, and the 
experiences and motivations of individuals engaging with them, are not topics of 
interest in the work on piety. Muslims become the function of particular discursive 
traditions, at the expense of the singularities of Muslims’ empirical experiences 
(Bangstad 2011). As piety becomes a function of the Islamic tradition and hence of 
textual authority, individual Muslims function as representatives of these processes. 
In her work, Mahmood (2001: 831-832) does mention a young woman in her 
twenties, who is consistently struggling to wake up for the morning prayer (fajr) and 
interrupts one of the mosque lessons to seek advice on the matter. Her concern is 
addressed by Mona, a woman in her late thirties who, familiar with “an Islamic 
interpretive tradition of moral discipline”, provides a detailed elaboration of the role 
of self-disciplines in cultivating a moral self (ibid 2001: 832). However, Mahmood 
stops short of explaining why the woman is experiencing difficulties, if and how she 
implements Mona’s advice, and whether she ultimately succeeds. Her analytical 
concern with the discourses underlying the pedagogical processes of self-fashioning 
ignores their actual implementation; the reasons underlying these struggles and 
hesitations are side-lined in the process. 
In contrast to Mahmood’s account of piety, my ethnography prioritises the everyday 
experiences of implementing piety in a range of different settings outside the mosque 
and beyond Islamic places of learning. The emphasis is not only on their engagement 
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in the public domain, but also on intimate conversations and practices in a range of 
everyday settings. It additionally draws attention, not solely to discourse, but also to 
the embodied, affective and cognitive dimensions of practising Islam (section 1.7; 
Chapters Five-Six). In doing so, it joins recent anthropological work on Islam that has 
sought to displace the over-determining influence attributed to discourses and 
rationalities of piety, by acknowledging their inextricable ties with other 
contemporary attitudes, practices and discourses. Soares and Osella’s (2010: 11) 
collection of essays suggest replacing an idea of Islamic piety/tradition with “Islam 
mondain” (Islam in the present world) by focusing on the different “ways of being 
Muslim in secularizing societies and spheres”. A concern with ethical self-fashioning 
is only one part of this “new kind of sociality” which is also compatible with both 
producing and participating in modernity and the neoliberal economy (ibid 2010:11). 
“Islam mondain” emphasises lived experiences, and the “complex ways of being 
Muslim in the contemporary world in which Muslims reflect upon being Muslim, 
upon politics, morality, family, consumption, employment, media, entertainment, and 
so forth” (ibid 2010: 12). For example, Osella and Osella (2010) investigate the ways 
in which elite entrepreneurs in Kerala combine their commitments to reformist 
morality, with their involvement in the neoliberal economy, through their support of 
charitable educational initiatives. Other essays in the volume (Marsden 2010; 
Schielke 2010a) similarly emphasise the complexities of their informants’ political, 
economic and religious engagements, and highlight the diversity and contradictory 
nature of Muslims’ everyday lives. Rather than prioritising Islam, this work 
emphasises the actual world in which Muslims live, and avoids reducing analyses of 
Muslims to an Islamic tradition or to the micro-politics of ethical self-fashioning 
(Soares & Osella 2010: 12).  
 Like my own work, Simon (2009) and Schielke (2009; 2010a), both explore the 
actual experiences of implementing Islamic ethics, and account for those individuals 
who may not adhere to a dominant moral selfhood, or who may negotiate pious 
concerns amongst a range of other ideals and models of selfhood. Simon’s (2009) 
work explores individuals’ experiences of prayer in Minangkabau, Indonesia and its 
role in constituting selfhood. In contrast with Mahmood’s discussion of prayer, it 
points to the importance of attending to individuals’ experiences of enacting prayer 
(salat). Different people come to understand salat differently: for some it acts as an 
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arena in which a coherent moral self transcends tensions (as for Mahmood’s 
informants), whilst for others it is a place of struggle with social meaning whereby 
salat refuses a “secure place in discourses of moral selfhood” (ibid 2009: 270). Thus, 
moral selfhood is not a coherent process, but remains a struggle because it is built on 
contradictions, uncertainties, tensions, and anxieties. The practice of salat encourages 
an “embodied engagement” with these tensions (ibid 2009: 271). 
Similarly, Schielke (2009; 2010a) describes the ambivalent or contradictory, and 
sometimes immoral views and experiences of young men in a northern Egyptian 
village. Subjectivity, Schielke argues, must account for ambiguities; whilst people 
may present their trajectory as coherent, they constantly shift between multiple, 
contradictory self-representations, torn between conflicting self-ideals. For his 
informants, romantic love, social respect, good character and self-realisation 
constitute other ethical “teleologies of the subject”, which provide moral and 
normative frameworks for his informants (ibid 2010a: 29-30). Different conceptions 
of the self are present within a single culture, but also within the life of a single 
individual. As a consequence, Schielke maintains, ambivalence ought to be the 
starting point for the study of morality and ethical subjectivity (see also Marsden 
2007b).22 
A focus on my informants’ everyday experiences will emphasise the ways they 
negotiate different teleologies of the subject, and multiple forms and modes of 
subjectification (Chapters Two-Four). This analytical lens will shed light on how 
practising Islam is rarely a straightforward or coherent project, but a fragmentary one 
marked by inconsistencies, contradictions, and doubt (Pelkmans 2013).  
1.6 Ethics, imagination, and problematization 
This section brings to bear the analytical insights of the previous two sections – a 
concern with contextual and historical specificities and an attention to lived 
                                                
22 In his study of all-male sonic gatherings in western Pakistan, Marsden (2007b) argues that focusing 
on the “substrate of embodied dispositions” may ignore the fact that individuals may be involved in a 
multiplicity of gatherings that offer “very different forms of sociality, experience and social aesthetics” 
(2007: 485).  
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experience – on an elaboration of Foucault’s work on ethics (section 1.2.3). The 
following two sections develop the theoretical concepts that will inform my analysis 
of ethical change across this thesis. 
By conceptualising ethics as the ways in which norms are lived, and the relationship 
that the self has to itself (section 1.2.3), I have outlined how my thesis will explore the 
ways in which the four different areas of ethics (ethical substance, modes of 
subjectification, techniques of the self and telos) are reworked by young practising 
women by drawing on both Islamic and secular-liberal discourses (section 1.4). Here, 
I expand this analysis further and, following Moore (2011), I begin with the premise 
that the making of selves always involves establishing new relations vis-à-vis others, 
thus creating new possibilities for understanding oneself and self-other relations. I 
focus on how these different areas of ethics are altered and transformed depending on 
these women’s relations with others, including kin, future husbands, practising 
friends, non-Muslims and God. I suggest we look at the specific forms and 
mechanisms of subjection which are engaged through these relations, and the 
“specific grounds for transformations in subjectivities” (Moore 2011: 74). 
I draw on Moore’s (2011) concept of the ethical imagination, which constitutes the 
means through which individuals imagine relationships to themselves and to others: 
“the way in which technologies of the self, forms of subjectification and imagined 
relations with others lead to novel ways of approaching social transformation” (Moore 
2011:15). Whilst for Foucault, (2000: 117) ethical practice is informed by thought and 
reflection – an ability to stand back from acting and reacting – the ethical imagination 
also includes embodied dispositions, affect, and fantasy as well as processes of 
unknowing (Moore 2011). As Moore elaborates, the relation between self and other is 
relational, imagined, social and affective. It is also historically specific, taking 
particular forms at particular times (Moore 2011: 76). According to Foucault (2000: 
291), ethical practices are proposed, suggested or imposed by a given society, culture 
or social group. They provide points of reference and not absolute limits (Faubion 
2001: 89-90). Accordingly, there is an element that remains undetermined “in its 
active state of possibility” (Moore 2011: 16). 
The ethical imagination, Moore (2011) elaborates, is a site of cultural invention. It 
provides for historical possibilities and offers a way through which to explore social 
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change, as people’s ideas about themselves, ultimately determine the paths they 
follow and pursue. Thus, self-formation is always historically specific and is shaped 
by specific ethical problems that arise at a particular moment in time. Foucault’s 
notion of problematization demonstrates how these ethical transformations are 
enacted, not as a direct result of socio-political change, but as "a set of located and 
embedded responses that take particular forms" (Moore 2011: 84).  
In an interview published posthumously, Foucault (2000) elaborates on the concept of 
problematization as developed in his second volume of The History of Sexuality. He 
suggests problematization is "the development of a domain of acts, practices and 
thoughts that seem to me to pose the problems for politics" (ibid 2000: 114). In his 
book, he elaborates on how sexuality arose as a problem – as a work of thought, and 
an object of knowledge, that required scrutiny, analysis and elaboration. "For a 
domain of action, a behaviour, to enter the field of thought, it is necessary for a 
certain number of factors to have made it uncertain, to have made it lose its 
familiarity, or to have provoked a certain number of difficulties around it” (ibid 2000: 
117). In this genealogy, he traces certain areas of ethical practice that began to be 
problematized with the advent of Christianity (e.g. fidelity, relationships with boys). 
The result of these particular problematizations was that certain sexual behaviours 
came to be seen as a domain of ethical experience. Foucault argues that change 
occurred, not in rules but in the ethical substance and the forms or modes of 
elaboration. For example, fidelity came to be interpreted as an observance of the rule, 
rather than a matter of mastering desires.  
Social, economic, or political processes instigate, but do not determine the various 
different responses, and at times contradictory solutions, that constitute this terrain of 
problematization. In fact, Foucault (2000: 115) is not interested in analysing these 
problems from the point of view of politics. Rather, he scrutinises the positions and 
solutions politics takes on these issues and the reasons it provides. These solutions, he 
argues, develop out of the specific problematization, which defines, but does not limit 
the elements that constitute the different solutions. Problematization develops the 
conditions in which possible solutions can be given: it constitutes “the soil that can 
nourish them all in their diversity and in spite of their contradictions” (ibid 2000: 
118). 
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The notion of problematization sheds light on the mechanics of ethical change. It 
“constitutes the dynamic interface between one discourse and another”, inciting the 
transformation of ethical fields (Faubion 2001: 97). It thus enables us to theorise how 
historical and contextual factors come to bear on processes of self-transformation and 
how they engage the ethical imagination. As I suggested above, recent debates on 
multiculturalism have turned the questions of what constitutes culture, and what it 
means to be Muslim and British, into “problems” or objects of thought. These 
problems are instigated by a range of socio-political factors, but what interests me is 
the way they have emerged as areas of knowledge that have come to pose a problem 
for politics.  
Whilst I focus on some of the solutions to these problems proposed by policy makers, 
media pundits, or public culture, my central focus throughout is on the responses of 
young second-generation Somali women. I pay attention to the ways in which their 
ethical imagination is engaged in these forms of problematizations. As Moore (2011: 
16) demonstrates, in contexts of social change the ethical imagination is brought into 
play by new ideas, ways of being, and people’s own theories of change. My 
informants position themselves within these areas of problematization but also 
contribute their own understandings, and their own solutions to these problematized 
areas. They provide their own imaginations of self and self-other relations, thus 
altering the conditions in which possible responses can emerge and take form.  
I demonstrate how ethical change unfolds as young second-generation women draw 
on a range of intersecting discourses in order to negotiate multiple teleologies, and 
rework the substance of their ethical projects and the mode of subjectification that is 
being problematized in these debates. I inquire into the ways they imagine novel self-
other relations through their changing engagements with culture, religious practice, 
and knowledge, as well as their novel aspirations for marriage and the afterlife. In 
order to trace historical transformations, I examine the continuities and discontinuities 
between these young women’s engagements with these notions and those of first-
generation Somali women. I argue that practising Islam is shaped, but not determined 
by, historical forms of problematization, as these young women bring to these 
problematizations new forms of understanding self and self-other relations.  
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1.7 Time, hope, affect 
People’s imagined ideas about themselves and others always contain a dimension of 
aspiration (Moore 2011: 22). The ethical imagination enables us to theorise how 
individuals perceive and imagine change but also to unravel “the potentialities of the 
relationalities they engage and make possible” (ibid 2011: 22). Hope is created 
through shifts in forms of subjectification, animating the ethical imagination, 
processes of self-fashioning, and resulting forms of agency (ibid 2011: 144). It 
propels us forward and “attach[es] us to the world, to ourselves and to others through 
imagination and fantasy” (ibid 2011: 22). As I demonstrate in what follows, young 
women’s practice of Islam entails shifts in forms of subjectification, which involve 
reorienting the self forward in time. Hope is, thus, crucial in energising these young 
women’s quests for self-transformation.  
Throughout I engage with the recent anthropological literature that has focused on the 
temporal character of hope, by emphasising hope as a form of orientation towards a 
possible future (Miyazaki 2004; 2006; Crapanzano 2003).23 In his ethnography on the 
Suvavou people in Fiji, Miyazaki (2004) develops a framework for approaching 
moments of hope. He shifts attention away from a focus on hope as a subject of study, 
and develops an analytics of hope as a method. According to Miyazaki (2004: 5), 
hope lies in the “radical temporal reorientation of knowledge” for the future. Through 
this perspective, he accounts for his informants’ persistent attempts to seek 
compensation from the state after having been removed from their lands. Miyazaki 
interprets their perseverance as an enduring hope to confirm their self-knowledge and 
truth of who they are. Building on Ernst Bloch’s (1995) concept of the “not yet”, 
Miyazaki approaches hope as an anticipation of fulfilment that requires constant 
repetition, and involves an oscillation between openness and closure. Hope, he insists, 
                                                
23 Hope as a category has emerged amongst social theorists as an alternative framework for critical 
thought, brought about by a sense of lost hope in progressive politics (Zournazi 2003). For other 
anthropological work on hope see Hage (2003) and Zigon (2009). 
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should not be seen in terms of its own endpoint, but as the maintenance of a 
prospective perspective.24  
In what follows, I similarly approach hope as a force that animates my informants’ 
engagements with new forms of knowledge and thus reorients their relations to 
themselves and to others in time. However, building on Miyazaki’s work, I also draw 
attention to the experiential dimensions of these young women’s temporal 
reorientations – the ways this prospective orientation entails an affective experience 
of potentiality, intensity, euphoria, and excitement (Navaro-Yashin 2009; Stewart 
2007). For example, in the following chapters I consider my informants’ experiences 
as they reconfigure their relations to God, through their engagements with Islamic 
knowledge. I also point to the ways in which these experiences of intensity and 
potentiality are registered, interpreted, and described through the idiom of “high 
iman”, or simply “iman”. Although iman literally means a firm belief that arises out 
of knowledge and conviction, my informants employ the term in everyday usage to 
refer to an affective experience of excitement and euphoria that results from 
imagining new connections with others.  
This experiential dimension of hope is drawn from Islamic discursive models of 
emotions and affect, but cannot be reduced to it. Mahmood (2005) for example, offers 
a theory of hope as emotion grounded in the Islamic discursive tradition. Hope (al-
raja), fear (al-khauf) and love (al-hubb), she argues, are emotions that her informants 
seek to cultivate so that they may arise naturally within the self. Her purpose is to 
demonstrate how emotions should not be assumed to arise spontaneously but may be 
cultivated as both modalities and motives for pious action (ibid 2005: 140). Hope is 
conceptualised as an emotion, constitutive of a pedagogical project. Similarly, 
Hirschkind (2006) – on whose work I elaborate in Chapters Five and Six – argues that 
the practice of listening to cassette sermons amongst members of the Islamic revival 
involves the honing of affective-volitional dispositions and orientations that form part 
of the visceral background that informs ethical action. For example, listening can 
involve the process of inshirah, the “opening the heart” in order to achieve closeness 
                                                
24 Miyazaki (2006) also investigates the ways in which hope works as a reorientation of knowledge 
towards the future, in the life of a Japanese security trader.  
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to God, which is both indispensible to action and serves to motivate action by 
reforming and attuning the heart and making it more receptive to God. 
These pedagogical conventions inform my informants’ thinking; hope, love, and fear 
are emotions which they work to cultivate as modalities and motives for action 
(Chapters Five and Six). Furthermore, these young women draw on the Islamic 
discursive tradition as they capture and represent their affective experiences. 
However, by drawing on Miyazaki’s (2004) analytical framework, I argue that both 
Mahmood and Hirschkind depict a static model of emotions, which cannot fully 
apprehend the character of a hopeful moment (Miyazaki 2004: 22). In contrast, I draw 
attention to hope as a prospective orientation – a means of engaging with the world –
that is generated as young practising women appropriate new forms of knowledge. 
Although my informants may describe their affective experiences through the terms 
derived from these Islamic models of piety, these experiences are never fully captured 
by them (see Chapter Five, section 5.5). My analysis reveals a discrepancy between 
representations of affect and the ways in which it is experienced. Accordingly, my 
understanding of hope differs from that employed by Mahmood and Hirschkind. It 
involves an affective experience that is generated through temporal shifts in 
subjectification, as my informants imagine new relations to self and others, and is 
only partly captured through the language derived from Islamic teachings. I elaborate 
further on these themes in Chapters Five and Six. 
1.8 Reflections on fieldwork  
Gaining access to the field in an urban setting is a frustrating process. Urban lifestyles 
rarely lend themselves to dedicating long periods of time to a “researcher”. In my case 
this was compounded by the fact that I had planned to conduct much of my research 
in domestic settings, hoping to be able to follow the trajectories of individual women 
across London. First-generation women, in particular were initially sceptical and 
reluctant to participate. They worried this was yet another one of the many policy-
based research projects targeted at Somali women, which they felt rarely translated 
into visible improvements in their lives. Furthermore, many women lead busy lives 
between work, childcare, and domestic responsibilities. This undoubtedly played a 
part in their initial reluctance to participate, questioning the extent to which my 
research would bring them any direct benefits.  
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My research focused mainly on female members of 21 Somali households in London. 
This was both a deliberate choice, but also one dictated by the difficulties of gaining 
access to the everyday lives of men. Pious women tend to respect purdah (gender 
separation) whenever possible. Some men did feature in my research, as the fathers, 
husbands, and brothers of my informants, and I did conduct some interviews with 
young Somali men. However, most husbands and older brothers were absent from the 
houses I frequented, often because they worked or socialised outside the home, or 
because they lived elsewhere. Thirteen of the twenty-one homes I frequented 
throughout my research were female-headed, either because the couple had divorced, 
or the husband had moved back to Somali-speaking territories or in some cases had 
passed away. As typical of many other Somali households in London, most of the 
ones I frequented were relatively large compared to British standards, with an average 
of five children per home. The majority of women, in addition to looking after their 
families in the UK, sent remittances home on a monthly basis. 
I initially contacted several Somali organisations in Kilburn, Camden, and Tower 
Hamlets. I explained that I was conducting research on generational and religious 
change and the organisers allowed me to volunteer in the organisations, introducing 
me as a student-researcher. I began voluntarily teaching English at supplementary 
classes for Somali teenagers, teaching ESOL (English as a second language) lessons 
for adults and volunteering at youth clubs in Camden, Tower Hamlets and Newham. I 
took part in as many activities organised by these organisations as I could, including 
women’s dance classes (buranbuur), meetings, and celebrations (see Figures 1, 3 & 
4). I supported a Somali woman with her campaign to become a local councillor, and 
I was involved in a local campaign against FGM. For a year I conducted interviews, 
and wrote and edited articles for Somali Eye, an English magazine based in Tower 
Hamlets that catered for a diaspora readership. During and after fieldwork I 
volunteered on a weekly basis with Kayd: Somali Arts and Culture, an organisation 
that coordinates regular artistic and cultural events in London and in the Horn of 
Africa, including the annual Somali Week Festival in Bethnal Green London, and the 
Hargeysa International Book Fair (see Figure 4).  
The initial months of my fieldwork were by far the most challenging. I was living 
with my sister in Battersea, in South-West London, as I was still working out where I 
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should move for access purposes. The benefit of this experience was that I came to 
know the London tube and maps almost by heart, but the long commutes from 
Battersea to East London were exhausting. My evenings were spent frenetically 
writing field notes in my diary on tube journeys home, and I soon felt that the sheer 
distances – sometimes travelling for two hours to get home from an event – were 
demotivating and hampering my research. Living so far from my informants’ places 
of residence significantly limited my opportunities to interact with individuals on a 
daily basis. However, after several months I found a house in Hackney in North-East 
London, which allowed ease of access to the boroughs of Tower Hamlets, Newham 
and Camden, where the majority of my research took place (Map 1). 
After having moved to Hackney, I almost immediately noticed that I was developing 
greater rapport with both the students and the organisers of these Somali-run 
organisations. Nevertheless, it was often difficult to ask questions in these settings, 
and I therefore began to organise interviews with older Somali women. I conducted 
both narrative interviews on their experiences of everyday life in the UK and “back 
home” throughout the post-independence period, as well as life-history interviews. In 
total I conducted interviews with 18 first-generation Somali women (including 
women from the 21 households), who had migrated to the UK in the last 20-25 years 
from both urban and rural areas across Somali speaking territories. Some of the 
women were happy for me to interview them several times and this enabled me to ask 
follow up questions or explore themes in greater depth. Unless the women were 
comfortable with the idea, I rarely recorded these sessions, and the interview always 
took place in their homes. As Somali hospitality dictates, I was almost always offered 
food and tea following the interview, and my vegetarianism had to be temporarily 
shelved for fear of insulting my hosts, whose meals were mostly meat-based. 
Conversations during interviews were often informal, and although I had prepared a 
list of topics I usually allowed the conversation to flow naturally, occasionally 
bringing it back to my list of themes. Initially I began with life histories, which 
generally required minimal prompting. The women were more than happy to speak at 
length about their lives, recounting minute details of their pasts, and reflecting 
nostalgically about their youth and the beauty of Somalia, while also expressing deep 
sadness about the present situation there. I was often shown photographs and 
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pamphlets, or introduced to poetry recitation or music from the 1970s-80s. My 
interview topics also touched on themes regarding their everyday lives in London, 
their religious education, and particularly some of the personal, religious, and familial 
changes experienced since living in the UK. In addition, I produced 21 kinship 
diagrams of families I frequented throughout my research, collecting biographical 
information of extended kin, and marriage patterns.25 
Several months into my fieldwork I was asked by some of the women I met at the 
community centres in Camden and Tower Hamlets whether I could teach them, and 
their children, English in their homes. We agreed that I would teach voluntarily and I 
began spending my afternoons in their homes, teaching, eating, and conversing with 
the children and watching evening TV. At that stage I was frequenting six households 
on a weekly basis and through these contacts I was introduced to other women who 
were happy to be interviewed or visited on an informal basis. Although these visits 
enabled me to gain an insight into Somali familial life it was often difficult to 
converse with the older women. As mentioned, most of the homes were female-
headed, or the husband was rarely in the home during the day. A typical day involved 
a mother juggling chores such as cooking, cleaning, and collecting children, whilst 
also entertaining a steady stream of family members informally passing by, as well as 
numerous phone call to and from friends and relatives. Rarely did the women have 
time to sit down and converse with me. On occasions when we organised meetings for 
informal conversations or interviews, my informants would often cancel with very 
little notice, or ignore my phone calls to them when the time came. This was an even 
greater problem when I had lived in Battersea, and had travelled across the city for 
one interview!  
I quickly began to feel like I was constantly nagging and relying on other peoples’ 
generosity for interviews and access, something which was not helped by my very 
limited understanding of Somali: some of the older women had little English, and I 
was relying on others for translation. Despite these difficulties, I did manage to 
develop very close friendships with three first-generation Somali women who had 
lived in Mogadishu until the 1990s. Their stories feature most prominently in Chapter 
                                                
25 These kinship diagrams will inform my analysis of marriage practices in Chapter Four. 
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Two. I began by teaching them English and accompanied them to Quran lessons, but 
soon we developed a more intimate relationship, and I often went with them to 
weddings, friends’ houses, and other social occasions. I spent many afternoons sitting 
in their living rooms, conversing, eating, and drinking Somali tea. They also 
introduced me to their extended network of kin and friends in the local area. 
One of the most significant events in my fieldwork was the day I met a young woman 
in her mid-20s, whom I shall call Layla. We met by chance at a Somali event and it 
was Layla who introduced me to many other young practising Somali women in their 
mid 20s-30s. At that point I had mostly frequented older women, teenagers, and some 
young non-practising women who worked at the community centres where I 
volunteered on a weekly basis. It was through Layla and her friends that I began to 
learn more about young women’s understandings and experiences of practising Islam. 
From the start she showed a willingness to answer my questions patiently, but also 
demonstrated an interest in my life. Soon, accompanied by Layla, I began frequenting 
Islamic lectures, classes, informal Islamic circles (halaqa) as well as weddings, 
parties, and dinner outings. I spent much of my time in their family homes, as the 
majority were unmarried at the time of my fieldwork and lived with their families. I 
also accompanied these young women on a range of activities across and beyond 
London, including to a Sufi Festival in Sötenich Germany, a fundraising hike in 
Scotland, and a trip to the Ihsan mosque in Norwich, and several weekends away in 
Liverpool and South Wales. 
Throughout my fieldwork, different people, depending on the interactions, positioned 
me differently in relation to them. For many of the older first-generation women I was 
very much an outsider: I was a white, young, non-Muslim and unmarried woman, and 
had little or no understanding of the Somali language. The fact that I was Italian did, 
however, facilitate some of my interactions. Several women who had been raised in 
Mogadishu spoke Italian and they enjoyed sharing some of the same vocabulary 
(pasto, lasagne) or commenting on similarities between our two cultures, in contrast 
to the British whom they considered individualistic, cold, and distant. Often, my 
informants would comment on the inhospitable attitude of their English neighbours, 
who rarely greeted them in passing and showed no interest in welcoming them into 
the neighbourhood. Furthermore, their interactions with non-Somalis were few and 
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far between, particularly if they were not in employment. The fact that I was not 
British meant the older women felt free to express quite openly the racism and social 
barriers they had encountered in British society.  
Unlike my experience with the older Somali women, many of the Islamic spaces that I 
frequented with my younger practising informants were hugely diverse and included 
Muslims from across the world, as well as many white-British converts. As a non-
Muslim I was still positioned as an outsider despite sharing age, gender, and a similar 
level of education with many of the women. Although I tried to avoid answering 
questions about my faith as much as possible, attending Islamic classes and events 
meant that I was constantly questioned about my beliefs, my motivations for being 
there, and whether I would ever convert. Sometimes my outsider role proved 
incredibly valuable to my research; some women felt they could open up with me and 
discuss issues that they felt unable to mention to other Somalis or Muslims. For 
example, I describe in Chapter Three, a young Somali women who told me she no 
longer had faith and that she struggled to explain this to any of her Muslim friends or 
family members. Although I tried as much as I could to be honest about my personal 
lack of belief, often the young Muslim women I frequented wanted to know exactly 
with which passage of the Quran I disagreed, or had difficulties accepting. These 
questions would then turn into a discussion about the different interpretations of the 
text, and the nuances of the opinions of scholars and Muslim feminists.  
These exchanges were insightful and often enabled me to rethink many assumptions 
regarding religion, Islam, my own Catholic upbringing, and my current lack of faith. 
The work of feminist scholars on religion and the postsecular (Bracke 2008; Braidotti 
2008; Mahmood 2005) was hugely influential to my thinking throughout the 
fieldwork process, as I reflected on my own secular-liberal assumptions, and my 
informants’ quests to practise Islam. By engaging with these young and informed 
women in debates surrounding Islamic texts, I learnt about the ways they engaged 
with textual knowledge, and the importance they attributed to reading, analysing, 
interpreting and debating. However, many of these young women often stressed that 
there was a limit to scrutinising the texts, to reasoning, and to taking issue with a 
particular verse. Ultimately, for them, reason had its limits which one had to accept, 
and often, one simply had to rely on faith. In their view, they could explain the texts 
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to me, but ultimately whether I accepted them or not was only in God’s hands. 
Although they continued to engage in discussions with me, they accepted that they 
only had a limited role to play in my ultimate acceptance or rejection of faith. After a 
few months my friends stopped questioning and accepted my participation in classes, 
daily prayers, and fasting.  
My experience of conducting research on faith however, was an unsettling process. I 
noticed the ways in which I, like Susan Harding (1989) experienced a form of 
liminality, alternating between belief and disbelief. In her ethnography on 
Fundamentalist Christians in the U.S, Harding describes how, when driving home 
following an interview with a pastor, she suddenly breaks to avoid an accident, only 
to ask herself: What is God trying to tell me? In that moment, Harding feels she has 
spoken with her voice but not her words; she had begun to share the knowledge, 
vision, and sensibilities of a believer. Likewise, throughout my research I noticed the 
ways in which I gradually began to speak differently – interspersing my English with 
Arabic phrases, changing my tone and altering my clothing. But more surprisingly, I 
began to think of myself differently, particularly in the presence of my practising 
friends. Because practising Islam for my informants involves, above all, a shift in 
self-understanding and the establishment of a relationship with God, I found myself 
thinking in these terms, reflecting on fate and the presence of God, and reminding 
myself about death. These thoughts would have been completely alien to me prior to 
fieldwork. 
Ethnographic fieldwork inevitably means that the relationship between the researcher 
and one’s informants is never fixed or clearly defined, as one shifts between the roles 
of a friend, daughter, volunteer, teacher and so on. Throughout this thesis I have to 
my best abilities sought to omit sensitive material, protect anonymity as much as 
possible, and in some cases sent copies of the chapters to informants who expressed a 
desire to read them. In order to do so, I have had to change names, biographical 
details, identities, and locations. Somalis in London, particularly those belonging to 
the same clan or living in the same area, are well acquainted and I have been rigorous 
in my attempt to ensure that the individuals mentioned are not recognisable.  
Much of the data on young practising women presented in this thesis is discursive; it 
involves conversations I had with my informants and numerous debates and 
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discussions they had amongst themselves. Whilst it may appear that I spent more time 
talking with them, rather than observing behaviour, this bias is in fact a reflection of 
how young practising women spend much of their time talking, debating, and 
critically reflecting on their own experiences. The fact that my fieldwork was spent, 
for the most part, over coffee or dinner, in bedrooms, prayer rooms or walking and 
talking around London, is a result less of my own research design, than of their 
everyday practices and engagements. 
Historically in anthropology there has been a divide between the subject of one’s 
research and the audience of the written monograph. Somalis, and particularly those 
in the diaspora, however, approach the writings of non-Somalis with a unique 
curiosity and critical eye. At least one member of each of the Somali households I 
frequented had read or knew about I.M Lewis’ (1994; 1962) eminent ethnographic 
work amongst the northern pastoral Somali society – something quite unusual in 
anthropology. Throughout my research my Somali friends often reminded me of the 
complex politics of representation into which I was immersing myself by writing 
about Somali women. From the day I met Zaynab, a young practising Somali woman, 
she questioned my reasons for writing about Somalis, and my entitlement to do so. 
“Why are you interested in Somalis? What have you got to say that we can’t say 
ourselves?” she would often ask me in a blunt outspoken way. Her attitude was 
understandable given the ways in which middle-class white European writers have 
represented Somalis and Muslims in the mainstream media. 
Similarly, in spring 2012, I participated in a discussion with a couple of young Somali 
women on the recent popularity of Mary Harper’s (2012) book Getting Somalia 
Wrong. One of the women expressed her annoyance at white liberals who, she argued, 
represented themselves as Somali “experts”. Lewis’ work on Somalis, she felt, had 
dominated Somalis’ own understandings of their clan system and Somali society for 
decades. “We’d prefer if you didn’t dominate representations, so that we don’t have to 
see ourselves through your words”, one of the women commented, directing her 
words at me.  
It is with her words in mind, that I would like this thesis to be read; it is not a general 
account of the experiences of Somalis in London, but rather a historically situated 
account of a small group of two generations of Somali women. It explores the ways in 
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which young practising Somalis relate to the Islamic tradition and come to understand 
themselves, and others, differently in the process. It does not seek to provide a 
coherent account of these women’s lives, nor a linear historical narrative, but rather 
explores the recursive and fragmentary processes of ethical change. My hope is that 
this thesis will challenge simplified depictions of Somali, Muslim women in Europe, 
and offer a glimpse into these young women’s experiences of self-transformation.  
1.9 Chapter Outline 
The following two chapters take as a starting point the rhetorical and political shifts 
around multiculturalism that have dominated the last decade in Europe, and that have 
led to the problematization of cultural differences and Muslims’ place within British 
society (Appendix B). I explore the ways young Somali women position themselves 
within these areas of problematization by reconfiguring their understandings of 
themselves, and reworking their relations with others through the concepts of Somali 
culture and religious practice and faith. I trace the differences between their 
understandings and engagements with these concepts and those of their mothers.  
Chapter Two investigates the ways in which second-generation women problematize 
and objectify Somali culture. They emphasise the importance of choice as a mode of 
engagement, with the aim of fashioning themselves as autonomous subjects in 
relation to culture and Somali kin. In doing so, they separate themselves from their 
mothers and Somalis whom they perceive as traditional, because they are unable to 
fully objectify, and sufficiently update, Somali culture. 
In Chapter Three, I explore the ways these young women engage with the problem of 
what constitutes the Muslim subject, and a series of interrelated problems around the 
visibility of Islamic practices. The process involves a reformulation of the relationship 
between exterior practices and interior dimensions of the self, prioritising interiority – 
intentions, values and an affective relationship with, and submission to, God. They 
simultaneously separate themselves from mothers and cultural others, realign their 
relations to non-Muslims, and in the process alter and rework the Islamic pedagogical 
tradition from within.  
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Chapter Four brings together the two previous chapters and the different ways in 
which these second-generation women fashion themselves vis-à-vis culture and 
Islamic practice and faith. The chapter is based around a marriage event organised for, 
and by, young second-generation practising women. I argue this event is a technique 
of self-fashioning through which these young women transform themselves and 
negotiate their relation to culture, Islam, and God by drawing on both the Islamic 
tradition and a liberal ethics of choice and autonomy. By creating imagined 
engagements with potential husbands, these women manage coexisting ideals of 
social mobility, financial security gender equity, romantic love, and love for God. In 
doing so, they also alter the meanings and practices attached to marriage.  
Chapter Five investigates the ways in which two generations of women relate to, and 
establish, what constitutes authoritative Islamic knowledge. It traces the ways in 
which first-generation women have begun to reason about, and understand, the 
meanings of texts. Subsequently it explores what the younger practising women 
understand by “seeking knowledge”. Contributing to the literature on Islam in Europe, 
it argues that young second-generation women emphasise most importantly a 
commitment to Islamic structures of authority, as well as the liberal concepts of 
choice and autonomy. In addition, it points to the importance of affective processes as 
crucial to determining their long-term commitment to a particular source of 
knowledge. 
The argument about affect, time, and hope is taken up in Chapter Six. This final 
chapter explores the temporal dimensions involved in practising Islam, arguing that in 
order to fully capture the character and potential of practising, we need to explore the 
relationship between self-making and time. It suggests that two temporalities are 
crucial to the younger women’s engagements in pious projects: a focus on the 
immediate present, and on the distant future of the hereafter. Paying attention to these 
temporalities enables us to capture the ways in which these young women engage in 
self-making – in imagining themselves and their relations with others – in the 
temporal domain of the afterlife. It is an engagement with this temporal dimension 
that, alongside other imagined engagements, animates their actions in the present time 
on earth. 
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Figure 1: Buranbuur dance class in Mile End, 2010 
 
Courtesy of Ocean Somali Community Association. 
 
Figure 2: Zaytun Somali Restaurant, Stepney Green 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                 Zaytun was formerly a Somali restaurant and was frequently visited during my fieldwork.  
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Figure 3: Somali wedding in central London, 2009 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This content has been removed for reasons of copyright 
 
Figure 4: Somali Week Festival, 2011 
 
Courtesy of Kayd Somali Arts & Culture
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Chapter 2: Updating Culture: generational changes and 
historical transformations 
2.1 Disputing Somali culture 
It must have been a rather strange sight for Idil, after returning from a long day at 
university: her mother Sofia who is regarded by Idil as relatively computer illiterate 
and computer-phobic, was sitting in the living room with her face glued to the 
computer screen and her Italian friend/ anthropologist slouched in the couch beside 
her. But in fact, true to self, Sofia was not engaged in any profound computer 
programming or analysis. Instead, she was undertaking one of the more commonplace 
and elementary of computer tasks: sifting through a YouTube search for “Somali 
songs” and translating the lyrics for me. We had been chatting all afternoon, lazily 
sipping Somali tea as the topic of conversation had drifted to Somali music and 
dancing. Sofia explained to me, as she hummed her favourite tunes, that back in the 
1980s in Mogadishu it was common to attend dance and theatre performances. 
Reminiscing about these “good old days” in her country, Sofia excitedly clicked on 
the mouse switching from buranbuur poem songs to popular romantic tunes.  
Once Idil had made sense of the situation she tried to slip away to her room but Sofia, 
at that moment, had an inspiration; she called her back and asked her to demonstrate 
her Nikko dancing to me. Since this is a very sensual dance which involves moving 
hips and bottom to a drum beat, it is contentious amongst religiously-minded Somalis: 
Nikko is rarely danced at religious weddings or in mixed gatherings. Because Idil was 
not, unlike her mother, practising Islam, she did not mind performing it in front of 
both male and female company (something Sofia wilfully turns a blind eye to). In 
fact, it was one of those aspects of “Somali culture” that she was proud to celebrate 
and acquiescing to her mother’s wish, Idil returned from her bedroom with a flowered 
dirac (loose Somali dress) and a scarf tied around her hips used to accentuate her 
bottom. After a quick search on YouTube for the correct drum beat, she turned her 
back to us stuck out her bum and swayed to the beat. It was beautiful, controlled, and 
rhythmic and she showed me the way she had adapted the movements to reggae in 
order to dance in nightclubs. But while Idil was dancing Sofia’s two Somali 
neighbours, Nimo and Ilhan, dressed in black jilbaabs, walked into the house. Nimo 
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sat on the couch, watching and smiling but Ilhan remained standing, observing with 
her arms folded and a stern look of disapproval painted across her face.  
For a while no one took any notice, but after a few minutes Ilhan had had enough and 
she dashed to one of the shelves, picked up the Quran and began reciting the opening 
sura (chapter). Once finished, she turned to Sofia and reminded her that music and 
dancing were cultural practices that were haram (forbidden) and incited Shaitan 
(Satan). I had foreseen the response before the Quran was even put down, because a 
mood of mischief had crept into the air, particularly between mother and daughter. 
Sofia jumped up and also began dancing, whilst Idil swayed more energetically, 
lifting her long dirac to reveal her bare legs. 
2.2 Problematizing culture 
It is trite to say that culture has been a contentious concept in anthropology. However, 
just as anthropologists have turned away from culture, it has, in recent years entered 
public debate and politics. Through claims to authenticity and uniqueness, culture has 
come to serve as a form of governmentality and is institutionalised in multicultural 
policies; in turn, it has been appropriated as a way of making claims on state 
resources as well as being implicated in contests of representation and value (Phillips 
2007; Moore 2011: 34-35). As Yudice (2003) notes, this culturalisation of politics has 
also been fed by the social sciences and their concern with diversity (Yudice 2003).26  
This chapter is not concerned with theorising Somali culture as an entity or analytical 
category, but instead explores the historically specific ways in which culture has been 
objectified, reworked, and deployed. I suggest that debates around multiculturalism 
and diversity, which surfaced in the UK throughout the late 1960s with the surge of 
immigrants from the former colonies, and more recently have centred on the demise 
of multiculturalism (see Appendix B), have given rise to a series of problematizations 
around the meaning and make-up of culture. A series of interrelated queries around a 
                                                
26 According to Yudice (2003) culture has been employed as a resource for sociopolitical and economic 
amelioration; it has been invoked to solve conflicts over citizenship and cultural capital. Cultural 
citizenship, he contends, is a form of “cultural power” (an extension of Foucault’s biopower) whereby 
culture, as resource for politics and a form of governmentality, is invoked both to resolve, and assign 
responsibility for a range of problems. 
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subject’s relation with culture, and what it means to have, or belong to, a culture, have 
emerged as areas of knowledge and governance, and as political issues that need to be 
addressed and tackled (see section 1.6). In this section I trace the ways culture has 
been dealt with in public and political discourses, academic work and policies on 
multiculturalism in the UK. The rest of the chapter returns to the themes raised in the 
original vignette, and focuses on how two generations of Somali women navigate 
their ways around these problematizations and seek to fashion themselves through 
reworking their understandings of, and their relations, to Somali culture. 
Baumann (1996) has argued that British hegemonic public discourse equates 
community, ethnicity and culture and has reified culture as an imprisoning cocoon 
and as a determining force.27 Building on this insight, Phillips (2007) explores how a 
reified culture is used in multicultural legal and policy frameworks. She contends that 
minorities have often been represented as bounded communities defined through their 
cultural characteristics and juxtaposed to a liberal autonomous self. Culture, she 
maintains, is employed across the political spectrum as a way of demonising and 
stereotyping individuals from minority, non-Western groups. Multicultural 
frameworks have made recourse to culture as a way of referring to race, thereby 
reproducing fixity, defining groups in totalising ways, seeing people as separate and 
different to the majority culture, and thus predicting the behaviour of minority groups. 
For example, whole ranges of behaviours deemed unacceptable, such as forced 
marriages or female genital mutilation, have been attributed to cultural characteristics. 
This deployment of culture has produced a “radical otherness” and has depicted 
minorities as incapacitated by culture and as lacking in autonomy (ibid 2007: Chapter 
Three). It has produced “a determinist understanding of culture that represents 
individuals from minority or non-Western cultural groups as controlled by cultural 
rules" and as juxtaposed to the liberal, autonomous agent and culture (ibid 2007: 101). 
                                                
27 In his ethnography of multi-ethnic Southall, Baumann (1996) shows how these discourses are in turn 
employed by ethnic minorities as a way of making claims for public resources and to compete in local 
politics. However, they coexist with what he defines as a “demotic discourse”, which individuals from 
ethnic minorities employ to question the congruence of culture and community, and recognise that 
culture is processual and dynamic. Although Baumann’s informants employ both discourses, the 
hegemonic reification of culture dominates the ways they talk about their own community, ethnicity, 
and culture as a bounded whole. 
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As other scholars have shown, these cultural representations, which are readily 
accepted in popular discourses, have also been highly gendered. Often minority men 
are depicted as perpetrators of violence against passive female victims (Phillips 2007: 
Chapter Three). This notion of culture relies on the stereotyping of minority – and 
very often, Muslim – gender relations, and serves as a means of suppressing 
difference (Ewing 2008). 
In the mid-2000s, as a consequence of various national and global events, the legal 
and policy frameworks in the UK, which were originally structured around race-
relations and ethnic diversity, were extended to recognise religious differences (see 
Appendix B). As I elaborate in the following chapter, the debates that ensued 
throughout this period have also contributed to the problematization of (Islamic) 
religious practices and the female Muslim subject in the public sphere. Here, 
however, what interests me is the ways that the incorporation of religious diversity 
within existing frameworks has meant that religious communities (e.g. Muslims in the 
UK) have often been treated in political and public discourse as a bounded 
community with a shared culture (Werbner 2009). Religious diversity, as a 
consequence, has largely been conflated with, and managed within, existing 
frameworks of cultural diversity. 
The literature on cultural and religious change amongst Somalis in the diaspora has 
often inserted itself within, and fed into, these debates (Hopkins 2010; Valentine et al 
2009; Valentine & Sporton 2009; McGown 1999; 2007; Tiilikainen 2003; 2007; 
Isotalo 2007; Lilius 2001).28 It has sought to address and offer a range of responses to 
the questions that are problematized in public and political discussions. For example, 
scholars have explored the changing sense of being Somali in the diaspora (Hopkins 
2010; Langellier 2010; Valentine & Sporton 2009; Kusow 2007; Bjork 2007a; 2007b; 
Fangen 2007), or the changing relationship between Somali ethnicity, culture, and 
Islam (De Voe 2002; McMichael 2002; McGown 1999). Furthermore, much of this 
work has sought to address issues of diversity, integration or assimilation. 29 Whilst I 
                                                
28 In Chapter Four I engage with the literature on the Somali Diaspora that deals with changes to 
kinship, clan and gender. 
29 For other work on the Diaspora and processes of adaptation, integration or assimilation, see 
Engebrigtsen 2007; Bigelow 2010; McMichael 2002; De Voe 2002. 
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do not dispute the data presented in these studies, and in fact build on them 
throughout this chapter, my theoretical approach departs from this literature in two 
interrelated ways. First, I seek to understand the categories of Somali culture and 
religion as historically specific notions that have become objectified as particular 
forms of difference and have come to pose a problem for politics in the contemporary 
moment. In what follows, I treat culture as a means of engaging with the world and 
with others (Moore 2011: 11). My emphasis, therefore, is less on assessing what 
constitutes Somali culture or Somaliness as a form of belonging, or on determining 
changing cultural and religious identifications. Nor do I seek to address the questions 
of integration and assimilation. Rather, I focus on how, and why, my informants 
concern themselves with these particular questions around culture and religion at this 
moment in time, how they understand these categories, and the ways they employ 
them in processes of self-fashioning. 
Furthermore, I suggest that the diaspora literature has unduly prioritised the migration 
process as an explanatory factor that accounts for these religious and cultural 
transformations. As a consequence, much of the emphasis has been on changes that 
result as a consequence of engagement with the host society. McGown’s (1999) study 
Muslims in the diaspora: The Somali communities of London and Toronto is a case in 
point. Her book approaches religious change through an exploration of the 
“mechanisms of integration” from the perspectives of the immigrant population and 
the political culture of the host society.30 By prioritising the process of migration, this 
work not only neglects the historical specificities of current debates on integration 
that have problematized culture and religion as described above, but it also fails to 
account for the ways that changes amongst first- and second-generation Somalis are 
the result of long-term historical factors, and an engagement with a variety of 
discursive traditions and practices. For example, it insufficiently accounts for the 
internal transformations that are constitutive of the global Islamic tradition (Amir-
Moazami & Salvatore 2003; section 1.2), and it pays insufficient attention to the ways 
some of the changes examined originate prior to the process of migration (see 
                                                
30 McGown argues that the encounter with an individualistic, secular society has “forced” Somalis into 
a “crisis of identity”. Religion, in her account, plays a functional role: it serves as an “anchor” for 
Somalis providing “an oasis of tranquillity amid the dislocation of refugee straits and the turmoil of 
adjusting to a new culture” (ibid 1999: 97). 
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Appendix A). In contrast, my work positions my informants’ experiences at the 
interstices of a range of discursive traditions and broader historical trajectories 
(Chapter One, section 1.1).  
In the remainder of the chapter, I draw out the ways Somali women’s ideas about 
culture intervene within these areas of problematization around the make-up of 
culture. As Foucault (2000: 118) notes, problematization determines the elements that 
constitute the different solutions that arise as a result; it shapes but does not determine 
the responses. These women’s ideas and relations to culture, I suggest, are shaped by 
contemporary debates on multiculturalism, but are also historically specific ideas of 
Somali culture that have developed throughout Somali history, and reformist 
discourses on culture and authentic religion. In order to frame this chapter, I begin by 
unravelling the different understandings of culture that are at play in the original 
vignette. The first half of the chapter explores the ways first-generation Somali 
women have changed their ideas about culture in the last 60 years. In the second half, 
I consider how second-generation women seek to further update and rework Somali 
culture in the process of rethinking their understandings of self and self-other 
relations.  
2.2.1 Nikko dancing as culture  
I return briefly to the initial vignette in order to identify some of the themes that will 
be developed in this chapter. At stake in the incident above are conflicting ideas about 
the make-up of culture and the elements of Somali culture deemed suitably 
compatible with religion. Idil, a second-generation non-practising Somali woman saw 
Nikko as a dimension of culture, a resource that she had actively embraced and 
enjoyed celebrating and displaying to others. Taught by a young cousin, she had 
learnt to update and adapt this practice to suit a variety of contexts, ranging from 
weddings to clubs; Nikko was a part of her Somali culture and whether it conflicted or 
not with religion, this was not a concern for her at that point in time. Interestingly, 
Nikko is a dance that the majority of first-generation Somalis associate with the 
minority Jareer-Bantu, who are descended from pre-Somali populations and recent 
immigrant Eastern Swahili groups originally brought to Somalia as slaves (Lewis 
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2008: 6). For Idil’s parents Nikko is therefore not an authentic Somali dance, but one 
that has been appropriated from minority cultures of African and slave descent.31 
Idil’s appropriation of Nikko is a way of reworking and updating an objectified notion 
of Somali culture, as a set of practices, objects, or values. As I explore later in this 
chapter, crucial to her deployment of this notion of culture were the ways she 
fashioned herself through a creative, willing and autonomous engagement with 
culture. 
Ilhan, on the other hand, a first-generation religiously minded mother, had identified 
any form of dancing, including Nikko, as a cultural practice, conflicting with a 
religious requirement and awareness of modesty. These treatments and reifications of 
culture and religion are, I argue, historically specific. As I explore in the following 
section, first-generation Somali women have only recently come to adopt a discourse 
that separates religion from culture, and identifies certain practices as cultural 
(whether Somali or Bantu). Second-generation women, on the other hand push this 
discourse further, as has been amply illustrated in the literature on the diaspora 
(McGown 1999; Talle 2008) and that on second-generation Muslims in Europe 
(Jacobson 1997). In doing so they accuse their mothers of not being able to fully 
separate religion from culture. 
Sofia instead, who was familiar with Nikko from her days growing up in Mogadishu, 
had only recently begun learning about Islam, as I explain in more detail below. She 
was torn between conflicting interpretations and prioritised her loyalty to her daughter 
and passion for dancing above appeasing her religiously minded friends. This conflict 
between the aspects of culture which ought to be abandoned, and those, which should 
be appropriated and celebrated is, I illustrate, a topic of heated debate amongst my 
informants. It also points to the instability of the category of culture. Sofia’s 
participation in the dancing further demonstrates the arbitrary nature of separating 
religion from culture; it indicates the impossibility of fully reifying culture as object, 
                                                
31 Jareer literally means “hard-haired” and is a discriminatory way of referring to the African descent 
of the Bantu populations. Traditionally, Bantu do not belong to the main Somali populations; Somalis 
have tended not to intermarry with the minority “Jareer-Bantu” and the latter have largely been 
socially and politically excluded and marginalized within Somali territories. Many first-generation 
Somalis do not think of themselves as black African but of Arab descent. 
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and the difficulty of transforming embodied practices such as dancing into cultural 
objects.  
In what follows, I trace the origins of debates about Somali culture to the 1950s. 
Through a series of narratives of first-generation Somali women, I explore the ways 
these understandings of culture have played out in the lives of these women, and how 
they intersect with the recent impact of reformist discourses. 
2.3 Tradition and culture: post-independence Somalia 
The romanticisation and valorisation of “tradition and culture” (daqaan iyo hiddo) 
amongst Somali people can be traced back to the 1950s with the emergence of a new 
urban middle-class. Many of my first-generation Somali female informants were 
socialised and educated in an urban milieu throughout the late colonial period and 
following independence. In Appendix A (section 2) I describe this historical context 
in more depth, and outline ways in which, following independence, discourses of 
modernity, freedom, development, and equality became increasingly prevalent across 
these urban areas, particularly in the capital Mogadishu. These discourses became 
intertwined, at both the government and local level, with the reified idea of Somali 
nomadic, traditional culture (Kapteijns 1999).  
Kapteijns (1999: 152) explores the ways colonial rule, through its insistence on 
delineating an authentic Somali tradition and defining and applying customary law, 
created a body of “state-sanctioned tradition”. Assuming this reflected the “tribal” 
nature of local society, it simultaneously suited the universalising European notions of 
fairness and order. This allowed the state to emphasise what it regarded as authentic 
tradition. "This articulation of tradition also focused narrowly on politics, kinship and 
men", and overemphasised patrilineality over other principles regulating resource 
sharing; politics and kinship thus became a part of the colonial understanding of 
pastoral society (ibid 1999: 152-153). This articulation was reinforced by I.M Lewis’ 
ethnographic monograph (1961) published under the auspices of the British colonial 
government. It further enhanced, amongst Europeans as well as Somalis, an idea of 
northern Somali pastoral politics and kinship as representative of authentic Somali 
tradition (ibid 1999: 151). This rendition of tradition simplified local realities and 
presented a timeless and monolithic conception of a northern traditional society. 
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Colonial interpretations of Somali traditions similarly “discounted social change and 
presented a timeless, essential truth about Somali society” (Kapteijns 1999: 152). 
Despite extensive academic criticism (Cassanelli 1982; Ahmed 1995), this idea of 
cultural authenticity persisted throughout the post-independence period, and was 
appropriated and celebrated as a national signifier of Soomaalinimo (a national 
Somali community identity). 
It was amongst urban middle-classes throughout the 1970s that the imagined idea of 
an authentic Somali tradition and culture became widespread and was appropriated by 
nationalist movements. Kapteijns (1999: 155) notes the ways Somali cultural 
authenticity and national identity were framed in terms of the northern pastoral 
tradition. As a result, pastoral tradition was invested with even more power than 
before "because it now symbolized an authentically Somali national identity 
contrasting starkly with colonial (or neo-colonial), ‘modern’, European values” (ibid 
1999: 155). At the same time, aspects of traditional culture associated with clan 
ideology, or seen as threats to an ideology of women’s rights and equality, were 
denounced as “backward” impediments to modernisation and progress in favour of a 
pan-Somali identity (see Appendix A). 
Ideas about an authentic Somali tradition were intertwined with ideals of moral 
womanhood, in both anticolonial nationalist struggles and throughout the post-
independence period (Kapteijns 1999). Throughout the 1970s the Somali Women’s 
Democratic Organization (SWDO), a subgroup of the Socialist Party, was dedicated 
to improving equality of women in different aspects of Somali society. Its main focus 
was on family planning and health care, but members also promoted traditional 
cultural activities such as poetry, handicrafts, and folk dancing (Akou 2011: 79-80), 
illustrating the ways women, in government rhetoric and policy, were made to stand 
as symbolic markers of modernisation, nationalism, and cultural authenticity. Akou 
(2011) similarly describes the ways in which government pamphlets, banknotes, coins 
and stamps, throughout this period, idealised women as symbols of traditional life. 
Women were typically depicted wearing clothes associated with nomadic society, 
such as the guntiino and garbasaar, or imported “African” style dresses. As we shall 
see in Chapter Four, tradition and cultural authenticity also played a role in 
discussions of modern love and companionate marriage.  
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However, women throughout the 1970s-80s remained ambivalent about the role of 
tradition, criticising the ways it posed a barrier to their own emancipation. The 
following poem is an exchange between a man, who invites women to remain true to 
their customs and culture, and a woman, who ultimately turns away from tradition, 
which she sees as an obstacle to her development. 
Male (Maxammed Jaamac Jaaf): 
In the old days it was custom 
That a girl perfumed her hair 
And braided it 
She wrapped around her waist 
A wide cloth belt with fringes and an ornamental cord 
And wore a white dress 
But something has changed… 
You, women, have destroyed our culture 
You have overstepped the religious law 
And destroyed our religion 
Girls, won’t you behave? 
 
Female (Mariam Mursal): 
What was custom in the old days 
And a hundred years ago 
And what has been left behind 
Don’t make us go back on that well-worn road 
For we have turned away from it with effort… 
First get some education and learn how to read and write 
Don’t try to turn back, you country hick, people who have woken up 
 
(Kapteijns 1999: 139). 
As we shall see in the narratives that follow, first-generation Somali women reflecting 
back on their lives in Mogadishu, oscillate between a romanticised notion of culture, 
and an idea of culture as an impediment to modernisation and emancipation. 
However, in the last decades and following their movement abroad, they have begun 
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to understand tradition and culture through the lens of reformist Islam. Whereas in the 
above poem, religion and culture are equated and positioned as the seat of morality, 
today amongst Somali women, religion is increasingly being favoured as the authentic 
moral base of Somali society. 
2.3.1 Sofia and Nimo: post-independence Mogadishu 
Sofia, whom I mentioned in the initial incident was born in 1960 – the year of Somali 
independence – in Hoodan, a district of Mogadishu, and lived in the capital until the 
onset of the civil war in 1992. Her father ran a small grocery shop and was a 
government-employed Arabic and Quran teacher until his death in 1980. Sofia’s 
mother, who had become widowed following a marriage that had been arranged by 
her family, married her father “out of love” as Sofia described to me. However, she 
was very often ill and it was therefore Sofia’s maternal grandmother who did most of 
the housework and looked after the children. At the age of five Sofia started attending 
dugsi (Quran school).32 She completed secondary school and after two years of 
participating in the urban and rural literacy campaigns initiated by the Supreme 
Revolutionary Council (SRC) under Siad Barre (see section Appendix A, section 2) 
she attended the University of Afgoi studying English and History at an Anglo-
American state-funded institute. In 1984, following the completion of her degree, 
Sofia began teaching at a secondary school, and that same year she married her first 
husband. Following a first divorce she remarried and gave birth to her first daughter 
Idil in 1990.  
Nimo, her friend who was also in the initial vignette, was born fifteen years after 
Sofia in 1975 in Mogadishu at the height of Siad Barre’s military regime, which 
seized power following a military coup and governed the newly formed republic 
between 1969-1990. Her father, a police officer, married her mother when she was 18, 
although Nimo was raised by her maternal grandmother and her aunts, uncles and 
cousins who shared a large house in Hamar Weyne, the centre of Mogadishu. The 
                                                
32 The education system in Somalia was only standardised in 1972, when Somali became the official 
language of instruction. Prior to 1972 education was not fully state-funded and instruction was in 
Arabic, English or Italian. 
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family wealth came mostly from a paternal uncle who owned a successful 
import/export business.  
Raised throughout Barre’s socialist regime, both women benefited from the education 
policies of the time, which encouraged women’s education under the banner of 
modernisation, development and women’s rights (Appendix A, section 2). These 
women’s narratives echo some of the themes of self-emancipation, “awakening” from 
custom and culture, and a future of education and modernisation, also present in the 
song exchange above, between Mariam Mursal and Mahammed Jaaf.  
Sofia often reminisced about her life in Mogadishu throughout the 1980s; she spent 
most of her free time going to the cinema, the beach, restaurants and concerti (theatre 
and dance productions). “We all wanted to be Western back then!” she explained, 
referring to her choice of modern leisure activities and clothing. On one occasion she 
showed me photographs of herself in tight 80s dresses, her hair afro-styled posing for 
the camera. As I sat on her living room couch she pulled out a big pile of old 
photographs, many of which were of her friends and relatives posing in photographic 
studios. Her clothing was a complete contrast to the hijab and long dresses which I 
saw her wearing everyday in London: in one photo she wore tight high-waisted jeans 
and sandals, in another she was in a guntiino and her friend wore a Western-style top 
revealing her bare shoulders; in another still she posed with male friends and male 
cousin. “Look at this, we’re holding each other! That’s not allowed now!” she pointed 
out. “We used to wear all sorts… mini skirts even!” Her photographs captured the 
amalgamation of modern, urban lifestyles with national celebrations of traditional 
culture, as represented by the guntiino. Sofia has also shown me with great pride 
photographs of herself in a guntiino – what she defined as traditional dress – taking 
part in national celebrations at school and university. As she often pointed out to me, 
gender segregation (purdah) was not a concern for her as it is now; many of their 
friends had boyfriends, and hardly any unmarried woman wore hijab. At school the 
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hijab, considered a sign of “backward tradition”, was banned as a threat to a secular 
education, and an ideology of modernisation and progress.33  
Most Somali children, including Sofia and Nimo, attended dugsi (Quranic school) 
from an early age and were taught about religious obligations such as prayer and 
fasting. As I discuss further in Chapter Five, religious instruction focused on learning 
to read, recite, and memorise the Quran, not on translating, understanding, and 
reasoning about the meaning of texts.34 As a first-generation Somali woman explained 
in an interview, when I asked about her early religious education,  
 “From the age of 4 I went to dugsi (Quran school) with my brothers and 
sisters. Just down the road… Aged 6 I started going to normal school, 
formally, but I still went to dugsi from 3-4 in the afternoon. In Somalia 
every three or four houses, they have dugsi… you learn the Arabic 
alphabet, then you learn to put words together, and then memorise the 
text… at age 7 I learnt how to pray.” 
The Quran in Somali was not available at the time and, although Arabic was taught at 
school, few could understand what they were reciting. A friend of Sofia recalled, “I 
had Quran education, but it wasn’t that important in Somalia. I wanted to be as 
Western as I could!” – once again drawing on the discourse of modernisation and 
emancipation. 
Furthermore, young women received very basic religious instruction at home. As 
another first-generation Somali woman pointed out to me, her mother, who had now 
passed away, knew very little about religion: 
 “My mother, she knew how to pray… she knew that if you did something 
bad like stealing or backbiting you went to hell, and if you were good you 
went to heaven… she told us to cover when there were men … but religion 
                                                
33 Figures 5 & 6 show some of the forms of dress worn by Somali women in the 1970-80s. In contrast, 
figures 3,4 & 7 capture a range of clothing worn by first-generation women in London throughout my 
fieldwork. 
34 As I noted in Chapter One, seven of the twenty-one first-generation mothers I frequented were highly 
qualified, having completed secondary school or university in Somalia. 
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was like culture to her… it was something she had heard. She didn’t go to 
dugsi, didn’t follow the Quran… she heard it from someone else, and 
didn’t exactly know its meaning… Every year people become more 
modern.” 
Nimo recounted to me how Somalis seldom followed religious obligations such as 
praying, wearing hijab, and respecting purdah (gender segregation). Partly this was 
due to the discourse of socialist modernisation prevalent at the time, which conflated 
religion with tradition and positioned both as impediments to socialism and progress. 
But Nimo also blamed a lack of conscious awareness of religious norms and 
practices. Religion, she explained, was understood in the past as synonymous with 
culture, as an embodied sense of practices, norms and values. “We knew how to pray, 
recite, it was part of everyday life… we knew what was right and what was wrong” I 
was told by Nimo on one occasion. Religion, she elaborated, was learnt in the same 
way as one learnt to perform housework or other familial duties. In retrospect, Nimo, 
like other Somali women who grew up in this context, explained that even though she 
knew certain practices were “wrong”, she did not feel compelled to abandon them, 
precisely because they did not know why they were wrong.  
2.3.2 Sofia and Nimo: religious transformations in the diaspora 
With the onset of civil strife in 1992 and following the birth of her second daughter, 
Sofia was forced to abandon her home in Mogadishu and seek refuge in southern 
Somalia and finally in Nairobi (see Appendix A, section 4). Thanks to her husband’s 
connections with the Somali embassy in Rome, Sofia was given a visa to work in 
Italy as a housekeeper. She often spoke to me about this humiliating and painful 
experience of being separated from her family and sacrificing her academic and 
professional aspirations in order to financially support them. In 1998 after four years 
working in Italy, Sofia joined her younger brother in London where she was granted 
refugee status and indefinite leave to remain. 
Nimo was forced to leave the capital in the middle of secondary education and 
abandon her plans to pursue higher education. In Kenya, where she escaped with her 
family, she married her maternal second cousin and only a couple of months after 
their relocation to the UK in 1990, she was pregnant with Hawa, her first daughter. In 
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London, Nimo lived with her six children and her husband in a flat in the same 
council block as Sofia, who lived alone with her three daughters. As the only Somalis 
in the building, the two women became close friends. During the course of my 
fieldwork, Sofia divorced her husband, who for the past ten years had lived apart from 
her and had contributed very little to the family income and who, she suspected, had 
probably married another woman in Kenya. Although her brothers and sisters also 
lived in London, she received very little emotional and financial support from them. 
Nimo had become her main source of support; the two women helped each other with 
household chores and child rearing, participated in the same hagbaad (money 
exchange) and regularly lent each other money.  
Sofia had only started learning about religion in the last two years when I met her, 
thanks to the influence of Nimo, whose husband had encouraged her to “research” 
Islam. Sofia and Nimo had begun attending Quran classes and lectures at the local 
Somali mosque, like many Somali women in London (see Chapter Five). They had 
also acquired, and begun to reflect on and implement, reformist teachings. Like many 
of her friends, Sofia retrospectively described her lifestyle in Mogadishu as morally 
“wrong” and ignorant of religion. “Step by step I started studying and I realised I was 
wrong”, she explained. Going dancing, attending concerti, mixing, not donning the 
hijab were practices she now condemned, blaming her lack of knowledge about 
religious obligations. Whereas a few years previously she might have enjoyed 
wearing colourful dirac (Somali dress) at weddings, watching romantic films, and 
listening to music, her increased knowledge of Islam, had, she claimed, taught her that 
these cultural practices should be discarded. The initial Nikko dancing incident 
demonstrates, however, that she sometimes felt ambivalent about this choice. 
 “When you see food and it doesn’t look good you say: that’s not good! 
But you’ve only seen it then, you haven’t tried it. When you try and taste it, 
it’s actually good. I’ve tried and tasted religion now, and it’s like I’m 
becoming a Muslim again. [It feels like] I used to belong to another 
religion and I’m only now becoming Muslim.”  
Nimo herself had been through a similar change. She began to wear hijab when she 
was married in Kenya, but only on arriving to the UK did she come to understand the 
importance of reading and understanding the meaning of the Quran and knowing and 
 67 
reasoning about Islamic rules, obligations, and requirements. “Religion is the basis of 
Somali culture. That’s why we are good people”, Nimo explained to me. However, 
she continued, Somalis had abandoned religion throughout the 1970s-80s. Although 
at the time she had regularly attended dugsi, and had been taught to recite the Quran 
and hadith, to pray and fulfil religious obligations, she now considered this 
knowledge insufficient and inadequate. She had never been told the meaning of what 
she was reciting, nor why it was important. She explained: “In Somalia… I knew I 
was a Muslim, but I didn’t understand the meaning, and I didn’t understand the 
Quran. Before I thought that dress was [a matter of] culture, but here I have started 
understanding and realising that the Quran says to veil. I understand the meaning”. 
Since coming to the UK, Nimo added, and accessing the translation of the Quran in 
Somali, and attending lessons and lectures, she had begun to reflect and mould her 
behaviour according to Islamic obligations grounded in the texts.  
As I further elaborate in the next chapter, most of my first-generation female 
informants raised in the former Somali Republic, did not cover their heads with a 
hijab, and many wore a garbasaar (shawl) to cover their heads only after marriage 
(e.g. Figures 5 & 6). Many older Somali women living in London today who, twenty 
years earlier would not have concerned themselves with Islamic clothing, have now 
begun to don the hijab, abaya and jilbaab justifying it as a process of “religious 
awareness” (Talle 2008; McGown 1999). This has not been a process unique to the 
diaspora context, however, as the jilbaab, niqab and hijab, which had previously only 
been worn by Arab and Persian settlers, had become increasingly popular throughout 
the 1980s in Somali territories as a consequence of the influence of Islamic reform 
movements (See Appendix A, section 3). As Sofia explained: “with time we have 
changed our dress, our way of talking and interacting with men…. Now we know the 
meaning of the Quran… thanks to translations, books, people around me talking 
about it the whole time.” 
As with many practising second-generation women, for Sofia and Nimo, the manner 
in which one dresses is a matter of religion, not culture. Traditional clothing, such as 
the guntiino, is not sufficiently modest for everyday interactions and should be 
reserved for women-only events. However, there exists a diversity of opinions 
concerning this recent adoption of the hijab and jilbaab. Some women, for example, 
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have come to see the adoption of a black or colourful jilbaab as part of Somali 
culture. As Nafisa further articulates in the next section, it is a reflection of a renewed 
moral consciousness within Somali society; the hijab and jilbaab have acquired a 
sense of collective morality and kin honour (see Chapter Three). Whereas in post-
independence Somalia, morality was represented and embodied by traditional dress, 
this has now been replaced by Islamic dress (section 3.4). Still, other women are 
critical of the ways this supposedly “Arab-style” form of clothing has taken over as 
representative of Somali dress.  
In a discussion I had with Sofia, Nimo, and another friend on religion and culture, 
Sofia explained that she understood “religion” as part of being Somali, but as 
qualitatively different from culture. While “religion comes from Allah, culture is 
something shared between people”, she claimed. This was representative of a newly 
acquired way of talking about culture vis-à-vis religion, influenced by reformist 
discourses. 
 “Before in Somalia we knew [about] religion, but we didn’t understand 
it… It was like driving a car without having taken lessons. Before I knew 
how to drive, but now I have a full understanding of it: I know what I have 
to do to turn, park, go around roundabouts… Now we know what religion 
says and we’re much more conscious about it, so we can explain our 
behaviour.”  
Religion had previously been a part of everyday practice, such as driving a car 
without lessons, learning to cook or perform daily tasks. Now they have begun to 
reflect on religion, turning both religion and culture into two separate objects. As 
Nimo explained, religion has helped her decipher which parts of culture are haram 
(forbidden), “wrong” or unnecessary. Not wearing hijab and backbiting, she claimed 
are two things in “Somali culture” that religion has taught them are wrong. Others 
frequently mentioned clan divisions, dancing to music, ignoring purdah, visiting 
graves and emotional mourning at death. Religion is no longer seen as inherited, but 
consciously learnt in formalised ways. This acquired knowledge constitutes a series of 
facts, which serve as a moral framework from which to scrutinise, choose, or select 
elements of culture. Culture, as a consequence, has been reduced to a set of practices, 
objects, attitudes, and values. 
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2.3.3 Nafisa: teaching Somali culture  
Nafisa was born in 1955 in Bedelweyne, central Somalia, but moved to Mogadishu 
with her family aged 15. Her father was a doctor, who after serving in the Ethiopian 
war in 1977, became a critic of the Barre regime and was jailed until the civil war. 
Nonetheless, Nafisa attended school and university and throughout the 1970s, worked 
as a criminal lawyer in Mogadishu. She was married by her family to a patrilineal first 
cousin, who worked as a doctor in the capital, and they had five children together. 
Throughout her early career, Nafisa, an advocate of the Barre regime’s progressive 
agenda, had campaigned in support of the new legislation on inheritance that had led 
to the execution of ten theologians in 1975 (see Appendix A, section 2). Family law 
had to be changed, she reasoned at the time, as it stood as an impediment to fully 
achieving women’s equal status in Somali society. When I first interviewed her in 
London, however, she explained how in retrospect she had been wrong and misguided 
in supporting these legislative changes. “I didn’t know my rights as a Muslim woman. 
Now I do, I know why these [Islamic] laws [on inheritance] make sense”.  
Nafisa blamed the regime, its attack on religious practices, institutions and leaders, 
coupled with its pervasive corruption, and exploitation of clan alliances, and 
nepotism. It had resulted in the moral laxity that presided throughout the 1980s. 
Echoing some of the same critiques voiced by Sofia and Nimo, Nafisa elaborated:  
 “In my lifetime when I was working in Mogadishu, people had core 
values. I could not do certain things, [such as] go to my neighbour and 
beat her up, or take her stuff. But this is exactly what happened in 
Somalia during the civil war. There was a change in morality during the 
1980s, and core values were lost. In my view the government is in charge 
of keeping morality, and the government at the time [failed to do this].” 
She illustrated this vision of immorality with an example. Prior to the 1980s, women 
who opportunistically dated men in order get promotions, or to climb the social 
ladder, were considered immoral. Throughout the 80s, however, this behaviour was 
endorsed by society. “Those who grew up in the 80s will never know of that morality 
that existed before”, she explained.  
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Nafisa’s narrative not only describes immorality in terms of a lack of values, 
symbolised by women’s sexuality. She also suggests that the state should be 
responsible for upholding moral norms. Most importantly, however, she depicts 
Somali history as separated in two periods: a distant, traditional and moral past and an 
immoral transitory phase governed by corruption, modernisation, and personal and 
clan-based aggrandisement. Her narrative corresponds with Sofia and Nimo’s 
discussions of the lack of religious and moral knowledge in the 1980s. Morality was 
only regained in a subsequent phase in the diaspora. However, this has not occurred 
by returning to tradition but through an engagement with religious texts. Religion and 
religious leaders have come to replace the state as upholders of communal morality.  
Nafisa had herself experienced religious change during her lifetime, which, she felt, 
was a reaction to having been uprooted, and having to rethink and reconstruct an idea 
of herself. “When I came to in this country I found I was a number in the Home 
Office. I felt I had lost my identity, tradition, culture, religion”, she explained to me in 
an interview. 
 “It’s a reaction to being uprooted … I wasn’t feeling in control of my life, 
I didn’t know what would happen to my life. Security makes you choose to 
either blend with people, or to keep your own identity. And you go back 
and find out: what is my identity? First I realised how important my 
image to others was. For example, I started covering my hair, and before 
in Somalia I never used to. Here I started because I was asserting who I 
was: a Muslim woman from Somalia.” 
For Nafisa, this conscious engagement with an objectified notion of religion and 
culture had occurred with her forced migration abroad. 
In the UK, Nafisa had founded one of the few female-led Somali community 
organisations in the 1990s, which coordinated a range of projects for Somali women 
and teenagers, ranging from supplementary English classes to providing health 
training to mothers. Amongst many other activities, she campaigned to introduce 
Somali as a GCSE subject in Camden schools, and ran a Somali cultural programme 
in a local primary school, which introduced children to Somali language, games and 
poems. At an annual educational achievement award ceremony for Somali children in 
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the borough of Camden, Nafisa delivered a speech first in Somali, and then in 
English. She stressed that Somalis in London ought to maintain three things: 
language, culture and identity. Everyone who had the opportunity to study Somali at 
GCSE should do so, and then she elaborated on what she meant by culture and 
identity. “Remember that you are Muslims most importantly… So pray, pray pray – 
it’s very important. It will help you be good, be a better person… it’s when you’ve 
fallen on your knees that you most need to pray.” Then she continued, “You are 
British-Somali. Remember that! And don’t forget the Somali aspect!” she exclaimed, 
reiterating the importance of acquiring the Somali language and knowledge of Somali 
history. “The sky is your limit!” she concluded, encouraging and motivating the 
younger generations present to pursue their dreams.  
Questioning Nafisa about her involvement in these activities, she explained, 
 “Because I studied back home, and I’m educated, I can make sense of 
who I am, [and what it means] to live in a western context... I want to be a 
role model for my people and especially the younger ones. A lot of kids 
are very confused… [they’ve been] brought up here they don’t know who 
they are. [I feel] I should be giving them an identity. I tell them: you’re 
not British you’re Somali-British.” 
Similarly to Nimo and Sofia, Nafisa had adopted a reformist discourse that stresses 
the separation of religion from culture; religion has been cast as a conscious, 
collective moral framework used to monitor and assess culture. Having learnt to 
reflect on religion, she was able to identify both the negative and positive aspects of 
Somali culture and had redrawn an understanding of both. Religion and culture were 
no longer part of everyday practice, but two interlinked objects of knowledge that 
could be transmitted to the younger generations. According to Nafisa, religion was 
constitutive of being Somali, something that, as we shall see later, is contested 
particularly by younger practising Somalis. She explained to me in a second meeting: 
 “Other Black British speak English and, although they might have a 
religion, they are Christians and this brings with it a series of 
connotations: they drink, eat pork, and wear different clothes. Somalis 
have a language, a culture that dictates what to wear, eat and drink, how 
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a man should court a woman, ask for her hand in marriage… I taught 
these young people about Somali history and geography, about Somali 
love songs that are as good as those written by Shakespeare! I taught 
them about the problems of clan, the caste system, and forms of 
discrimination against minority groups such as Gabooye.”  
As an educated woman, Nafisa had taken the responsibility to instruct young Somalis 
to embrace the good parts of an inherited Somali culture (i.e. love songs, language, 
religion, etc.) and reject the bad parts (the clan system, cast discriminations). Her 
discussions draw on a pan-Somali discourse, I describe further in Appendix A 
(section 2), through which some aspects of tradition, including the clan ideology were 
considered an impediment to progress, whereas other aspects were celebrated as 
authentic representations of Somali culture. Nafisa also draws on a reformist 
discourse that separates religion from culture. In contrast to Nimo and Sofia, however, 
she fails to fully prioritise religion, and classifies as cultural practices, elements that 
the others would regard as religious prescriptions (e.g. on clothing, food, and 
courtship). 
2.4 Religion and culture: generational and historical changes 
In the last 20 years, these women have begun to engage with reformist Islam and with 
a discourse that prioritises and separates authentic religion from tradition or culture. 
Whilst some women encountered these discourses prior to migration, for others, this 
shift has coincided with changes in the lifecycle, and forced migration to the diaspora 
(see Appendix A). As the experiences of Nimo and Sofia demonstrate, for many of 
my first-generation informants, it has resulted in a conscious engagement with Islamic 
scriptures, and an awareness of the meanings of texts (McGown 1999; Tiilikainen 
2003; 2007). McGown (1999: 95) explores the ways that, since migrating to the UK, 
Somalis have experienced an “increased religiosity” and a “heightened awareness of 
their religion” manifested in the ways their adherence to Islam has become more self-
conscious. Unable to take their identity for granted, they have sought to reimagine it 
by separating “religion” from “cultural habit”.35 Similarly, Tiilikainen (2003) claims 
                                                
35 See section 2.2 for critiques of McGown (1999). 
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that Somali women in the diaspora are increasingly gaining religious knowledge. She 
argues that Islam has come to serve as a moral framework, signifying continuity with 
the home country, healing from past and present sufferings, as well as change and 
challenge. 
As I show in the previous sections, my data supports these findings. First-generation 
Somali women have begun to consciously engage with religious knowledge, with the 
aim of implementing it on the self (see also Chapter Five). Nimo suggests that her 
previous ignorance of religion was tied to her unfamiliarity with the meaning of 
religious texts and the ways religious practices were part of her everyday life. For all 
three women, religion and culture had not been consciously thought about as distinct 
categories. In recent years, however, these women have begun to draw new 
distinctions between the categories of religion and culture. Somali women who do not 
make these separations are often criticised by other religiously-minded women for 
being traditional. What I wish to stress here, however, is how the mode of engagement 
to culture has changed. In the last 50 years, religion has come to provide these women 
with a moral basis from which to “pick and choose” amongst objects, attitudes, and 
practices that are thought to constitute Somali culture. 
First-generation Somali women’s understandings of the category of culture and its 
relation to religion is often a source of debate and contestation. Their attempts to 
grapple with these issues demonstrate the unstable boundaries between these two 
concepts, but also highlight how these women insert themselves within current 
problematizations around culture. Ilhan, whom I introduced in the initial vignette, 
makes a clear distinction, asserting that certain cultural practices, including Nikko 
dancing are incompatible with religion. According to many practising Somali women, 
most forms of music and dancing are considered immodest and hence contrary to 
Islamic ethics and norms. Nikko constitutes a cultural practice, which was popularised 
precisely because Somalis were previously ignorant of religion. Sofia, on the other 
hand, appreciates these divisions, but her discourse does not always map onto 
practice. She enjoys dancing and does not always see a clash with religious 
prescriptions, particularly if it is performed in women-only environments. 
Furthermore, whilst most of these women agree that religion ought to be prioritised 
above culture, they disagree on whether the two constitute completely different 
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categories. On the one hand, Nimo understands religion and culture as qualitatively 
different, and prioritises the former as the source of morality, on the other Nafisa sees 
religion as part of Somali culture.  
This discourse of religious authenticity is based on a long tradition of renewal and 
reform, which stresses the “purification” of Islamic faith from cultural superstitions 
and practices (Voll 1983; see section 1.2). They are also discourses employed by 
many contemporary Islamic scholars in Europe, such as Sheikh Hakim-Murad or 
Tariq Ramadan, and reiterated by second-generation Somali women. Despite the fact 
that first-generation Somali women have begun to adopt this discourse, and discern 
cultural practices deemed to clash with Islam, second-generation Muslims often direct 
these criticisms at their parents.  
In a lecture on YouTube, entitled Islam vs. culture and Superstition, Dr. Abdullah 
Hakim Quick, an American-born Islamic scholar, who was popular amongst my 
second-generation informants, explained:  
 “It is crucial for Muslims to go back to the authentic sources… when we 
are making our judgements, we should be using the Quran and the Sunna, 
the sayings of the scholars as a basis… to give us a consciousness to make 
decisions in the things that we are doing… There is a problem I call Islam 
vs. culture, whether it be outside of America or American culture, which 
clashes with Islam. And many of us learnt Islam from our parents… and 
so we say that’s what they do in our country. We pray like this, we don’t 
marry those people over there because they live by the river, we live by 
the mountain...” 
The scholar contrasts a cultural Islam, or the Islam learnt from parents, with an 
authentic Islam based on scriptures. The latter, he argues, encourages a conscious and 
reasoned engagement with texts as opposed to an inherited form of religious practice. 
In contrast, cultural Islam is ridiculed for its “backward” or traditional embracement 
of practices such as marriage prohibitions, which have no basis in religious scriptures 
(see also Chapter Five).  
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Another popular scholar amongst second-generation Muslims, Yasir Qadhi, 
elaborates on the generational gap between Muslim migrant parents and their 
children. In a series of lectures on Culture clash: Immigrant Muslims raising children 
in the West, available on YouTube, he poses a question to Muslim first-generation 
parents: 
 “I want to ask the parents to think about a human phenomenon... it’s part 
of our nature to want our children to be like us, to keep our ways and our 
traditions… but I ask you an honest question, how similar to your parents 
are you? It’s not going to happen, be realistic, be pragmatic. We as people 
who have been born and raised here cannot act the way you were our age. 
We can’t! We have grown up in a time and culture that is radically 
different! There are elements that will be preserved, like religion… there 
are things that won’t. Don’t get angry if certain elements are lost – retain 
the most important. And those are religious in nature.” 
Yasir Qadhi stresses the importance of generational change, of allowing second-
generation Muslims to abandon aspects of their inherited culture as long as they retain 
the authentic teachings of Islam. Religion here is presented as a form of continuity 
with cultural practices, as opposed to the radical break or clash depicted by Abdullah 
Hakim Quick. 
Drawing on these scholars, many second-generation Somali women criticise their 
parents for not fully separating out and prioritising religion over culture, and for 
failing to adequately choose amongst different aspects of culture. This discursive 
strategy, which is illustrated in the following section and recurs throughout this thesis 
(sections 3.4; 4.4.1 and 5.3), has also been noted amongst other young Muslims in 
Europe (Ewing 2008; Roy 2004; Schmidt 2002; Jacobson 1997; 1998). Jacobson 
(1997), for example, explores how amongst second-generation Bangladeshis in 
London, ethnicity is perceived as an attachment to traditions and customs and denotes 
an attachment to a country or region of origin, whereas religion is understood as an 
attachment to an absolute truth and to a global community. This “collective ideal” 
enables young people to feel part of a global trend, and thus to reject their parents’ 
teachings on these grounds (Jacobson 1997; Gardner and Skakur 1994).  
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Whilst these forms of identification are certainly true of my second-generation 
informants, my interest is in how they involve new understandings of the self and 
self-other relations. These women’s critique of the cultural attitude of their parents – 
which also ignores the changes that many first-generation Somali women are 
undergoing – is deployed as a way of differentiating oneself from the older 
generations and from a Somali past (see Chapter Six). It is employed to contrast an 
inherited, and hence traditional or cultural attitude to culture, with a mode of self-
fashioning based on liberal choice and autonomy. As the following example 
demonstrates, what is at stake in their criticisms of the older generation is their 
perception that their mothers have failed to fully engage with culture in a conscious, 
willing and autonomous manner, so that it continues to be unconsciously inherited as 
part of their lifeworlds.  
2.5 Second-generation Somali women: a play on FGM 
Throughout my fieldwork I volunteered on a campaign project entitled Community 
Against FGM. Implemented by a local community organisation in Tower Hamlets in 
partnership with the national charity Forward UK, the project aimed to raise 
awareness about female genital cutting or mutilation.36 The first phase involved 
conducting primary research with first- and second-generation Somali men and 
women about the practice. Amongst many of the preliminary findings, the organisers 
learnt that the practice was still widespread and, although some women had 
abandoned it out for fear of prosecution,37 this had not altered their attitudes towards 
the practice. The campaign, therefore, set out to tackle and alter the attitudes held by a 
diverse group of first-generation Somalis. In addition, based on the findings it also 
aimed to encourage men, who they felt took a passive stance on the issue, to 
pressurise families and communities into abandoning the practice, and to empower 
young women to speak out against perpetrators.  
                                                
36 The campaign used the term FGM (female genital mutilation) and I shall from hereonin employ this 
term. Forward UK is an African women-led UK charity that works towards advancing and 
safeguarding the sexual and reproductive health and rights of African girls and women.  
37 FGM has been a criminal offence since 1985 but in 2003 under the FGM Act it became illegal, inter 
alia, to travel abroad and assist a non-UK person to undergo the practice on a British national or 
resident. 
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At the heart of this campaign was the message that FGM was a cultural practice that 
had no legitimacy in religious texts. The project recruited a small group of Somali 
Sheikhs (religious scholars), mostly in the east London area to cooperate and reach a 
consensus on the illegality of FGM in Islamic law, and to raise awareness about the 
cultural nature of the practice. Despite initial disagreements amongst the scholars 
about the extent to which circumcision was sunna,38 those who were able to find a 
consensus on the issue were invited to participate in a series of workshops in schools, 
community centres, and mosques with Somali women and men across different age 
groups. It was hoped that the scholars would use their authority in the community to 
exert their religious opinion and override any cultural understanding of the practice. 
Thus, the project presumed that Somalis already prioritised religious knowledge over 
cultural practices and would be persuaded by the arguments presented by the scholars. 
The project culminated in a play entitled The Muted Cry, which was first performed in 
October 2011 throughout the Somali Week Festival (SWF) to an audience of men and 
women of all ages, and followed by a discussion panel. SWF is an annual event that 
takes place throughout Black History Month. Funded in part by the Arts Council, it is 
held annually at Oxford House in Bethnal Green, east London and aims to celebrate 
Somali arts by inviting a range of international Somali poets, writers, comedians, 
artists, and musicians (see Figure 4). Most of the artists are first-generation men from 
Somali-speaking territories who attract an older audience of both men and women. 
While young Somalis occasionally attend poetry, music, or comedy events with first-
generation artists, they often complain that they do not understand the language or 
humour, and feel somewhat alienated from these aspects of their culture. However, 
some of the SWF events are specifically organised to showcase women’s artistic 
productions and others are aimed at second-generation playwrights and poets and 
frequented by younger Somalis in the diaspora.  
The Muted Cry was an event that sought to highlight, but also bridge, this 
generational divide. It was performed on a Thursday evening in a large hall crowded 
with mostly Somali women of different ages and only some non-Somalis and Somali 
                                                
38 Some scholars maintained that some form of circumcision was sunna (based on the Prophet’s 
teaching) whereas others denied it. It was only the latter group of religious scholars that took part in the 
workshops. 
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men. The play features Hodan, a young Somali girl who is taken by her mother from 
the UK to Hargiesa on holiday, where she undergoes FGM, and returns to London 
traumatised by the practice. As the play unfolds, familial conflicts and disagreements 
are revealed: Hodan never appears on stage but her father, worried of tarnishing the 
reputation of the Somali community and the honour of his family, prefers to brush the 
incident under the carpet. The mother is informed, by her son, of the criminality of 
her act and the possibility of prosecution. However, concerned about her daughter’s 
health and plagued by guilt she ignores his warning. Meanwhile Hodan’s cousins, and 
brother, all second-generation Somalis, angered and frustrated by these reactions, 
debate the religiosity of the practice and finally appeal to a Somali Sheikh, who 
appears on stage holding a Quran. The stage lights are dimmed and a spot light 
highlights his upper body, as he informs the audience that FGM is a non-religious, 
cultural, and traditional practice: there is no Islamic evidence for the practice, except 
for a “weak hadith”. The Sheikh continues: 
 “Moving on to the way Somalis practice female circumcision, that 
method is one which is opposed to Islamic ruling and tradition and it has 
nothing to do with Islam. This method is one which is traced back to 
ancient cultures and traditions and religion is very much opposed to it. 
The religion is opposed to everything which harms the person, their body, 
their mind and psychological well being. Therefore, it is unlawful and 
forbidden and this harmful way Somalis practice female circumcision 
should be stopped. Everything that harms a Muslim person is not allowed 
and forbidden. May Allah guide us to the right path.” 
The play concludes with a call for the eradication of the practice so that Somalis may 
progress into the future, reiterated by the following dialogue amongst the younger 
generation: 
Ali: Youngsters... Are we crazy, or empty of any thought process, have 
we no shame... We, the educated, we, who claim to be modern and yet we 
have been convinced that some cultural and traditional practice…. 
Naima: This method of female circumcision brings shame on to the 
culture and tradition of the Somalis, it is a stigma and black spot against 
the Islamic religion and it is damaging and traumatic for girls, it is 
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unlawful and totally forbidden in Islam. Everyone else has progressed and 
is in the 21st century apart from us.  
 (Enters a crowd of young women and men) 
Mukhtaar: Who is pushing this practice? Are men supporting this, are 
women propagating this practice. Guys speak up, are you guys supporting 
the continuation of this practice in our community?  
Guys: No… No… No  
Naima: Are the girls happy for our community to become a butcher house 
for girls?  
Girls: No… Noooooooooo. No! 
Naima: Then what devil is pushing this practice in our community and 
why won’t it stop?  
Ali: I will tell you why this practice will not stop: it is because of the lack 
of knowledge and the lack of power and connection of our community 
which is helping this practice. Look, none of us here support this practice, 
yet still it is going on… 
The performance was followed by a discussion panel including representatives from 
Daughters of Eve Project, Negaad a Somaliland-based NGO, Forward UK and 
Equality Now. Diverse arguments were raised against the practice: some used the 
language of rights; some highlighted the health and medical implications; while others 
gave graphic descriptions of the practice, condemning its brutality. Referring to the 
play, many of the panellists emphasised the necessity that religious scholars begin a 
public dialogue, and avoid delivering conflicting messages regarding the practice.39  
The play sends a clear message that FGM is a cultural practice that must be discarded 
because it contradicts religious practice and belief. Circumcision is cast as a negative 
cultural, ethnic, and traditional practice that religious knowledge should seek to 
eradicate. These accusations are also often voiced by younger Somali girls towards 
their mothers, who employ this discourse to mark themselves as different from the 
                                                
39 Since the original screening of the play, the organisers have recorded it on film, and added Somali 
subtitles. It has been screened on several different occasions and employed as an awareness-raising tool 
in workshops across London.  
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first-generation (Talle 2008; Johnsdotter 2007).40 
Culture is condemned as traditional, barbaric and uncivilized. The final dialogue of 
the play reinforces the associations between religion, education, awareness, modernity, 
and future progress. Religious knowledge must serve as a means of uniting the Somali 
community, enabling them to collectively select amongst elements of their culture 
that do not conflict with religious textual knowledge. Although campaigns to 
eradicate FGM were also present throughout the 1980s in the former Somali 
Democratic Republic, these were articulated through a discourse of tradition vs. 
modernity. We can see how this has now been replaced with reformist ideas that 
stress religion vs. culture and tradition.41  
Written, directed, and performed by second-generation Muslims in English, the play 
also marks a clear generational divide. Hodan’s mother forces her to undergo FGM, 
and her father ignores the younger generation’s plea to reflect on, and confront, the 
problem and consult a Sheikh. The woman is represented stereotypically as the carer 
of familial well being, as well as emotionally vulnerable and easily persuaded by 
others, whereas the father is presented as authoritative and the defender of family 
honour. Both parents are represented as adopting a cultural attitude, uncritically 
performing cultural practices. In the final scene described above, only the younger 
educated and modern generation stand at the front and call out for the eradication of 
the practice. Ali cries out to the young to reflect and act, rather than passively allow 
the practice to continue in order to avoid the errors of his parent’s generation. The 
young must scrutinise their actions and values in order to separate themselves from 
the practice; only reflection on these unconsciously adopted cultural elements, which 
are associated with the past, will enable progress into the future. The play is, therefore, 
also a critique by second-generation Somalis of their parent’s inability to approach 
culture as object, and to fully separate religion from culture and act independently of 
culture.  
                                                
40 See Hussein (2008) for a report on changing attitudes towards FGM amongst Somali women in the 
borough of Waltham Forest, London. 
41 Efforts to eradicate female genital cutting were already present throughout Barre’s regime. For 
example, in 1988 an international seminar was held in Mogadishu with the aim of spreading awareness 
of, and eradicating the practice.  
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2.6 Culture and self-fashioning 
I have argued thus far that what is at stake in these criticisms of the second-generation 
towards their parents is a process of self-stylisation, through which young women are 
constituting new self-other relations and engaging the ethical imagination by 
distancing themselves from the past, and from older kin. Young Somali women are 
seeking solutions to a problematized notion of culture, and in so doing, are 
refashioning themselves. As we have seen, they argue that older kin inherit culture; 
culture is thus presented as determining of their actions and practices.  
Commenting on the culturalization of political and civil conflict, Wendy Brown 
(2006) argues that liberalism has imagined and positioned non-liberal people as ruled 
by culture in opposition to liberal people who have culture. This juxtaposition is 
played out in a series of oppositions between non-liberalised culture and moral 
autonomy, freedom, and equality. The liberal subject is assumed to have an ability to 
abstract herself from a context. The opposite consists of an “organicist creature 
considered to lack rationality and will, [whereby] culture and religion... are saturating 
and authoritative” (ibid 2006: 301). For the liberal subject, culture and religion 
become a "background", that can be "entered" and "exited"; culture is thus rendered 
extrinsic rather than constitutive of the subject, it becomes “food, dress, music, 
lifestyle, and contingent values” (ibid 2006: 301). The latter, on the other hand, 
involves an “optional” relationship to culture – the non-liberal is determined by 
cultural rules. In section 2.2 I argued that policy and legal discourses on 
multiculturalism portray culture as a determining force, so that cultural and ethnic 
minorities are seen as constrained by culture and juxtaposed to the liberal autonomous 
(Western) self (Phillips 2007). Second-generation women are therefore drawing on 
and twisting this discourse by positioning their mothers as determined by culture, and 
imagining themselves as autonomous agents, able to articulate an “optional” 
relationship to Somali culture. 
These young women’s criticisms are captured by the ways in which they ridicule 
older Somalis for their habits and for their “typical Somali” forms of behaviour. A 
running joke between many second-generation Somalis in London refers to two 
imaginary figures, Halimo and Farah. These names signify the stereotypical, 
traditional, Somali woman and man, and are often used by younger women to mock 
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mothers and older kin. These figures are given old-fashioned names and their 
behaviour resonates with ideas of tradition and culture. Halimo is said to be abrupt, 
wears mis-matching colourful dirac and garbasaar (northern Somali dress and 
shawl), has a traditional conception of gender relations, often makes embarrassingly 
racist remarks,42 and is overly preoccupied with clan. Halimo is cultural, rather than 
religious, and therefore ignorant of both British culture and religious knowledge. 
Maryam, a young practising Somali woman was particularly skilful at acting out an 
imaginary Halimo. Occasionally, if one of her friends donned a particularly bright 
hijab or pronounced an old-fashioned Somali expression, she would imitate and mock 
her by calling her “Halimo”, thus using the figure’s name to describe a particular 
behaviour. At weddings, much to our amusement, Maryam frequently enjoyed 
imitating Somali traditional “Halimo” ways of dancing. These performances were 
also replicated in my informants’ behaviour towards “freshies” – Somalis who have 
recently arrived from the Somali regions – as I describe in Chapter Four. Through 
these imitations, and by mocking traditional behaviour, young Somalis present 
themselves as different, educated, and aware of these unconscious dimensions of 
culture. Humour is used as a way of separating themselves from older generation and 
Somalis.  
As I have illustrated in the previous section, young Somalis, like some of their 
mothers, stress the importance of choosing the aspects of Somali culture which are 
compatible with religion and reject the practices, objects, or values, (e.g. FGM, Nikko 
dancing, clan ideology, etc.) that conflict with religious knowledge. Moore (2011) 
elaborates on this process of objectification in her discussion of alternative rites of 
passage (ARP) amongst the Marakwet in Kenya. As a consequence of pressure from 
NGOs, ARPs have been implemented as a means of eradicating the practice of FGM 
by celebrating positive cultural values and practices and discarding others, like the 
play I described above. ARPs, Moore claims, have emerged as a set of “identifiable 
processes and practices” which stress key “positive” cultural values, whilst rejecting 
traditional practices such as FGM. These rites position parents as tied to culture and 
represent a transfer of power, from parents and kin networks to pastors and NGOs. As 
                                                
42 Younger Somali women often ridiculed their mothers for considering themselves ethnically different 
and morally superior to other African women.  
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Moore (2011: 53) points out, “choosing the good parts has become emblematic of 
modern ways of thinking and doing, as people increasingly engage with a process of 
self-fashioning cast in the idiom of new forms of knowledge.”43 Embracing the “good” 
parts of culture is crucial to young second-generation Somali women’s processes of 
self-making. These engagements are shaped by multicultural policies and discourses 
in the UK that reify cultural difference and equate it with ethnicity and bounded 
notions of community (Baumann 1996). 
Young women emphasise the importance of participating in cultural events, wearing 
traditional Somali clothes, eating Somali food, and reading and reciting Somali 
poetry, as a way of celebrating Somali culture. Similarly, Valentine & Sporton (2009: 
742), note how for young teenage Somalis, the importance of “being Somali” was 
"produced through everyday domestic practices, from the language spoken, clothing 
worn and faith practiced, through to the food eaten" (see also Hopkins 2010). Somalis 
talk about Somali culture as a set of inherited practices, values, and objects that they 
willingly embrace.  
In the initial vignette Idil, Sofia’s daughter, identifies Nikko as a cultural practice, one 
that she has embraced and enjoys displaying to others. It is this conscious engagement 
with culture that young women often stress. During Somali Week 2011, Huda, a 
young second-generation woman exhibited and sold Somali crafts that she had 
collected on her previous visit to Hargeysa. Amongst the most popular items were 
those used by Somali nomads to collect, sieve, and carry camel milk. It was unclear to 
other participants of the event whether these were objects used in the past, or whether 
they were employed by present-day nomadic Somalis. As people approached her stall 
at the festival, Huda proudly explained the purpose and use of each item, sharing her 
enthusiasm, and appreciation of these cultural items. Culture was reified for her as a 
set of objects pertaining to an ahistorical nomadic pastoral tradition. 
                                                
43 Moore argues that a new model of knowledge has emerged, marking an epistemic break from a 
process where individuals learnt and were transformed through action, to one where they learn through 
accumulating knowledge in formalised settings modelled on contemporary educational practices. This 
deployment of culture in Marakwet, Moore concludes, is not only a consequence of national politics, 
Christian and NGO advocacy, international legal instruments and human rights discourses, but also of 
new forms of knowledge, agency, and self-fashioning. (ibid 2011: 54). 
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Similarly, Anab, a young second-generation woman, frequently stressed the 
importance of celebrating aspects of her Somali culture. At university she had set up 
the first Somali society, and had been an active participant in a second-generation led 
movement campaigning against clan ideology, and in favour of political change back 
home. She often shared with me her passion for Somali arts and poetry “I love that 
aspect of Somali culture and I love to revive it in my own self” she explained on one 
occasion. She had begun to compose her own poetry, drawing on traditional Somali 
poetry genres. When I discussed this chapter with her over dinner at my house, she 
added, “When I speak Somali, I really like it cause I feel it’s what makes me Somali, 
and I’m proud of it… When I look at myself in the mirror wearing a head wrap, I feel 
that somehow I’m connecting to my grandmother, I look at myself and think of the 
connection between us… through this object.” Embracing the “good parts” of culture 
was a way for Anab and many other second-generation women to connect with 
Somali kin, through a willing engagement with what they perceive to be a shared 
culture.  
This engagement with culture also includes embracing a set of “positive” values of 
hospitality, care, and kinship loyalty, and reciprocity. Aman, for example, another 
second-generation Somali woman, claimed that older Somali women were overly 
preoccupied with kin obligations precisely because they had been “educated” or 
socialised in this way. Unlike them, she had the distance to critically consider the 
burden of financially supporting extended kin. However, she stressed it was one of 
those dimensions of culture that she had learnt to accept. “Us Somalis… it’s 
something we’ll always have to do”, she explained, “sometimes it’s too much though 
and we need to separate ourselves from it. But not like they do here in the UK, where 
everyone does for themselves, we need to find something in between.” For Aman, the 
older generation simply helped kin because they had always done so, whereas women 
of her generation had the choice and could therefore learn to negotiate a “safe” 
distance from this cultural value and norm. 
Whilst this process of selection and objectification is evident in the engagements with 
Somali culture of both generations, younger women stress that the older generations 
are unable to fully objectify culture and adequately “pick and choose”. In selecting 
amongst identifiable elements of culture, however, the content of culture has not 
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remained static nor has it been emptied of meaning. As with Anab’s reworking of 
Somali poetry, the following example illustrates how young women actively seek to 
update and revise Somali culture. 
2.7 Updating culture 
Miss Somali was organised in 2010 in West London by a group of young, mostly non-
practising Somali women. Amongst them was Idil, Sofia’s daughter, who worked at 
Nomad radio, a web-based radio programme featuring Somali shows and music and 
issues relating to the Somali community in London. Like other initiatives such as 
Sheeko magazine, or Somali on Air, another radio program, Nomad aims to portray an 
alternative image of Somali youth in the UK, who are often associated by the media 
with youth gangs, crime, unemployment, or FGM.  
Promoted as an event that encouraged “Beauty with Principles” and one that would 
build “socio-economic bridges in the community” Miss Somali was advertised across 
London and was awaited in trepidation and excitement by Somali youngsters. 
Organised in a conference hall, and costing £20 per head, the event was marketed as a 
glamorous, modern, and professional affair. The logo (Figure 9) that appeared on the 
Facebook group and also adorned the stage, captured the manner in which the 
organisers sought to merge traditional Somali culture, with modern ideals of 
education and development as well as contemporary styles. It was described on 
Facebook as follows: 
 “The Union Jack (in the shape of Somali speaking territories) is supposed 
to represent “integration” into the UK. The leaves symbolise peace, 
natural beauty, and cultural and traditional backgrounds (roots). The scroll 
at the bottom stands for intelligence, development and perseverance. 
We’ve chosen the colour scheme to signify sophistication, sleek and 
modern. Silver was purposely considered as it is a precious (hence the 
crown), classy, elegant and distinguished [sic]. We have had a lot of 
positive feedback about the logo, many people said it was creative yet 
simple.” 
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I attended the event with my friend Deeqa, a woman in her mid 30s who had spent her 
teens in Mogadishu and subsequently moved to Italy to attend university in Rome. 
She had recently moved to London in search of employment, and worked part-time at 
a community centre. Non-practising, she arrived beautifully dressed in a dirac and 
garbasaar across her shoulders, with her hair nicely done up. Although the dirac 
originates from northern Somali territories it only became fashionable amongst 
Somalis in the 1960s (Akou 2011), and amongst Somalis in the diaspora it has come 
to symbolise traditional Somali cultural dress. It is typically worn at weddings and 
other Somali events. Because some dirac are made of semi-transparent fabric, 
practising women prefer not to wear it outside female-only events.  
“I never wear this!” Deeqa laughed, “but at a Somali event it’s ok!” As we made our 
way up the red carpeted stairs, the handrails decorated with pink ribbons, I could not 
help but notice an X Factor resemblance to the event: the jury was positioned in the 
front row, the lights were dimmed and there was an air of forced glam and 
sophistication. The resemblance might not have been unintentional, as the Saturday 
night program is one of the most popular shows amongst young people in Britain, and 
those with a Somali heritage here are no exception.  
In contrast to Deeqa, most of the young women were dressed in formal Western 
evening wear and the men donned suits. Professional photographers had set up a 
studio at the entrance to the theatre for anyone interested in having their picture taken, 
and a few volunteers were selling soft drinks at the bar. This was nothing like the 
Somali Week Festival or the many community events organised by the elder Somalis; 
it purposefully aimed at celebrating Somali culture, whilst portraying it as modern and 
fashionable.  
I could sense Deeqa’s unease with the spectacle that was unfolding in front of her. 
Not only did she feel older than the people present, but she also felt more 
“authentically” Somali. Throughout, she commented on how these youngsters knew 
very little about Somali history and culture, which became apparent as the evening 
progressed. The event consisted of musical and theatrical entertainment, but its 
centre-piece was a fashion-show/beauty-pageant during which the contestants were 
assessed on their outfits, and their answers to various questions posed by the jury. The 
contestants walked down the catwalk in front of the jury showing off four different 
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outfits. Traditional wear constituted one of the four categories, and each contestant 
was asked a question about Somali culture. The only contestant in hijab, who had 
tailored her dress out of a Somali Republic flag, was asked to describe the flag and 
label the five Somali territories in the Horn. Deeqa sighed with the response, relieved 
these young girls had at least a little knowledge of their country. Another young 
woman was questioned about her favourite Somali food. The event continued with the 
women displaying a series of contemporary Western outfits, interspersed with 
performances by aspiring female Somali poets, a Nigerian comedian, and the rapper 
Que. When Miss Somali was announced, the clapping and excitement of the audience 
drowned out her voice out. She pranced back on stage, provocatively holding a 
Somaliland flag above her head, as a crown was placed on her head with the crowd 
erupting in further applause.44 Deeqa looked away, irritated by what she saw as a 
divisive political statement in a space that, for her, was meant to be celebrating pan-
Somali traditional culture. 
As we walked away from the event, Deeqa commented on her disappointment with 
the event. “Most of it had nothing to do with Somalis!” she complained. Having been 
raised in Mogadishu, Deeqa felt that younger Somalis were ignorant of what was 
really and “authentically” Somali. Similarly, many of the older mothers whom I 
frequented throughout my fieldwork often lamented the ways in which they felt their 
children had lost any sense of Somali culture. Sofia, for example, whose daughter Idil 
was in the organising committee of Miss Somali complained on numerous occasions 
about her daughter’s detachment from Somali culture. “My daughters are not proper 
Somali daughters” she moaned one evening, “I love them anyways, but sometimes I 
look at them and don’t recognise them… we don’t have the same feelings even though 
we are mother and daughters.” 
Idil saw her participation in Miss Somali as a way of engaging with, and updating, 
Somali culture. It was a way of willingly connecting with her older kin, including her 
mother. Her mother Sofia, however, did not feel this connection. According to her, 
                                                
44 The Republic of Somaliland declared independence in 1991. It remains internationally unrecognised 
and the issue of independence is hotly contested amongst Somalis in the diaspora.  
 88 
Somali culture was more than that: it was also about sharing feelings and inherited 
dispositions; aspects she felt she had failed to transmit to her daughter.  
2.8 Conclusion  
I began this chapter by suggesting that culture has become problematized in the 
contemporary moment, giving rise to a series of questions around the make-up of 
culture and people’s engagements with it. These queries have been taken up by two 
generations of Somali women. As I highlighted in the original vignette, the practice 
of Nikko dancing raised a series of concerns amongst a small group of Somali women; 
Is Nikko authentically Somali? What is the relationship between this aspect of culture 
and religion? How should we engage with Somali culture? What is our relation to a 
Somali past and to Somali kin? Throughout this chapter, I have unravelled the ways in 
which a diverse group of Somali women engage in this area of problematization, by 
formulating different responses to some of these queries. 
By investigating changes across two generations of Somali women, I have traced a 
series of historical shifts. First, I explored how Somali traditional culture was reified, 
romanticised, and objectified in various ways throughout the 1950s-1970s, and how 
first-generation Somali women, who were raised in Mogadishu throughout the period, 
engaged with this notion of culture. Second, I considered how, in recent years, 
reformist discourses have impacted on the ways in which both first and second 
generations understand and relate to Somali culture. Throughout both periods, culture 
has been increasingly reduced to a set of values, practices, objects, and attitudes; 
religious knowledge has been prioritised and has come to provide a moral framework 
informing the process of selection amongst a set of cultural elements. This has 
allowed for the “bad parts” of culture (clan ideology, dancing, FGM, etc.) to be 
discarded, and the “good parts” (clothes, food, kin values and obligations etc.) to be 
retained. However, as I demonstrated through the Miss Somali event, young second-
generation Somalis have simultaneously been working to update and rework Somali 
culture in distinct ways, forcing older Somali women to question the authenticity of 
these claims and criticise their daughters’ lack of attachments to culture.  
These historical transformations, I maintain, reveal the younger women’s historically 
specific engagements with the ethical imagination. As I have shown, young women 
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appropriate liberal concepts within multicultural discourses and policy frameworks, 
alongside reformist discourses, and a reified notion of Somali tradition and culture, in 
order to reformulate their own understandings of themselves and their relations with 
others. Debates about culture become a means through which these women engage in 
processes of self-making. However, the meanings attached to culture are malleable 
and constantly shifting because the women’s relations to culture constitute constantly 
refracted subject positions. They cannot therefore be taken as descriptive terms or 
analytical entities precisely because they constitute historically specific means of 
engaging with the world and with others. 
Second-generation women emphasise liberal concepts of choice and conscious 
awareness as modes of subjectification to culture. Their ultimate aim – or telos – is to 
construe themselves as autonomous subjects vis-à-vis older kin, a Somali past, and 
Somali culture. In order to differentiate themselves through processes of dis-
identification and disavowal, they associate older Somali kin with the past, but also 
construe them as determined by culture, and as unconsciously inhabiting culture. 
These young women’s relations with their older kin therefore acquire a temporal 
dimension: young women seek to break with the past and project the self forward (see 
chapter Six). 
Contrary to dominant discourses on multiculturalism, which equate religion with 
culture and community (Werbner 2009: 30), young Somali women separate religion 
from culture, and understand themselves differently in relation to each notion. As I 
explore in the following chapter, public representations of Islamic practices, such as 
the donning of the hijab, frequently equate the latter with community values. In 
contrast, young Somali women stress the importance of understanding these practices 
as religious, rather than cultural. Their modes of engagements and practices of ethical 
self-fashioning, in relation to religious practice and faith, differ and engage different 
elements of the ethical imagination compared to those outlined in this chapter.
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Figure 5: Somali woman, Mogadishu, 1979 
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Figure 6: Somali woman, circa 1980s 
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Figure 7: Mother and daughters, Whitechapel, 2013 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 8: Young women, Whitechapel, 2013 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(Faces have been obscured to protect the anonymity of the individuals concerned). 
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Figure 9: The Miss Somali Event logo, 2009 
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Chapter 3: Multiculturalism and the problematization of the 
Muslim subject 
3.1 Make Bradford British 
In February 2012, my practising Somali friends, Layla and Ifrah, advised me to watch 
Make Bradford British, a Channel 4 two-part reality TV show. They had both seen it 
that week and were looking forward to exchanging opinions on the show, a common 
event whenever a TV program featured Muslim participants or characters. A year 
following Cameron’s speech in Munich on the demise of multiculturalism (see 
Appendix B), the program is presented as an experiment in multiculturalism – an 
opportunity to question how individuals from different classes, cultural and religious 
backgrounds can live together, and whether there is such a thing as a shared sense of 
“Britishness”. “Is this a future defined by difference? Or one which brings us together 
as a nation?” the program editor, Heenan Bhatti, purports to investigate. Make 
Bradford British, he insists, offers “a positive contribution to the on-going debate 
around what constitutes a collective national identity”. 45 
Set in one of the most notoriously “segregated” cities of the UK, in the first episode, 
the project managers and “community and diversity experts”, Taiba Yasseen and 
Laurie Trott bring together 100 British citizens from Bradford to sit the Life in the UK 
test.46 Eight participants, representing different ethnic, racial, class and religious 
backgrounds, are selected, out of the 90 individuals who failed the test. Amongst 
them is Damon, a metal sheet worker, who lives in a predominantly white area of 
Bradford, Maura a former magistrate from a middle-class suburb, and two young 
Muslims, Sabbiyah and Rashid. The participants, encouraged by the organisers to “be 
honest” and display their prejudices, are asked to share a large house, with the aim of 
recreating a microcosm of a multicultural society. Tension builds as Rashid, a devout 
Muslim and former rugby league player, insists on participating in congregational 
prayer at the mosque, five times a day. The almost exclusive focus of the episode is 
                                                
45 http://www.channel4.com/programmes/make-bradford-british/articles/why-bradford 
46 A pass on the test is a requirement, under the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act, 2002, for 
anyone taking up British citizenship. 
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on the “problematic” nature of this Islamic practice; the other inhabitants of the house 
complain as Rashid’s trips to the mosque disrupt vital decision-making processes such 
as drawing up shopping lists and Sabbiyah argues with him at the dinner table over 
his interpretations of prayer. He is filmed explaining, “a person who prays in 
congregation gets the reward 25 to 27 times more than a person who prays 
individually”. His commitment depicts prayer not only as a barrier to successful 
integration but as part of a straightforward point-accruing system. The episode ends 
with a trip for the group and Rashid compromising on his Mosque praying; he prays 
in a forest instead, a scene that moves Maura to tears. 
In part two, the participants are paired up and made to live in each other’s homes. 
Sabbiyah, the young hijabi Muslim woman, is paired up with Audrey, a mixed-race 
landlady of a Bradford pub. On her first day of serving soft drinks in the pub, a white 
middle-aged man in the pub attacks Sabbiyah. “How long have you been in this 
country? Why are you dressed like that?” he asks provocatively. “I was born and 
bought up here… it’s my identity, it’s part of who I am”, the young woman replies, 
taken aback by the comment. “If you were born here, why not take up our identity… 
our wear? When was the last time you dressed in a mini skirt and a low cut top?” he 
questions. “I don’t want to wear a mini-skirt and a low cut top! I’m covering my 
modesty” Sabbiyah responds trying to defend herself. At that point, another woman 
intervenes on the man’s behalf: “I don’t mean no disrespect, but this young lady looks 
beautiful in what she’s got on… but it don’t fit in, it’s not like us. If you’re in 
England, be like English people”. Intimidated Sabbiyyah retreats, sobbing quietly in 
the corner of the pub: “I’ve never questioned my identity, never, for the first time I 
felt myself questioning it. Am I really British? Can I ever be seen as British?” 
Although Audrey initially struggles to empathise with her, she reflects on the racist 
abuse she received in the past, noticing how this has now shifted to the Asian 
(Muslim) community. 
In the meantime Damon, who subsequently explains that he used to think mosques 
were “terror camps” and “secretive places”, is invited to live with Rashid, who makes 
every effort to “show good character” and the “good” side of Islam through his 
hospitality and his constant references to the virtues of Islam. Damon attends 
congregational prayer at the mosque, and in one of the final scenes of the show, he 
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reflects on what he has learnt from his encounter with Rashid: “Islam is not a bad 
religion… the ways of life are the old British ways.” As the program is brought to a 
close, this statement stands as a final summary and resolution to the initial tensions 
and conflicts. Not surprisingly, Channel 4’s political intervention and contribution to 
the multiculturalism debate is a simplistic, naïve statement encouraging an 
embracement of difference and recognition of shared values. Echoing political 
discourses on Britishness and national identity, it proposes that recognition of “shared 
British values”, will overcome the problems, and associated threats of segregation and 
marginalisation.  
In a series of interventions by the participants and organisers following the show, 
Sabbiyah embraces and further develops the proposed “solution” to the problem of 
multiculturalism. Questioned during an online interview on whether she understands 
Islam as compatible with Britishness, she replies: 
 “Yes Islam and Britishness are compatible for the following reasons: 
Islam promotes loyalty and love to one’s homeland, it promotes wellbeing 
and contribution to one’s community, and it promotes love and equality 
towards your neighbours. It ensures civil liberties and rights. Britishness 
to me is all of the above and thus Islam and Britishness work hand in 
hand.” 
Her response reveals a similar resolution to that envisioned by the program editors, 
whereby shared values of loyalty, equality, love, and a commitment to civil rights, 
define what it means to be both British and Muslim. 
On a Saturday evening, following the screening of the first episode, Layla and Ifrah, 
who had initially advised me to watch the show, came around for some food. As the 
conversation drifted from the latest YouTube hit, to the Channel 4 programme, Ifrah, 
a young 26-year-old practising youth worker, accused the participants of the show of 
over-reacting to Rashid’s desire to pray in the mosque. “Why can’t they just tell him 
what they’ve decided when he gets back?! Why are they making such a big deal of 
this?!” Layla, a 25-year old teacher, sighed, “He makes Islam seem so stupid and 
simplistic though!” The mistreatment suffered by Sabbiyah in the second episode, 
infuriated them further. Their frustration, however, unlike my own, was directed less 
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at the editing and directing of the show, and more at the participants. They worried 
about perpetuating stereotypical representations of Muslims and often criticised the 
depiction of Muslims in media and film. One such example is the Peter Kosminsky 
series Britz, which narrates the story of a young second-generation Muslim brother 
and sister in Bradford who, soon after the July 2005 bombings, take divergent paths: 
the brother takes up a job at MI5, whilst the sister trains to become a jihadist. My 
friend Ifrah had on one occasion expressed her anxieties about the show, which she 
felt contained unlikely, stereotypical, depictions of the Muslim community as 
segregated and patriarchal, organising jihadist meetings on university campuses, and 
training in jihadist camps in Pakistan, and so on.  
However, Make Bradford British pleasantly surprised these young women by the end, 
and both commended Rashid’s presentation of Islamic virtues, and the ways in which 
he challenged Damon’s prejudices. “It’s stereotypical, but at least the end is not the 
usual stuff about Muslims… Rashid redeems himself at the end, he’s good!” Layla 
exclaimed. Although Make Bradford British had reinforced the problematic nature of 
Muslim practices, according to my friends, it had fallen short of reiterating the 
“usual” conventions of other TV programs. It offered a positive resolution to the 
question of how to be British and Muslim, stressing interior virtues and values – 
aspects of Muslim subjectivities that my informants too were keen to emphasise – 
above the practices of prayer and hijab. 
3.2 The problem of being British and Muslim 
This chapter takes recent public debates on multiculturalism as a starting point and 
treats them as a distinctive field of problematization that centres on the question of 
what it means to be British and Muslim (see sections 1.6). As Foucault (2000) argues, 
within this general terrain of problematization – of the relation between Islam and 
Britishness – a set of intersecting domains offer a series of problems and challenges 
for politics and for self-formation. In what follows, I focus on the problem of what 
constitutes a Muslim subject, and on a series of related queries that are reproduced in 
debates on multiculturalism, and exemplified in shows such as Make Bradford 
British: what does it mean to be a Muslim? How do we know who is a Muslim? Do 
external practices make one a Muslim? This chapter is concerned with the ways in 
which this problem is articulated through a preoccupation with exterior practices, 
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such as Rashid’s prayer and Sabbiyah’s hijab, and with the relation between 
interiority and exteriority.  
These problematizations are evident in the current shift in public and political 
discourses and policies, where the notion of multiculturalism has become inseparable 
from the supposed “problem” of Islam. In Appendix B, I note how a recurring 
concern amongst politicians and public commentators is the notion that 
multiculturalism is producing segregated communities with conflicting values. At the 
heart of these discussions is, I suggest, a growing anxiety about Muslims’ supposed 
“difference”, and their place within the UK. In the post 9/11 climate, and increasingly 
following the July 2005 bombings in London, the Muslim problem in the UK has 
been debated through the lens of security, as Muslims have been associated with a 
global discourse of “cultural dysfunctionality”, “separatism”, violence and terrorism 
(Meer et al 2010; Werbner 2009; Grillo 2007). Muslims’ supposed “illiberal” values, 
are seen as a threat to British national identity. As reiterated in Make Bradford British 
and in Sabbiyah’s comment above, “British values” and “Britishness” are often 
evoked in public discourses to contrast a set of universal values of human rights and 
democracy, with essentialised notions of supposedly non-liberal, Muslim values. 
Accusations against Muslims’ allegedly non-liberal, conflicting values have been 
sparked by a series of national events including the Rushdie Affair, the Danish 
cartoon controversy in 2005, and the Archbishop of Canterbury’s suggestion in 2008 
that Islamic law should be formally recognised in the UK.47  
Here, I move beyond descriptive and prescriptive approaches to multiculturalism 
(Modood 2007; 2010), in order to critically examine the historically contingent nature 
of these problematizations and the forms of self-fashioning they enable and constrain 
(see section 1.1). I begin this chapter by exploring the interconnections between 
political debates and public perceptions, drawing out how these debates in Europe 
have been framed through a liberal-secular logic which has over-emphasised visible 
signs of difference. At the centre of this chapter is a focus on how young practising 
                                                
47 Mehdi Hassan (2012) has argued in the New Statesman that the recent “halal hysteria” by tabloid 
newspapers, about Muslims’ disregard for animal rights, is indicative of another wave of accusations 
against Islam’s incompatibility with British values. 
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women, such as Layla and Ifrah, intervene within this terrain of problematization and 
position themselves differently in relation to these debates.  
Within these debates around multiculturalism and the Muslim subject, certain 
practices such as the donning of the hijab or niqab have been singled out as objects of 
concern and scrutiny, and “attributed a status of exceptionality”; they have come to 
stand as religious symbols, as markers of authentic Muslim identity, and of the 
growing visibility of Islam (Bracke and Fadil 2012: 49). The hijab has become 
“fetishized” and symbolically overloaded; something Muslim women, as we shall see, 
simultaneously critique and reinscribe (Tarlo 2010: 75-6). In the UK, the issue of the 
niqab entered public debate relatively late following Jack Straw’s demand in 2006 
that Muslim women remove their niqab (face veils) during consultations in his 
constituency. He insisted that the niqab represented a "visible statement of separation 
and difference". Overnight, as Tarlo (2010) notes, the media transformed the issue by 
maximising otherness and obscuring the pre-existing debates on the niqab amongst 
British Muslims. The tabloid newspaper The Sun, ran a headline “Take off your veils” 
whilst The Mail and The Telegraph framed the issue by inserting a “Muslim problem 
page” dealing with anxieties about multiculturalism, and concerns about security, 
education and employment law (ibid 2010: 144).  
In his ethnography of the headscarf controversies in France, Bowen (2008) explores 
similar public debates, and unravels the historically constructed reasons underlying 
the law that led to the headscarf ban in public schools in France in 2004. His 
ethnography revolves around the ways in which politicians and public figures have 
reasoned about, and justified, their arguments and policies about Islam, politics, and 
public life. He traces the development of French state secularism, laïcité, and its 
grounding in Republican ideas of citizenship. He further accounts for these 
controversies by unravelling the historical relationship between the state, religion and 
the individual, the role of state institutions, the impact of the colonial past, and the 
role of the media in shaping public opinions.  
A Republican way of life, Bowen explains, requires that individuals agree on basic 
values. State institutions such as public schools, are designed to ensure uniformity and 
neutrality; they have the responsibility to guarantee individual freedoms, such as 
freedom from pressures, emanating from the family, community, and church (ibid 
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2008: 29). It is for this reason that Islam is seen as a threat to Republican values and 
national identity (see also Ewing 2008 for Germany). In France, these political 
discourses have permeated media depictions and popular perceptions around the 
visibility of Muslims in the public sphere. As in the case of the UK, the headscarf has 
been rhetorically linked to concrete social problems, such as the growth in 
communalism, and a lack of social mixing, the influence of “Islamism” in France, and 
the denigration of women. Furthermore, a Muslim’s everyday behaviour, such as 
prayer or the donning the hijab, has come to be treated as a sign of one’s values, and 
read as an unwillingness to “fit” into France (Bowen 2004a). As elsewhere in Europe, 
these popular depictions are revealing of the ways in which the headscarf has evoked 
deep-rooted feelings of fear, anxiety, and discomfort around national belonging, 
citizenship and sociality (Moors 2009).  
A recent body of work has investigated how these debates on multiculturalism 
supported by an underlying secular-liberal ethics (Asad 2003; see section 1.4). 
Fernando (2010) points out how argumentations around the headscarf in France are 
framed in terms of either personal choice or religious duty.48 As others have noted, 
they have often revolved around a “liberated” female national self who is contrasted 
with its Muslim (oppressed) other (Bracke and Fadil 2012; Ewing 2008).49 Fernando 
insists that legal frameworks and political and public discourses on religious freedom 
in France, and in Europe more generally, assume that religious practices are merely 
signs, or outward manifestations, of religious conscience and religious choice. Public 
discourses make a distinction between belief and practice, whereby the latter is 
constituted as “a second-order contingent expression of belief” (Fernando 2010: 27). 
According to this logic, banning the headscarf “does not constitute a violation of 
religious liberty because it has no effect on the believer’s [inner] conscience” (ibid 
2010: 26). Personal choice constitutes religious conscience, and the latter is divorced 
from submission to religious duties or practices. The problem with this articulation, 
                                                
48 Similarly, Bracke and Fadil (2012) argue that these debates are often mediated around a set of 
regulatory structures, amongst them is gender. They focus on the limitations of the question of whether 
the hijab is oppressive or emancipatory. 
49 This strategy of reinforcing boundaries of the nation through the demonisation of the “other” is not a 
new phenomenon (Ewing 2008; Said 1978).  
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Fernando goes on to argue, is that it leaves practising Muslims with no discursive 
space in which to conceptualise or articulate practices like veiling, which pious 
Muslim women consider a religious duty, albeit one that is inseparable from inner 
desire and choice (ibid 2010: 29). 
Make Bradford British inserts itself within this political context, offering its own 
solution, but also contributing to the problematization of Muslims in the UK. In what 
follows, I explore how young second-generation Somali women understand and make 
sense of what it means to be a Muslim by reflecting on the questions posed by 
multiculturalism debates. I investigate the manner in which they respond to these 
popular representations, and negotiate their processes of self-fashioning by altering 
their ideas of exterior practices, such as wearing the hijab, as well as interior 
dimensions of the self. I draw on recent anthropological work, which has also 
explored how pious Muslims in Europe manage these visibly Islamic practices in 
environments where they are seen as problematically “other” (see section 1.4; Bracke 
2011; Fadil 2011; Jacobsen 2011a; Jouili 2009). For example, these scholars explore 
how Muslim women, for whom these Islamic practices are primarily ethical 
techniques of self-discipline, challenge, negotiate or at times appropriate secular or 
liberal modes of subjectification.  
Building on this work, this chapter highlights how through multiple strategies of 
negotiation, young practising women reconfigure their understandings of interior and 
exterior dimension of their selves. I am interested not only in the different ways these 
women negotiate what they regard as an over-signification of exterior practices, but 
more importantly in the ways in which they rework their understandings of 
themselves by prioritising interiority (see Jacobsen 2011b: Chapter 6). In doing so, 
they distance themselves from the past, by insisting that they, unlike their mothers, 
work from the “inside-out”. Their understandings of the relationship between 
interiority and exteriority, and their prioritisation of interiority are, I argue, indicative 
of historical rearrangements and generational differences. The problematization of 
exteriority leads these young women to refashion contemporary Islamic pedagogies 
that stress the dialectic, mutually-constitutive relation between interior and exterior 
processes of the self, crucial to the fashioning of a pious Muslim subject (Mahmood 
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2001). By emphasising interiority, they rework the elements that are being 
problematized in public debates.  
The next section will proceed to look at Layla and her personal problematizations of 
the relationship between interiority and exteriority. I highlight how her critiques of 
her parents’ excessive preoccupations with exteriority and her concerns with being 
“too Muslim” in the workplace impact on her choice to don colourful skirts and hijab. 
I contrast her decision with Ifrah, a practising woman who, following a period of 
reflection, decides to adopt the jilbaab as a personal and collective challenge. Finally, 
I compare both of these women with Fatima, a non-believer, who continues to wear 
black abaya and hijab in order to appear visibly Muslim to her family and friends. 
These three narratives are woven together throughout the chapter to illustrate the 
ways second-generation Somali women constitute different, unstable and, at times 
contradictory, subject positions and in order to rethink notions of interiority and 
exteriority, faith and practice. 
3.3 The problem of interiority and exteriority 
Layla had had a difficult week when she came around for a coffee and chat. She had 
been arguing with her parents about her clothing, and her Muslim appearance had also 
been questioned in her workplace. Troubled and uncertain she had written a poem, in 
order to share her experiences and solutions with her friends, including Ifrah whom I 
introduced in the initial vignette. This is a fragment of her poem Inside-out, Outside-
in, which she had written and recorded on her laptop: 
Sister A is dressed in black, covered from head to toe, but she is empty 
inside. She looks down on people, judges them, and when I smile at her as 
she crosses me on the street she glances at me expressionless and hands 
me a book on Islamic rules of modesty. Sister B doesn’t even look like a 
Muslim on the outside, but when our paths cross she smiles and I can feel 
the warmth of her heart, the goodness emanating from her soul. We 
exchange greetings and part ways. But what if sister A merged with sister 
B to make Sister C? Someone who is God fearing, who strives to act and 
refuses to give in to desires and temptations, whose warmth of the heart 
and whose iman are visible on the outside. Sister C covers herself to 
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please her Creator; she is beautiful not because of the curves of her body 
(because these cannot be seen by other men except her husband) but 
because of what she is inside.  
Following the recording, she explained, 
“Islam is about the middle way, that’s why I say inside out, outside in, 
ultimately I think it’s better to be a good person inside, but it’s about 
balancing the two…. I think the inside is most important, but I’ve also 
seen how the outside works to make people more aware. If I’m wearing a 
hijab I’m less likely to shout, be loud and aggressive, swear… my 
behaviour changes as well because I’m representing Muslims, so I have 
an obligation in that sense.” 
Layla was questioning and problematizing the relation between interiority and 
exteriority and what it means, for her to be a Muslim; the poem captures her attempt 
to reconcile parental pressures, Islamic ideals, and a secular-liberal gaze. The “sisters” 
in the poem capture some of the different subject positions available to Layla, which I 
will analyse in more detail throughout the chapter.  
Layla, explicitly set out to attempt to define, and make sense of “the middle way”; she 
sought a sister C who could adequately balance the “inside” – a “warmth of heart” 
and emotional connection with God – with external practice. This recognition of the 
mutually-constitutive relation between exterior and interior dimensions of the self is 
informed by contemporary Islamic reformist teachings that emphasise the ways in 
which obligatory acts of worship, such as donning the hijab, are techniques of self-
fashioning which ought to arise from, but also cultivate, correct attitudes, intentions, 
and emotions (Mahmood 2001; see section 1.3). Modesty, for both Ifrah and Layla, is 
more than simply donning the hijab; it is a moral virtue acquired through the 
coordination of outward behaviour and inward dispositions (Mahmood 2005: 135). As 
Layla explained, the hijab works to make her “more aware” of her behaviour. 
Similarly, Ifrah explained to me, “Once you have the hijab, it shifts the way you 
behave, the way you feel. You start being modest in dress and behaviour”. Modesty 
requires training oneself to cultivate emotions and sincere (ikhlas) intentions (niyyah) 
that subsequently motivate one to act. As Jacobsen (2011b: 316) points out in relation 
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to young Muslims in Norway, the “inner” hijab relates to consciousness of modesty, 
and the “outer” hijab refers to both the manifestation of inner modesty and to its 
disciplinary dimension. Ultimately, as this chapter will demonstrate, what constitutes 
the “middle way” is unclear and unstable; whilst most young second-generation 
women agree with Layla’s insistence that the “inside is more important”, they vary in 
their negotiations of exteriority with interiority.  
3.4 Sister A: exteriority as cultural 
To return to Layla’s poem, Sister A is depicted as judgemental, fixated on rules and 
regulations and on perfecting external practices, whilst being “empty” on the inside. 
Her attitude to the hijab reflects the ways in which Rashid’s prayer is depicted in 
Make Bradford British: dogmatic, un-reflexive, un-reasoned, and an obstacle to 
successful integration. By discarding sister A, Layla positions herself against a 
prioritisation of exteriority. This could be seen as a distancing from a strict adherence 
to rules and obligations pertaining to particular interpretations of Islam, as well as 
from an Islamic tradition that emphasises virtuous action above states of mind (Asad 
1993: 219). Sister A also epitomises the cultural attitude towards the hijab from 
which Layla and many second-generation Somali women distance themselves, and 
attribute to their parents (see Chapter Two).  
Layla frequently argued with her parents about her clothing. Although she worked as 
a secondary school teacher, she continued to live at home with her parents and five 
younger siblings. Raised in a religious home, as a child she had been strongly 
encouraged to don the hijab by her parents, but throughout her degree, she began to 
reflect on religion and question her reasons for wearing it. “I started thinking, am I 
just wearing it because I’ve been told to?” she had asked herself. In retrospect she 
wishes she had not been pushed to wear it as a child. “Children should not be taught 
rules regimentally, but they should learn to accept them themselves”, she had 
explained to me. Like the other female members of her family, she consistently wore 
the hijab. However, unlike her older sister and mother, she alternated long colourful 
skirts and loose long-sleeved tops with the occasional abaya. 
On one occasion, she described an argument she had with her father: 
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 “I had a photo up on my laptop of us on a trip abroad and I was wearing 
jeans with a dress on top down to below my knees. He saw it and was like: 
so is this what you wear when you go off with your friends? I was so 
offended so I started arguing back. I told him he was so bothered about 
exterior appearances and that wasn’t what mattered at all. You could 
have a girl in bikini with the best character in the world. But I guess 
that’s all he sees, the exterior. He doesn’t know all the worship and things 
I do.” 
I tried to reassure her, reminding her that she was in fact extremely pious, and she 
replied modestly: 
 “No I’m not that pious… but I try and he just doesn’t see that. He doesn’t 
understand that I’m very conscious of God; I know that I will be judged 
by Him and I try my best to be good. He [dad] just sees me as a bad 
Muslim, I guess it doesn’t help that my sister wears niqab… I was just 
upset he judged me so quickly, didn’t even hear what I was going to say…. 
I upset he didn’t trust me, and he doubted me so much. And I don’t 
understand why he’s so obsessed with exterior things like that! It’s not 
that hijab doesn’t matter, it does, and I know that, but it’s not the main 
thing. I know so many people who wear hijab but don’t practise or 
anything” 
For Layla’s parents, only the jilbaab, an Islamic style of dress that covers the head, 
and drapes over the chest, commonly worn by many young and older Somali women 
was sufficiently modest. Layla thought her sister’s decision to wear the niqab had 
been influenced by her father, and on another occasion she made clear that this 
parental pressure on her was far from sporadic.  
 “We have an on-going battle, everyday. “Why don’t you wear hijab??” 
And I tell him “I am wearing hijab, this is my opinion!” I’ve never really 
cared about doing things to please my parents though, if it goes against 
my religion. Like the jilbaab, I wasn’t going to wear it to please my dad, 
the intention is wrong and I would have resented it. I do things to please 
God and so far as it’s considered modest that’s ok.” 
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When we discussed the reasons why she felt different in contrast to her parents, she 
explained: 
 “that’s the way they were brought up I guess. Exterior things matter so 
much to them, they always have. It’s a cultural thing, Somalis generally 
are like that… I don’t know, to me sincerity is really important. I’d rather 
explain to my parents my opinion and let them understand me and why I 
do things, show them I am actually doing what’s best. I don’t want to lie 
to them, and just please them like that…” 
Layla’s comments reflect an important distinction made by many young second-
generation Somali women between the cultural attitude of their parents and their own 
commitment to an authentic, transcendent Islam. 50 As I argued in Chapter Two, 
“cultural” is employed to refer to a mode of subjectification based on an uncritical 
acceptance of inherited practices. Similarly, here it is used to refer to submission to 
parents, kin, or community. According to Layla, her father is cultural because he 
judges without listening to her reasoning, focuses excessively on exterior 
appearances, and constantly pressures her and her sisters to adopt the jilbaab. Unlike 
her parents, Layla and her practising Somali friends adopt a reasoned, but also 
emotional, engagement with practice, drawing on Islamic pedagogies of self-
discipline (Mahmood 2001). Although the hijab is an obligatory practice, crucial to 
her fashioning as a pious self, it is “not the main thing”, according to Layla, but one 
of many practices that cultivate interior emotions, intentions, and dispositions. What 
matters most to Layla is her internal, sincere, and personal connection with God. 
These critiques were reiterated by some of Layla’s practising Somali friends. On one 
occasion, as we were having coffee with other friends, Ifrah explained how the 
Somali youth she worked with had raised this issue with her in a workshop. She 
accused the older generation of perpetuating the “problematic” discourses about 
external practices: “Generally it’s constantly about being seen by the Somali 
community. That’s what matters. There’s constant talk amongst women ‘did you see 
                                                
50 This process of separating culture from religion, and associating the former with coercion, and as 
something of the past, is a common discursive strategy amongst second-generation Muslims (see 
Jacobsen 2011b; Ewing 2008).  
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so and so wearing this, and so and so what she was wearing?’ ” Her friend, who had 
been overhearing our conversation added:  
 “If you're wearing trousers that's not considered modest. It's too western 
for them. But then you get so many Somali women wearing abaya to avoid 
getting glances or comments. But it's ridiculous, you get Somalis who 
wear it but don’t pray! It doesn't make sense! Older women are very strict 
about religiosity. But they are also aware of how they are seen by 
outsiders… ceeb (shame) you know? Or maybe because they want to cling 
on, they’re worried they might lose their identity.” 
For many Somalis, teenagers and older first-generations, the hijab and jilbaab have in 
recent years also become a marker of collective morality, honour, and Somali culture 
(Talle 2008: 65). As I discussed in Chapter Two, for many of the older women I 
frequented, covering one’s head and body was articulated in everyday conversation as 
signifying religiosity; it was unquestionably the “right thing to do” and was a marker 
of a “good Somali woman”. As an external manifestation of moral integrity, women 
should be seen by others to be morally sound, and immoral behaviour is deemed 
shameful (ceeb). For older women, ensuring their daughters are visibly moral serves 
to enhance their own moral integrity, and that of their kin, as well as to increase the 
younger women’s opportunities of marrying well. Muneera, a young mother who felt 
the pressure imposed by other Somali women explained: “If I wore jeans, I would be 
gossiped about day and night! It's shameful for a married woman not to dress like this. 
So in a way it protects me, people don't question. Also it looks really bad on my family 
if I don’t wear this.”  
Similarly, as Isotalo (2007) describes for Somalis in Finland, trousers have come to be 
associated with excessive assimilation into the host society, a loss of faith, shame, and 
a threat to the moral integrity of one’s clan. Therefore, for older Somali women, the 
hijab is both a religious duty, which they realise they neglected in the past, but is also 
constitutive of Somali culture and morality. For younger women, on the other hand, it 
is seen as cultural when imposed by others, and religious when it is adopted willingly, 
and as a consequence of reasoned engagement with Islamic texts and teachings.  
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For practising Somali women, modest clothing is not solely about identity, nor about 
complying with community pressure that may involve accusations of shame (ceeb), of 
being “judged” or “seen” by others. Unlike themselves, their mothers are, on the one 
hand, excessively focused on clothing and external markers of piety, and on the other, 
inconsistent with their practice. 
Ifrah explained in respect of the teenagers who attended the youth club, whom she 
presumed had been influenced by their mothers: 
 “It’s conflicting, if you’re wearing something that doesn’t represent what 
you feel inside. It’s just an external manifestation that doesn’t match 
what’s inside. It’s a bit superficial. But Somalis are like that: religious on 
the outside, maybe because they’re kinda encouraged to dress like that.”  
However, the younger second-generation women’s disagreements with their parents’ 
cultural attitude towards the hijab neglect how many older Somali women have also 
begun donning the jilbaab and hijab as a consequence of a reasoned engagement with 
texts and a discourse of Islam and authenticity (Talle 2008; McGown 1999; see also 
Chapters Two and Five). Their daughters’ criticisms, therefore, are more about their 
own concern with distancing themselves from a perceived judgemental attitude, a 
prioritisation of external practices and a submission to the norms and dictates of the 
Somali community. 
These young women’s criticisms of their mothers’ prioritisation of the external reflect 
many of the characteristics attributed to Muslim communities by the media and 
popular discourse. Interestingly, these young women appropriate the language 
employed in debates about multiculturalism, in order to criticise their mothers’ 
practices. According to the younger generation, older Somali women are wearing the 
hijab because they feel judged by others; they are embracing it out of social pressure 
to conform, not out of reasoned choice and an internal connection to Allah. This 
cultural attitude towards donning the hijab is understood as susceptible to judgements, 
and therefore a sign of submission to others. It is perpetuated, as the following 
example illustrates, by their mothers, whom the young women argue “segregate” 
themselves from mainstream society. 
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In April 2011, a few days following the French ban on wearing niqab in public 
spaces, I met with Layla, Ifrah, and some other practising friends at Nadifa’s house in 
Stepney Green. Sauda, an occupational therapist in her 30s, who was the most 
politically engaged of the young women, mentioned the ban and reflected on the UK 
and on her own situation: 
“Hijab will never become a problem here. But things are getting tough… 
it’s a political ploy though. In times of recession, low unemployment, they 
blame it on immigrants who steal welfare money, this ghettoisation thing. 
I don’t see it. They just want to target us, but Muslims aren’t ghettoised at 
all, we’re all over the place, you get all sorts of Muslims in west London. 
Multiculturalism is the best thing we have; we can walk around freely, 
feeling safe, Muslims all want to come to the UK.” 
Sauda was referring here to Cameron’s Munich speech, delivered a few months 
previously, and the rhetoric on the failure of multiculturalism, Britishness and 
supposed segregation of Muslim communities, and a lack of shared values. For Sauda 
and many of her practising friends, the UK, unlike other countries, was a safe haven 
for Muslim women, who could wear the hijab in relative freedom, thanks to 
multiculturalism. To these young women, who identified as British, Somali and 
Muslim, the talk of ghettoisation did not make any sense. It applied more to their 
parents, who had not been raised in the UK, and as refugees had relied significantly 
on welfare support. Ifrah explained: “ A lot of our mothers have come from war torn 
places, then had loads of kids, and have always been housewives, that’s the culture, 
the women are at home. They hang out with Somalis. So it’s very strange to have to 
go to work all of a sudden.” 
Layla agreed, but contrasted her generation, with that of their mothers: “Our 
generation has had loads of opportunities, and there’s no excuse for us not to get out 
there. It’s our responsibility to take part, and contribute. We have no excuse.” In 
contrasting their own duties to participate and contribute to the British public sphere, 
with those of their mothers, these young women redirected public critiques of 
multiculturalism at their parent’s generation and their cultural attitude to Islamic 
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practice. Multiculturalism assumed that Islam segregated Muslims, but what was in 
fact to blame was the “bad part” of culture (Chapter Two).  
As I discussed in the previous chapter, young women’s insistence on a separation 
between religion and culture is informed by contemporary reformist teachings that 
stress the purification of an authentic transcendent Islam from cultural practices. This 
is a rhetoric expressed by European Islamic scholars and actively embraced and 
reproduced by young Muslims in Europe. For example, during an Eid party organised 
by my informants in a community centre in Bromley-by-bow, a female scholar argued 
in a talk delivered on Women in Islam:  
 “Women should get involved in their community in order to voice their 
own concerns and represent other women. They should support their 
Sisters to ensure that the services needed for women are in place. Women 
should work to challenge media stereotypes of Muslim women as 
oppressed… It’s men who use culture or cultural norms to oppress 
women. Islam does not oppress them…. Muslims should go out there, in 
hijab and show what they are capable of achieving.” 
The scholar adopts a popular liberal feminist objection to multiculturalism that insists 
that multicultural policies empower male elders in communities, often to the 
detriment of women and children (Okin 1999). According to the speaker, Islam offers 
a solution: it provides a way for women to challenge oppressive cultural and 
patriarchal norms, to participate in the wider public sphere, and to challenge 
stereotypical representations whilst maintaining their modesty. Unlike media 
representations, she contends, women are oppressed because of men’s appropriation 
of culture, not because of Islam.  
3.5 Problematizing exteriority: From sister A to sister B 
In the poem, Layla’s distancing from Sister A also represents a critique of public 
representations, such as those in Make Bradford British, that over-emphasise and 
problematize practices, such as prayer and hijab as crucial to Muslim identity. 
Following the show, Layla and Ifrah had commented on their frustration with the 
participants, who, in the first episode, portrayed Rashid’s prayer as a problem. Their 
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annoyance was exacerbated by the mistreatment of Sabbiyah, who had been portrayed 
as a victim of racist, anti-Muslim accusations, despite defending herself by stressing 
the importance of modesty, choice and identity. Layla and her friends shared with 
Sabbiyah the experience of being judged by exterior appearance in the workplace. 
However, they felt that, unlike Sabbiyah they were able to defend themselves and 
negotiate the over-determination of exterior signs of difference in more effective 
ways. In what follows, I illustrate the ways in which Layla and Ifrah negotiated their 
exteriority differently, despite sharing a similar conception of interiority. In doing so, 
I illustrate how their decisions had exposed them to different forms of exclusion. 
Throughout her teacher-training course in religious education (R.E.), Layla had 
experienced and become frustrated by the over-signification and stigmatisation of her 
hijab.  
"I get targeted cause I'm a Muslim! Every time a lecturer says something 
about Islam, he looks at me, to justify what Islam says. He's questioned 
me and so have others on whether I can teach RE objectively as a Muslim. 
They think it’s impossible cause I carry it on my head. I've never been in 
an environment where I'm the only Muslim. But I get treated as a Muslim, 
I really wish they would just treat me as Layla!” 
Layla resented the way others saw her solely through her religion. “They see the hijab 
before they see there’s a person there!” she explained. The presence of this religious 
symbol made her lecturers doubt her ability to think and teach anything that fell 
outside of her faith. 
On another occasion, following a lecture, Layla had been questioned by one of her 
university classmates, "Excuse me, what's your background?" she had demanded 
abruptly. Surprised Layla had replied, "My parents are Somali why?" "Do you think 
that if you weren't a Muslim you'd choose Islam?" the classmate continued. Annoyed, 
Layla retorted: "What do you mean by that? That I'm blindly following Islam? No I’ve 
actually done a lot of study into it, I know a lot about my religion. How am I meant to 
answer that question? I don't know! I can't tell you." 
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As Layla recounted this incident to me, she pointed out: “She must just assume I wear 
hijab cause that’s what I’ve always done, or that my parents force me!” Frequently, 
my informants were confronted, particularly in work environments, with non-
Muslims assuming the hijab was a sign of a cultural, traditional identity, imposed by 
their families and communities. As we saw earlier, hegemonic discourses in the UK 
often conflate religion with culture (Werbner 2009: 30) and understand culture as an 
imprisoning and determining force (Phillips 2007; Baumann 1996). Her classmate 
assumed the hijab was what Layla would have described as a cultural symbol of 
patriarchal subordination, not something she had willingly adopted.  
Sauda, the practising friend of Layla who I introduced in the previous section, had 
had a similar experience when she first started wearing hijab at work: 
 “When I started wearing hijab at work I got asked so many questions, 
and I don’t even wear abaya, imagine if I did! People started saying I 
looked better before, asking me why was I wearing it. One person said to 
me: oh of course you’re not allowed to take it off. And I shouted back: I 
don’t want to take it off!! They couldn’t sit in front of someone who wears 
hijab, it bothered them! And I was the only one in the office... but we have 
Muslim clients the whole time!! They just couldn’t take it from one of their 
employees. I should give them a crash course on Islam cause they have 
clients!” 
As with Layla’s example, her work colleagues had assumed that the hijab was a sign, 
imposed on her by her culture or community. Sauda, instead, had responded by 
emphasising she did not want to take it off – that it was her choice to wear it. As with 
Layla, she employed a liberal discourse of choice and autonomy, to “talk back” to a 
dominant narrative that positions the hijab as a normative practice, antithetical to 
autonomy and choice (Bracke 2011; Jacobsen 2011a). 51  This strategy echoes 
                                                
51 Bracke (2011) explores the multiple strategies young Muslims employ to “talk back” – in 
Althusseurian terms – to a dominant discourse that presents them as oppressed victims. Whilst some 
women might rely on the vocabulary of liberalism, re-signifying the terms of debate in order to stress 
an emancipation gained through Islam, others, for example, might react by educating Muslim women 
about their rights in Islam. 
 112 
Sabbiyah’s reply in Make Bradford British that she did not “want” to wear mini-skirts 
and low-cut tops; she had the “choice” to wear what she wanted.52 
These discursive strategies constitute only one way in which Layla sought to 
negotiate her practice. Following several weeks of feeling judged by her exterior 
appearance, Layla phoned me one evening to discuss her current coping strategies: 
 “I've really tried to be less Muslim this week! I've tried not to speak 
about Islam. I'm actually considering dressing less Muslim, maybe 
wearing Western clothes like jeans and a long top, rather than black 
abaya. Of course I can't take off my hijab, so I can't escape the fact I'm a 
Muslim.” 
She began to wear colourful long skirts and patterned loose-fitting tops, rather than 
her usual black abaya, although she did wear the latter in certain situations and 
particularly amongst other Muslims. She shopped for long-sleeved shirts and tops, 
dresses and shoes in major high street shops, such as Topshop, Debenhams and 
Primark and picked up her hijab in markets in Whitechapel. She layered her hijabs in 
different colours, and adorned her clothing with bright coloured bangles. By 
combining elements from difference places, experimenting with a range of styles, and 
incorporating a concern with modesty with Western clothing, she articulated and 
realised what Tarlo (2010) has described as an individualised, cosmopolitan “Islamic 
fashion”.  
Layla hoped that dressing “less Muslim” would enable her to manage how those 
around her interacted with her, and would encourage them to focus less on her 
exterior appearance, and more on her virtues and interior dimensions of self. In line 
with a secular logic, she was recognising the hijab as simultaneously a sign of her 
interior dispositions and as a religious duty (Fernando 2010). Acting and dressing 
“less Muslim” was a way of “re-signifying” her clothing practices, similarly to 
Jouili’s (2009) French and German informants who were forced to negotiate the 
                                                
52 This emphasis on choice and autonomy as a mode of subjectification by which second-generation 
Muslim women negotiate the practice of donning the hijab, has been noted elsewhere in the literature 
(Jacobsen 2011a; Fernando 2010). 
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donning of the hijab in restrictive secular environments (see section 1.4). Reflecting 
Sister B in the poem, Layla was placing greater emphasis on interior virtues, 
dispositions, and manners. Her aim was to encourage others to appreciate her “good 
character” (aklaaq), which she deemed more representative of what it meant for her to 
be a Muslim. She had, in fact, applauded Rashid in Making Bradford British, and his 
success in bringing this to the fore.  
Layla was also distancing herself from a prescriptive understanding of modesty by 
focusing instead on the “inner” virtue of modesty which could be expressed 
differently in practice: as long as one was revealing only face and hands, it did not 
matter how that was achieved in practice. As the following example illustrates, she 
had appropriated this attitude towards practice from European Islamic scholars. 
On a Friday evening in October 2010, Layla and I attended a talk delivered by Sheikh 
Babikir53 during which he spoke, amongst other things, about how Muslims should 
avoid creating barriers with non-Muslims. Instead they should impress non-Muslims 
with their hospitality and, their manners (adab). Following the talk, I heard Layla say 
the following to a friend: 
"I think he's completely right about being a Muslim through manners – 
through the person you are, not through a uniform. That's the universal 
aspect of Islam, it’s what unites all cultures. I don't think we should wear 
things that stick out in the West, or that create divisions amongst us.” 
 “Modesty varies with culture”, Layla explained to me when I asked her about Sheikh 
Babikir’s comment: “Sometimes cultures pass off things as being the only way to be 
modest, like Somalis with the jilbaab and wearing black, but that’s not the only way to 
be modest.” Furthermore, Layla felt quite strongly about not alienating others through 
her dress. In order to do da’wa (raise awareness of Islam), she had to present herself 
as approachable.  
                                                
53 Sheikh Babikir Ahmed Babikir has been working in the UK since the 1970's. He is currently the 
Imam of Yusuf Islam's Islamia School, and also leads on weekly da‘wa circles at Cricklewood mosque. 
He studied the Islamic Sciences in Sudan under Sheikh Fatih Qaribullah (Radical Middle Way: n.d). 
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Her focus on Islamic virtues and manners also merged with a liberal public discourse 
on multiculturalism and “British values”. On another occasion, she had explained to 
me, following a discussion of Cameron’s speech, “Our aims happen to coincide with 
Western ones; Freedom, democracy, justice, equality these are also Muslim values.” 
The language of values enabled her to position herself as both Muslim and British, 
within debates on national identity. This corresponded with the teachings of one of 
her favourite scholars and academics, Sheikh Abdul Hakim-Murad, who argued in a 
lecture entitled British and Muslim: 
 “Islam, once we have become familiar with it, and settled onto it 
comfortably, is the most suitable for the British. Its values are our values. 
Its moderate, undemonstrative style of piety, still waters running deep; its 
insistence on modesty and a certain reserve, and its insistence on common 
sense and on pragmatism, combine to furnish the most natural and easy 
religious option for our people.” 
The Sheikh, interestingly, attempted to reverse the dominant discourse on values, 
stating that it was not Muslims who had appropriated British values, but that British 
values were in fact Islamic.  
Layla’s emphasis on values merges Islamic understandings of virtuous conduct, with 
political discourses on national identity, and understandings that “shared values” offer 
a solution to the problem of how to be British and Muslim. This is reflected in the 
final resolution of Make Bradford British, where Damon accepts Rashid as British 
because his Muslim values resemble British ways of life. Furthermore, it also 
represents a secular-liberal understanding of the religious subject, with faith 
understood as private – a position reflected in Layla’s poem with Sister B who 
exemplifies interior “goodness” and “warmth of heart”.  
However, these negotiations were far from straightforward and not ones with which 
Layla was completely satisfied. Articulating a “middle way” for young practising 
women such as Layla and Ifrah is both a personal and social struggle, which requires 
negotiating how they think and feel about practice and faith, and managing how they 
will be viewed by others. 
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3.5.1 Ifrah’s jilbaab  
The threat of being judged and targeted as a result of her exterior appearance was a 
serious preoccupation for Ifrah. She typically wore the hijab and black abaya and had, 
on several occasions, been the target of verbal abuse on the streets or on public 
transport. She felt that more modest forms of clothing would have further restricted 
her employment opportunities. “Especially after 7/7 bombings we really got targeted. 
You never see a niqabi at work do you?” She explained to me, “Of course you can 
wear it, but you make a choice of not applying for jobs where you can’t wear it.” 
Although she would have liked to wear it, she felt that clothing such as the niqab was 
not suited to her work life.  
Towards the end of my fieldwork, I met with Ifrah and Layla for a walk around 
Tower Hamlets. As we wandered through back streets and alleyways, and 
occasionally popped into shops to browse the latest Islamic clothing, Ifrah 
unexpectedly announced that she had decided to wear the jilbaab. As mentioned, the 
jilbaab, often worn by practising women and particularly by first-generation Somalis, 
is a loose Islamic dress that covers the head and drapes over the shoulders and chest. 
It typically comes in dark colours and is considered by some practising women, such 
as Layla, to be too cumbersome and sombre, making them “stick out” in London. 
Layla and I looked at her with surprise, but Ifrah reassured us that she had already 
thought about designing her own jilbaab, by adding creative twists to a piece of 
clothing that was otherwise quite banal in style. “It’s just that I want to keep moving 
upwards. I think I’m ready for that and I think what was stopping me before was fear. 
I had real fear of doing it, but I think I can face that fear now, I’m ready for it.” 
I asked her what she meant by fear and she mumbled how it was tied to her previous 
experiences, but she wouldn’t expand further on that occasion, perhaps because the 
thought of her past evoked bad memories. She had previously told me how the 
adoption of the hijab and abaya had been a personal struggle for her. This was not 
only because of the stigma attached to them, but also because she felt judged by her 
non-practising friends. As she explained on that occasion: 
 “It was so hard. The first few months I was properly depressed. I just felt 
so uncomfortable in abaya and hijab. People started treating me 
 116 
differently, everyone was staring at me. I noticed when I was with friends 
they thought they couldn’t do certain things around me, like listen to 
music, or stuff like that. They thought they couldn’t say certain things, so 
they made me feel like the one that sticks out. I didn’t feel comfortable; I 
felt boring, like the crazy side of me wasn’t there anymore, like I couldn’t 
be happy and loud and me. I didn’t feel I was in my skin. But at the same 
time I really wanted it and I'd decided it.” 
Her decision to don the jilbaab was tied to her idealised and prescriptive 
understanding of modesty and pious conduct. Unlike Layla, for whom modesty was a 
virtue that could be practised in a range of different ways, Ifrah envisioned the jilbaab 
as the ideal modest form of clothing. She explained to us that afternoon that the 
jilbaab was more effective than the abaya in masking her shoulders and figure. 
Furthermore, in the same way that the hijab made Layla “more aware”, the jilbaab 
would further strengthen Ifrah’s interior iman and work as a self-disciplining practice 
to further improve her behaviour.  
Initially Layla struggled to accept her decision and the two young women heatedly 
debated the issue. Ifrah continued to explain her decision:“I’ve done a lot of research 
into it and I’ve learnt that the ideal is what the wives of the Prophet used to wear, the 
jilbaab”. Layla hesitated and then gently challenged this perspective:  
 “But that was the clothing suited to the time. The Prophet’s wives had to 
be protected more than others. To me, modesty can be reached in different 
ways… if you look at the hijab it’s practiced in different ways across the 
world, but they’re all modest in different ways… and here I think it’s 
important not to stick out but to adhere to social contexts… so to work I 
wear a shirt and long skirts cause I’m meant to have a professional look” 
Ifrah retorted:  
 “But some cultures wear hijab and it doesn’t cover their shoulders, like 
the Syrian trench-coat. Also, I wear jilbaab not to fit into social contexts, 
but to adhere to an ideal and to please God. To get more rewards – that’s 
my only intention. Instead, by trying to fit in you’re pleasing others. It’s 
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my jihad, my struggle, and it really is hard. It’s my own personal struggle 
to satisfy my Creator.” 
Layla continued to disagree:  
 “But Islam isn’t about struggle… you should be happy! I just don’t see it 
that way. Although part of me wishes I did have an ideal because it would 
make it easier for me, and I’d know what to work on. But I just see 
character as more important, not exterior clothing.” 
But Ifrah refused to give in: “I see character and manners as really important, but 
also the outer”. 
Whilst Layla insisted on prioritising interiority by emphasising the virtue of modesty, 
and the importance of character and manners, and not “sticking out”, Ifrah felt her 
position was excessively focused on “pleasing others”, rather than “pleasing God”. 
She directed at Layla the cultural critique that practising women often employed to 
distance themselves from their parents: a cultural mode of subjectification involves an 
uncritical submission to kin, community, or social pressure, whereas their 
engagements with Islamic practices result from a personal and intimate relationship 
with God. 
Layla initially struggled to accept Ifrah’s decision, as she felt Ifrah was being cultural 
by prioritising external behaviour. However, on another occasion, she explained to me 
how she was slowly learning to accept her motivations, “I think it motivates her and 
sends a constant reminder”, she explained, “and she sees it as a struggle, against 
what people think about her. She feels stronger when people comment and ridicule”. 
Although Ifrah’s decision had initially surprised Layla, she later explained to me how 
Ifrah’s adoption of the jilbaab did not actually reflect the cultural attitude she 
attributed to her parents. Unlike her parents, Ifrah was familiar with Islamic 
pedagogies that stress the connection between exterior practices and interior 
intentions, emotions, and dispositions. In addition, Layla explained, Ifrah was aware 
of the importance of interiority and occasionally, in conversation, also privileged it 
above exteriority. Her emphasis on exteriority was a way of motivating herself to be 
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pious. In fact, she had often stressed the importance of being Muslim “through 
manners” in similar vein to Layla. 
For Ifrah, donning the jilbaab was also a statement of her inner strength, 
determination, and commitment to faith. It came to represent not only a personal 
struggle against experiences of marginalisation, but also a collective struggle that 
connected her with the experience of other Muslim women in the umma. “I feel really 
brave you know, it was so hot the other day and everyone on the tube was staring at 
me. One man moved away when I sat down!” It was akin to her adoption of the hijab, 
which she had gradually begun to see less as a restriction, and more as a visual marker 
of choice and identity. 
 “A Sheikh once said that the hijab is a protection for women as the beard 
is for men. It’s also a symbol of practising. If you’re wearing it, men 
won’t bother coming up to you, because they know you’re practising. So it 
makes sense, and you get used to it. But it’s not a fashion accessory. You 
have to be aware of what it means to wear it.” 
Ifrah employed a liberal discourse of resistance to defend her decision to become 
more visibly Muslim – one echoed in Sabbiyah’s insistence on clothing as a marker of 
identity. These items of clothing stood as powerful signs of her practising Muslim 
identity, and offered her protection from both Muslims and the non-Muslim public. 
By articulating her decision through a personal and collective metaphor of struggle, 
she adopted a confrontational stance, rejecting negative images and taking pride in a 
stigmatised identity (Jouili 2009: 265). The jilbaab stood as a signifier of legitimacy 
and defiance. 
However, both Ifrah and Layla were aware of the exclusions and restrictions which 
they faced wearing Islamic clothing in public places. Layla had sought to overcome 
these as much as she could, but Ifrah had accepted that her decision would further 
limit her movements across the city, and particularly her employment opportunities. 
Like Layla’s decision to be “less Muslim” Ifrah’s adoption of the jilbaab was a 
distressing choice negotiated within spaces of exclusion. 
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3.6 ‘What matters is what I think and feel’: Fatima as a practising 
non-believer  
Fatima, like Layla and Ifrah, was a young second-generation Somali woman who had 
begun to practise Islam during the early years of her university degree. However, in 
the last few years, after a long period of struggling, hesitating, and trying to convince 
herself otherwise, she had decided that she was no longer a Muslim. The day we met 
for an interview, I had not even the slightest inkling of learning about her non-belief; 
dressed in hijab and abaya, she looked like she had always done when we met in 
public.  
One of the first questions I asked when I learned of her decision was why she was 
continuing to wear hijab and abaya. She explained her decision was a pragmatic one 
that enabled her to negotiate the pressures from her family and other Muslim friends 
and acquaintances. Non-belief, but even more so removal of the hijab, she explained 
to me, was incomprehensible to her family. “I’m not praying and they comment on 
that, but somehow that’s it, it doesn’t matter too much. If I ever took off my hijab, that 
would be the end of it, then they would start accusing me of all things. It’s culture!” 
Fatima shared with Layla an understanding of cultural attitudes as an excessive 
preoccupation with external appearances. By maintaining her dress she remained, at 
least to her family and outsider observers, a Muslim.  
With very little prompting on my part, she divulged the difficulties encountered 
following this drastic change. She differentiated between values and faith, and 
elaborated on how her understanding of the former remained “Islamic”, despite her 
lack of faith: 
 “My feeling of right and wrong is Islamic. It’s just difficult to think about 
these things without referring to religion cause that’s what I’ve always 
done. And in a way I don’t want to fall back into a Western idea of good 
and bad because I realise how much it influences us without us even 
knowing, and I don’t really agree with it. I have a void in that sense.”  
According to Fatima, she could continue to be a non-Muslim, yet share Islamic values 
and participate in Islamic practices. Like Layla, being a Muslim (or non-Muslim) was 
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not about adhering to a set of rules and values, but was instead connected to having, 
or not-having, faith: 
 “I’ve decided not to tell people that I don’t believe. To be honest, what 
matters to me is what I believe personally… But it's also very weird. I'm 
not a Muslim inside, I know I don't believe, but everything else about me 
is Muslim. I don’t drink, I dress like this, so people around me think I’m 
Muslim. My identity for them is Muslim. But maybe that doesn't matter? 
Fatima attempted to reconcile her behaviour by separating practice from interior 
belief, reflecting the distinction Layla made in the poem between Sister A and B. 
Although others saw her as a Muslim, what mattered to her was her lack of belief. 
Donning the hijab did not affect her non-belief, as it simply stood as a sign of her 
identity, not a manifestation of her authentic internal self. As she explained later, “I 
hate Muslims who think you believe whatever they do. I never again want to be told 
how to think and feel, what matters is how I think and feel.” 
Fatima was drawing on a secular prioritisation of interior religious conscience and 
religious choice (Fernando 2010). The hijab did not impact on her interior thoughts 
and feelings, but usefully worked as a signifier in her relation with her family. Her 
comments also reflect a liberal-secular mode of subjectification which stresses the 
importance of personal authenticity (Taylor 1994) and the “expectation and demand 
that one’s acts should express an authentic inside of who I am and who I choose to be” 
(Jacobsen 2011b: 314; see also Fadil 2008: 273). For Fatima, her faith had infringed 
on her own thoughts and feelings. Her freedom from faith, was articulated according 
to a liberal conception of “freedom of conscience” – an ability to think and feel as she 
pleased. 
Jacobsen (2011b: Chapter 6) notes how this attitude towards the hijab is becoming 
increasingly common amongst young Muslims in Europe, as the practice of wearing it 
has come to depend more on the authentic feeling it expresses. Whilst this was less 
common amongst my practising informants, Anab, a young woman in her mid-20s 
justified her decision to remove her hijab by drawing on this liberal discourse. 
Although she still considered herself a practising Muslim, she argued, “It didn’t feel 
right anymore, I wore it but I wasn’t connected anymore, it didn’t feel like it was me.” 
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Since removing the hijab she had been frustrated by the assumptions made to the 
contrary by both Muslims and non-Muslim. “I don’t understand why my religiosity 
and spirituality need to be assessed by whether I’m wearing it!” she explained. Her 
prioritisation of internal spirituality through the removal of her hijab, also posed a 
challenge to the over-signification of the practice in the public sphere. 
3.7 Inside-out reconsidered  
To return one last time to the poem, Layla insists that interiority alone is insufficient, 
as her resolution lies somewhere in the middle, with Sister C, who is capable of 
balancing interior and exterior dimensions of the self. I have demonstrated above how 
Ifrah and Layla differently negotiate the “middle way” depending on their personal 
negotiations of family pressures and workspaces. I have also illustrated how both 
women shift between different positions; on the one hand, exterior practices do not 
matter and interiority is prioritised, on the other, there is a connection between interior 
and exterior dimensions of the self and the hijab or jilbaab do impact on the ways in 
which they act and “feel” inside. 
Central to both women’s ideas is their knowledge and application of Islamic 
pedagogical projects of ethical self-fashioning, as explained by Mahmood (2001; 
2005). In Chapter Six, I describe how Layla advises her friend on how to remain 
consistent in her iman and in her prayers. She stresses the importance of “fake it till 
you make it” – repeating prayer in order to instil a habit which will, in turn, generate 
and strengthen sincerity in one’s intentions and motivate action. Layla’s 
understanding of prayer requires a particular coordination between emotions, 
intentions and actions in which practices are constitutive of a self-disciplining process 
and are both the means, and the ends, to fashioning a pious self. When contrasting her 
attitude towards external practices with that of her father, Layla had emphasised the 
importance of “sincere intentions” and interior dimensions of the self. Her father 
failed to understand her intentions to wear the hijab to please and connect with God 
and to instil and cultivate interior virtues and emotions. Fashioning a moral self, 
according to these young women, and in contrast to their parents, requires a careful 
coordination of outward behaviour and inward dispositions (Mahmood 2005: 135). 
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Yet despite this understanding of Islamic pedagogies, both women negotiate their 
practices in different ways, though they both ultimately prioritise interiority. 
According to Layla, “the inside is most important”. This emphasis on interiority, I 
argue, indicates a reworking of this Islamic pedagogical model, which results from 
the problematization of exteriority. It is also illustrated by another young practising 
woman, mentioned in Chapter Five, who contrasts her understanding of iman with 
that of her mother, who works from the “outside-in”. As I illustrate below, for both 
Layla and Ifrah the interior experience of iman is constituted through virtuous 
conduct, but it is most importantly an emotional experience of connecting with God. 
These women are both drawing on Islamic discursive traditions, but it is this 
insistence on interiority, and its shifting and unstable relation with exteriority, that 
indicates, I suggest, a historical change in understandings of what constitutes a 
Muslim subject. 
3.7.1 Interiority as affect 
On one occasion when Layla explained the problems she faced in the workplace to 
her friend Latifa, who advised the following:  
 “You need to strike a balance between being social and maintaining your 
spirituality. You can do hijra in your head;54 it doesn’t have to be physical. 
Just take yourself out of the context. Increase your ibadat (acts of 
worship), so that these people don't suck it out of you.” 
Performing “hijra in [one’s] head” exemplifies Latifa’s insistence on interiority, and 
is ultimately crucial to her negotiation of exteriority and her understanding of what 
constitutes a “proper” Muslim subject. Focusing on her personal feeling of connection 
with God, Latifa suggested, would help negotiate social relations and avoid isolating 
herself, without compromising her faith. What mattered ultimately was not 
                                                
54 Hijra means migration or flight, and refers to the Prophet Muhammad’s migration in 622CE from 
Mecca to Medina. It is used more generally to denote Muslim migration away from non-Muslim lands, 
but in this case Latifa is adapting this concept to encourage Layla to undergo a mental migration from a 
non-Muslim space to a Muslim space inside her head, that will connect her with God. 
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necessarily what she did and looked like, but that she was able to maintain an internal, 
spiritual connection with God.  
Similarly, on another occasion Layla expressed her uncertainty about how she should 
negotiate handshakes with other men. On the one hand, she knew modest behaviour 
required her to avoid shaking hands with men. On the other hand, however, she 
realised that in a context where others failed to recognise this, she may need to 
negotiate this practice.55 She was attending an interview for a job and was uncertain 
as to whether she should shake the hand of her interviewer. Prior to attending, she 
contacted a Sheikh whom she knew well, and trusted, to discuss the matter. He 
advised her that provided her intention was simply to succeed in the interview, she 
should shake his hand. Avoiding shaking hands could compromise her success, 
making her appear unfriendly and “religiously biased”. By prioritising her interior 
intentions and the importance of an internal connection with God, Layla was able to 
negotiate the practice, without feeling she had compromised her modesty. 
This understanding of interiority as a connection with God, and an affective 
experience of faith is also shared with Ifrah (see section 1.7). For example, on the day 
she announced her decision to don the jilbaab, Ifrah described the feelings she hoped 
to achieve: 
 “When I went on umrah (pilgrimage) I wore niqab and I felt so good. I 
don’t think it’s a good idea to wear it here… but I liked the feeling of 
being enclosed, feeling connected, and the jilbaab will help with that.” 
The jilbaab offered her protection and accentuated her relationship with Allah. It 
enveloped and “protected” her, and created a distance from others so that she could 
focus on her connection with God. The endpoint, which Ifrah achieved through 
physical withdrawal, was similar to Latifa’s concern with doing “hijra in [her] head”. 
The aim for both women was to move away from caring about how the hijab affected 
their relationships with others, to focusing on an emotional connection with God. As 
Ifrah explained: 
                                                
55 Both Fadil (2009) and Deeb (2006) discuss the ways Muslims negotiate the practice of hand shaking. 
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 “I've stopped caring how people see me, what people think of me. I used 
to be so worried at the start. Even when I first started practising and 
wearing this I was worried what my friends would say, but now I know I 
have Allah, so I don't care. Now when people stare me up and down I look 
away and I just ignore it. I’m happy and confident with who I am, I have 
nothing to hide.” 
The experience of connecting with God enables both Ifrah and Layla to discard “what 
others think”, and to feel at ease despite judgements by their parents, other Somalis, 
and the wider public. As revealed by their comments, it is a personalised experience 
of affect that enables them to feel confident, whether they are wearing jilbaab, niqab 
or hijab, and to retreat, at least emotionally, from the public sphere. Whilst Ifrah 
initially struggled, felt uncomfortable with the hijab, and feared others’ comments, 
eventually, as she strengthened her connection with God, she stopped caring and 
worrying about what others thought of her.  
What draws Ifrah and Layla together as young second-generation practising women, 
and differentiates them from their mothers, is this shared affective experience of faith 
and of self-transformation. In Chapter One (section 1.7) I stressed the ways in which 
my informants experience novel forms of self-other relationships, and particularly 
those with God, as affective (Navaro-Yashin 2009). I noted how they interpret and 
describe these occurrences as moments of “high iman”. The importance attributed to 
these experiences is manifested in the manner in which they frequently discuss and 
ask after their mutual states of iman. Comments such as, “How’s your iman doing?” 
or “My iman’s really low this month” were common in everyday conversations 
amongst my informants. They testify to the extent to which faith, for these young 
women, is objectified; it becomes possible to refer to iman, as denoting an affective 
state separate from practice.  
This understanding of faith as affective is captured by a comment Layla made, 
following a halaqa session that she delivered on prayer: “I’d say it’s a connection 
between the heart and the mind. You feel it as well, in your heart. But if you only feel 
it and haven’t quite made sense of it, it’s not complete and if you think you have it, but 
don’t feel it, that’s not enough”. Following the session, I asked her to elaborate more 
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precisely on this experience, asking her to reflect on her thoughts, bodily sensations, 
and feelings: 
 “It only happens when I’m in a good spiritual state. When my iman is 
high, I feel God. It’s like a feeling, like something is surrounding my heart, 
wrapping it. Sometimes I feel really warm but not always. I feel 
overwhelmed by something, at peace, and my body feels really good, my 
thoughts are fixed on Him.”  
Similarly, Maryam another young practising woman contributed her understanding of 
what it meant to “feel connected” with God, and to have a “high iman”: “Sometimes I 
walk down the street and I feel so good, I feel that connection, that feeling of 
excitement, like something bursting in my chest.”  
This somatic experience of iman as a feeling of energy, excitement and potentiality is, 
I argue, produced through, but is also constitutive of, my informants’ novel embodied 
engagements with others – in this case with God (see section 1.7). Layla’s comment, 
in particular, captures the ways in which her experience involves a temporary moment 
of warmth and potentiality, which flows through and transcends the mind and body 
split: this affective experience is not independent of thought and language, but can 
never be captured fully by language (Moore 2011: 185; Navaro-Yashin 2009). These 
experiences are crucial to these young women’s understandings of interiority. 
Although their emphasis on “inside-out” draws on Islamic pedagogical models 
(Mahmood 2001), it simultaneously reworks these around the questions posed by the 
debates on multiculturalism, such as those on the visibility of the Muslim subject. 
These understandings of interiority, which are also shared by non-believing young 
second-generation Somali women, are indicative of broader historical 
transformations. 
3.8 Conclusion 
This chapter has argued that multiculturalism debates are indicative of a 
problematization of the question of how to be British and Muslim. As illustrated by 
the TV program Make Bradford British, this question has emerged as an object of 
thought and inquiry, giving rise to a series of queries surrounding the Muslim subject.  
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Foucault (2000: 118) argues that problematization not only “develops the conditions 
in which possible responses can be given; it defines the elements that will constitute 
what the different solutions attempt to respond to” (section 1.6). Make Bradford 
British offers a solution, albeit one that reflects popular, and normative political 
discourses on the supposed “problem” of Islamic practices in British public spaces.  
This chapter has outlined the ways that young second-generation Somali women 
intervene in this terrain of problematization by rethinking the relationship between 
two ethical substances – interiority and exteriority. I have detailed how Layla and 
Ifrah, two practising second-generation Somali women, negotiate exterior practices 
depending on their experiences of work environments and their relationships with 
their parents. In so doing, I have pointed to their different attempts to find a “middle 
way” between interiority and exteriority, and the ways these solutions are often 
unstable and negotiable. Furthermore, I have stressed how any negotiation, even if it 
involves appearing “less [or more] Muslim”, cannot be divorced from the constraints 
of hegemonic discourses on multiculturalism, national identity, and the Muslim 
“other”. As Jouili (2009: 467) citing Butler points out, negotiations occur within a 
“field of enabling constraints” whereby any form of resistance is a painful process of 
making difficult and fraught moral choices. Layla and Ifrah’s choices are also 
partially constituted within, and constrained by, normative practices in British public 
spaces. 
These practising young women draw on a heterogeneity of intersecting discourses 
with the aim of fashioning themselves as pious subjects. The ethical substances 
(exterior practice and interior dimensions), as well as their modes of subjectification 
(submission to God, and choice) draw on both an Islamic discursive tradition of 
ethical self discipline and a liberal ethics of autonomy (see section 1.4). According to 
Jacobsen (2011b) this intersection of two contrasting models of the self results in the 
“willing submission” of young Muslims to Islamic traditions that brings about a 
subjectivity that is “appropriate to ethical self-determination and aesthetic self-
invention … into the field of religious identity and practice” (ibid 2011: 382). This 
new kind of subjectivity differs to that articulated through liberal registers. Fadil 
(2008: 244-251) similarly states the importance of heterogeneous discourses in her 
work on young Orthodox Muslims in Belgium. However, she disagrees that these 
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intersections produce a new kind of subjectivity that is distinct from the one found in 
liberal secular societies. Rather, she insists that liberal registers are crucial to the 
practices of her informants (ibid 2008: 245). She argues that this convergence of 
different traditions results, instead, in the “double articulation of the category 
autonomy”, which can be mapped onto two different axes. On the one hand, young 
Muslims employ liberal ethics on a horizontal axis to articulate their intersubjective 
relations, and to express their autonomy from others, including kin. On the other, they 
employ both a liberal discourse of autonomy and Islamic ethics in their vertical 
relations with God. These two traditions coexist in “non-contradictory ways”; for 
these young women autonomy is a consequence of their subjection to God (ibid 2008: 
250). A discourse of freedom and autonomy is not, therefore, necessarily “at odds 
with the idea of submission to God, but is rather achieved through it” (ibid 2008: 
251). My work accords with Fadil’s claim, and I have shown how these two traditions 
are employed differently when these young women engage with culture and relate to 
older kin (Chapter Two), and when they engage with Islamic practice and faith, and 
relate to God. Fadil’s analysis points to the importance of including the self-God 
relationship in an understanding of ethical practice, and in the following chapter I 
expand further on the importance of self-other relations. I complicate Fadil’s 
argument by exploring how young women’s ideas about their relations to potential 
husbands do not fit either the horizontal or vertical axes. Furthermore, as I stress 
throughout, these young women’s imagined relations with others are constantly being 
remade, and are therefore unstable and contextually variable. 
By comparing practising women’s insistence on interiority with a non-believer’s 
understanding of non-faith and a practising non-hijab wearer, I have sought to 
emphasise the diverse forms of negotiations employed by what Fadil (2009; 2008) has 
described as orthodox, non-Muslims and non-orthodox Muslims. Contrary to Fadil, I 
have focused on the similarities between these women, in order to illustrate how 
second-generation Somali women are transforming the relationship between 
interiority and exteriority. For Layla, Ifrah, Fatima and Anab, exteriority alone does 
not make one a Muslim, nor does the manifestation of virtuous conduct (although for 
Layla and Ifrah both are incredibly important). For these young women, the solution 
is a prioritisation of interiority as a personal and private experience of affect and 
thought.  
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These processes contrast with the practices of older first-generation Somali women, 
who, according to younger women, prioritise exteriority and emphasise the hijab as 
crucial to their religion. Overlapping with these generational differences are shifting 
Islamic discursive traditions. Asad (1993: 219) writes that, deen (invariably translated 
as religion) “relates more to how one lives than to what one believes ... For Muslims 
... it is virtues – mastery of the body, the ability to be patient, and the capacity to 
judge soundly – that matter, not states of mind". Mahmood (2001), referring to more 
contemporary reformist traditions, stresses the dialectic, mutually-constitutive relation 
between interior and exterior processes of the self, crucial to the fashioning of a pious 
Muslim subject. These young second-generation Somali women are, I argue, further 
shifting the relationship between interiority and exteriority, and transforming and 
reformulating what it means to be a Muslim in Britain in the context of shifting 
policies and discussions.  
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Chapter 4: Sincerely seeking an ideal husband 
4.1 Seeking a suitable Somali 
 “We’re doing a Somali marriage event!” Zaynab announced excitedly, as I arrived in 
the café to join some of my friends before one of our weekly Islamic classes. I then 
remembered that Zaynab, Sauda and Nadifa, three unmarried, practising women in 
their 30s, had been contemplating the idea of a marriage event a couple of weekends 
ago. As we sat sipping tea and munching on chocolate bars, they proposed their plan 
and bounced ideas off one another. “These days it’s just so difficult to find a 
professional Somali who’s also practising”, Zaynab explained, “so what’s wrong with 
organising an event to see what we get?!” Not all embraced the idea with equal 
enthusiasm. Some younger women remained sceptical about participating in the event 
and contributed to the discussion with a degree of detachment. Ifrah claimed she was 
too “romantic” for this kind of event, while Maryam was hesitant and felt the 
occasion might be uncomfortable and embarrassing: “It’s pride I guess. I don’t want 
to appear desperate”. Sceptical the event would attract only “desperate and ugly 
men”, she confessed that she preferred to help with the organisation of the event, 
rather than take part herself. Zaynab assured them both it would not be embarrassing, 
as the people attending would be in the same position, and would hopefully maintain 
some degree of confidentiality following the event. Nadifa, meanwhile, provided 
further justifications for the event, “Ideally we’d meet men in normal encounters, like 
in a café, or studying, but that just doesn’t happen that easily. And there’s nothing un-
romantic about facilitating meetings with appropriate men!” Zaynab nodded and 
explained how many of her practising friends were also struggling to find suitable 
Somali men. "What's wrong with us? We are normal aren't we?! I mean why can't we 
find people? There must be men who are like us?!” 
This chapter unpacks the question of how and why these young, practising, and highly 
educated Somali women organised a marriage event in order to find suitable Somali 
husbands. I approach the practices and debates involved in the organisation of the 
event as techniques of self-making: as actions these young women employ to 
transform themselves (see section 1.3.1). Building on Foucault, I focus here on the 
multiply-constituted subject (Moore 1994) on the ways in which these young women 
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manage a plurality of teleologies of the subject (autonomous, pious, and good Somali) 
and modes of subjectification (exercising choice and autonomy, acting for the sake of 
Allah, pleasing kin), in their imagined relations with future, potential husbands. This 
allows me to bring together the previous two chapters, and to account for the ways in 
which young second-generation women construe different, yet coexisting, subject 
positions as they attempt to transform themselves differently in relation to an idea of 
culture, religious practice and internal belief. Marriage lies at the fulcrum of 
contradictory identifications implicated in their processes of self-transformation. Here, 
I focus on how these different teleologies are managed and negotiated by young 
practising women through their discussions and debates about marriage ideals and 
expectations. In doing so, I build on the anthropological literature on the everyday 
practice of Islam (Schielke 2010a; Soares & Osella 2010), pointing to the ways that 
young Muslims pursue piety alongside other contradictory ideals, reflecting the 
complex and fragmentary nature of everyday experience. 
The topics of marriage and courtship were a constant source of excitement, stress, and 
curiosity amongst young practising Somali women. Many had started practising in 
their early to mid 20s, a time at which they were also expected to marry. Through 
their encounters with friends, relatives, or religious scholars they were frequently 
exposed to reformist teachings concerning marriage and love, or to instructions on 
appropriate (or halal) courtship practices. Contemporary reformist teachings instruct 
young Muslims to pursue a companionate marriage based on pious virtues and ideals. 
Yet for these young women, socialised in the UK and raised by Somali parents, this 
ideal coexists alongside notions of romantic love gained through films, music, and 
popular culture, pressures from their kin to “marry Somali” or marry within their clan 
(qabyl), and personal ambitions of socio-economic mobility. In what follows, I 
examine recent changes to understandings of marriage and love amongst second-
generation practising Somali women. 
I build on two bodies of anthropological research on marriage and romantic love. 
First, I draw on recent scholarship that has juxtaposed Islamic reformist teachings 
with ideals of romantic love. Marsden (2007a), for example, has pointed to the 
existence of love relationships in societies where values of male honour and female 
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modesty constitute important sources of moral value.56 In Chitral, in the North-West 
Frontier in Pakistan, romantic love has existed in poetic discourses and everyday 
experiences of elopement marriages long before the influences of “Asian modernity” 
and Bollywood films. However, Marsden shows that cross-gender love and elopement 
are seen by increasingly dominant Islamising discourses as a threat to individual and 
collective honour. Similarly, other scholars working on the Islamic reform have 
tended to focus on the ways these movements both oppose “romance relationships” 
and simultaneously seek to transform what they regard as traditional marriage 
practices. Masquelier (2005) demonstrates the ways Islamist movements in Niger 
seek to find a solution to the difficulties experienced by young men in getting 
married, by reducing the price of bridewealth and by speeding up marriage contracts. 
Although Masquelier notes that romantic love is “making inroads” into the moral 
imagination, marriage amongst Mawri couples in Niger continues to be less about 
companionship and intimacy and increasingly about motherhood, domestic life and 
economic survival (ibid 2005: 68). Schielke (2009), in his analysis of moral 
ambivalence and fragmentation maintains that, for Muslims in Egypt, romance and 
love are antithetical to – yet coexist alongside – ideals of rigid sexual morality. He 
argues that, “love represents an ethic of desire and commitment … that stands in stark 
contrast to the religious discourse on chastity and the social practice of parental 
control over marriages” (2010: 30). Less is known about the manner in which global 
reformist discourses in Europe, where Islam is a minority religion, are appropriated 
and merged with ideas of romantic love, and how this has altered marriage practices 
and meanings.  
A second body of work explores how the discourse of love and companionate 
marriage has become a marker of the “modern” in different contexts around the world 
(Faier 2007; Masquelier 2005; Ahearn 2001; Roefel 1999). Romantic love is depicted 
as an increasingly popular ideal in a globalised world, that presents “narratives which 
situate social actors in relation to modernity through the discourse on what is 
'traditional' and what is ‘modern’'" (Donner 2012: 5). Hirsh and Wardlow (2006) 
explore the shifting expectations for marriage in a variety of contexts, and the ways in 
                                                
56 Abu-Lughod (1986) demonstrates the ways in which discourses of sentiment and intimacy exist 
alongside dominant discourses of honour. See also de Munck (1996). 
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which a companionate ideal, based on a notion of “modern love”, is becoming a 
crucial element of modern relationships and modern personhood. This companionate 
ideal, they argue, is composed of a series of elements which interrelate in different 
ways, in different contexts: an emphasis on the emotional closeness of a couple, a 
privileging of the conjugal couple over family relationships, an idea that 
companionship is a deliberate goal of marriage, and a “modern” discourse of love 
based on the idea that a person is a better partner because of his or her unique 
characteristics (ibid 2006: 5). Crucial to this narrative is an ideological association 
with the idea of an egalitarian relationship between husband and wife, although as 
Hirsch and Wardlow (2006) note, this does not guarantee that the eventual marriage 
will be egalitarian.  
There is an assumption within this latter body of ethnographic work that romantic 
love and companionate marriage are external ideals, which encroach upon, and 
transform local practices, as well as being implicated in a teleological narrative of 
modernity (Giddens 1992).57 As Osella (2012) notes, this idealised narrative assumes 
that marriages based on love and companionship will eventually replace marriages 
based on financial and pragmatic considerations. For many young Somali women 
raised in the UK, romantic love constitutes only one of several marriage ideals, from 
mainstream films, music and popular culture, which they draw on in particular ways. 
On the one hand, these young women appropriate these ideas in order to assert their 
aspirations for an intimate, egalitarian, and upwardly mobile companionate 
relationship. On the other hand, they infuse these ideas of love as emotional intimacy 
with Islamic ideals of a companionate, virtuous marriage, and spiritual love. Ideas of 
romantic love are not, therefore, simply the result of external, global forces, nor are 
they necessarily incompatible with reformist discourses. 
Through the practices of planning and discussing the marriage event, these young 
practising women draw on and merge a range of intersecting discourses and practices 
on marriage. These multiple discourses are not simply encroaching and transforming 
their understandings of marriage; they provide points of reference that these young 
                                                
57 Giddens (1992) depicts a modernist narrative in which marriage based on intimacy, monogamy and 
choice becomes increasingly globalised.  
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women employ in their creative attempts to reimagine their relationships to 
themselves and to potential husbands, Somali kin, and God. I begin by exploring 
some of the historical changes in marriage practices amongst Somalis, including some 
of the more recent transformations in kinship and marriage in the diaspora. The 
literature on the Somali diaspora examines changes to clan, household structure, and 
gender roles (Griffiths 2002; Affi 1997), but little mention is made of the ways in 
which marriages are imagined and formed in the diaspora, especially amongst 
younger generations. Furthermore, very few studies focus on the impact of Islamic 
reformist discourses on marriage. This chapter aims to fill this void by providing an 
ethnographic account of the marriage experiences and aspirations of young practising 
Somali women. I intertwine a description of the organising and eventual unfolding of 
the Somali marriage event, with my informants’ practices of searching for a husband, 
and their discussions about the expectations, pressures, and possibilities of marriage.  
4.2 Courtship and marriage: past and present 
Based on his research throughout the 1950s amongst nomadic pastoral Somali society 
in the former British Protectorate of Somaliland, I.M Lewis (1961; 1962; 1994) 
presents one of the earliest accounts of marriage practices within Somali society.58 
Although his work reifies a monolithic and timeless account of Somali society 
(section 2.3), it offers a useful point of departure from which to unravel some of the 
developments and continuities in marriage practices amongst Somalis in the present-
day diaspora.  
According to Lewis, parents and senior agnates often controlled choices of brides, and 
personal preferences were only considered to a limited degree (Lewis 1994). Pre-
marital relations remained formal with no intercourse or love-play occurring publicly 
before marriage (Lewis 1962: 12-13). Several of the older Somali women I 
interviewed stressed how their parents, who had married in the 1950s-60s had either 
only met on several occasions prior to marriage in the presence of kin, or in some rare 
cases, had never been introduced before their engagement. Lewis identifies two 
                                                
58 His insights, which resulted in a series of monographs on kinship and politics, are however most 
applicable to pastoral societies and less relevant to southern Somali cultivators such as the Dgil and 
Rahweyn. 
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components to the marriage transaction, which are still important to marriages in the 
diaspora: an individual aspect, represented by the mahar (a woman’s personal dowry) 
and the corporate aspect represented by yarad and dibaad (bride-wealth and dowry) 
(Lewis 1962: 21-22). The mahar is the legal aspect of the marriage; it was 
traditionally less in value, compared to the bridewealth, and the amount was agreed 
upon between the couple, although normally the payment was postponed until 
divorce. The bridewealth, on the other hand, is received by the girl’s father and 
distributed amongst close agnates within the diya-paying group.59 The dowry, paid by 
the wife-givers is decided by the girl’s family and is designed to enable the couple to 
set themselves up, although it remains legally in the property of the man. Marriage 
was typically virilocal and exogamous, as marrying within the diya-paying group was 
seen to be threatening cohesion.60 Elopement marriages (masaafo) were also frequent 
if a spouse’s family was unable to raise sufficient sums for the bridewealth or if kin 
were opposed to the marriage (Luling: personal correspondence). 
Divorce, Lewis (1962: 34-38) notes, was and continues to be common amongst 
Somalis, and no particular stigma was associated with it. The cause for marriage 
instability, according to Lewis, lies in the structural position of women as wives, who 
remain more attached to their own kin and retain, upon marriage, much of their pre-
marital legal status, thus remaining “clients” amongst their affines.61 This instability, 
he argues, is further accentuated and reflected in the ways in which affinal relations 
lack the political allegiances offered by agnatic relations (1994: 47). In marriage, a 
woman is treated as a “protected relative” and is never fully identified with her 
husband’s kin; she is bound to his kin only through her children. Furthermore, while 
first marriages are more likely to be arranged by kin, there was often more choice 
involved in later marriages. This was true of marriages throughout the 1950s but also 
                                                
59 The diya-paying group is a lineage or group who collectively receive or pay blood compensation. 
60 Marriages were not endogamous for southern Somali groups (Luling: personal correspondence) 
61 Interested primarily in the structural features of marriage and divorce, Lewis’ account pays scant 
attention to the actual empirical observations of marriage. He identifies reasons for frequent divorce 
such as incompatibilities, strife between co-wives, infertility and external pressures from kin, but fails 
to develop these explanations or to give them any significance in his analysis of marriage instability. 
Lewis’ structural-functionalist explanation, and his over-emphasis on clan and agnatic filiation have 
been the source of much debate and criticism (Ahmed 1995). 
 135 
much later. As many of my first-generation Somali women informants relayed to me, 
they were subjected to much more pressure from kin in the first marriage compared to 
subsequent arrangements. 
Following independence, and with the expansion of the urban middle classes, the 
discourse of modernity, nationalism and cultural authenticity also had a significant 
impact on marriage ideals and practices (see Appendix A). Kapteijns’ (1999) analysis 
of love songs reveals dominant discourses on marriage in post-independence urban 
Somali society. Kapteijns explores how the popularisation of the love song, developed 
by the new urban middle class intellectuals and influenced by post-independence 
struggles for equality and freedom, reflects the ideals of a new urban youth culture. A 
rejection of the wisdom and religious morals of rural elders, and an assertion of 
individual emotions over the “discipline of male-dominated family and kin-group” are 
recurring themes throughout the songs (Kapteijns 1999: 111). Romantic love, based 
on mutual consent and the solemn commitment of both partners, is portrayed as a 
central value within marriage. This is juxtaposed with marriage typical of traditional 
pastoral society, as described by Lewis, whereby one needs approval from male 
elders, and where “the husband-provider [is] in charge of an obedient wife” 
(Kapteijns 1999: 132). Nonetheless, this breaking away from an imagined tradition is 
depicted as incomplete. Both marriage partners employ the concept of tradition, 
rooted in pastoral traditional culture and customary law, as a tool for legitimising the 
marriage (ibid 1999: 149). Companionable marriage, therefore, is discursively 
depicted as interlinked and inseparable from tradition. The latter is positioned as the 
seat of morality and is opposed to a frivolous, immoral modernity (see Chapter Two).  
Whilst I avoid drawing an analytical opposition between “love marriages” and 
“arranged marriages” (Osella 2012: 244; De Munck 1996), most of the first-
generation participants in my research, including Sofia, Nimo and Nafisa, whom I 
introduced in Chapter Two, and who were raised in urban areas in post-independence 
Somalia, often drew on a discourse of love and companionship when they discussed 
their own marriages. They contrasted their own relations with their husbands, with 
those of rural or traditional Somalis, and those of their parents. Seven out of eleven 
female Somali informants, who were raised in Mogadishu throughout the 1960-80s 
told me they had married out of “love”. They often enjoyed reminiscing and 
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recounting their love affairs. Ubah, for example, had met her husband at a bus stop in 
Mogadishu and she described to me how he had pursued her and that she had initially 
refused his advances: 
 “He worked near my house and saw me go to the bus stop. One day he 
stopped me and asked for my number, but I refused. A few days later he 
saw me again and asked me to go for tea, so I accepted. It was ok back 
then, [as long as it was] in a public place. I gave him my office number 
and he always called me there. We saw each other for two years and then 
he came to my house to ask my family to marry me.”  
Similarly, Sofia recounted her husband’s love and adoration: “When we got married 
my husband loved me so much! I was so amazed I couldn’t understand why he loved 
me so much, what I had done to deserve it!? Maybe I had been blessed!” As indicated 
by Ubah’s comment, courtship might often last several years and the couple attended 
cinemas, concerts, and other social gatherings together. Shamso, who married a work 
colleague explained how she had had several boyfriends, and her “parents would 
know, but not always. If they knew they would usually push for marriage.” However, 
women from smaller cities, towns or rural areas, were less likely to have experienced 
as much leniency in courtship and marriage. Amongst the women from rural areas 
that I interviewed, few employed the same language of love and companionship to 
refer to their husbands and many emphasised that their marriages had often been 
organised by their kin, but that they had had the choice to reject a proposed spouse.  
The literature on the Somali diaspora elaborates on some of the transformations that 
have altered kinship and marriage practices in the diaspora in the last two decades, 
which form the backdrop to this chapter. It points to the increase of female-headed 
households coupled with a decline of male authority and a changing attachment to 
clan and kinship. In addition, in what follows, I argue that changing relationships to 
tradition, and the impact of reformist discourses, have also altered meanings attached 
to marriage. In his book on changing notions of clan identity, Griffiths (2002) 
explores the unprecedented growth of single women with children. Ladan Affi (1997) 
terms this the “single-mother phenomenon”, which she attributes both to the fact that 
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women and children migrated alone without male counterparts, but also to the high 
rate of divorce in the diaspora.62 A redefinition of gender roles, where women often 
raise a family without the support of men, whilst men expect to exert authority within 
the home as they did in Somalia is seen as a prominent source of conflict (Affi 1997: 
443). A lack of extended networks of support to help with household chores has 
placed extra burden on women, and further accentuated marital conflicts. “A state of 
unease in gender relations” Griffiths (2002: 113) claims, was common in a range of 
the households he in which he conducted interviews. The loss of status for men, due 
to social, educational, and economic barriers, has meant that few men are able to fully 
support their households, thus losing their role as breadwinners. On the other hand, 
women have had greater adaptability to altered economic and social conditions, and 
for those who had previously been dependent on men, state benefits have allowed 
them to secure an income for themselves and their children, leading to a sense of 
“disposability” of men (Griffiths 2002: 111). The “displacement of male authority in 
the home” is perceived as having had significant implications for the stability of the 
conjugal couple (ibid 2002: 112-3). Similarly, my data from 21 Somali households in 
Camden, Tower Hamlets and Newham reveals the prevalence of female-headed 
households where men (husbands and older brothers) are rarely present and only 
intermittedly exercise influence.63 
Although changes in gender relations and the absence of extended kin in the diaspora 
may suggest a decline in the importance of clan, Griffiths (2002) demonstrates the 
linguistic and practical reification and persistence of clan in London (see also Bjork 
2007b). Since 1991, clan loyalty has intensified and inter-marrying has become 
increasingly common (Lewis 1994: 52). This insight, however, is more pertinent to 
the first-generation. Divorced women form closer attachments to their own clan 
(patriline) rather than that of their husband and their children. Practical and financial 
networks of support, for example hagbaad (informal credit schemes), are organised 
by these women within their own clans, as are financial and material transfers to 
                                                
62 Crosby’s (2006) study of resettled Somali women in Georgia and gender roles, indicates that 
amongst her informants, 56% were married, 20% single, 16% divorced, and 8% widowed. 
63 As I noted in Chapter One, thirteen of the twenty-one households that I frequented throughout my 
research were female-headed.  
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Somali regions, which often work to reconstitute feelings of family loyalty and 
relatedness (Lindley 2010; Decimo 2007; Hammond 2007). First-generation Somalis 
generally wish for their children to marry a Somali spouse, preferably within their 
clan, or into a clan with which they have a particular affinity. Whilst the significance 
and amount of bridewealth and dowry payments has declined, some of these 
transactions are still considered important to marriage and the maintenance of kinship 
relations.64 During my fieldwork, a newly wed Somali woman in her 20s, decided to 
divorce her husband who was from her mother’s clan, who was opposed her decision. 
Negotiations between both spouse’s male kin persisted for over a year because the 
young woman, who could have sought the intervention of the Sharia Council, chose 
not to do this, as it would have meant bypassing the authority of her male kin who 
were working to convince her husband to grant her a divorce. As illustrated by her 
experience, marriages continue to be largely a matter negotiated amongst male kin. 65 
For the younger second-generation, marriage practices are changing and clan is 
becoming less relevant. Griffiths (2002:123) notes how younger generations are often 
critical of clan and tribalism, or feel that the role of elders is disconnected from their 
own lives. Instead, they have developed new forms of identification based on their 
school, or area of residence, for example. Nonetheless, the importance of marrying a 
Somali spouse continues to be a significant consideration. Young Somalis tend to 
assert their own choice in marriage, although they often recognise the pressures 
exerted by their families. Furthermore, they maintain that marrying Somali is a way of 
retaining their culture (see Chapter Two). Data from my kinship diagrams of the 21 
Somali households shows that the majority of marriages of the last two generations 
have been amongst Somalis. However, members of the second-generation tend to 
assign less importance to clan affiliation than their parents.  
The impact of religious reformist discourses on marriage has not been explored in 
depth in the literature. Like the previous chapter, this one focuses on the experiences 
                                                
64 In the diaspora yarad, gabaati (engagement money) and dibaad have declined in amount and 
significance. An average yarad might range between £100-500. The husband and his family are 
additionally responsible for paying for the wedding reception, the bride’s clothes, and jewellery.  
65 The importance of clan continues to be celebrated at marriages. For example, the buranbuur song, 
which is typically sung by a female elder, often offers praise to the clan of bride and groom.  
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of young practising women. For these women, bridewealth payments (yarad) are seen 
as irrelevant, or of minor importance when compared to the mahar, thus reducing the 
place of agnatic kinship in the marriage. Increasingly, practising women are 
requesting a non-monetary mahar, such as asking that their husbands teach them to 
recite the Quran or accompany them on the Hajj (pilgrimage). Similarly, practising 
young women place more importance on the nikah (Islamic ceremony), prefer to have 
a modest aros (Somali wedding celebration), and often criticise Somalis who spend 
on lavish ceremonies.66 They draw on reformist scholars who argue in favour of 
reducing marriage expenses and prioritise the importance of marrying a “good 
Muslim” as opposed to someone from the same ethnicity or clan. Practicing women 
tend to prefer women-only weddings and avoid music, with the exception of 
buranbuur, which is considered a traditional dance and is sung and danced to the beat 
of a drum (see Figure 1). These second-generation youth are also distancing 
themselves from the marital relationships of their parents. Such marriages are seen as 
traditional, unequal in terms of gender, and as having resulted in a high rate of 
divorce, invisibility of men in the household, and an inability to secure a stable source 
of income for the family.  
4.3 Situating the marriage event  
Returning to the marriage event with which I opened this chapter, I elaborate on a 
series of factors that account for why these young women decided to organise such an 
event. Since practising Islam, young women’s interactions with men, and their 
available opportunities for courtship, have been radically altered. For many of these 
young women, practising has entailed acting modestly and therefore changing or 
reducing the manner of interaction with men who are not their mahram.67 Whereas 
they might previously have had intimate friendships with members of the opposite 
gender, since practising they seek to alter these friendships, which are no longer 
regarded as appropriate according to Islamic norms. Maryam explained on one 
                                                
66 Weddings in the diaspora are amongst the most important of social gatherings. Many of my 
informants were invited to at least one aros (Somali wedding ceremony) a month, and these took place 
in hotels or in large community halls (see Figure 3).  
67 Mahram is a term to refer to unmarriageable kin, e.g. brother, father, uncle, etc. 
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occasion, “Since I started practicing I don’t really know any men. I used to have loads 
of male friends but I changed my number and haven’t been in touch you know. I just 
don’t know anyone”. Furthermore, many of the women try to avoid mixing with men 
too often, although this is sometimes unavoidable, particularly at work. The 
socialising that does occur with men often maintains a large degree of separation, 
such as avoiding physical contact.  
In addition, practising has meant that these young women stay away from certain 
places such as clubs, pubs and bars, music concerts, and “gender-mixed” social 
occasions such as weddings. Non-practising Somalis frequently socialise in mixed-
gender environments with other Somalis, including shisha cafés, bars, clubs, 
restaurants and parties. Shisha cafés run by Somalis across the city are popular places 
for young second-generation Somalis to frequent on a Friday or Saturday night. 
Mixed weddings are also a prime location for engaging and meeting other Somalis; 
women conceive of this as an occasion to dress up and often spend hours styling their 
hair and doing their make-up for the evening.68 Dating or having a boyfriend is 
generally considered shameful (ceeb) or forbidden (haram) amongst older first-
generation Somali parents, and lacking in modesty or haram amongst practising 
women. Nevertheless, many non-practising young women do date, but until the man 
seeks a marriage proposal from the woman’s father, boyfriends/girlfriends are very 
infrequently introduced to families. Practising women, on the other hand, criticise and 
tend to avoid mixed weddings and environments that are not halal. As Ardo, a young 
practising Somali woman, instructed the youth group where she worked: “Marry 
swiftly if you’ve found the right man. It’s the halal way of being with a man, so it’s 
best not to delay”. She concluded by explaining the inappropriateness of dating and 
of pre-marital sex. Meanwhile, Islamic lessons, one of the few places where women 
are more likely to meet practising men, are considered inappropriate places for 
courtship.  
                                                
68 Practising women are often critical of mixed Somali weddings for being cultural and not properly 
religious. They criticise women who might usually wear hijab throughout the day and take it off for a 
wedding, and the men who gather at the back of the room to “check out” the girls dancing. Mixed 
weddings, therefore, become the target of criticism by practising women who see these occasions as 
“meat markets” and prefer, whenever possible, to avoid them. 
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In view of these limitations, seeking a “recommendation” or being “set-up” by 
friends, family, community leaders or a Sheikh is a common solution. This process 
typically occurs when a young person, who is interested in getting married, mentions 
her interest to a sibling, or older relative in order to seek a “recommendation”. 
Community leaders, scholars, or imams also compile matrimonial lists. However, 
young women look upon these options with scepticism, as they involve entrusting 
someone else with the task of choosing one’s spouse. Furthermore, by seeking 
recommendations from parents or older Somali kin, one runs the risk of being 
introduced to a cultural Somali. Amongst my informants, friend recommendations are 
sought more willingly and more frequently than those from family, community, or 
mosque leaders. Friends are considered more appropriate judges of character and 
better placed to identify suitable men. If asked to do so, female friends will consult 
friends, or family friends to gather whether they know anyone appropriate for the 
individual at hand. Occasionally, these propositions occur in prayer rooms and I have 
witnessed Somali women approach each other asking about marriage availability. For 
example, on one occasion Maryam’s cousin had asked her to look out for a “good 
religious Somali woman” who spoke fluent Somali and was possibly interested in 
returning to Somalia at some point. Maryam assumed the task and approached Somali 
women in the mosque or at Islamic classes, enquiring whether they met the criteria 
and were potentially interested in her cousin. If they agreed she would jot down their 
number and hand it to her cousin. It was up to him to call the woman and converse in 
order to become acquainted and assess if they were in fact compatible.  
Telephone or email conversations are usually the first form of contact between a man 
and woman who have been recommended by others. The first conversations, I was 
told, are usually relatively formal, and focused around topics such as education, 
employment, religion, ideas about married life, and children. Whilst many initial “set-
ups” fail after the first few conversations, if there is mutual interest the couple may 
continue to speak for sometime until they arrange a meeting. Some couples told me 
they met for a coffee after initial conversations, whereas others arranged for the man 
to visit the woman’s father at home. If initial encounters take place outside the home, 
if the relationship continues, it is expected that the man should approach the woman’s 
father to ask for her hand in marriage. Proposals, however, are not always successful, 
especially if the couple do not know each other beforehand. Because dating is 
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discouraged, my friends explained their preference of meeting in public places before 
making an official engagement. However, if the relationship continued, telephone 
conversations served an important role in maintaining contact, learning more about 
the person, and talking intimately in halal ways.  
Websites and chat rooms have become increasingly popular amongst young practising 
women. They enable users to maintain an element of privacy and choice in their 
selection of marriage partners, whilst also opening up a wider array of potential 
spouses, and bypassing the authority of kin, and community or religious leaders. 
Accordingly, websites such as singlemuslim.com, imuslimmarriage.com, 
muslimmatch.com, muslims4marriage.com, and muslima.com are increasingly 
common ways of seeking a husband or wife. Like the marriage event, women may 
often be secretive and embarrassed about their use of such websites. On 
singlemuslim.com, the most popular amongst my informants, registration is free and 
users can set up a profile including personal details, such as country of origin, income, 
physical characteristics, a profile photo, personal descriptions of oneself, and a range 
of other characteristics including religiousness.69 One can also indicate what is sought 
in a husband or wife, and the privacy settings can be regulated, in order to control 
who has access to the profile photo. Users may see who has viewed their profile, but 
only men can initiate a conversation. Once a profile has been set up one can search for 
a potential spouse using the criteria mentioned above.  
The singlemuslim.com website boasts over 500,000 users worldwide and contains a 
live chat option, a news page for comments, and a range of articles on marriage, 
advising the users on issues ranging from how to be a wife/husband, to courtship, 
marriage etiquette, and birth control. The article on Finding a Companion presents 
matrimonial websites as one of the contemporary “new ways” of seeking a husband, 
and cautions users to be careful of non-halal websites.  
Several of my informants set up profiles on these websites. Nadra, for example, 
created a profile, which included a short statement stating that she was looking for a 
                                                
69 Required questions include stating the level of religiosity (from very religious to not religious), 
consistency in prayer, whether one wore hijab or preferred a man with a beard. 
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man with “good character, patience and ambition”, who would help her improve her 
relationship with Allah. She had set her profile photograph as private, and spent hours 
everyday searching through men’s profiles. Much to her disappointment, however, the 
majority of men were of Bangladeshi or Pakistani origin and she excluded these from 
her list without reading their profiles. These men, she explained, expected their wives 
to spend their days cleaning, cooking and caring for their mothers – something she 
was unprepared to do. She enjoyed sifting through profiles, checking potential 
candidates’ employment statuses, and assessing their level of piety. However, after a 
couple of weeks of using the site, she decided it was excessively time consuming and 
too difficult to assess the suitability of the men based solely on their online profile.  
Of the young practising women I knew who were married or got married during my 
fieldwork, only one found a spouse – an English convert – on singlemuslim.com. 
Another had known her Somali husband prior to practising, and another married a 
Somali work colleague. Meanwhile Anisa, a woman in her early 20s, married a 
former colleague she became reacquainted with at a mixed wedding; whereas a friend 
of hers met her husband at university. Of the seven weddings I attended throughout 
my fieldwork, two were organised through a recommendation. The first was a woman 
in her mid 30s who was introduced to her Somali husband by a relative and the 
second, was a young woman in her mid-20s, had been recommended to an English 
convert by mutual practising friends. As I explore below, many Somali families often 
discourage marrying converts or non-Somalis.  
The organisers of the marriage event had tried to meet a potential husband in many of 
the above ways. However, following several unsuccessful attempts, the women began 
to feel increasing pressure from family and friends to get married. As Zaynab’s 
comment, “Why can’t we find people?” suggests, my friends often complained about 
the scarcity of suitable men. They found it increasingly difficult to find a husband 
who fitted their criteria: practising, Somali, and professional. The idea of the event, 
therefore, seemed like a logical step. It opened up possibilities, while enabling them 
to set the criteria, monitor the interactions, filter adequate participants, and, 
ultimately, organise an event for, and by, themselves. They would ensure that the 
environment was adequately halal, but would also be free of parental, kin, or 
community control. 
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4.4 Breaking with tradition 
4.4.1 Seeking modern, professional men 
The idea of organising an exclusively Somali marriage event was a contentious one 
for all involved, and one which required careful negotiation and planning. All the 
young women were adamant that they did not want to marry cultural Somalis (see 
Chapter Two). Somali men who have recently arrived to the UK from Somalia are 
often referred to as “freshies” or “fresh off the boat” and are considered to be 
undesirable partners by these young Somali women. They are thought to speak little 
English, have “old-fashioned” or traditional manners, ways of speaking, comportment 
and dress and, furthermore, hold traditional ideas about marriage. Moreover, they are 
rarely employed in professions these young women would deem suitable, and which 
would guarantee financial stability. The term “freshie” therefore is used to refer to 
stereotypical and undesirable characteristics.  
As I described in Chapter Two, these young women criticise and ridicule a presumed 
unreflective attitude to culture, which is associated with traditional kin, “freshies” and 
older generations. They position themselves in opposition to the “freshie” or cultural 
subject – an “organicist creature” in Wendy Brown’s (2006) words – who is unable to 
articulate an optional relationship to culture and ethnic belonging. In doing so, these 
young women constitute themselves as autonomous liberal subjects against a 
traditional figure who lacks rationality and will, and for whom culture is all-
encompassing and authoritative (ibid 2006: 301). 
Whilst a reformist discourse emphasises the importance of marrying a good Muslim, 
and overlooking ethnicity or culture, these young women often found themselves 
negotiating this ideal with the importance of maintaining their culture (Chapter Two), 
as well as with the pressure exerted from kin (section 4.6). Whilst Layla and others 
had reservations and disagreed with the exclusivity of the event, Zaynab, Nadifa and 
Sauda were amongst those who advocated a Somali-only event, and argued it was an 
ideal way of managing their own expectations with those of their kin: “At least I can 
say I've tried. If I don't find anyone then I'll look elsewhere. But at least when my 
mum will ask why I'm not marrying Somali I can say I even organised an event!" 
Zaynab explained, and Sauda added, “It’s a way of maintaining our culture.”  
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In negotiating these conflicting ideals, they often drew a distinction between cultural 
or traditional, and Western, Somali men. These two categories of potential husbands 
were distinguished according to an assumed idea of gender relations. “They expect us 
to stay home, do the cooking and cleaning… just be a traditional Somali wife” a 
young practising woman once commented, referring to the former category. These 
young women perceive traditional Somali men to be similar to their parents. They are 
criticised for not having, or for not desiring, an egalitarian companionate relationship 
based on mutual choice (Hirsch & Wardlow 2006). Many second-generation women 
criticise their parents, and other first-generation Somalis, for having traditional or 
“patriarchal” gender roles, whereby the woman is assumed to remain in the home and 
perform the household and childcare chores, and to be subservient to male authority. 
A practicing Somali woman in her 20s described in an interview the ways she felt that 
her mother’s marital relationship was different to her own because her mother stayed 
at home: “The man is the breadwinner, its part of Somali culture” she added. Other 
young women claimed that their parents had an “arranged marriage” and “little 
choice”, and that their mothers had fewer education and employment opportunities 
than their fathers. In the case of female-headed households, men who have not 
divorced their wives are assumed to have a second wife “back home”. Hodan, for 
example, explained how her mother had been married to a distant cousin when she 
was fifteen. She continued to live with her husband even though, according to Hodan, 
he spent half the year in Somaliland with his second wife and children. “I would never 
take that! I always tell her to chuck him out, and she won’t!” she exclaimed.70  
Accordingly, these young practising women espouse a companionable and egalitarian 
relationship based on mutual choice (Hirsch & Wardlow 2006). Whilst they recognise 
these marital ideals are also part of Western culture, they argue that these ideals are 
present within the Islamic tradition. In this way, Islam is seen as “more” emancipatory, 
because it advocated these principles prior to the development of Western feminism 
(see below section 4.5).  
                                                
70 These stereotypical portrayals of traditional gender roles do not accurately reflect the reality of their 
mothers’ lives.  
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Muneera’s relationship to tradition was, however, ambivalent. She explained: "I'm not 
a very good Somali wife, and sometimes I feel bad about this. So I make all these 
promises, like cooking breakfast in the morning, dressing up in dirac, burning 
incense.” Her comments demonstrate a conflicting attitude towards marriage. On the 
one hand, “traditional roles” are perceived as old-fashioned and based on unequal 
gender relations, but on the other, a good marriage is viewed as inextricably tied to 
Somali tradition or culture.71 
Similarly, these young women negotiated these ideals with what they regarded as 
traditional Somali marriage practices (section 4.2). Ifrah, a young practising woman 
described her ideal marriage to me as traditional, yet Islamic:  
 “I’m a bit of a traditionalist. I’ve always loved a family… so I really 
want to be the mum who looks after the home, who cares for her 
husband… I want to be a caring, supportive wife, looking after home and 
family. However, this does not mean that I have to have an inferior 
relationship to my husband. Housework and child work are valued in 
Islam, not like in the West.”  
There is an interesting twist here. Whilst tradition is associated with housework, and 
the “West” with women’s emancipation from the home, these women recognise that 
the problem lies in the devaluation and lack of financial and social recognition of 
housework as work. Islam, they insist, unlike the West, places value on the latter, 
through its commitment to the ideals of gender equity and mutual companionship.  
Many young second-generation women also attack traditional Somali men as well as 
their parents for their inability to maintain a stable, financially secure marriage, which 
in Islam is considered a husband’s responsibility. The high rate of divorce, the 
frequency of female-headed households and the absence of male figures are often 
held up as evidence to support their scepticism towards marrying Somali men. Ifrah, 
for example, often explained that she had been against marriage until she began 
                                                
71 Interestingly, this idea of a modern companionate marriage as inextricably tied to tradition was also a 
prominent theme for the young urban middle classes in Somalia throughout the 1970s (Kapteijns 
1999).  
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practising because she felt that many of the Somali marriages she witnessed were 
“dysfunctional”. She explained to me: “I used to be so anti-marriage before I started 
practising. Just cause I saw so many divorces around me, I was convinced I would 
end up as a divorcee; I just didn’t see the point in marriage.” 
Somali men are held responsible for many of these failures. This negative perception 
is tied to the stereotype of the Somali man who lounges and “lingers” outside Somali 
restaurants and cafés, chewing khat and who is unemployed and “useless” at looking 
after his family. “I don’t want to get one of those men who linger outside Internet 
cafes and Somali shops!” a friend told me in a conversation about Somali men. When 
I questioned Sumaya on what she thought was the problem with Somali men she 
replied: “Maybe the reputation of being lazy. They look at their relatives who haven’t 
aspired to higher things and they just like to be comfortable, going into IT, bus 
driver… maybe they haven’t seen successful Somali men, so they don’t aspire to do 
much.”  
Many young second-generation Somali women have been raised in contexts of 
considerable financial strain. Their families often arrived as asylum seekers with very 
few resources and due to a series of social, educational, economic and language 
barriers, have struggled to find employment. This has been particularly true of men, 
who have often experienced a loss of status, and in some instances have returned to 
the Somali regions. Although the picture of Somali men depicted by these young 
women is a gross simplification, it is true that many first-generation Somali men have 
been unable to support their families and have struggled to find employment in the 
UK. First-generation Somali women have been faced with the difficulties of 
sustaining often very large families of children and, at times, extended kin.  
The young women’s choice of a “professional” Somali man, and their desire for 
social mobility should therefore be seen as a way of distancing themselves from the 
negative characteristics associated with their parents’ marriage and, as asserting a 
preference for a cosmopolitan marital relationship based on social mobility, financial 
security, choice, and egalitarian values. Their imagined relationships based on love, 
equality and companionship coexisted and converged, therefore, with pragmatic and 
economic considerations (Osella 2012: 244). As we drove home in Sauda’s car, the 
evening after first discussing the event, we talked about the ways in which we could 
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ensure it attracted “professional” candidates. The advertising, Zaynab claimed, was 
crucial in this regard. It should state explicitly the desired criteria and ought to be 
circulated in the right places, through appropriate media: via email in mosques, 
Somali businesses, and across business networks. The word “professional” referred to 
both education and employment: a man with a university degree and a graduate full-
time job. For most of the women, attracting a man with a good salary, which 
guaranteed them a comfortable life, financial security, and status, was an important 
consideration.  
Most of the young women are university educated and worked full-time. An educated 
man, with whom to converse and share ideas and interests, was considered a 
necessary requirement for a marriage partner. Accordingly, level of education is very 
commonly used amongst my informants, and particularly older generations of 
Somalis, as a marker of status.72 “No freshies… we want to have a proper intellectual 
conversation with people!” Sauda joked. Ideally, the man would be like them, raised 
and educated in the UK and sufficiently Western. "We have nothing in common with a 
freshie" Nadifa explained, “We want someone who is employed, is ambitious, but also 
has a good character, is practising, more than just praying… actively learning 
religion” summarising Zaynab and Ifrah’s perspectives.  
4.4.2 Seeking Solutions 
Following preliminary discussions my friends designed a leaflet advertising the event. 
Alongside indicating the “religiosity” of the occasion, by including a passage from the 
Quran, the leaflet specified the aim of attracting “professional” and practising 
Somalis between the ages of 25-40 (Figure 10). The leaflet was circulated via email 
and Facebook, and disseminated in mosques, community centres, university prayer 
rooms, Somali restaurants, and shops. After the initial advertising, my friends decided 
to assign me the task of answering phone calls. In this way they would not be 
recognised should a relative or friend call to enquire about the event. I was told to 
explain to the men on the phone that the women were in their late twenties/early 
                                                
72 For example, amongst older Somalis, those educated at either Mogadishu or Hargeysa universities 
consider themselves better educated and hence of higher status to those who had not received any 
formal schooling or university education. 
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thirties, practising and professionals. The event was free and the venue would be 
disclosed upon registration. Having been assigned this task, I received regular phone 
calls from my friends, who were curious to know who had called and whether I 
deemed any to be suitable candidates. These discussions revealed further criteria 
which the young women used to judge whether a man was “desirable”. I was told to 
ascertain the level of English of the enquirers by listening attentively to their accent 
and language skills, as this would identify whether they were “freshies” or not. If the 
men demonstrated insufficient conversational English, they should not be allowed to 
participate in the event, and I was told to cut them from the list.  
One of the first phone calls I received was from a man in his late 20s. He attempted to 
speak Somali but I asked him to speak in English and we conversed for over 20 
minutes. He had a strong Somali accent and I feared he would be deemed unsuitable. 
Pleased to hear a Sheikh would be attending, he asked whether it would be a mixed 
event and in what manner people would interact. “Its good to have a halal meeting 
like this, where we can meet sisters interested in religion, but who also want to 
maintain culture”, he said to me. He elaborated this point further, and the following 
day he sent me a text describing himself. Aged 28, he was currently enrolled on an 
MSc in chemical and process engineering. He added: 
“I work as well in order to feed my family. Due to my strong iman my 
main goal that I am here this country [sic] is to educate and migrate to 
Islam country as it is difficult to raise children here According to hadith… 
I am looking for a woman with iman and taqwa and good character. Been 
[sic] professional is not important for me.” 
I forwarded the text message to my friends and Zaynab rang back laughing 
hysterically, “The grammar!! What did he sound like?? Was his accent good? Think 
we can cross this one out!” I was surprised, as I thought his level of education would 
please my friends. However, I was soon instructed as to how to interpret messages 
and speech in order to effectively “spot” a “freshie”. His message was apparently 
replete with “giveaways”. This was apparent not only from the standard of his written 
English, and willingness to migrate to an Islamic country, but was also implicit in 
some of his priorities and comments, such as being “able to feed my family”. 
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A few days later I received a more successful phone call. Kadar seemed friendly and 
his English was fluent, with an East London twang. Although still a student he was 
keen to get married, and he praised the event. 
“At the end of the day if I marry a white girl my culture is lost. I lose 
everything Somali. It's good to marry a Somali girl, you maintain your 
culture, language all these things. But if you've grown up here it's good to 
have a Somali girl who you understand, who's grown up here as well. 
Religion is important and I could marry a Muslim, that’s good as well. 
But it's not the same as marrying Somali and someone practicing. In that 
way you have culture and religion. Usually it's the men who organise 
these things, but it’s different that the girls organise, it’s a good initiative. 
It’s not the traditional way but it’s good. 
 When I hung up the phone I immediately rang my friends and described the 
conversation. Nadifa asked me what he sounded like and was relieved to hear he had 
grown up in the UK. However, she was concerned that he was perhaps too young for 
her friends.  
Kadar had also shown a proper engagement with his culture. Although he prioritised 
religion above culture, he demonstrated an ability to constitute an optional 
relationship to culture (Brown 2006; see Chapter Two). In his view marrying “Somali” 
was not completely necessary, but it was a preferable option, and a way of 
maintaining a connection with his culture. The young women shared a similar 
conception of the place of culture within marriage: aiming to share, with their 
prospective Somali husbands, a similar set of values and practices, such as language, 
norms and practices surrounding Somali marriage, and kinship relationships. 
Furthermore, Kadar recognised that an event organised by women was 
unconventional and not “traditional”, but commended it nonetheless and was keen to 
be involved.  
The day before the event I overheard one of the phone calls Zaynab made to the 
participants. She was calling to ensure they would all be attending, and perhaps also 
wanted to ascertain that the participants fitted the criteria: “We’re looking for 
practising brothers, interested in the deen (religion)” I heard her explain: “All the 
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sisters are practising, they pray five times, some do even more, some are students of 
knowledge.” She waited for a response and then proceeded, “But they are also 
professionals. Do you have a job?” The other women and I sniggered at the bluntness 
of her question. “May I ask how old you are?” I guessed the man then asked her why 
she was involved in such an event because we heard her reply: “The event was set up 
by a group of us, who felt that Somali women were looking outside for practising 
professional brothers, so we wanted to give Somalis a chance.” She hung up the 
phone demoralised. 
On that same evening as we sat in my house making final plans for the night, and 
ensuring all the participants had confirmed their attendance, we received a phone call 
from a “freshie”. Zaynab answered the phone and after a long conversation in Somali 
she hung up and turned to us with a discouraged expression. I was curious to know 
what exactly was wrong with this man so I probed my friends who, reluctant to speak 
badly about him, were not articulating their disappointment. “He just doesn’t speak 
the lingo. He’s awkward and says the wrong things. [For example:] I want a beautiful 
Somali sister, who is young and knows her culture, is close to culture, these kinda 
things. He wants a traditional wife” Zaynab explained. “I asked him if he had a job 
and he was like: I work here and there – come on, that’s not for us!” Nadifa, having 
understood the “type” added, “He just expects different things from a wife. We want 
someone who speaks good English, has a stable job, that kinda thing.” 
Disheartened, we sat around thinking about how to remedy the situation. Nadifa, 
Zaynab, and Sauda had invested time and money into hiring the venue, including 
buying refreshments, printing leaflets, and distributing them. Desperate, we decided 
to contact a Somali Sheikh who had previously congratulated us on the event and 
offered his support. The phone call was a success: the Sheikh promised to contact 
Somali brothers who attended his mosque, whom he knew were looking to get 
married. An hour later the phone started ringing intermittently and, having heard 
about the event from the Sheikh, around ten Somali men registered. Zaynab’s face 
visibly lit up as the phone calls became easier and more frequent. Only on one 
occasion did we hear her tell a 40 year old divorcee “unfortunately we are looking for 
men without children, its just the preference of the girls really.” Hanging up she 
explained to us, “We don’t want to be looking after another wife’s kids!” 
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The Sheikh’s support guaranteed that the men attending would fulfil at least two of 
the three criteria. The young women could only hope and pray that the men would 
also be “professionals”. By seeking out practising men, the young women were 
certain they would not enter a traditional marriage, but one based on a companionable 
relationship of mutual love, and respect and a shared faith and practice. The young 
women reasoned that “within Islam” men are required to be the breadwinners, and 
that finding a practising man should also guarantee them a degree of financial 
security. 
4.4.3 Choosing a husband 
As the event made clear, these young women stressed the importance of choosing 
one’s husband, and prioritising their own preferences, over those of kin. Often they 
resorted to Islam in order to justify their choice, arguing that their religious tradition 
supported these liberal ideals. Yet, in what follows, I explore how choice of spouse 
was employed as a mode of subjectification alongside, and often within the limits of, 
Islamic ideals regarding virtuous conduct, emotions, and love for God.  
Several of my informants had received proposals from men of different ethnic 
backgrounds, and occasionally the young women found themselves arguing with their 
parents about these choices. Conflicted, the young women often sought advice from a 
religious expert. On a marriage course by Sheikh Rabbani, which I describe in more 
detail below, the lesson was followed by an hour-long Q&A session. One of the most 
common questions addressed the issue of how to deal with parents who disapproved 
of a marriage with an individual from a different community, cultural background, or 
ethnic group. The Sheikh advised that while Muslims had an obligation to be good, 
gentle, respectful and righteous towards parents, they did not necessarily have to obey 
them. “If parents say no to someone who is of ‘good character’ and good in deen 
(religion), then hold your ground. Don’t get angry, don’t lecture them on Islam, just 
address their concerns.” He advised his audience further:  
“Speak to them with respect, they might be worried they won’t be able to 
communicate with your spouse, or the in-law, worried you’ll move 
somewhere else... so try to address that, be understanding, the reasons 
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might not seem completely unreasonable, talk practical things… slowly 
you can convince them of your choice.”  
Ultimately, however, the Sheikh insisted that what mattered was choosing to marry 
someone of piety “You don’t have to listen to what parents say in terms of marriage”, 
he stated. However, although the conjugal couple was considered more important than 
family relations, supporting and respecting one’s kin was also seen as virtuous.  
Islamic discourses could be employed strategically to advocate choice and autonomy 
in marriage vis-à-vis one’s kin. Sumaya, for example, explained to me that when she 
began practising and learning about religion she “also started to realise [she] could 
marry whom [she] wanted… religion taught [her] that.” This of course meant any 
good Muslim man, but this designation was not conceived of as limiting. The newly 
married conjugal couple typically move away from their parent’s homes into a new 
house after marriage. My informants claimed that although the extended family was 
an important source of support in their marriage, it ought to play a minor role in 
marriage choices, and also in the dynamics between a husband and wife. As one 
woman described to me, a modern marriage also signifies “Not involving the tribe in 
your marital arguments”, though this was always difficult to avoid in a situation of 
divorce, for example. The concept of choice through Islam, for my informants, 
involves a distancing from family through an adherence to religious practices and 
obligations. A religious marriage enables these young women to negotiate the 
traditional constraints and pressures of their kin, to champion “gender equity” and 
choice, and to transform the meaning of love and marriage in the process.  
Povinelli (2006) argues that the love relationship based on intimacy and choice is a 
liberal mode of self-governance. The intimate contract is presented, she contends, as 
distinct yet always imminently under threat by economic and political contracts. 
Typical of what she terms the “autological subject” – the subject-in-love – exists in 
opposition to the “genealogical subject”, who is governed by the “drags of descent” 
and whose actions are dictated by culture and tradition. The liberal subject “is 
presumed to become sovereign at the moment she projects herself as her own 
authentic ground” (ibid 2006: 46). According to Povinelli, the autological subject 
cannot exist without its mirror. For young practising women, choice and equity are 
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ways of asserting a difference vis-à-vis their parents. Yet, this liberal mode of 
subjectification coexists and intersects with these women’s desire to submit to God, 
and hence also to Islamic norms of pious conduct. Through discussions, debates, and 
practices around marriage, these young women simultaneously construe themselves 
as autonomous and pious subjects. Marriage and their imagined relations to a 
potential husband become the terrain through which these young women negotiate 
and manage different modes of subjectification and conflicting teleologies. In what 
follows, I explore these tensions as they play out in relation to romantic and spiritual 
love. 
4.5 Reformist Teachings: the Islamic conjugal couple 
Islamic reformist teachings constitute an important source of authority in young 
practising women’s reworking of their marriage ideals and aspirations. These women 
receive ample advice on the importance and benefits of marriage by attending Islamic 
courses and lectures, listening to online lectures, and reading books and pamphlets 
that circulate in mosques or Islamic bookshops.73 Scholars often emphasise the 
primacy of the conjugal couple based on mutual respect, rights and responsibilities, 
Islamic virtues, and spiritual love. As I noted above, the young women contrast a 
traditional marriage with an ideal companionate marriage, based on gender equity, 
choice and social mobility – one, they argue, that is drawn from both the Islamic 
tradition but is also central to Western culture. Hence, contrary to the literature (Hirsh 
& Wardlow 2006; Masquelier 2005), their marriage ideals are not based on an 
appropriation of a global modern ideal of companionate love. They emerge from their 
simultaneous engagements with ideals of romantic love and notions of a pious 
relationship that aims to uphold Islamic virtues and cultivate spiritual love. As I have 
shown above, these ideas also coexist alongside concerns pertaining to financial 
security.  
                                                
73 The Sisters Magazine is often a source of advice and information regarding marriage and love. Some 
of the courses, lectures, or books consulted are delivered or written by a range of scholars such as 
Sheikh Faraz Rabbani, Sheikh Babikir, Sheikh Al-Kawthari, Sheikh Reda Bedeir, Hamza Yusuf and 
Yasmin Mogahed. 
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In January 2011, I attended a one-day Islamic marriage course with two practising 
friends. Led by Sheikh Rabbani74 at SOAS University, it was intended for married 
couples, as well as those seeking marriage. The course, entitled True Love, Getting 
Married: Clear and Practical Guidance for Success was divided into four lessons and 
included a final Q & A session. It touched on a series of lessons including the 
importance of marriage in Islam, an analysis of passages from the Quran on marriage, 
advice on selecting the appropriate spouse, the fiqh (law/jurisprudence) of marriage, 
and a summary of Al-Ghazali’s comments on the ideal characteristics of a spouse.  
“Marriage is a spiritual act, it is half our deen”; the Sheikh began the course, citing the 
hadith and unravelling its meaning. He explained that Islam was divided into two 
parts: the first constituted our relationship with the Creator, the second our 
relationship with creation, which was based on our ability to uphold and sustain good 
character (aklaaq).75 “Marriage is the key test of good character, it is half because you 
are relating to creation. No relationship tests like marriage does; it nurtures good 
character if it’s successful”, he explained. Prayer and similar acts of worship, he 
elaborated, were partly “selfish acts” which worked to improve oneself and one’s 
relationship with God. Marriage, and our relationships with others, on the other hand, 
represented the real test of sincerity because they required effort in upholding good 
manners and embodying the exemplary behaviour of the Prophet.  
A good marriage, therefore, was one in which the conjugal couple supported each 
other in the pursuit of pious virtues. Marriage, he explained, reiterating the 
importance of companionship and choice, facilitates our journeying on earth: “We 
have to make our life comfortable, and a spouse should be a companion, a source of 
support and assistance. Choose a companion who will help you get where you want to 
go”. Marriage constitutes the means towards the fashioning of a pious self: “Marriage 
gives you focus, it stops you from drifting and helps uphold taqwa (piety).” 
                                                
74 Sheikh Faraz Rabbani was born in Karachi, Pakistan, raised in Toronto, Canada and currently lives in 
Amman, Jordan. He holds a BA in Economics & Commerce but has also studied the Islamic Sciences 
in Damascus under scholars such as Shaykh Haytham Idilbi and Shaykh Abd al-Rahman Kharsa. In 
Canada he was the Educational Director of SeekersGuidance (Sunni Path: n.d.).  
75 Aklaaq has a specific meaning in Islam and refers to the ability to implement virtues, by drawing on 
the exemplary behavior and manners of the Prophet. 
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Throughout the course Sheikh Rabbani emphasised the importance of mutual respect 
and support, and reciprocal rights and responsibilities. Based on the concept of 
“gender equity” or “gender complementarity”, the Sheikh encouraged both men and 
women to “nudge” their spouse into adopting the sunna by sharing tasks at home and 
helping each other out in everyday life. “The Prophet did the cleaning, the cooking, 
and fixed his own sandals”, he reminded the men. Gender equity is based on a 
naturalised notion of gender difference, which considers men and women to be 
naturally different yet equal in the eyes of God – a notion that has become popular in 
discourses of authentic Islam (Jouili 2011; Deeb 2006). Deeb (2006) notes in her 
discussion on “gender jihad” amongst her Shi’i female informants, that the concept of 
equity relies on feminist textual reinterpretations. These interpretations claim that, if 
applied correctly, Islam can eradicate many of the problems women face in 
patriarchal societies. From these women’s perspectives, Deeb shows, the notions of 
gender equity and gender jihad also prove to the West that Muslim women can be 
both pious and modern. 76As noted above, my informants claim that gender equity 
demonstrates the ways in which the Islamic tradition has already incorporated many 
of the values associated with Western culture. On one occasion, as we discussed her 
role as a wife, Muneera, a practising second-generation woman, explained to me: 
“Western culture has become part of me and so I think everything has to be equal. But 
actually I have learnt that equity is also part of Islam”. The companionable ideal, 
therefore, merges both assumed Western and Islamic attitudes and values.  
Similarly, young Muslims often reminded one another of the Prophet’s exemplary 
behaviour: “He used to help out at home, mend his own clothes, he never used to hit 
them or anything. He had real respect. Responsibilities have to be shared, a husband 
can bring the children to school, help out at home”, Ifrah explained. In reference to a 
passage from Sura al-Nisa (chapter “The women”) of the Quran,77 which was 
                                                
76 This notion of complementarity is often used to explain how women are considered to naturally 
embody characteristics that men lack, such as mercy, kindness, patience, generosity and so on. Other 
Islamic scholars (e.g. Feminist Islamic scholars) may, however, use the language of liberal rights to 
assert gender equality and its presence within Islam. My informants tended to refer to the former 
concept, but occasionally also employed the language of gender rights and equality. 
77 The meaning of the following translated passage was frequently debated amongst my informants: 
“Husbands should take good care of their wives… If you fear high-handedness from your wives, 
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frequently discussed and reinterpreted amongst these women, Ifrah commented: 
“Both husband and wife should obey each other, not in the sense of obeying orders 
but in the sense that they work together for the same goals, they co-operate and 
respect each other.” In unravelling the passage, she emphasised the importance of 
mutual respect, support, and cooperation between the conjugal couple.  
According to these young practising women, “gender equity” was legitimated by its 
contrast with the traditional gender roles of their parents, and also in relation to the 
contradictory and unstable notion of the West. According to some women, Islam 
already encompassed certain rights and values present in the West, which were not, as 
others claimed, necessarily opposed to those of Western society. In a lecture 
addressing a large audience of young Muslim women in central London in 2012, 
Yasmin Mogahed, a popular feminist Muslim scholar from the US, addressed the 
topic of Muslim women’s empowerment.78 The problem, she articulated, is that in our 
societies “We allow anyone other than our Creator to define success, failure, 
happiness, and worth… and in so doing we have entered into a form of slavery”. First, 
she explained, referring to a popular, simplified, notion of Western feminism, women 
have made men the standard of their success and worth. “As women, we will never 
reach true liberation until we stop trying to mimic men and value the beauty in our 
own God-given distinctiveness” she insisted. Second, she argued that the 
advertisement industry has defined women through the standard of beauty; our worth 
is judged on whether our beauty “pleases men”. Instead, our relationship with God 
ought to be the only true standard, and the only path to empowerment. She concluded: 
“We don’t need the society’s standard of beauty and fashion to define our 
worth, we don’t need to become just like men to be honoured, and we 
don’t need to wait for the love of a prince to save or complete us. Our 
                                                                                                                                      
remind them [of the teachings of God], then ignore them when you go to bed, then hit them” (Quran 4: 
34). 
78 Yasmin Mogahed lives in the US, and holds a B.S. Degree in Psychology and a Masters in 
Journalism and Mass Communications. She has taught Islamic Studies, and served as the Sisters’ 
Youth Director for the Islamic Society of Milwaukee. She previously worked as a staff columnist for 
the Islam section of InFocus News, and is currently an instructor for New Dawn Institute, and a writer 
for the Huffington Post. Her latest book is entitled Reclaim Your Heart (Yasmin Mogahed: n.d.). 
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worth, our honour, our salvation and our completion lies not in the slave 
but in the Lord of the slave.” 
Amongst young practising women, Khadija, the first wife of the Prophet and the first 
female convert to Islam, was often treated as an exemplary figure of the ideal Muslim 
wife. On numerous occasions I was told about the way she “comforted, cared and 
supported” her husband. My informants, who wished to inform me about the gender 
equity and importance of choice in Islam, reminded me that Khadija worked, was 
older and wealthier than the Prophet, and that she chose to propose to him. The 
Prophet did not take a second wife while he was married to her, and he respected and 
loved her immensely. This, my informants claimed, was truly a perfect marriage. 
Equality, monogamy, mutual support, and choice were already present in Islam, and 
hence, my informants insisted, there was no need to draw on Western society to find 
these ideals.  
4.5.1 Transforming Romantic love 
Love was frequently a topic of conversation amongst my informants. “Do you believe 
in love?” Ifrah asked her friends over dinner at my house one summer evening. 
Frequently, she had interrogated me on the same issue. She continued, “I believe in 
soul mates; that two people can be so alike, and complement each other, and they just 
know it and feel it.” Layla, who was generally more of a pragmatist regarding these 
issues, hesitated and then replied, “I believe in love. But soul mates? Is there really 
just one person?” But Ifrah insisted on the concept, comparing the idea of soul mates 
to close friendships: “You can be soul mates with friends… when you’re very close, 
and you tell the other person everything and feel for each other…” Layla nodded, this 
time in agreement, then hesitated for a moment and added, “Actually you’re right, 
there’s evidence for soul mates in the Quran.” She took out her iPhone and searched 
for the relevant verse from the Quran: “The sacred unity of two unknown souls 
written by fate from birth”. This Quranic passage, she explained, was also frequently 
reproduced on Muslim wedding invitations. As we continued to discuss the issue, 
Zaynab knocked on the door. As she made herself comfortable around the table, we 
introduced her to the conversation. She retorted, “I don’t know, I’m sceptical. Love is 
overrated. And it never lasts… anyway, love like it is in the movies doesn’t exist”. 
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This scepticism, concerning “love in the movies”, was, in fact, shared by many young 
second-generation Somali women. Raised in the UK, these women are avid 
consumers of Hollywood films, romantic novels, soap operas, and popular music.79 
Yet, I often heard them make similar pragmatic and sceptical remarks regarding these 
romantic portrayals of love. Ifrah agreed with Zaynab that love which was typically 
represented as “superficial”, or as lustful, based on physical attraction, was not “real”. 
As Idil, a young woman in her 20s put it, “I don’t think love at first sight really works. 
If I have a car crash and ruin my face will that end love? That’s just physical 
attraction, infatuation.”  
In the course mentioned above, Sheikh Rabbani cautioned his audience to exercise 
restraint in marriage, recommending both partners to fast regularly as a way of 
restraining desires and lowering their gazes. As has been noted elsewhere in the 
literature, reformist discourses strongly oppose cross-gender relationships based on 
desire, passion, romance, and sex (Schielke 2010a; Marsden 2007a). Yet, amongst 
these Euro-American Scholars, this does not result in a complete opposition to a love 
relationship, but to a separation between a love relationship based on physical desire 
and lust, and an Islamic one based on emotional closeness, spirituality and love for 
God. Marriage should not be a fulfilment of desires based solely on beauty. The 
Sheikh explained: “Your partner is not a commodity. Do not fall only for beauty, it’s 
not enough… look at the underlying virtues of your spouse. And only marry if you 
can take on the responsibilities.” Similarly, he criticised those who married for money. 
Following a citation of a hadith from Al-Tirmidhi, he explained, “Marry the one of 
religion and character. The one who marries for wealth will be impoverished by Allah, 
the one who marries for beauty will not be satisfied, and the one who marries for 
honour and status will be abased.” By emphasising “good character”, pious marriages 
were presented as superior to the “dysfunctional” marriages of Western societies. 
“Marriages fail these days because we have become self-centred. We need to start 
                                                
79 Amongst the Somali teenagers whom I tutored or frequented over the course of my fieldwork, many 
spent their weekends watching romantic comedies such as, 27 dresses, Step up 2, Honey; catching up 
on the latest soaps such as Eastenders and Hollyoaks and sharing rap/hip hop/RnB music. In an 
assignment I set them based on Oscar Wilde’s ideal husband, many wrote about their ideal husband as 
being someone caring, supportive, loving, with a good job, truthful and honest, who helped around the 
house, and someone to “share everything with”. 
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caring for each other for the sake of Allah”, Sheikh Rabbani argued throughout the 
course.80 Similarly, as I described above, young practising women replicated some of 
the Sheikh’s teachings by separating physical attraction, or “love at first sight”, from 
love as an emotional intimacy based on a notion of soul mates.81 This latter form of 
love, they argued, was more realistic and could be found not only in Islam, but also in 
contemporary culture.  
Throughout the early stages of my fieldwork, one of the most popular films amongst 
young Somali teenagers and older women was The Twilight Saga: a series of films 
depicting the love between a young teenager called Bella and a vampire called 
Edward. The romantic relationship portrayed through the film is one of care, mutual 
affection and loyalty, not lust or physical attraction. Many of these young women 
went to see the film for the 2009 Eid celebration. For weeks they all spoke with 
excitement about the movie. Ifrah and Maryam, two practising friends, had seen the 
movie several times. “Twilight is so beautiful, it's about real love, they love each 
other sooo much. They would die for each other. I wonder if that love really exists…” 
Ifrah pondered. The film captured love as a spontaneous and unconstrained emotion 
based on an idea of soul mates or companionship, centred on an appreciation of the 
uniqueness of a companion’s characteristics (Hirsch & Wardlow 2006).  
 However, many also recognised that, according to Islamic teachings, these unique 
characteristics ought to be founded on Islamic virtues. Jane Austen’s novels and film 
reproductions were often mentioned as exemplary of the ideal romantic relationship. 
Sumaya, for example, had seen the BBC production of Pride and Prejudice a dozen 
times. On one occasion, she even organised with her friends a Pride and Prejudice 
fancy dress party! I heard Sumaya say on several occasions that Elizabeth Bennett, 
the main protagonist of the novel, could have been Muslim, as she embodied all the 
                                                
80 The Sheikh also advised his audience to reflect on the following pragmatic issues when considering 
and selecting a compatible spouse: righteousness and deen, good character, attractiveness, reasonable 
marriage expenses and mahar, similar ideas about children and child-rearing, the importance one 
attaches to virginity, and family background. 
81 This criticism is also echoed in contemporary Islamic scholars’ teachings. As Hamza Yusuf claims, 
in a lecture frequently cited by my informants entitled: Womanhood: An Islamic Perspective, the 
conjugal couple in Islam is different to the Western model. In the secular West, the couple is based on 
sexual pleasure. In Islam, the couple is ordained by God, sexuality is not separated but is part of the 
sacred, something enjoyed by both partners. 
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virtues of a Muslim wife: modesty, humility, honesty, and intelligence. Sumaya also 
saw Elizabeth’s critical attitude towards social mores and norms as reflecting her own 
criticisms of older kin’s cultural practices. Most importantly, Elizabeth was 
outspoken, not afraid to speak her mind and was certainly not submissive to male 
authority, particularly in her relationship with Darcy, her future husband. Sumaya and 
her friends longed for this kind of love relationship – one in which love arose as a 
spontaneous emotion between the couple, but also developed as a consequence of 
learning about each other. In the novel, Elizabeth only begins to love Darcy after she 
has learnt to overcome her pride and prejudice, and to see Darcy for who he really is, 
with his “true” characteristics and virtues. 
My informants oscillated between these two understandings of love, as a natural 
emotion that arises thanks to an appreciation of the unique characteristics of an 
individual on the one hand, and that love is “learnt”, as it is understood within Islamic 
reformist contemporary teachings, on the other. During my fieldwork, one of my 
young practising friends divorced her husband after less than a year of marriage. On 
one occasion we discussed whether she had been in love. “Well I was attached to him, 
physically, emotionally, spiritually. I wasn't in love that’s the thing. I think that grows. 
I was just attached and was learning to love”, she explained. What is revealing about 
this comment is the way she was drawing on reformist discourses about “learning to 
love” and “loving for the sake of Allah”, in order to make sense of her marriage. 
According to the young woman, love is more than an attachment, it is an intense and 
unique emotional experience, yet it does not necessarily arise naturally, but can be 
“worked on” or “learnt”.  
Similarly, Muna, a young married woman in her 20s had been introduced to her 
husband through an aunt’s recommendation. Prior to her marriage, she had only met 
her future husband in the presence of her family and conversed with him via phone 
and email. They had immediately “clicked”, she explained, and after half a year they 
had decided to marry. As we sat in a coffee shop discussing her marriage, I asked her 
about her first few months of married life. She described the first few weeks as lonely. 
She missed her family, especially during her honeymoon: “But Alhamdulillah we 
worked at it, we had to get to know one another, especially our personalities. You 
have to get used to small things around the house. At the beginning we set down 
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ground rules of what we could and could not do!” “And love?” I enquired. “It comes 
after marriage, it’s natural. You start doing things for each other you don't realise, 
you become willing to do it. Like a mother for her child. But the idea is that you work 
at your marriage, with the intention of pleasing Allah. And inshAllah He’ll help you.”  
This idea of learning to cultivate love is, as I describe in Chapter One (section 1.7), 
based on Islamic ideas of self-discipline. According to Islamic pedagogies, emotions 
such as love, hope, and fear, ought to be cultivated so that they may arise naturally 
within the self (Mahmood 2005). Mahmood demonstrates how emotions should not, 
as in the liberal tradition, be assumed to arise spontaneously, but may be cultivated as 
both modalities and motives for pious action (ibid 2005: 140).  
Spiritual love for one’s husband should also be an extension of the love one instils for 
the Prophet and for God. Sheikh Babikir,82 during a brief talk I attended with my 
informants on Love in Islam, argued that the spiritual type of love was what kept us 
alive, gave us wisdom, and was characterised by longing and searching. The love a 
believer has for the Prophet, he explained, is meant to be a yearning love that leads 
the believer to love Allah. “The more you love, the closer you are to true faith”, he 
explained, adding, “No love comes out of ignorance, you need to know what you are 
loving… and knowledge is gained through experience”. Accordingly, learning to love 
God involves teaching oneself to love Him through praise, worship, and experience of 
his creation, as Sheikh Babikir claimed, but also by rationally learning His attributes 
by reading and engaging with the scriptures. Learning to love a husband is similar. 
While praise and worship is reserved solely for God, love can be learnt by 
appreciating a husband’s naturally good traits (fitra), and his pious virtues.  
Following the lecture Nadifa commented on the Sheikh’s definition of “deep love” 
(mawabba):  
 “This is a spiritual love that God puts between a husband and a wife at 
marriage, love that is inside, deep, spiritual, that Allah blesses your 
marriage with, He gives you the potential for deep love when you get 
                                                
82 See section 3.5 for biographical details 
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married, places that potential in your heart and then it’s up to you to find 
and work on it.”  
Similarly, Yasmin Mogahed, in the lecture I described above, criticised women who 
made romantic love their sole purpose in life. Those who make marriage and romantic 
love their ultimate aim, she argued, are chasing a mirage and will never be content. 
“Completion cannot be found in places other than God”, she insisted. She contrasted 
two types of love. The first type is based on what, “You get from them [husbands], 
how they make you feel”. This type is ultimately unstable and can never be fully 
satisfied. Another type of love arises between people who love each other for what 
they are: “The beauty you see in them is a reflection of the Creator”. This love is 
stable and constant. “Learn to love in the right way… for Him, through Him and by 
Him”, she argued, “and you will learn there is a space in the heart reserved only for 
the Creator”. Love for one’s husband ought to ideally be an extension of one’s love 
for God. 
This latter type of love is illustrated by many of the Sufi poems that some of my 
informants learnt to recite. Sumaya, for example, had begun to memorise and sing the 
Qaṣīdat al-Burda, an ode in praise of the Prophet.83 The poem captures the sense of 
“longing” or “spiritual love” described by Sheikh Babikr, as well as the second form 
of beauty captured by Yasmin Mogahed. It is unclear in the poem whether the poet is 
referring to the Prophet or to his loved one. I asked Sumaya about the burda poem, 
curious about how she distinguished love for God, from love for her husband. She 
replied: 
 “Well the burda is good because it makes you think about love, the way 
you might have experienced it: that attachment, that waiting around for 
him, longing, not being able to be apart. Everyone can relate to it. But 
he's talking about love for the Prophet. The idea is that you should love 
your husband for the sake of Allah, so you should love God more than 
your husband... I'm not exactly there, but inshAllah. Only when you love 
                                                
83 The burdha is a poem or ode of praise to the Prophet Mohammed, composed by an Egyptian Sufi, 
Imam al-Busiri. 
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God more than yourself have you achieved real piety… but we should all 
strive for that love.” 
Although Sumaya was working towards instilling a “spiritual love”, this ultimately 
remained an ideal, which she felt she had not accomplished in practice. The ultimate 
aim was for her to transform the emotions she felt towards her spouse into spiritual 
love – a form of extension of her love for Allah. Her love for her husband ought not 
take over the space reserved solely for her love of God. Yet, as she pointed out, and as 
the discussions above demonstrate, the kind of love relationship envisioned by these 
young women fused idealised notions of romantic and virtuous love acquired through 
films such as Pride and Prejudice, with notions of spiritual love gained through 
Islamic teachings. Through these ideas, the young women sought to articulate novel 
ways of thinking about their relations to potential husbands on earth. 
4.6 Practical impediments to a pious relationship 
As discussed, young practising women hold ambivalent attitudes towards marrying 
Somali. They refuse traditional men in favour of those who maintain a “choosing” 
relationship with their culture, emphasising choice, equality, and financial security, 
yet also try to select a husband who embodies Islamic virtues. However, this picture is 
further complicated by the pressures exerted by their kin, and the young women’s 
feelings of obligation towards them. As Zaynab explained when justifying the need 
for a Somali-only event, it served as a way of “maintaining culture”, but also as a way 
of abiding by her mother’s wishes.  
Most Somali parents wish for their daughters to marry either Somali, or at times 
endogamously within their own clan. In certain circumstances, where the young 
woman has little connection with her patriline (i.e. her father and paternal uncles), 
female kin may encourage marriage within the matriline. Furthermore, there is a 
preference for marrying one’s daughter to a respectable clan with a good reputation, 
and to a man who has a stable source of income. An unmarried woman in her mid-20s 
may be a source of concern for parents, as she may be reaching unmarriageable age. 
Furthermore, control over young women’s sexuality is a preoccupation not only for 
the parents, but also often for the extended kin. If dating, she is considered to be 
acting immodestly and can be a source of shame (ceeb). During my fieldwork, a 
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Somali man who proposed to a young practising Somali woman faced opposition 
from his father and uncle who discovered a few days prior to the marriage that gossip 
circulated about the young woman’s shameful behaviour before she was practising. 
Whereas the young man decided to pursue the marriage, refusing to listen to the 
rumour and arguing that she had changed, his father refused to meet his new bride and 
banned her from visiting his home. Concerns with male honour and female modesty 
are particularly acute for older Somali generations. However, I have also witnessed 
young Somali men distinguish between modest young women whom they claim are 
suitable for marriage, and other young women, who are only suitable for dating.  
Pressure usually originates from the young woman’s own patriline, and is exerted 
either by organising meetings with potential spouses or by refusing the young 
women’s marriage choices. Sahra and Ifrah often spoke about the pressures exerted 
by their families. Both in their mid-20s, they were nearly past the “marriageable” age 
by Somali standards. In reference to her father, Sahra commented on how he would 
often “give her the talk”. On one occasion she described the incident: “He walked into 
the room and announced: you should be thinking about marriage, it’s about time isn’t 
it?” Although she tried to dismiss these comments, at times, following these incidents, 
she would contact her closest friends asking them to look around for her, as she 
trusted their recommendations more than her father’s. “Preferably not a Somali, I 
need to start looking around, before my father sets me up!” she had told them. Her 
fears were exacerbated when her father and uncle occasionally threatened to organise 
for an eligible Somali man to visit to the house.84  
 “He wants me to come in to serve the tea, so that the guy can check me 
out spend a few minutes out there and then leave. That’s the way it’s done, 
he said. I don’t get him! My uncle thinks that’s the Islamic proper way… 
but it’s not! As if! I’m not going to serve them tea! What am I, a trophy 
wife?! So that he can just have a quick glance at me?! 
                                                
84 Ardo and Layla were amongst a couple of young women who had voiced their disagreements about 
holding a Somali-only event.  
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Sahra was worried that once the man had come to the house he would feel compelled 
to marry her, not because he liked her, but solely to please her kin. When she 
recounted the incident, Ifrah burst out laughing.  
 “I’ve had that done to me too! My brothers and sisters don’t tell me 
they’ve invited someone, they just get me to serve tea! And then a few 
weeks later they say: Ifrah, do you remember that man you served tea to? 
Are you interested?”  
Sahra’s comment resonates with some of the themes explored above. Her uncle, in 
Sahra’s view, was confusing Islam with tradition or culture. Islamically, she had the 
right to choose her spouse, and these meetings were not condoned in the Quran and 
hadith. She also felt that these traditional practices encouraged a marriage based 
solely on physical attraction. She considered the practice of “serving tea” degrading 
and submissive, objectifying her body to a male gaze. In her mind, it was 
representative of the “backward” and cultural gender norms. 
Yet some of these meetings did come to fruition. For example, Muna, whom I 
introduced above, had been introduced to her husband through a family meeting. 
Ifrah, who in that case had ridiculed the practice, had on another occasion decided to 
follow up on a family recommendation. For a few months she had conversed on the 
phone with her potential new spouse, only to realise that they did not share the same 
expectations for marriage.  
Throughout my fieldwork I heard of cases where parents refused a husband because 
he was not Somali. However, I did not hear of anyone refusing a potential husband on 
the basis of clan. For many parents, marrying a non-Muslim was completely out of 
the question, unless the husband converted to Islam. In several situations, where a 
potential spouse was a non-Somali Muslim, the parents were initially unhappy with 
the marriage choice, but after a few months decided to give way to their daughter’s 
choices. Asiya, for example, struggled initially to convince her father to allow her to 
marry a convert whom she had met on an Islamic website. After several months of 
persuasion, however, the marriage went ahead. Furthermore, many parents, 
particularly those more religiously inclined, accepted the “religious argument” often 
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presented to them from their daughters: that they ought to be able to marry any good 
Muslim regardless of his ethnicity.  
Nimo’s practising daughter, for example, had met her husband through an online 
Islamic class and he had come to visit with his sister and brother-in-law to propose to 
her. “He’s Somali, from near Kismayo”, Nimo, a first-generation Somali woman, 
whom I introduced in Chapter Two, told me on a visit to her house. “He’s from 
another family (meaning clan)... But he's Somali”, she explained and then corrected 
herself, “Any Muslim is good. If he's religious and a good man we can't refuse him. 
But you know, it’s nice to share the same culture.” Occasionally however, young 
couples will marry without their kin’s consent, hoping that they will be accepted in 
the future. For many young practising women, this is seen as an unfavourable option 
because often they wish to “respect” their kin and avoid severing ties for the future. 
4.7 Sincerely Seeking 
A few days prior to the “Sincerely Seeking” marriage event, the organisers planned a 
meeting at my house to discuss the format of the evening. As I cooked pizza, they sat 
drinking tea and discussing the details, assigning each one of us a role for the evening 
and listing the things that needed to be bought beforehand. Unfortunately, having left 
the preparations to the last minute, they had insufficient time to contact a Sheikh to 
introduce the event and therefore needed someone else to take that role. 
 “We need someone to speak about the benefits of marriage and the benefit of having 
these halal events… to set the right tone”, Sauda suggested. “Someone who can give a 
speech, recite a few hadiths… but also be entertaining and hip!” Nadifa added, “Set 
the scene, so it doesn’t look like speed dating, and it’s done with proper adab 
(manners/etiquette). We need a speech, it’s the cultural way. You need a speech to 
start something. Somalis will like that!” she remarked. So in an effort to ensure that 
the event was sufficiently cultural and religious, they set about phoning friends and 
relatives, eventually settling for Zaynab’s married sister. As a practising mother of 
four she had the authority to lead the event.  
After many discussions of the possible activities and discussion groups, Nadifa wrote 
out the plan for the evening: 
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6:30-7 Registration (assign numbers and name tags to participants) 
7-7:15 Speech on the benefits of marriage 
7:15- 7:45 Discussion groups on topics: (led by the organisers) 
a) What are the ingredients to a happy life? 
b) What are the problems of getting married in a modern world and how do 
we alleviate these problems? 
c) Is it important to do hijra? 
d) Problems of living in the west 
e) Islamic schools versus public schools 
7:45-8:15 Refreshments 
8:15 Talk on adab of speed-dating 
8:15-9pm 3 minute speed dating 
9pm closing remarks. 
We discussed what we were going to wear, and most agreed it preferable not to don 
the “usual abaya”. As we sat back, exhausted after an evening of planning, the young 
women made a pact: if one of them found a husband through the event, they had the 
obligation to start the domino effect, using her husband’s networks to find a suitable 
partner for the others. 
On the evening of the event I headed down to the venue early in order to help out with 
final preparations. When I arrived, Zaynab, Nadifa, and Sauda were printing out the 
registration forms and programmes, and together we carried the food, forms and 
stationary down to the hall. Zaynab was walking around, clearly agitated: the 
atmosphere of anxiety and nervousness was palpable. Zaynab feared the men might 
not show up and imagined the embarrassing situation of sitting in a room full of 
women waiting for a man to show up. As planned, Sauda had dressed up in a long 
black dress, tightly fitted around the waist and a light green hijab. She had also 
applied a thin layer of make up to her cheeks and eyes. Zaynab and Nadifa, much to 
her disappointment, were dressed in their “usual abaya” but before we made our way 
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to the hall Zaynab asked to borrow some eyeliner from her friend and applied it 
quickly and rather carelessly to her eyes. I thought at the time that she may not have 
wanted to give the impression that she was too hopeful of finding a suitable partner. I 
was assigned the task of sitting at the entrance, registering participants as they arrived, 
and handing them a nametag. Soft drinks and light snacks were arranged in the room 
next to the main hall, which had struck me, upon arrival, as sterile, bleak and lifeless. 
Intended for large audiences, the room had tiered seating facing a large stage. 
Tonight, however, the seats were empty, the stage dusty, and the walls were bare. 
Hoping that the event would be a success, I nervously pondered as to whether the 
event was going to create a positive and vibrant atmosphere.  
Zaynab’s sister, Koser, who had been asked to fill the role of the Sheikh by delivering 
an introductory speech, arrived a few minutes before the event to practice her speech. 
Everything was ready and we sat in trepidation awaiting the arrival of the participants. 
Several women and only two “freshie” men had arrived half an hour after the event 
was intended to commence. As I sat at the entrance, the first two men had walked in. 
Looking straight past me, one of them addressed Nadifa, who was standing on the 
other side of the hall, in Somali. Ahmed was in his 40s, chubby, dressed in jeans and a 
large puffed coat and his friend wore a large black leather coat. As I asked them to fill 
in the registration forms, Sauda, who was walking around nervously, glanced at me 
with an expression of concern. Her fear of failure, of having “only freshie men” was 
actualising before her eyes. We had registered twenty-five men that week, but feared 
they might not attend. “Somalis are always late, don’t worry”, I tried to reassure her. 
The men had taken their seats on the tiered chairs and helped themselves to the 
refreshments. Layla and Maryam had arrived at this point and they sat next to me, 
peering into the hall and giggling about the two “old freshies”. Zaynab was the most 
agitated: “You know what, it’s sadaqa (charity), even if people don’t show up we get a 
reward for organising this.” Sauda added: “It’s true, we did it because we feel there’s 
a need for it. Our intention is for others to benefit from it. Even if just one person 
finds another, it’s worthwhile.” Despite these justifications, the organisers were 
beginning to get impatient. About one and a half hours later, only seven women and 
three men had arrived, but the speech could not be prolonged any further and the 
event was forced to start. Koser began her speech:  
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 “We decided to organise this event because it is increasingly difficult for 
young women to meet practising Somali men in a halal way with the 
appropriate adab. It has become apparent that many Sisters are looking 
outside for marriage (not that there is anything wrong with that). Many 
have said that they feel there are no suitable and eligible Somali Brothers 
available. We do not believe this to be the case and so, Insha’Allah, we 
hope that this event will dispel such negative perceptions.” 
She stated the benefits of marriage in Islam, reciting the hadith: “Marriage is half of 
religion”, concluding with a blessing and a du’a (supplicatory prayer). The chairs in 
the hall were then rearranged in a circle for the discussion groups. The women sat on 
one side, with the men on the other. Layla refused to take part, explaining she had 
simply come to help and so I sat with her at a distance on the tiered chairs, and she 
translated some of the comments the men made in Somali. Ifrah also refused to take 
part and took my place at the door. As she said, she was “too romantic”, and this type 
of event was not her “way of doing it”. During the discussion more participants 
strolled in, culminating in seven men and approximately twelve women.  
The older men dominated the conversation, but this was “typical Somali” according to 
Layla. “They’re just repeating the same thing. I’m really not interested in Somali 
men. That guy reminds me of my brother, and the other guy could be my dad!” she 
whispered. The other young women participated in the discussion, although several 
seemed disengaged and occasionally stood up to come to talk to us. The organisers 
engaged in the discussion although they gave the impression they were not personally 
“seeking”. 
The first topic addressed “the ingredients to a happy life” and a young woman opened 
the discussion, mentioning the importance of stability, good role models, and a happy 
home. A younger man stressed the significance of being ambitious, sharing goals and 
responsibilities. Ahmed’s friend spoke about a life focused on religion (deen) and his 
priority of teaching children about the Prophet, and about religion and culture, adding 
it was something in which a wife should be particularly adept. Layla giggled at this 
comment: “Here we go”, she whispered. Ahmed’s friend had, in “typical Somali” 
fashion, made reference to traditional gender roles, something from which the women 
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wished to distance themselves. Sauda had suggested the second topic – problems in 
getting married in the modern world – which was intended to be a good test for 
“unsuitable men”. As she had commented, “I guess if people talk about the problems 
of women wanting their own way, their own independence, too assertive, changing 
family roles, that will be a clue!” she had told me. As predicted, the older men made 
remarks about the ways in which modern society had “ruined” women, making them 
excessively concerned with money, “buying new dirac”, and, in the process, 
disposing of their husbands. Meanwhile, the younger men lamented the loss of culture 
and religion, while some of the women spoke about the difficulties of raising children 
in a secular country faced with crime and similar social problems. The next topic, on 
the need for hijra (migration to Islamic countries) also caused division between the 
men and women. The latter noted it was unnecessary as they could perfectly well 
“practise religion in the West”, while the men, both young and old, stressed the 
importance of returning home “to our roots, to our culture, and religion… to raise 
our children in a Somali way.” This, I felt, would be interpreted by my friends as a 
clear indication they were insufficiently Western. The conversation then shifted to a 
reflection on the poor attendance of the event. “Somali men are embarrassed, they 
think something like this is shameful, but what is shameful is that they don’t come to 
these events!” one of the older men exclaimed. “There’s a taboo on this type of 
event… people are embarrassed to admit to their friends, but I think it’s ridiculous, 
there is nothing wrong, and it’s better to meet people in this way that in other non 
halal environments, like going to clubs and stuff like that” Koser added.  
At this point I was asked to exchange places with Ifrah to finish registering the men 
who were strolling in almost two hours late. As I sat in the corridor outside the hall, 
Maryam burst into laughter. “This is hilarious, really entertaining”, she said while 
imitating Ahmed’s comment on women’s extravagant shopping needs, ridiculing his 
“old fashioned” manners, and use of Somali expressions. 
Following the discussions, we prepared the hall for the speed-dating event. The chairs 
were placed in pairs facing each other and aligned in four parallel lines. As planned, 
Nadifa stood up and explained the rules, remarking: “I’d like to advise people to 
renew their intentions before this. It’s important to have the right intentions. 
Marriage should be for the sake of Allah, and I ask Allah to bless this gathering. May 
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we be honest and sincere in seeking our partners.” Her brief talk reemphasised the 
religious dimension of the event. Provided “intentions”85 were “pure”, there was no 
need for parental approval or religious supervision of the event. Male and female 
participants were directed to talk for three minutes to each other, after which the men 
were to rotate clock-wise to speak to the next woman. Everyone was provided with a 
sheet of paper on which to write three people they may wish to contact in the future. 
With the consent of the individuals, the organisers would subsequently email the 
contact details requested on the form. Because of the over-representation of women 
over men, the organisers opted out of this part. Though the younger girls were 
reluctant to participate, they felt that it would be rude not to do so.  
The event ended after the speed-dating and the men thanked the organisers. The men 
appeared less nervous than at the beginning of the evening, and seemed eager to 
exchange contact details with the women. One of the younger men apologised as he 
left the hall, “We should be inviting you, not this way round”, he exclaimed, to which 
some of the young women rolled their eyes. The mood had livened up towards the 
end, and an initially embarrassing situation had been transformed into an entertaining 
and amusing evening. After clearing and tidying the room, we jumped excitedly into 
the car and, without discussion or much consideration, headed to a restaurant on 
Edgware road.  
During the journey, and later at the restaurant, we reflected on the event and assessed 
the evening. It was decided that it had not failed, and had definitely picked up towards 
the end of the evening, as younger men had arrived. However, none of the women, 
perhaps with one exception, had found a potential match. Reluctant to speak 
negatively about the men, one of the women noted how a young man was, “Just really 
honest and sincere… spoke about the importance of having Allah in the marriage and 
he was really nice about the event, said it was such a good idea to organise something 
like this.” Yet she didn’t seem interested. Only one woman showed an interest in a 
man who was, “Doing well for himself, works in marketing, he seems into his deen, 
proper practising.” Embarrassed, she suggested she might be interested in meeting 
                                                
85 This focus on intentions runs throughout the thesis, as younger women use this idea to claim they 
can judge things for themselves and that there is no need for others to monitor their behavior. 
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him again. She was hesitant, however, worried someone else might be interested in 
the young practising professional or that perhaps he had written someone else’s name 
on the form.  
At the restaurant, Zaynab took out the forms they had used for the speed-dating 
section. Unlike the women, all the men had noted preferences. Indeed for days 
following the event we received and ignored text messages and phone calls requesting 
we send the women’s contacts. Zaynab sifted through the forms and commented on 
the men, praising a couple for their academic achievements. As we sat at the table 
Zaynab asked if anyone had found a potential husband. The women shook their heads 
or kept quiet. I turned to Maryam to gauge her thoughts: “They were alright you 
know. One guy is really academic, smart guy. Another has a good job, but I guess 
they’re just not my cup of tea!” Why? I pressed. “Just not attractive to be quite frank 
with you! Plus I could see it from the way they spoke Somali that they were the 
cultural types. They look like the guys who’ll just sit and expect you to do all the 
work! Plus they didn’t seem interested in the deen”. Non-Somalis, she suggested, 
were her next target, a thought that resonated amongst the young women that evening. 
The next event, they all agreed, would be open to all Muslims, not only Somalis. “At 
least we did our best”, Zaynab added. “We’ve started a good Sunna and will get 
rewards for it.” She had done her best to organise a “virtuous” halal event, and 
Islamically, her action would be judged for its intention not by its final outcome. 
Hopefully, her mother would also appreciate that she had limited it to Somalis only.  
4.8 Conclusion 
I have shown how the Sincerely Seeking marriage event is one of many techniques 
that young practising women employ to negotiate and reconfigure different modes of 
subjectification (choice, pleasing God, respecting kin) and different teleologies of the 
subject (autonomous, pious, or good Somali daughter). By focusing on these women’s 
strategies and their pursuits for suitable husbands, I have emphasised how piety 
demands more than the implementation of Islamic ideals, as these young women draw 
in different ways on a range of coexisting discourses including: Islamic notions of 
spiritual love and companionate marriage, a liberal emphasis on choice, intimacy, and 
romance, aspirations for financial stability, and inherited ideas about Somali kinship, 
tradition and marriage.  
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Throughout, I have pointed to a set of historical transformations relating to the 
meaning of marriage and courtship in the diaspora. First-generation Somali women, 
who were raised in urban areas throughout the 1970s-80s, were exposed to the ideas 
of romantic love, companionship, and to ambivalent attitudes towards tradition. More 
recently, second-generation Somali women have begun to infuse notions of romantic 
love with ideas of spiritual and virtuous love, highlighting the ways in which 
reformist ideas of marriage are not necessarily in conflict with romantic ideals 
(Schielke 2010a; Masquelier 2005). Furthermore, young practising Somali women are 
moving away from an emphasis on clan, stressing the importance of choice and equity 
and negotiating the pressures exerted by Somali kin to marry a Somali man.  
Although Islamic ideals are discursively prioritised above other elements in marriage, 
in practice this depends on a range of factors, including a woman’s commitment to 
Islamic virtues and norms of conduct. Furthermore, as we have seen, these young 
women often remained ambivalent about their expectations: they emphasised the 
importance of economic stability and social mobility, but downplayed its significance 
when discussing Islamic ideals, or refused traditional men, and expressed the 
importance of “respecting” their kin’s propositions. Finding a suitable professional, 
practising, Somali man who “fitted” all of these criteria proved to be a challenging, if 
not impossible, mission. As a result, second-generation women were often forced to 
compromise on some of their expectations. Throughout my fieldwork I witnessed a 
number of practising women opting to marry a non-Somali – often a convert – but 
also some who chose to marry a “professional” Somali man with a stable income in 
the hope that he would, with time, become more committed to his practice of Islam.  
As we have seen in previous chapters, social change involves more than a process of 
embracing and combining a multiplicity of global or local discourses on love and 
marriage. These young women are doing more than simply mixing different elements 
from reformist teachings with liberal notions of romance in a process of “bricolage”. 
Instead, they are reworking these discourses, and refashioning marriage in relation to 
enlarged visions of the self and self-other relations. Whilst the elements that are being 
transformed are those that are problematized in the contemporary moment, through 
imagining their relations with potential husbands, these young women constitute 
novel forms and possibilities of being in the world. Ethical practice, therefore, does 
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not only involve thought and reflection, but also includes fantasy and the imagination 
(Moore 2011). These women’s imagined relations with potential spouses are neither 
the same as their horizontal, intersubjective relations with kin, nor their vertical 
engagements with God (Fadil 2008: 244-251), but they reside somewhere in-between. 
On the one hand, second-generation women emphasise that a relation with a future 
spouse ought to be based on choice, equity, romantic and spiritual love, and should 
therefore be prioritised over cultural constraints and above their relations with Somali 
kin. On the other hand, they point to the importance of “pleasing” or “submitting to 
God” through their marriage. A husband should not be prioritised over God, but loved 
for God, through Him and by Him; love for a husband should extend from one’s 
relation with God. Nonetheless, the latter, as Sumaya makes clear, is often difficult to 
attain in practice. This self-husband relation is unstable and constantly reconfigured 
by these young women. By discussing, imagining, and fantasising about an ideal 
husband, these young women strategise and seek to shift their understandings of 
themselves. These practices shed light on the workings of the ethical imagination, as a 
site of creativity and potentiality, through which they can remake themselves and 
manage their relations with others. In Chapter Six, I pick up on these themes to 
explore how these young women imagine potential marriage partners in the temporal 
domain of the afterlife. 
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Figure 10: The Sincerely Seeking Leaflet 
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Chapter 5: Mosque hopping and iman boosts: changing 
engagements with Islamic knowledge 
5.1 Somali mosques and “mosque hopping” 
As we waited patiently for Layla’s mother, Fadumo, to make her way down from the 
flat, Quranic recitation blared out of the car stereo, drowning out the children’s 
bickering. Layla sat behind the wheel, her head resting against the car window, with 
her three younger siblings and I squashed into the back seats. It was a warm summer 
evening during Ramadan 2010 and having filled our stomachs with sambusa, baaris, 
and hilib (samosa, rice, and meat) and cleaned the kitchen following a long afternoon 
of preparations, we were running late, as usual, for tarawih prayers.86 Because Layla 
was the only licensed driver in the family, her filial duties often required her to taxi 
around different members of her large family to mosques, weddings, tuition classes or 
the homes of friends and family. Luckily, today we were only dropping them off at 
the local Al-Huda Somali mosque, a few minutes’ drive from their flat (Figure 11). As 
Layla stopped her car in front of the mosque, the kids jumped out excitedly, ran and 
waved goodbye, while Fadumo struggled to catch up with them. As we sped off to the 
East London Mosque (Figure 12), I glanced back to see them slipping in with many 
other latecomers. Layla and I picked up a couple of friends on the way and finally 
parked the car in front of the mosque. The prayers had only just begun and we 
squeezed in amongst the crowd to find a spot, and touching shoulders with strangers 
as we joined the prayers. 
Throughout Ramadan, Layla and her friends prayed in most of the large mosques in 
London, in what they called “mosque hopping”, with a diversity of Muslims of 
different ages and ethnicities. Some of the more popular mosques included Goodge 
street mosque, Finsbury Park, Regents Park, and Brixton. Most evenings, following 
Iftar (fast-breaking meal), I drove around with Layla, picking up her friends on the 
way; this sometimes meant driving from Tower Hamlets to Newham, and then into 
the city centre. Most evenings, we experienced a new style of recitation, a different 
form of prayer or a new setting. Rarely did they consider attending the local Somali 
                                                
86 Prayers performed in the evening during the month of Ramadan. 
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mosque, which for their mothers and younger siblings was a familiar and regular 
space of worship and sociality. Layla preferred not to attend these gatherings; she 
didn’t like being recognised by her kin, as this distracted her from her worship. 
“Everyone’s like: ‘oh you’re the daughter of so and so’… They judge me and ask me 
why I’m not wearing the whole black jilbaab thing!” she explained. The last time she 
had attended she had done so solely to please her father, who was eager for her to 
listen to a Somali talk, but had decided to wear niqab so as not to be recognised.  
These different preferences between mother and daughter were not unique to Fadumo 
and Layla, and this Ramadan routine was far from exceptional. Throughout the year, 
second-generation practising Somali women rarely attended classes or lectures at the 
local Somali mosques, but instead drove around London to a wide range of events and 
classes, organised by independent organisations or mosques, which were delivered in 
English and aimed at younger Muslims. “Mosque hopping” was, in fact, a regular 
weekend activity and “seeking knowledge” was characterised by a relentless search 
for what they deemed authoritative knowledge.  
Starting with the different spatial practices of first and second-generation Somali 
women – attending Somali mosques and “mosque hopping” – I argue that these are 
indicative of two contrasting modes of engagement with religious knowledge. They 
reveal changing ideas of what constitutes authoritative knowledge, and transformed 
expectations of what knowledge is expected to provide.87 By tracing continuities and 
discontinuities across these two generations, I point to a series of historical 
reconfigurations in order to explore first, where and how knowledge is transmitted 
and consumed, and second, the mechanisms used to establish, and modes employed to 
relate to, authoritative knowledge.  
The chapter is organised as follows. I first begin by contrasting the first-generation’s 
forms of learning and modes of relating to knowledge with the second-generation’s 
critiques of these processes and their own forms of learning. Older first-generation 
women have only recently begun to engage with Islamic texts with the aim of reading 
                                                
87 Jensen (2006: 652) explores how converts in Europe “shop around” for knowledge. As I elaborate 
throughout, “mosque hopping” is not indicative of free choice, but a liberal mode of subjectification 
based on choice, which is, however, limited by an Islamic discursive tradition. 
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and reciting, but also understanding, and applying them to their own practice. 
Previously, throughout their upbringing in the Somali regions, emphasis was solely on 
memorisation and recitation and on learning religious practices through observing kin. 
As I discussed in Chapter Two, most older women now understand religion to be 
different to, yet constitutive of, Somali culture, hence their preferences for Somali 
mosques.  
I subsequently turn to the younger second-generation. There has been a tendency in 
the literature on the Islamic reform to portray young Muslims as engaged in a 
reflexive, self-conscious, and rational form of Islam, as opposed to their parents who 
are bound by a non-reflexive, embodied engagement with knowledge (Jouili & Amir-
Moazami 2006). This juxtaposing, however, does not fully capture the experiences of 
first-generation Somali women. It should instead be seen as strategy for 
“authentication” that is constitutive of a tradition of renewal and reform and opposes a 
traditional Islam with a true, authentic, Islam (Deeb 2006). In what follows, I explore 
the ways this strategy is employed by the younger generation, in order to make sense 
of their own change and to distance it from that of their mothers.  
I investigate the wide range of spaces of learning, and the scholars with whom these 
young women engage, and highlight the processes involved in “hopping” or selecting 
mosques. I then elaborate on three intersecting modes of subjectification that are 
crucial to my informants’ engagements with knowledge: a liberal concept of choice 
and autonomy, a submission to Islamic forms of reasoning and to structures of 
authority, and an experience of affect. The ability of particular forms of knowledge to 
facilitate or transmit these modes, determines whether my informants consider them 
authoritative. An experience of affect and potentiality is, I argue, crucial in 
determining any long-term commitment to knowledge.  
Recent sociological and anthropological scholarship on Islam in Europe has argued 
that with a growing objectification, fragmentation, and pluralisation of authorising 
discourses and institutions, Islam has become increasingly individualised. Scholars 
have treated individualisation as an indication that Muslims are engaging in debates, 
asserting their interpretations, and hence integrating and adapting to European 
structures (Cesari 2003; Mandaville 2001; 2003). Others have investigated 
individualisation as a dimension of agency – as a social fact to be observed and 
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measured. Roy (2004), for example, has argued that globalisation and Westernisation, 
and the concomitant loss of social authority and a system of social and juridical 
coercion, has resulted in the task of seeking knowledge falling onto individuals. A 
democratisation of the religious sphere, Roy cautions, does not, however, necessarily 
result in “critical” liberal or secular discourse. Nonetheless, it has led to a 
privatisation of religiosity stressing the individual and the inner self, and a shift from 
focusing on norms to emphasising ethics and values (ibid 2004: 191).  
My interest is not in unravelling whether young practising Somalis are becoming 
more individualised, or more European. Rather, following recent scholarship, I argue 
that knowledge is a condition for becoming pious, and therefore engagement with 
knowledge is both deliberative and disciplinary (Hirschkind 2006; Jouili & Amir-
Moazami 2006). As Jacobsen (2011b: 293-4) notes in relation to Muslims in Norway, 
the fragmentation of authority structures does not result in the autonomous 
appropriation of the Islamic tradition, but in “a complex and structured process of 
contestation” in which authorities are simultaneously subjected to, challenged and 
resisted. Nor should the practice of “mosque hopping”, and personal choice, be seen 
as disembodied from authorising discourses and Islamic structures of authority. 
Following Fadil (2008: Chapter 2), I treat my informants’ emphasis on individually 
choosing a mosque, scholar, or interpretation, as a mode of subjectification grounded 
in a liberal ethos of autonomy and authenticity, which coexists and intersects with a 
submission to the Islamic tradition, modes of reasoning, and structures of authority. 
Processes of individualisation are, thus, modes of engagement that should not be 
divorced from institutionalised Islam (Peter 2006; Amir-Moazami & Salvatore 2003). 
I move beyond an emphasis on reason and choice to argue that a sustained 
commitment to a source of knowledge is primarily related to whether it transmits a 
feeling of potentiality, excitement, and euphoria: affect is a crucial component of 
what, for these young women, determines authoritative knowledge (see section 1.7). 
The practice of “mosque hopping” is ultimately determined by the affect – or “iman 
boost” in my informants’ words – transmitted by a particular source of knowledge, 
but it is ultimately grounded in, and limited by, a commitment to Islamic structures of 
authority and normative ideals.  
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By drawing on one of the young women’s most popular scholars, Sheikh Ibrahim, I 
suggest that authority rests not only on his ability to draw on Islamic scholarship, and 
on what my informants term Western ideas of knowledge, but also on his ability to 
engender affect and a feeling of potential self-transformation. This importance of 
affect in Islamic learning must be understood as grounded within the Islamic 
pedagogical tradition, whereby emotions, evoked in sermons or lessons, are 
constitutive of a project of ethical self-disciplining (Deeb 2006; Hirschkind 2001; 
Mahmood 2001: Chapter 4). As I have argued in Chapter One (section 1.7), this 
remains, however, a formal idea of affect whereby the Islamic discursive notion of 
affect is conflated with people’s affective experiences. My work points to the 
importance of intensity and excitement, which is grounded in these traditions, but is 
also a feeling that these young women describe as “high iman” or “iman boosts” and 
that they believe to be transformative. As I have argued thus far in the thesis, “shifts 
in subjectification” which engage with the ethical imagination, project the self 
forward, and create hope, which, in turn, animates these self-transformations. A long-
term commitment to knowledge is therefore dependent on whether it transmits this 
potentiality and hence facilitates these self-transformations. 
Finally, I elaborate on the intersections between these three ways of relating to 
knowledge by drawing out the ways that these young practising women debate 
different criteria for assessing the validity and authority of knowledge. “Mosque 
hopping” is ultimately structured around these three modes, but the relationships 
between them are often a source of disagreement and negotiation. Through debates 
with like-minded friends, these young women both reinforce normative ideas about 
Islamic knowledge, whilst including and articulating a range of new criteria on which 
their assessments are based. 
5.2 Reading the Quran in Somali 
Every Thursday evening, Nimo’s husband drove his children, wife, and his friend’s 
wife, Sofia, to Quran lessons, in their local Somali mosque in Islington.88 Frequently 
advertised on Somali satellite TV channels, the Somali mosque, which had sprung up 
                                                
88 Sofia and Nimo are introduced in Chapter 2 (sections 2.3-2.3.3) 
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in the last year thanks to donations from the local Somali community, runs weekly 
Quran lessons for both children and adults. The lessons for women, which I attended 
with Nimo and Sofia, were in Somali and were frequented by over twenty middle-
aged first-generation Somali women. The mosque had only just opened, and still 
smelt of fresh paint. The women sat in a circle on the ground, in a simple room on the 
top floor of the mosque, where the furniture consisted simply of a red carpet and 
white washed walls. The teacher, Aziza, also taught Quran to older women at one of 
the local community centres on Sunday afternoons, and organised informal lessons in 
Somali women’s homes. The class followed a similar format every week, focusing 
primarily on reciting and memorising the Quran. In turn, the women repeated 
passages from the Quran, with Aziza correcting their vocalisation and pronunciation. 
She played a cassette tape to demonstrate the correct pronunciation, used diagrams to 
explain where in the oral cavity and throat one pronounced certain sounds, and 
referred them to a Somali-language textbook for the rules for correct pronunciation 
and recitation (tajweed). In one of the first lessons in September just after Ramadan, 
Aziza explained to the women the importance of correct recitation: “The Quran helps 
you when you die… It’s like a cloud when the weather is hot. Every word learnt to 
perfection will be rewarded.” The class, which lasted over two hours, usually 
concluded with the Somali translation of the pronounced passage of the Quran or 
hadith, and a brief explanation of the meaning of the text followed by a short 
discussion.  
These lessons conveniently coincided with the classes arranged for Somali children, 
which were also very similar in content and structure.89 The classes were mixed, with 
approximately 80 children divided into classes of 15-20 students. Because these 
classes are run by, and for, Somalis, religious education becomes equated, for many 
youngsters, with ethnicity and culture. The students are taught, in a combination of 
English and Somali, how to read, recite, and memorise the Quran. Throughout the 
class, the children are instructed on the meaning of the Quran, the 40 hadiths, and the 
seerah (life of the Prophet), as well as the fundamentals of their faith and obligatory 
                                                
89 Typically Somali children, between the ages of 8-16, attend madrasa at least once or twice a week, 
although this varies with different families. Because of the scarcity of Somali mosques, many organise 
informal classes in the teacher’s home, where parents pay a small contribution of approximately £5 per 
student per week. 
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practices. Nimo’s daughter summarised succinctly the structure and purpose of the 
lesson: “We recite the Quran… they teach us to pray, and things we should and 
shouldn’t do.” This rule-based approach to teaching was further reinforced when 
Sofia’s younger daughter showed me her class notebook, after a year of attending 
classes. The first part was divided into five sections, each focusing on a different 
pillar of Islam, and in the introductory section she had neatly written, “Muslims must 
do the five pillars if they want to be good Muslims, please Allah, and be happy in the 
hereafter… in order to get to paradise and not be threatened by Shaitan.” The second 
part was dedicated to transcribing the hadith in English. Each hadith was 
accompanied by a few short sentences elaborating on the virtues and vices in Islam.  
In the last 10-15 years, Somali mosques have sprung up across London and many 
older Somali women attend weekly classes or weekend lectures in Somali at these 
centres.90 “These days, everyone is learning, even old people. We all became more 
religious when we came to Europe… When I came to this country, that’s when I 
started going to classes, learning Arabic, how to write, and how to translate” Farhia, 
a woman in her late 40s, explained. Because few older women are fluent in English or 
Arabic, these places of learning allow Somali women to access and understand 
Islamic scriptures, as well as provide a familiar environment and a space of 
socialisation with friends and relatives. Somali Quran lessons are also run in most of 
the major mosques in London,91 and many women arrange for female teachers to 
attend informal gatherings in the privacy of their homes. Most of these classes focus 
on reading, reciting, and memorising the Quran.  
Furthermore, Somali translations of the Quran, as well as textbooks such as the one 
mentioned above, are widely available in major Islamic bookshops. Women who are 
too busy to attend lessons and lectures read the Quran in Somali in their spare time, or 
listen to tapes or CDs of Quranic recitation. As Halimo explained to me, “When I 
came here, I started learning. I didn’t go to classes. I bought CDs of the Quran, or 
                                                
90 By Somali mosque I mean a place of worship run and attended by majority Somalis and usually 
administered by a Somali imam. Some examples include Al-Huda mosque in Stepney Green (Figure 
11), Tottenham mosque, or Islington mosque.  
91 For example, the East London Mosque runs weekly Quran tafsir (explanation) classes in Somali 
(Figure 12). 
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CDs in Somali and I listened, on my own.” When I first met Sofia she was reading 
books in both Somali and English, and she showed me her two favourites: Women in 
Islam and Heroes of Islam. However, this was rare amongst many of the Somali 
women I met, and most gained their knowledge by attending the gatherings I 
described above, discussing Islam with their friends and relatives, or listening to one 
of the many Somali satellite TV channels, or to Islam channel or Peace TV, in 
English. 
As I have elaborated upon throughout, first-generation Somali women’s engagement 
with textual knowledge is only a recent phenomenon, which has led to their conscious 
appropriation of the hijab, the practice of prayer, and other religious obligations, as 
well as an engagement with a reformist discourse that separates authentic Islam from 
cultural practices. Since coming to the UK, some Somali women like Nimo and 
Halimo have begun to criticise their former education and emphasise the importance 
of engaging directly with religious texts. Whereas in the past, religious knowledge 
was, like culture, transmitted through embodied practices, knowledge is now learnt 
formally by engaging with Islamic texts, and referring to religious specialists. In 
Chapter Two (section 2.3.1) I explained how the textualisation and objectification of 
knowledge amongst first-generation Somali women has led many to differentiate 
religion from culture; whilst the former is based on scriptural authority or specialists 
of this knowledge, the latter is transmitted through personal relations. I once pestered 
an old Somali woman in her 80s – Nimo’s mother’s age – about her knowledge of the 
afterlife. She responded in Italian, “You should read the Quran, Somalis don’t know 
these things.” However, it is important to note the diverse spectrum of engagements 
amongst first-generation women. Whilst some solely attend Quranic recitation 
classes, others read a range of Somali or English books on Islam, or listen to sermons 
and classes, and reason about the content of these in ways quite similar to the 
practices of the second-generation. 
Towards the end of one of the Thursday Quran lessons that Sofia and Nimo attended 
at the Islington mosque, Aziza, the teacher, made a comment that was unusual, given 
the focus of the classes: “It is not enough to know the Quran, we must also believe 
from the heart. The Prophet told a man he would go to heaven even if he didn’t know 
the Quran perfectly provided he forgave and helped others. God forgave him for not 
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knowing the Quran.” Inculcating practices and correct dispositions, Aziza 
emphasised, was more important than being able to recite the Quran. The former, she 
intimated, arose from inner faith, and a proper understanding of the religion. Although 
she had spent most of the lesson focusing on Quranic recitation, Aziza was 
suggesting to the women to focus on the content of the religion – to engage with the 
teachings of the Quran. Sofia nodded in agreement, “belief and doing good things is 
most important”, she whispered to me. Later that evening, we discussed her religious 
change with her first-generation Somali friends. Nimo reflected on her past: 
 “We learnt Quran and hadith off by heart, but we didn’t know the 
meaning. I knew some before, but I didn’t know like now. If you learn and 
know meaning you learn that hijab, praying, and fasting during Ramadan 
are compulsory. You learn to do good things, forgive, not backbite… but 
before we didn’t know, we didn’t understand, so we wore hijab one day 
and then threw it away. Now we know the aya (Quranic verse), so we 
know we have to do it.” 
Only since moving to the UK have they begun to engage with texts differently. The 
aim is to read the Quran in Somali, understand the meaning of texts, and employ that 
knowledge to reflect on, reason about, and correct one’s practices and behaviour 
towards others.  
For many of these women their previous “lack of knowledge” had meant a conflation 
of religious and cultural practices, and what they termed an “ignorance” regarding 
proper knowledge and practice. I have elaborated at length on this argument in 
Chapter Two, and explored the ways a range of different women make sense of the 
differences or overlaps between the notions of culture and religion. Here, I focus on 
the ways these reformist discourses have impacted on their knowledge practices. 
Islamic Knowledge, for some of these older women, is seen as constitutive of being 
Somali; whilst for others it is only compatible with, but not necessarily constitutive 
of, being Somali. What they have learnt to do in the UK is to recognise and self-
consciously reason about scriptures, in order to identify and correct their everyday 
practices. For the large majority of these women, seeking knowledge consists in 
learning to recite the Quran, consulting Somali translations of the scriptures, and 
trusting Somali authoritative figures to interpret and explain the meanings of the texts.  
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5.3 “For my mum it comes with the culture” 
Despite the changing engagement with Islamic knowledge experienced by the first-
generation of Somali women, young second-generation practising women, raised in 
the UK, differentiate their own engagements with knowledge, from those of their 
mothers, and even identify deficiencies in their mother’s education with some of their 
own earlier religious instruction. Layla, who I mentioned in the initial vignette, felt 
she had learnt a lot of facts as a teenager, but had never been taught “What Islam was 
all about”, whilst Maryam had only learnt to recite a couple of sura (chapters from 
the Quran), thanks to an aunt who had also taught her how to pray. In their opinion, 
their knowledge was superficial, focused around rules and obligations that rarely 
explained the reason why certain practices were necessary. “I used to go to madrasa 
as a child, but I hated it. I don’t think I was taught Islam properly. It was so boring, it 
didn’t make me understand the religion at all… reading Arabic, a language I didn’t 
even understand!” Maryam explained.  
As I describe in the introduction, Layla refused to attend the local Somali mosque 
with her mother, but instead drove to the larger, and more diverse, East London 
mosque, in the company of her friends. She did not find the forms of learning in 
Somali mosques particularly engaging, or relevant to her life. Often delivered in 
Somali, she felt the language, style, and content did not suit her Western tastes. She 
also disagreed with what she regarded as cultural modes of relating to knowledge (see 
sections 2.4 & 2.5). Discussing the attitude of older Somali women, and particularly 
her mother, towards religion, Layla pointed out that the excessive focus on the 
implementation of practices was a way of conforming to others’ behaviour. She 
explained that “Islam isn’t about restrictions, doing this, doing that, wearing jilbaab. 
It’s more about loving and connecting with God.” She also thought that the women in 
the mosque were “cliquey”, not welcoming to non-Somalis, and excessively 
preoccupied with cultural concerns; they spent too much time judging each other and 
discussing clan and family matters – all things Layla found irrelevant and distracting. 
In short, Somali mosques had a contrasting notion of religious knowledge and tended 
to confuse religion with Somali culture. 
This critique of the cultural practice of Islam was reiterated by Hamda, a young 
woman in her 20s, who had started encouraging her mother and younger sisters to 
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practice Islam more seriously, and to pray regularly. However, she continued to see 
a divergence in the way she and her mother practised:  
 “I think for my mum and her generation it is sometimes a by-product of 
who they are. It’s a given. It comes with the culture. She didn’t start 
wearing hijab until she came here. So I think when she came here she 
made more of an effort to practise her religion. But with our generation 
we made an active intent to go to lessons, classes, to learn the Quran, the 
meaning. That’s not present in my mum and her generation.” 
According to Hamda, her mother practised not because she intellectually, critically, 
and spiritually engaged with knowledge, but because she had inherited it from her 
culture and unquestioningly accepted knowledge from Somali religious 
authoritative figures. Hamda contrasted her mother’s “effort to practice” here in 
London, with her own “intent to understand”; her mother had begun implementing 
practices, but without fully and consciously reasoning about, or understanding, the 
meaning of scriptures. Hamda was, in fact, downplaying some of the changes 
experienced by the older generation, which I described in the previous section, in 
order to position herself as engaged with Islamic knowledge in a reflexive and 
authentic way. Interestingly, this was also a critique that the older first-generation 
Somali woman had made of her own parents (see section 2.3.1).  
Therefore, although some older women are engaging with the meaning of Islamic 
texts with the aim of perfecting their practice, as I highlighted earlier, many young 
second-generation women understand their mothers’ learning as inadequate and as 
solely, and overly, concerned with enacting obligations. When I questioned Khadija, a 
young woman in her mid-20s, in an interview, about how her iman was different to 
her mother’s, she replied: 
 “I do something whilst understanding the reason. If you do something 
and you don’t know the purpose and value it’s not really there is it? If you 
learn something you want to implement it right? I said to my mum, ‘you 
went umrah and what have you changed from that?’ My family – all they 
do are the 5 pillars. They don’t want to know extra. And you know what, 
we should really truly seek knowledge and understand things. There’s no 
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purpose in doing something and not understanding it cause the meaning 
of it is lost. 
According to Khadija, her mother focused solely on fulfilling basic religious 
obligations. Although she may have had some understanding of the Quran, she did 
not engage with knowledge so as to fully understand the reasons, purpose, and 
value behind practices. This was not, according to Khadija, the “true” and authentic 
way of seeking knowledge. These young women frequently criticise their mothers 
for seeking knowledge solely from a single source, and for trusting and 
unquestionably accepting Somali Sheikh as authoritative. 
Young practising women often accuse their mothers of failing to focus on their own 
internal transformations and their spirituality (section 3.4). Zaynab, for example, 
compared her approach to faith with that of her mother: 
 “My mum is very disciplined, she goes to talks at 8:30am, fasts every 
Thursday. I can’t do that. Her iman is higher than mine I guess, but we’re 
also very different. My mum has learnt about the heart, but she works 
from the outside-in. She’s more about doing things, praying, hijab, 
actions, and all about the haram and halal…” 
For Zaynab, her mother was practising and had learnt to correct her practice of Islam, 
but had not worked on her spiritual and emotional connection with God, which was 
crucial to these second-generation women. She had not transformed herself into a 
practising subject by engaging with knowledge in ways Zaynab deemed “proper” or 
authoritative. 
These criticisms directed at the older generation, as I have sought to illustrate, are not 
representative of the first-generation’s actual engagements with knowledge. Although 
many older women, such as Hamda’s mother, are taking the lead from their own 
daughters’ engagements with religious knowledge, some women see their daughters’ 
criticisms as an attack on Somali scholars and Somali culture. As I mentioned in the 
original vignette, Layla was often encouraged to attend the local Somali mosque. Her 
parents hoped that by encouraging her to attend these mosques she would combine 
her religious fervour with an attachment and loyalty to Somali kinship and religious 
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structures of authority. Her father also perhaps hoped that attending the mosque 
would increase the likelihood of her finding a suitable Somali husband.  
5.4 New forms of learning 
Education has been central to Islamic reform, and, as I elaborate below, knowledge 
(‘ilm) in the Islamic tradition is inseparable from faith and action. Studying is seen as 
a means of cultivating faith, and faith emerges, and can grow, through knowledge. 
Young practising women often speak about “seeking knowledge” as marking a 
particular stage in their lives. The phrase is employed to refer to a range of practices –
from reading or listening to Islamic sources, to attending classes and lectures, as well 
as to differentiate their engagement with knowledge from that of their parents.  
Sheikh Ibrahim, one of the young women’s favourite scholars, whom I mention in 
more detail below, once described the essence of “seeking knowledge”:  
 “The first words that Allah revealed to the Prophet were the words, ‘to 
recite.’ And not a recitation that is based on custom or culture, but read in 
the name of Your Lord. It’s a sacred recitation. The Prophet has stressed 
the importance of knowledge. We’re an umma of knowledge. We’re an 
umma of learning…” 
The Sheikh’s statement encapsulates the important connection between knowledge 
and the transcendent umma. It echoes many of these young women’s critiques of their 
mothers, and their emphasis on abandoning culture or custom, for a transcendental 
form of knowledge.  
Often, this quest for authentic knowledge coincides with practising Islam and with 
attending university with young, like-minded, Muslims. As Anab explained: 
 “From the age of 18 I started thinking: Why am I a Muslim? Is it because 
I was born into the religion? And I realised it was something that 
happened to me rather than something that I chose. With Somalis, when 
you ask questions to the elders they answer in a very rigid way. They say: 
you have to do it cause you'll go to hell! So that didn’t do it for me, so I 
got in touch with young Pakistani Muslims who lived in my area and I 
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started going to conferences, lectures, reading books… and that's when I 
discovered that there were Islamic books written in English! Tapes, DVDs, 
videos, everything! It was really interesting! And at these conferences I 
met young people who were wearing hijab and practising religion.” 
Anab had realised that Islam was something she had unquestionably accepted, not 
willingly chosen. In making sense of herself, she had turned religion into an object of 
intellectual inquiry, a process common amongst newly practising women (Jacobsen 
2011a; 2011b; Roy 2004). As I pointed out in the earlier section, many young women 
had, like Anab, found the learning they had received as children, which focused on 
the recitation of the Quran and the learning of rules and regulations, unsatisfactory. 
These teachings had taught them to perform certain obligations, but had not 
encouraged them to fully comprehend their faith. “Seeking knowledge”, for Anab and 
many other young women, signified a jettisoning of Somali culture and their families 
as sites of learning in favour of learning through the English medium, and amongst 
young Muslims of a similar age, and the wider transcendent umma.  
It is the importance attached to choosing amongst a diverse range of forms of 
knowledge and modes of argumentation and interpretation that most notably 
distinguishes these young women from their mothers. Most of these young women 
“hop” around the “field” of Islamic education, as Bowen (2010: 108-109) describes it, 
within which teachers and institutes differentiate themselves by degree of 
professionalisation, choice of language, and choice of sources (ibid 2010: 87). 92 They 
experiment with different forms and styles of learning, contending that each fulfil 
different needs, and attend to different aspects of their self-development. I elaborate 
on each of the different forms of Islamic education in turn. 
First, and most importantly, my informants have benefited from the recent surge in 
independent institutes and organisations that have flourished in London in the last 
decade. Like many young practising women, Anab began attending conferences and 
                                                
92 Bowen (2010: 109) employs Bourdieu’s concept of the “field” to describe Islamic education in 
France, suggesting that, in contrast to Bourdieu, it does not entail a notion of quantifiable symbolic 
capital, nor is it a bounded religious field distinct from the secular sphere. Rather, it involves “a set of 
repertories and pedagogical possibilities all having to do with ‘education’ but with reference to various 
ideas about Islam and to various strategies for advancement within French society.” 
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lectures, and frequenting classes run mostly by independent Islamic organisations, 
which she discovered thanks to her newly acquired networks of friends. Most young 
Somali women do not understand Arabic and therefore attend places of learning 
which emphasise the English medium. These organisations, which attract a range of 
young Muslims and are based across London in places ranging from rented out 
conference centres to privately owned buildings, are becoming increasingly popular 
amongst second-generation Muslims in the UK. Although the South Asian Deobandi 
and Barelwi traditions of reform are the most widespread in London, these 
organisations represent a wide range of Islamic “schools of thought” and scholarship 
from across the Muslim world (Birt 2005; Werbner 2004). Teaching styles and 
methods are diverse ranging from learning directly from Islamic scriptures, to 
approaching the Islamic Sciences from a range of religious texts, and employing texts 
to focus on a particular theme or problem usually relevant to the lives of Muslims in 
the UK. The latter form of teaching and learning is becoming increasingly popular 
amongst my informants and, similar to that of British higher education, emphasises 
critical evaluation and self-directed learning, and adopting topic-based teaching with a 
variety of sources (Gillat-Ray 2006: 63). Many of the young women frequent 
institutions in which teaching is action-oriented, with an emphasis on self-
improvement and da’wa (spreading awareness). In these institutes teaching is 
generalist, often focused on “real-world problems” (see Bowen 2010: 86-87). For 
example, most of my informants were not concerned with gaining an official 
qualification, but to learn in order to further their own personal development.  
Second, young second-generation women may also occasionally attend mosques or 
institutes that provide traditional teachings in Arabic and the Islamic Sciences.93 Most 
of the young practising women attended a tajweed course, and a couple were learning 
Arabic in order to engage directly with Islamic texts and scriptures. Only one of my 
informants was training to become a recognised ‘alim (scholar), and had signed up for 
an intensive evening professional course with an independent Institute in East 
London. However, she abandoned the course after two years, due to the workload and 
other family commitments. 
                                                
93 For example, The East London Mosque, Taybuun Institute, and Ibn Jabal Institute, provided such 
courses. 
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Third, whilst formal lessons provide much of the initial knowledge for newly 
practising women, my informants often organise halaqa (Islamic circles) sessions as 
informal ways of sharing and learning Islamic knowledge from like-minded 
individuals. These sessions also strengthen the idea of gaining authentic knowledge 
by engaging with other young Muslim friends, in contrast to the older generation who 
learn from other Somalis or from kin. Habibah, a young 20-year-old Bengali woman, 
for example, organised a fortnightly circle in her local community centre, over the 
course of two months. She invited most of her practising and non-practising friends, 
including many of my Somali informants. She hoped that by inviting non-practising 
friends, she might encourage them to begin seeking and implementing knowledge. 
Every fortnight, the young women rotated the role of chairing the session. My 
informants based their talks on lectures or courses they had recently attended: Layla 
spoke about knowledge and prayer, Zaynab about the diseases of the heart, Habibah 
about iman and the difficulties of practising. “These sessions are great, cause we can 
discuss the issues we face as British Muslims practising our faith” Habibah explained. 
Her comment highlights the differences between these sessions and those of their 
mothers; these halaqas were based around a particular topic that was relevant to these 
young women’s everyday lives and addressed the challenges of practising Islam in the 
UK.  
Similarly Nadifa, a young woman in her 30s, organised seerah (the study of the life of 
the Prophet) sessions at her house on Sunday afternoons. These sessions consisted of 
reading and taking notes on a passage from the book Muhammad: Man and Prophet 
by Abdil Salahi. The aim was to draw on the incident described, relate it to one’s own 
life, and discuss how best one could apply and embody the Prophet’s behaviour and 
characteristics. These sessions lasted less than an hour, but the rest of the afternoon 
provided an opportunity for socialising, relaxing, and often sharing food and watching 
Sunday television. 
Fourth, independent study is also crucial to the process of “seeking knowledge”, and 
many of my interlocutors shared and circulated amongst themselves mp3 recordings 
of various scholars, YouTube and Halaltube videos, internet sites, books, and DVDs. 
Layla, for example, would often fall asleep at night listening to Hamza Yusuf’s talks, 
whereas Anisa would walk around the streets of East London with the words of 
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Anwar Awlaki in her ears, while Nimo did the housework listening to Quranic 
recitation.94 Through these media these young women listen to English-speaking 
scholars from America to Saudi Arabia, reinforcing a feeling of connection to a wider 
transnational community of knowledge. Carrying electronic recordings, on their 
phones and iPods allowed them to select whichever speaker they find most 
emotionally engaging at a particular moment in time, thus enabling them to switch 
easily depending on their personal moods and tastes.95  
Finally, these young women also consume non-Islamic sources. On another occasion, 
Anab, who had been practising for over seven years, explained to me how she no 
longer attended lectures and consumed Islamic books and recordings as avidly as she 
had done when she first started practising Islam. More recently she had taken to 
attending self-help courses: 
 “In the last couple of years I’ve done loads of self-development courses. 
The landmark forum, you do a three day course where you learn to 
develop yourself and work through issues you've had in your life; you do 
workshops on commitment and discipline, on being adventurous in life, 
letting go. I don’t think they clash with religion at all for me, coming up 
with lists of improvements…” 
For Anab, different sources of knowledge, not only specifically Islamic ones, could be 
employed as long as they were used with the ultimate purpose of disciplining the self 
and inculcating pious dispositions. Similarly, Ifrah often consulted a blog entitled The 
Change Blog that offers advice on how to go about leading a life that is “radically 
different” from one’s current life. These consumption practices indicate that what is at 
stake is not solely related to Islamic reform, but is part of a quest for self-
                                                
94 Hirschkind (2006) similarly describes how, amongst pious Muslims, listening to cassette sermons 
does not solely entail accumulating factual knowledge, but also involves cultivating a set of affective-
volitional dispositions. 
95 It is worth mentioning the transnational dimension of these different forms of learning. As Bowen 
(2004b: 882) points out, these Islamic public actors are part of a “transnational Islam” as “a public 
space of reference and debate”. This transnational space constituted through the circulation of ideas, 
diverse modes of reasoning, debate and contestation, is not tied to specific places, nor is it “post-
national” or dependent on migration patterns.  
 194 
transformation. As I have argued throughout the thesis, the message of reform is 
appealing precisely because it offers a means for radical change. Knowledge, 
therefore, is meant to assist these young women, at least temporarily, in their 
processes of self-transformation.  
In the following section, I elaborate on this theme by exploring in detail the content of 
my informants’ most popular set of classes, offered by a Liverpool-based scholar, 
Sheikh Ibrahim Osi-Efa. I point to the importance of the experience of affect, which is 
grounded in, but not determined by, the Islamic tradition in the women’s engagement 
with what they deem to be authoritative knowledge.  
5.5 Sheikh Ibrahim: affect and self-transformation 
In September 2010, a few days after Eid-ul-Fitr, news spread that the Crawley 
Educational Institute (CEI) was opening a new academy in London. CEI is known 
amongst my informants for its close connections with centres of Islamic learning in 
Tarim, Yemen. The lessons offered in London were free, with a single payment of 
£50 for the course material. As part of a three-year course aimed at young 
professionals, the academy was running weekly evening lessons, from 7-9pm at a 
Quaker institution (Friends House) in Euston, on the Islamic Sciences.96 Advertised 
by a professional website and a Facebook group, the course was based around Islamic 
scholarly texts, and on traditional styles of learning, and was intended solely for the 
acquisition of personal knowledge, offering no final qualification or ijazah. The 
timing and venue conveniently suited my informants, who had been searching for a 
course they could attend regularly that would fit around their work schedule. When 
they learnt that Sheikh Ibrahim would be delivering some of the classes, they jumped 
at the opportunity to sign up. 
The Sheikh was well known and respected not only for the depth of his knowledge 
and his personal piety, but also for his charisma. Born and raised in Liverpool, 
England he has also studied in Yemen, Syria, and Mauritania and is the founder of 
                                                
96 These included Tafsir, Hadith, Shmail of Imam Tirmidhi and Aqida, and were taught by a range of 
different scholars.  
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several Islamic initiatives in the UK. 97 Renowned for his knowledge of the Islamic 
sciences, he was a source of inspiration for many of these young women, who often 
travelled across London to attend his talks, or exchanged online videos, or recordings 
of his lectures. Every week for a year, I travelled in Zaynab’s car journeying from east 
London to Euston. With nasheed (Islamic vocal) music playing on the car stereo, 
these journeys to and from Sheikh Ibrahim’s classes not only provided an opportunity 
for socialisation, but also a moment for sharing and exchanging our personal 
experiences and opinions of the classes.  
On the first day of the course, as I arrived with a group of four young Somali women, 
we were directed to the basement room of Friends House, where the room was 
bustling with energy; some were finishing off their maghrib prayers, while others 
were catching up with friends they hadn’t seen since the start of Ramadan. As was 
typical of these events, the room was split in two by large boards, separating the 
women from the men. Rows of chairs on both sides faced a stage furnished with a 
table, chair, and microphone for the teacher and, at the back, a large projection screen. 
We signed our name at the entrance and swiftly walked with our heads down, past the 
men’s section, to sit in the final rows of the women’s section. Many of the women 
were between the ages of 20-30, from a range of different backgrounds, including 
British converts. Recognising some of the female attendees from some of the other 
talks by the scholar, we exchanged a few brief greetings before a prompt start to the 
class. 
Sheikh Ibrahim’s classes took place fortnightly and were the most popular and best 
attended of the CEI classes. Lasting two hours, the Sheikh dedicated each class to one 
or more chapters of the Book of Numbers. Written by Al Imam Muhammad Umar 
Bahraq al Hadrami, the book touches on various aspects of Islam, ranging from 
jurisprudence (fiqh) to spirituality (tasawuuf). The chapters are based around a poem 
and are arranged in numerical order, to aid memorisation of the text – something the 
                                                
97 Sheikh Ibrahim Osi-Efa currently lives in Liverpool and works primarily in the UK. He is the 
founder of a range of Islamic initiatives including Ibn Abbas Institute, Starlatch Press, Badr Language 
Institute, and the Greensville Trust. He studied for three years in Syria and Mauritania, and for six 
years in Tarim, Hadramaut, Yemen, under al-Habib Kazim al-Saqqaf, al-Habib ‘Ali al-Jifri and al-
Shaikh ‘Umar Husain al-Khatib (Radical Middle Way: n.d.).  
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Sheikh encouraged the students to pledge to do throughout the course and about which 
he circulated a weekly email reminder. Throughout the class, most of the women took 
extensive notes and some recorded the lectures on their phones.  
On the first day, the Sheikh sat behind the table, his power-point presentation 
projected behind him, and began by reciting the Basmala98 and a couple of verses 
from the Quran. His introductory class started by outlining the importance of 
knowledge: “Knowledge comes with responsibility to teach and practise… it is 
concomitant with action, Allah does not befriend anyone who does not have 
knowledge or does not apply it…” he explained. 
 “There are those who speak of different types of intelligence, but what 
we’re interested in is religious intelligence. Those with religious 
intelligence abandon the world, they give up the hope of staying on this 
earth, and they embrace the hereafter. These are the people of deen 
(religion), who find it hard to think outside of it. Those who engage in 
true knowledge are never lonely, it becomes sustenance of the soul all the 
way through death and the afterlife.” 
He continued by contrasting secular education with religious knowledge, and 
critiquing the Islamic studies courses offered by British Universities: 
 “The problem with studying Islamic knowledge at places like SOAS is 
that their mission statement has nothing to do with creating God-fearing 
people. This is not religious knowledge. Before you study subjects like the 
natural sciences, you must study the sacred. This will protect you from 
incorrect interpretations of the universe.”  
The Sheikh then proceeded by supporting his statement with textual evidence from the 
Quran and hadith, citing both the book of hadith and the chain of transmission, which 
are crucial to establishing the authenticity of Islamic sources of knowledge:  
                                                
98 The phrase b-ismi-llāhi r-raḥmāni r-raḥīmi, (In the name of God, Most Gracious, Most Merciful) is 
often pronounced before any class, lecture, or recitation. 
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 “On the authority of Abu Darda: Whoever traverses a path in search of 
knowledge, God will make the path to paradise easy for him. Verily, the 
angels will lower their wings for the seeker of knowledge out of pleasure 
for what he does…” 
According to the Sheikh, religious knowledge is different to secular knowledge; it 
does not entail an accumulation of facts or the development of particular skills, but 
involves cultivating a “religious intelligence”. Knowledge creates “God-fearing 
people” and thus facilitates the individual’s connection with God and with the 
transcendence of the afterlife and the umma. If applied appropriately, it provides 
“protection”, and “sustenance for the soul” that can lead one to paradise; those who 
“seek knowledge” are ultimately rewarded. Furthermore, knowledge enables the 
believer to accept the volatility of this life and project herself to the future. Whilst this 
chapter is concerned with different understandings of knowledge, and forms of 
authority, Chapter Six deals with the way religious knowledge equips the believer to 
shift her own sense of temporality by disregarding the near future of life on earth, and 
projecting herself into the distant future in the hereafter. 
Following the initial introductory class, in the subsequent session the Sheikh moved to 
a discussion of wa’ad (admonition). As the course outline informed us, this class 
aimed to: 
 “Nurture and create an environment which arouses heedless hearts and 
invigorates the resolve of the slothful... [To address] the direct causes of 
spiritual inactivity in order to make ears attentive to the light of prophecy 
that forms the essential content of this text” (Course outline). 
One of the purposes of studying this book, the Sheikh explained, was to “place 
knowledge inside the heart… in order to motivate, to create sincere intentions.” The 
purpose of wa’ad (admonition), he explained, was to dilate the heart, and make it 
more receptive to receiving knowledge. Drawing on Islamic traditional pedagogical 
models, which presume a particular relation between emotions, virtues, and actions 
(Mahmood 2005: 140), the Sheikh proceeded to instruct his audience about how to 
experience knowledge:  
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 “One of the signs of the affected heart is the heart that begins to tremble, 
that is shaken by words. When the eyes fill with tears, the words inspire 
love for Allah and fear and hope for the afterlife. Knowledge should hit 
you inwards in the heart, and the eyes will start to swell as an outward 
sign… Human nature is to procrastinate, but the deen is immediate and we 
need to move swiftly to good deeds.”  
Again, this statement was followed by textual evidence from the Quran, and hadith, 
which he projected on the screen, allowing the students to note down the references. 
He then delivered his own wa’ad (admonition): 
 “Humans live in hope and fear of staying in this world, and are never 
ready to let go. But we need good deeds. We need metaphysical 
provisions for a long journey ahead. But time on this dunya (this world) is 
short! Death is near! Don’t procrastinate!” 
Following this warning, the Sheikh proceeded with a long, captivating, and 
emotionally charged, description of the Day of Judgement. The tone and content of 
each sentence was measured carefully so as to generate tension; his voice gradually 
ascended in some sentences but he interspersed this technique with a sporadic 
peppering of bellows, often causing jolts in the women. His eyes widened and he 
visibly became more agitated; he used his hands wildly to emphasise points, even 
banging the table for issues of particular pertinence. His imagery also created stirs in 
the audience, which could be expected given his depictions of the numerous 
disbelievers and sinners who will slip into the depths of hell as they cross the sirat 
(bridge or road) that traverses the summit of hellfire:  
 “Some will cross in a wink of an eye, like lightening, or a tornado. Others 
will fly over it, and then some will walk, crawl on their knees. Others will 
slip before they even set foot on it, with the dogs at the bottom, 
commanded to catch those who fall! All this relates to how quickly you 
implement knowledge here on earth! Abu Bakr, his faith never wavered, 
he’ll cross like a tornado…”  
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His deep solemn voice, echoing across the room, made the audience shiver. The talk 
finished with a long du’a (supplicatory prayer), after which we all packed away our 
belongings and left in silence, visibly shaken by his performance. “Wow, that was 
intense!” Maryam whispered as we made our way out, “I needed that! It freaked me 
out alright! It’s good though, it makes me wake up and do things… won’t be sleeping 
through fajr tomorrow!” Ifrah nodded, her eyes damp from tears, “That was inspiring, 
mashallah… you really feel you’re there on the Day of Judgement, like you’ve lived 
it!” As the Sheikh had intended, his talk had affected their “heedless hearts” inspiring 
fear and hope for the afterlife. We walked outside and as we sat in the car ready to go, 
Zaynab continued to ponder: “I’m so scared of going to hell!! So so scared! I really 
don’t do enough…” 
This form of admonitory talk (wa’ad) aims to cultivate a sensibility towards death and 
instil emotions and virtues of fear, sadness, and humility. Hirschkind (2006), in his 
ethnography of cassette sermons in Cairo, elaborates on the importance that members 
of the Islamic revival attach to cultivating a sensibility towards death, which they 
achieve through a series of techniques and practices of “death remembrance”. 
Sermons encourage believers to learn about death, and to reflect on it, in order to live 
with “dead eyes” – with the constant presence of death. They enable a “tasting” 
(dhawq) of death, which involves constituting death as a habit of thought, heart, and 
body. The processes of refashioning one’s sensory experience and infusing one’s 
sensibility towards death with the correct emotions of fear, sadness, and humility are 
thought to open the believer’s heart towards God (inshirah) (see Chapter Six).  
Like in Hirschkind’s (2006: 188-192) description, the pedagogical materials 
consumed by my informants, emphasise some aspects of death more than others. For 
example, these teachings often stress the imminence of the eschatological future by 
focusing on the cataclysmic events that are thought to precede and anticipate the 
“Final Day”, and point to the anticipatory signs that have already begun to unfold (e.g. 
the eruption of the Icelandic volcano in 2010). This is typically coupled with a 
constant reminder of the brevity of life and the possibility of imminent death. There is 
frequently a focus on the terrors and torments of the period in the grave. Finally, 
teachings recount the details of the terrifying elements of the Day of Judgment, 
emphasising, for example, the solitude and complete isolation of the individual on 
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that day. In particular, my informants frequently remind themselves of the crossing of 
the bridge (sirat) over hellfire, across which all must cross before the final judgement. 
For those without faith or who have no good deeds, the bridge will appear thinner 
than a hair and they will plunge into the fire.  
Ifrah explained to me how, having read Al-Ghazali’s book Remembrance of death 
and the Afterlife and listened to Sheikh Anwar al-Awlaki on death and the afterlife, 
she had begun to regularly conjure and “make real” an image of the afterlife. Her 
narration remained very close to the scriptures: 
 “Then the bridge terrifies me, ‘as thin as a string and as sharp as a 
needle.’ People will literally be falling straight into hell from there. It's 
really freaky. Some people won't even make it… and I always think about 
the sirat. Your iman will be your torch, here on your forehead, so the 
more you have the easier it will be to cross.” 
Perplexed as to why Ifrah would spend so much time thinking about, and visualising, 
death, I questioned her about it. She replied: 
"I want to know. I want to be prepared for it so that I'm not confused 
when it happens. It motivates me if I know what's going to happen to us. 
I’m so scared about not knowing what’s going to happen to me – about 
what God’s going to do to me. I think about it so much. I read about it, 
and it freaks me out that I want to be prepared. It makes me scared but 
that’s a good thing. At the same time, it makes me hopeful that I might 
make it to janna (paradise) instead.” 
Although fear is more frequently emphasised in pedagogical settings, as it is thought 
to have a stronger impact on moral action, as Ifrah stressed, a believer ought to 
oscillate between hope (al-raja), fear (al-khauf), and love (al-hubb). These emotions 
and virtues should not be assumed to arise spontaneously but may be cultivated as 
both modalities and motives for pious action (Mahmood 2005: 140) (see section 1.7).  
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Sheikh Ibrahim often complemented these admonitory sermons with his more 
frequent talks on love (al-hubb) for God and the Prophet. At one of the many lectures 
we attended on the Prophet, Sheikh Ibrahim explained: 
 “Every time we look at the Messenger, we are being immersed in the 
beauty of the divine. Sometimes we may engage in His light and we 
become immersed in the majestic nature of the divine. The Prophet is the 
one who makes manifest, who clarifies the connection with Allah and the 
99 qualities of Allah. Aisha, the wife of the Prophet, was asked, ‘how was 
the actual character of the Messenger?’ And she said: ‘His character was 
the Quran.’ He was the Quran who walked amongst people. So when we 
study the Prophet, we study the Quran, and when we study the Quran we 
study Allah.” 
These talks often revolved around the hadith of the Prophet’s character (shama’il), or 
stories from the seerah (life of the Prophet). Drawing on traditional Islamic theology, 
the Sheikh explained how the Prophet embodied the divine qualities of God; he 
manifested attributes on earth, which were otherwise incomprehensible to the human 
mind. For the believer, knowledge of the Prophet should, by extension, also entail 
knowledge of God. A personal connection with, and love for, the “One Being” could 
be established through this knowledge, but this connection could also serve as a 
means of “knowing Him” better. As the Sheikh claimed, reason (‘aql) had its limits, 
and one could not comprehend God solely with the use of the intellect. Hence, 
knowledge of God is not solely an accumulation of facts, but involves the cultivation 
of emotions and virtuous dispositions of love, hope, fear, and humility that will make 
one’s heart more receptive to God (Hirschkind 2006; Mahmood 2005).  
Knowing, however, must result in virtuous actions, as Sheikh Ibrahim explained, 
highlighting the connections between knowledge, faith, and action: “This is not about 
what you know, but how you are, your embodiment. Knowledge is about moving 
swiftly to good deeds.” Maryam, in fact, was always careful not to attend too many 
classes. “I’m not coming to this talk today”, she explained to me one day, “I just need 
to implement what I’ve learnt so far, instead of piling and piling knowledge. You 
know, I’ll be held accountable for this, I’ll be questioned on what I did with all that 
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knowledge.” Cautious of the responsibilities that came with acquiring knowledge, 
Maryam appreciated the importance of moving “swiftly to good deeds”. 
Whilst the Sheikh had alluded to the importance of accepting the limits of reason 
(‘aql), during another class, and drawing on the work of Al-Ghazali, he elaborated on 
the important use of reason (‘aql). Reason, he claimed, should serve the purpose of 
fashioning a pious self by channelling and employing the “good” to tackle the “bad 
forces” within the heart: 
 “You are human by virtue of the soul, that metaphysical dimension that 
resides in the heart. Everyday Allah unleashes forces into your heart… 
you have to become equipped, through knowledge, at dealing with these 
bad forces that have already taken force in yourselves. Religion comes 
from within, listen to the good, this is defined through your knowledge… 
If good intentions occur within it [the heart] then the body, by extension, 
will move in a manner deemed appropriate…” 
In the following Chapter (section 6.5) I elaborate in more depth on the Sheikh’s 
reference to the heart and the limits of reason.  
Following the classes on the Prophet, the young women left feeling excited and 
uplifted. This was a reaction I observed on many other occasions. “Wow I needed 
that, needed that iman boost! That was amazing mashallah…” Anisa commented, 
“That was really exciting, I feel better!” She had been feeling “low in iman” of late, 
and was certain that attending one of Sheikh Ibrahim’s classes would help her recover 
the lost enthusiasm, and encourage her to pray more regularly. Sauda, similarly 
commented, “These kinds of talks, they’re good for me, really inspiring. I need the 
inspiring intellectual side of it, thinking through, working to better myself.” Amongst 
the first to introduce us to Sheikh Ibrahim, she had persuaded her friends to attend by 
emphasising the scholar’s ability to evoke emotions of love for God:  
 “Sheikh Ibrahim really has that love for Allah, for the deen, and he 
transmits it to you. You know, spirituality is so important. Everything else 
comes easily if you have love in your heart… things like praying, wearing 
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hijab, they’ll seem like nothing if you have love for the Prophet and for 
Allah.”  
Similarly, Layla, with whom I attended a similar class on the Prophet, added: “The 
depth of his knowledge is incredible, mashallah. And he has so much love for the 
Prophet, and for Allah. You can feel it. You really feel it inside you… the way he 
describes the Prophet, the way He is.” 
Through the idiom of “iman”, the young women were describing a feeling of potential 
connection with the transcendent – the visceral, spiritually uplifting affect which they 
experienced by attending these classes. They often discussed and compared their 
respective levels of iman; “I’m on a high” or “I’m not feeling it”, were oft-repeated 
phrases, which corresponded to individual moods as well as varying levels of 
commitment, motivation, or inspiration. Ifrah compared and contrasted this affect 
with music: “Music makes you experience highs, you feel so good, positive, like 
everything’s alright. It’s like when you feel you’re high in iman, but it also darkens 
your heart, and it takes away time between you and Allah. You’re meant to feel those 
emotions for the sake of Allah, not music.” Although the same emotions were evoked, 
music, unlike religious talks, did not connect them with Allah and was therefore the 
wrong cause for their feelings. The importance of the transmission of this emotional 
experience, from these classes, was captured by Maryam’s comment, “Even if I’m not 
listening to the talk it’s good to come to the classes… to get some inspiration.” 
According to Sheikh Ibrahim, Islamic knowledge ought to be approached in specific 
ways: by employing reason “correctly”, and learning to implement knowledge into 
their everyday practices, thus altering interior attitudes and dispositions.  
As I have shown, these young women speak in terms of traditional Islamic 
conventions regarding emotions, actions, and reason in their projects of ethical self-
fashioning. In particular, Ifrah’s comments reveal how she appreciates the importance 
of inculcating virtuous dispositions and emotions that motivate her into action and 
make her more receptive to God. However, there is also another dimension that I wish 
to stress here. Although Ifrah’s comments indicate that she is clearly rehearsing these 
pedagogical conventions, the affective experience of these emotions differs from the 
formal understanding of emotions that both Mahmood and Hirschkind develop in 
their analyses (see Chapter One, section 1.7). I argue that they conflate discursive 
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traditions with the lived experiences of individuals implementing these norms and 
practices, thus neglecting the latter.  
Instead, I suggest that my informants’ experiences of Sheikh Ibrahim’s lectures, as 
captured by their use of words such as excitement, inspiration and so on, are not 
solely a reflection of these discursive traditions. I contend that these emotional 
experiences of euphoria and excitement do much more than motivate these young 
women to embody a pious disposition. Rather, they capture the potentiality of radical 
transformation offered by the practise of Islam. These affective experiences, 
described as “high iman”, result from shifts in subjectification, and are animating 
forces that reorient the self in time (Miyazaki 2004). In these instances, affect 
circulates and reverberates amongst the women. More than the content of the talks, 
what matters to these young women is the Sheikh’s ability to provide a feeling of 
potentiality, a feeling of the possibility of understanding themselves, and their 
relations with others, differently. Knowledge that creates this excitement is appealing, 
and therefore authoritative, in the long term. 
5.5.1 Islamic scholarship 
Thus far I have stressed how the practice of “mosque hopping” and seeking 
knowledge from a diverse range of sources is based on whether a particular scholar is 
able to instil virtuous emotions that open one’s heart to God and produce an 
experience of excitement and potentiality. In this section, I elaborate further on the 
ways that “seeking knowledge” is embedded in, and limited by, the discursive 
traditions of Islam, structures of authority and Islamic forms of reason. I subsequently 
turn to explore the ways in which my informants debate and contest other criteria for 
establishing authority, including the extent to which knowledge ought to be Western 
in its form, style, and content. 
In one of the last classes, during the final question and answer session, Sheikh 
Ibrahim, who had been discussing the life of Abu Thalib (an uncle of the Prophet) 
throughout the class, was asked by a student whether he regarded Abu Thalib a 
Muslim. The Sheikh responded: “There are multiple hadith that speak about Abu 
Thalib and the ulama are in difference of opinion. But the vast majority of the ulama 
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are in the opinion that Abu Thalib died as a believer.” The student disagreed with the 
Sheikh, and the conversation continued as follows: 
Student: “But there’s a hadith that says Abu Thalib will have fire on his 
chest.” 
Sheikh: “No, the hadith says Abu Thalib will be placed in the shallow 
waters of the hellfire, and that hadith is sahih (sound). What does that 
say? Is it proof of shirk (sin of idolatry)? If we want proof of his shirk 
then show us proof… show him declaring loyalty to hubab, or to manad. 
You’re not going to find loyalty to that. That hadith is actually a proof 
against… that is a punishment reserved for disobedient believers.” 
The Sheikh was warning the student against accusing others without authentic 
evidence. Instead, by referring to a hadith sahih, Ibrahim was drawing on traditional 
chains of transmission, which in Islam are used to ascertain the authenticity of hadith 
statements. In doing so, he offered authentic evidence to the student that the 
punishment awaiting Abu Thalib was one reserved for disobedient believers, not 
disbelievers. The student continued, “But you can’t say...” 
Sheikh: “This is not an argument. If you open a book of aqeeda (creed) 
you will see that jahannam is the lowest darakat of hell. Let’s ask Allah 
to open us up to understand the religion, amen, amen, amen… 
So, jahannam…” 
Student: “but… 
Sheikh: If you let me finish, it’s called adab (etiquette)… (long pause) 
Eventually jahannam will be free of all those who have been punished. 
There are different opinions on this topic… (long pause) 
No one can stand and accuse others of being wrong, when the ulama 
disagree! That’s a principle of religion, and akhlas… I wish I could do for 
the Prophet, what Abu-Thalib did for him. If you believe that, hold your 
tongue in adab. Tell us of what you did? We all stand before Allah with 
our opinions; let’s just hope that our opinions concur with the religion. 
You take your opinion and hope that you stand in good faith with Allah. 
But whatever opinion you hold you must have adab with that opinion. 
And especially if you hold opinion against!  
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Following the class, Maryam, Layla and Ifrah discussed the incident on the way 
home. Maryam, who was amused and shocked by the arrogance of the student, could 
not believe he had almost angered the Sheikh, who always displayed composure and a 
virtuous character. “That guy, he’s so rude!” she giggled. The young women often 
showed great reverence for scholars, and the student’s complete lack of etiquette and 
respect troubled them. Layla, was particularly impressed by the way Ibrahim was able 
to restrain his anger: “Mashallah… he was right to stress adab. And instead of 
arguing he made du’a for the student. That’s what we should always do. He didn’t 
attack him, but prayed he can have better knowledge!” According to Layla, the 
Sheikh’s comment, “Let’s ask Allah to open us up to understand the religion”, 
demonstrated his knowledge of Islamic teachings and his personal piety, and hence 
confirmed his authority.  
In an article detailing the styles of reasoning that are grounded in Islamic traditions of 
civic duty, Hirschkind (2001) argues that this public arena of debate is both normative 
and deliberative – a domain of subjection to authority and the exercise of individual 
reasoning. Whilst participation in this arena involves argument, criticism, and debate, 
ultimately, religious authority provides the foundation on which opposing viewpoints 
are articulated. The ultimate aim of reasoning is disciplinary, in that it is geared 
towards ethical self-improvement, and an argument therefore depends on its ability to 
move the self towards correct understanding, modes of being, and acting. The ability 
to act and speak reasonably and to conduct an argument in a calm and respectful 
manner rests on an “evaluative background” – on the inculcation of virtues and 
emotions of fear and humility (ibid 2001: 21-22).  
Sheikh Ibrahim had demonstrated this thorough knowledge of Islamic scriptures. His 
argument involved the proper interpretation of Islamic sources and, therefore, like for 
Hirschkind’s (2001) informants, religious authority provided the foundation for his 
debate with the student. In his classes the Sheikh always displayed referenced 
quotations from the Quran and hadith on his power-point slides to support his claims 
with scriptural evidence. In the discussion with the student, he corrected the student’s 
understanding of a particular hadith, demonstrating his superior knowledge of the 
tradition. My informants often stressed the importance of presenting scriptural 
knowledge. Citing the source in support of one’s argument demonstrated proof of 
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one’s interpretation. Habibah, for example, had recently downloaded an application 
on her phone that enabled her to check for herself the authenticity and reliability of 
Quran and hadith references, on any given topic. Checking references enabled the 
young women to read the text themselves, ascertain its reliability, and decide the 
extent to which it supported the scholar’s claims. Nonetheless, my informants were 
cautious about arriving at their own interpretations (itjihad), but instead relied on 
those of scholars who, in their eyes, possessed sufficient Islamic scholarly knowledge.  
The fact that Sheikh Ibrahim had studied traditional Islamic Sciences under scholars 
in Mauritania, Syria, and Yemen lent him further credibility with the young women. 
As Layla described, “A Sheikh is usually trusted through scholarship, the chain of 
narration through which he’s learnt, where he has studied.” Similarly, Habibah 
explained that she always checked “the background of teachers and looked at whether 
other Sheikhs accept them.” Scholars who had studied in renowned Islamic 
Universities such as Al-Azhar or The University of Medina, or under important 
scholars or descendants of the Prophet, were regarded as particularly knowledgeable. 
The form of knowledge they had was often termed traditional or “Eastern”, and was 
considered by some to be closer to “true” or authentic Islam. These young women felt 
that some preachers, for example Tariq Ramadan, did not possess this scholarly 
Islamic knowledge.  
Furthermore, Sheikh Ibrahim had demonstrated that “true” knowledge was more than 
an accumulation of facts. His tone and manners illustrated that he embodied the 
virtues of humility and modesty; not only was he a powerful charismatic orator, but 
his actions also manifested his own embodiment of knowledge, his own personal 
piety and connection with God. As we continued discussing the Sheikh’s dispute with 
the student, Ifrah added, “These days, people have no idea how to discuss religious 
matters. He’s right that we should not go around accusing people of disbelief – who 
are we to judge? It’s between you and Allah”  
She respected the Sheikh’s humble and non-judgemental attitude, exemplified by his 
reminder to avoid judgement and accusation. The Sheikh had displayed his own adab 
and his own ability to conduct debate in a calm, respectful, manner, in accordance 
with the virtues of civic debate (Hirschkind 2001). He directed the student to reflect 
on his unfounded accusation of Abu Thalib in his criticism of the Sheikh’s lesson. 
 208 
Ultimately, he explained to the student, this form of criticism was not conducive to 
the formation of a pious self. Instead of criticising others, the student ought to reflect 
on his own intentions and comportment in the eyes of God. Argument and debate are 
justified only if the ultimate aim is to move one or oneself towards pious action. 
5.5.2 Western knowledge and liberal choice 
For knowledge to be authoritative it must, first and foremost, be situated within 
Islamic structures of authority, and also within orthodox Islamic notions regarding 
reason, emotion, knowledge, and action. Yet, my informants often also stress the 
importance of a liberal concept of choice and autonomy in reference to a particular 
source, style, or interpretation of religious knowledge. Western knowledge, they 
claim, facilitates their exercise of choice through its format, style, and content. The 
extent to which authoritative knowledge ought to be Western is, however, often a 
source of debate and contestation.  
Layla articulated her views by contrasting Western and Eastern scholarship. On one 
occasion, I heard her discuss with a friend the work of Sheikh such as Ibrahim Osi-
Efa, and Abdal Hakim-Murad, a British Ba-Alawi scholar and Cambridge lecturer in 
Islamic Studies: 
 “Scholars like them, when they talk about a certain issue, they trace 
debates historically, provide different opinions on an issue, rather than 
state one point blank. They appeal to a Western intellectual audience. 
They bring Western scholarship and combine it with Eastern knowledge. 
They have a Western way of structuring their thoughts.” 
Layla pointed out that knowledge should also appeal to a “Western intellectual 
audience”, partly referring to the academic format and the style of classes such as 
Sheikh Ibrahim’s. The layout of the room as a university lecture hall, the use power-
point slides, and the Q&A sessions, all resembled academic forms of teaching and 
lent persuasiveness to the class. Anab suggested, in an interview that scholars should 
“modernise” their teaching techniques: 
 “I think they [scholars] should do workshops, they should use slides, and 
structure their classes around activities. We should sit in small groups 
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and ask questions… in this day and age you need to keep the principles of 
Islam but you need to cater to people – the way in which they are learning 
at the time. No one does workshops! But that's how people learn these 
days, not the other way that people often find boring.” 
Lectures and workshops contrast with the traditional lessons delivered in Somali 
mosques where emphasis is placed on recitation, memorisation, or dictation from a 
teacher. 
More importantly, however, the young women, as Layla had pointed out, appreciated 
the Sheikh’s ability to “structure his thoughts” in a Western way. Hamda elaborated 
on this idea, “At university… I saw many young people, young women and men, who 
were looking at religion from the intellectual point of view.” A good Western scholar, 
according to the young women, ought to provide multiple interpretations; his or her 
role should be one of guidance. It was then up to the individual to critique different 
opinions, and select an appropriate interpretation that would facilitate her self-
transformation.  
For example, in the incident above, the Sheikh had emphasised the plurality of 
opinions on Abu Thalib, and stressed that everyone was entitled to their own 
opinions, as only God knew the truth. The young women appreciated this exposition 
of multiple interpretations, as it provided them with a basis from which to draw their 
own conclusions, and formulate their own opinions on the issue, while remaining 
grounded in tradition.  
On a separate occasion, Layla contrasted this “Western academic style” of teaching, 
with that of a Bengali female scholar, whom she had asked about the compulsory 
donning of the niqab. The Ustadha had told her that it was fard (obligatory) and 
elaborated very little on her claim. This answer had been insufficient for Layla, who 
explained: 
 “She didn’t explain much, or provide opinions. She said it was worn by 
the Prophet’s wives and so it was fard. The face is beautiful and should be 
protected. She didn’t explain the context that the Prophet’s wives needed 
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to be protected, as they were associated with Him. She didn’t go into 
debates about the different interpretations of modesty…” 
The female scholar had failed to provide multiple interpretations that would enable 
Layla to forge her own opinion. This was unlike what she termed the Western form of 
relating to knowledge, which emphasised the importance of weighing up, and 
choosing amongst, alternative opinions and a range of schools of thought.  
The idea of Western knowledge is also used to refer to what Bowen (2010) has 
described as a mode of reasoning based on the “objectives of scripture” (al- maqâsid). 
This approach encourages Muslims to assess normative statements against what are 
seen to be the overall objectives of God’s revelations – a complex system, not easily 
reduced to a set of rules. This approach, Bowen argues, “offers a term that resonates 
with the history of Islamic scholarship and at the same time offers a mechanism for 
justifying innovative practices, for mediating between a practical exigency and a 
system of Islamic norms” (ibid 2009: 82). Layla was, in the above statement, 
criticising the Ustadha for failing to contextualise the hadith, and failing to prioritise 
the overall objective (guarding modesty) above the prescribed form (niqab). She also 
criticised her for failing to provide multiple opinions, thereby enabling her to choose 
amongst different interpretations. According to Layla, niqab was obligatory for the 
wives of the Prophet at that time, but may not be necessary to life in the UK today. In 
a non-Muslim environment, Layla insisted, the hijab was sufficient to accomplish the 
virtue and overall objective of guarding modesty. As we saw in Chapter Three 
(section 3.5.1), although her friends contested her view, it enabled Layla to adopt a 
more flexible and pragmatic attitude to her clothing.  
Within this discussion, personal choice is a mode of subjectification, albeit one that is 
primarily limited by the Islamic tradition and is also determined by the experience of 
affect. In what follows, I present some of my informants’ disputes regarding 
authoritative knowledge in order to highlight the interconnections between the three 
modes of subjectification – choice, affect, and submission – and the ways of 
establishing authoritative knowledge. These debates, on which mode ought to be 
prioritised, are often articulated by reference to a “Salafi-Sufi continuum” (Jensen 
2006). 
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5.6 Debating knowledge: Sufis, Salafis and “bad imams” 
Zaynab was always quick to voice her disagreements and views on matters in relation 
to what she defined as “Sufi practices”. She had attended Sheikh Ibrahim’s classes 
regularly for months, without expressing a word of discontent. Then, on one occasion, 
he delivered a lesson on the importance of dhikr (remembrance), a practice of 
collective worship, often associated with Sufi practices, which involves the chanting 
of the names of God, or verses from the Quran or hadith. As we sat in her car on the 
way back to East London, Zaynab complained to the others: 
 “ I don’t get it… isn’t it better to worship God by not sinning, by 
avoiding sins and doing good deeds? What’s the point of repeating His 
name over and over? This wasn’t done at the time of the Prophet and 
there are so many hadith proving that. Reading Quran to music isn’t 
sunna and the Prophet didn’t do it. He didn’t play musical instruments.” 
Layla, who had attended many of these dhikr sessions, interjected by emphasising the 
importance of intentions and the overall objective of dhikr:  
 “To be honest I don’t see the problem with group dhikr. I don’t agree 
with tariqa (paths, schools of Sufism) though. I don’t like the 
exclusiveness and I don’t understand why we have to have a teacher, why 
you need to follow a path. But I don’t understand what the problem with 
worshipping God in unison is –if the intention is to worship God, I’m sure 
you can’t be punished for that. It doesn’t make sense!”  
Zaynab continued: “But it’s an innovation (bid’a)…” 
Layla: “Yes, but there are good and bad innovations and worship surely 
can’t be a bad one.”  
Maryam intervened: “To be honest I don’t like referring to someone as 
Salafi, Sufi, whatever. When I went to the Sufi soul festival, I told one of 
my Salafi friends and she was so against it. She was saying these people 
do this and that and it’s not even true!” 
Layla, who at that point was beginning to get frustrated with Zaynab’s accusations, 
summarised the differences between Salafis and Sufis:  
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 “People say all sorts of things about Sufis – that they think they’re at one 
with Allah, so they don’t pray… but I’ve never met someone like that. 
Salafis place little emphasis on the internal, and I don’t like the way they 
say things, the harshness, they have different manners. They spend half 
their time saying what we shouldn’t be doing, what others do wrong.” 
Maryam: “I understand though, it’s hard for us because we had quite a 
Salafi upbringing – emphasis on rules and stuff – so it’s hard to pull away. 
You feel torn between them.”  
These comments reveal the ways in which these young women articulated 
disagreements on what constitutes “true” and authoritative knowledge, and the ways 
in which they categorised different forms of knowledge and attached importance to 
the three modes of subjectification. The young women only rarely discussed the 
differences between madhabs; many did not adhere to a single madhab, but selected 
accordingly amongst the four different legal schools.99 However, they very often 
debated the nature of Islamic knowledge according to a “Salafi-Sufi continuum” 
(Jensen 2006). 100  This distinction is a vernacular categorisation and does not 
necessarily coincide with scholars or organisations that self-identify as either Salafi or 
Sufi.101 
This juxtaposition should also be seen in the context of a growing influence of, and 
opposition to, Wahabi/Salafi scholarship in London. The Saudi sponsorship of 
mosques, organisations, books and pamphlets has significantly impacted on the forms 
and styles of knowledge available to British youth (Al-Rasheed 2005). My research 
confirmed that many young Somali women were drawn, at least initially to, Wahabi 
rhetoric. Imbued with an empowering and simple message of a strict, individualised 
adherence to Islamic scriptures, it is particularly appealing to young Muslims. This 
                                                
99 Bowen (2010: 65-66; 75) notes how this process of combining different juristic traditions is common 
amongst some scholars in Europe, who teach Islam on the basis of a set of Islamic principles. 
100 Roy (2004) classifies these polar opposites of Salafism and Sufism as neofundamentalist Islam, and 
humanist and ethical Islam. 
101 Sheikh Ibrahim does not self-identify as a Sufi.  
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form of knowledge is contested by, particularly Sufi scholars, who defend the 
centrality of ijazah (authorisation to teach an Islamic discipline), and the idea that true 
religion is transmitted through a connection back to Prophetic origin (Birt 2005).  
I have already demonstrated the ways in which the “Salafi-Sufi continuum” is 
employed to juxtapose knowledge that is based on fixed rules and regulations, with 
knowledge that considers the overall objective of the scriptures, the importance of 
contextualisation, and which is ultimately seen as more flexible and pragmatic. For 
some of my informants, Salafi knowledge – also referred to as the “haram vs. halal” 
approach (Bowen 2010: 64) – denies complexity, and is excessively strict, focusing 
solely on exterior practices (sections 3.4 & 3.5). For others, however, it is attractive 
because it motivates them to act and provides clear, universal, and straightforward 
rules on how to conduct oneself in everyday life. As Zaynab had pointed out, it is 
considered closer to the Islamic tradition because it avoids innovations (bid’a), and 
emphasises the Quran and sunna as its sole sources of evidence.  
Like many of these young women, Maryam experienced ambivalence towards these 
two forms of knowledge. She enjoyed listening to Salafi scholars; throughout the 
winter of 2010, for example, she exchanged with Zaynab, and recommended to 
others, the DVD of Sheikh Feiz on death and the grave. “It’s really good for me” she 
explained, “It makes me so scared that I wake up the next morning and start praying 
on time, stop wearing make-up. Sufi talks don’t do that for me!” Having watched the 
Sheikh Feiz DVD, I can confirm that it is, in fact, quite terrifying! Set against a soft 
and peaceful background melody, the Sheikh’s shout of “There’s no fleeing from 
death” even made me jump from my seat when I first heard it. Nevertheless, Maryam 
insisted on watching it over and over again:  
 “I think I need the shock factor. I like talks about death, the grave, and 
the afterlife. Not because I need to know for the sake of it, but cause it 
really gives me a kick in the back. I freak out and worry more about doing 
good things. The Sufis never talk about these things; they never mention 
death. When I’m with Sufis I’m less on guard cause they’re so relaxed.” 
At the same time, however, Maryam explained to me, “Sometimes Salafis are too 
strong… You know what I mean, they’re a bit judgemental.” 
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This obsession with rules, as Maryam had pointed out in the car conversation, was 
similar to the Islamic education they had received from their parents, focused on form 
and not meaning. It was also very similar to Somali culture claimed Anab: 
 “They’re not open about things. It’s like Somali culture – being told all 
the time what to do. And there isn’t much encouragement to find out for 
yourself. It was just like: ‘these people are bad watch out for them!’ Your 
educational scope is limited in that way, I don’t like it. About doing it 
cause you have to and I don’t think Islam is like that. I want it to be 
something personal that helps me become a better person. I think people 
should decide for themselves.” 
Following one of the viewings of Sheikh Feiz’s DVD, Layla, who could not 
understand Maryam’s obsession with the scholar, explained: “I don’t see the point in 
being so angry. I don’t like the attitude of Salafis, they are arrogant and too black 
and white about things, they always think they’re right and tell others they’re 
misguided! I’ve had so many Salafis tell me I’m wrong, because I go to mixed 
classes…” 
For Layla, the Salafi approach, based on strict rules, paid insufficient attention to 
aspects of spirituality, and to the “internal” dimensions of faith (section 3.7.1). She 
summarised succinctly the differences between the two approaches: “The Salafis are 
strict about rules, and the Sufis have the spiritual dimension, but sometimes they are 
missing on the rules and obligations. Islam is the middle way, so we should strive for 
that.” The “Sufi” approach, was considered not only more inspiring and more likely 
to cause the type of affect that Sheikh Ibrahim’s classes transmitted, but it also 
provided more choice and flexibility of interpretation. 
Despite these categorisations, Maryam and some of her other friends attended events 
and classes across the “Sufi-Salafi continuum”, emphasising the importance of 
diversity and the liberal mode of choice. For example, Maryam and I, together with a 
group of friends, had attended the Sufi soul festival in 2010 in Germany, travelling by 
coach from London with a large number of Muslims who were part of the Naqshbandi 
tariqa. On the journey home, Maryam, who had never attended a Sufi gathering 
before, discussed the event with her friends. As one of the few women dressed in a 
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black abaya and hijab, she had felt a little bit out of place. She expressed her 
scepticism of certain practices, such as singing the Quran or purchasing photographs 
of the Naqshbandi leader whom she had witnessed at the festival, but she had been 
“intrigued”, and had enjoyed the “happy atmosphere” and the “kindness and sharing 
vibe” of the event. Yet, participating in this festival did not preclude her involvement 
in what she termed more “Salafi” events. As she pointed out: “I prefer to pick and 
mix. I’m not sure I’d take everything about Sufism, but it was good to experience it 
and see what it was all about. I’m interested in everything; I’d even go to Shi’a talks. 
I think once you identify as one thing, it becomes a bit like a cult…”  
For Maryam, “mosque hopping”, and choosing, enabled her to avoid identifying with 
a sectarian Islam, or a group identity or cultural affiliation, but instead indirectly 
emphasised a commitment to a universal, transcendent Islam. The following example 
demonstrates how these young women debated and negotiated the importance 
attached to choice, submission to Islamic norms, and affect. 
In early June 2011, Maryam, who had at that stage entirely abandoned Sheikh 
Ibrahim’s classes, began attending weekly classes at a newly founded independent 
institute in Whitechapel. Her friend, Hibo, who had recently started practising Islam, 
had persuaded most of her close friends to attend in order to gauge their views on the 
classes. The funding and administration of the organisation were not known to 
Maryam, but the classes were free, and the centre ran a range of different courses 
ranging from the Islamic sciences to more thematic ones on the hereafter, the life of 
the Prophet and His companions, etc. The first one I attended was titled Heroes of 
Islam and was taught by Sheikh Faisal. Maryam had warned us that he was a 
controversial “Salafi” scholar102 in the media, but that, nonetheless, his lessons were 
inspiring and insightful, provided that you were able to “put aside” his opinions. 
Although Layla was sceptical about attending, she had been persuaded by her friend’s 
enthusiasm about the course and had decided, on that day, to try it out. Five of us 
walked in past the men at the entrance and made our way to the top of the building, 
where a TV link with the room below was set up, and a few rows of chairs had been 
                                                
102 Sheikh Faisal is linked to the political organisation, Al-Muhajiroun. He had been deported from the 
UK in 2007 for inciting racial hatred.  
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laid out for the women’s viewing of the class. There were only six other women in the 
room and the class had already started; the Sheikh was discussing a Khalifa, making 
constant analogies between the historical context and our current situation in the UK. 
I could tell Layla was not enjoying the class and she looked at me, eyebrows raised in 
amazement, as he spoke the following sentences: “Our time is one of strife and 
occupation! This is a land of kufar (non-believers). We’ve been in this country how 
long? And still they are kufar…” He proceeded by instructing his audience to voice 
their discontent at the fact of living “side by side to gays, lesbians, disbelievers... We 
shouldn’t accept it!” he concluded.  
We walked out of the talk silently, as if afraid to open our mouths until alone. This 
was the first time we had attended such a politicised talk, and once sufficiently distant 
from the building, my friends instantly began debating the content of the talk. Layla 
was shocked, not only by the content of the talk, but also by the violent and angry 
tone of the Sheikh; much of what he said, she thought, was misguided and she 
strongly opposed any of us attending these talks again. But the other women answered 
back, with Maryam explaining, 
 “Ok it’s definitely a bit extreme, and it really wasn’t like this last time. 
But you just have to learn to take the good things, the knowledge of the 
Khalifa or the Prophet, and then leave the rest. His Islamic knowledge is 
good, but his opinions not so much… so just leave those. But you know, 
I’m not stupid, I can choose for myself, think with my own head and 
decide what I think is good and what is a bit extreme.” 
Zaynab joked, “Panorama will be in here next! This guy is wanted! But Maryam is 
right, you just leave out the violent stuff.” Hesitating for a moment, she added,  
 “But also, he has a point. Muslims have become too apologetic these 
days; we don’t stand up for things. In East London we should stand up for 
ourselves and make the environment more Islamic. Next to where I live 
there are prostitutes. I should fight to make the environment more Islamic 
and get rid of that.”  
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Maryam joined in and added “My iman has been so stable since I’ve been going to 
these classes. They make me passionate and give me energy! And I stand up for 
myself. I used to ignore the EDL (English Defence League) and now they make me 
angry!” 
Layla felt alone in fighting her case, but she stated her points calmly and clearly. “I 
know you’re all smart and can judge things for yourself but I just don’t like the 
environment”, she explained. She felt his reasoning was not particularly intelligent or 
insightful, it created rifts between people, and references to Islamic scriptures were 
employed solely to advocate violence, this was not a message worth listening to, she 
concluded. Hibo, who had introduced the women to the course, noticed Layla’s 
increasing irritation and stepped in to mediate the discussion: “It’s important to do 
our own research on this topic. Go home now, research him, and what he’s saying, 
and make up your own minds. We don’t have to take everything he says.” 
This incident brings to the fore the ways in which these young women engage with, 
and navigate their ways around, different forms of knowledge and varying public 
debates about Islamic knowledge. Nimo’s comment, in which she joked about the 
BBC news program Panorama, suggests a critical awareness of the discourse of the 
“bad imam”. As Birt (2006: 693) notes, the “good imam”, in public debates in the UK, 
has come to be defined by reference to models of “civic religion”, in a policy context 
of community cohesion, and counter-terrorism. This ideal figure of the “good imam” 
must be trained in the UK, embody civic virtues, interfaith tolerance, and pastoral 
skills, and must work as an agent of national integration, fighting against extremism. 
In contrast, the “bad imam” has been defined as foreign-trained, and an agent of 
religious and cultural divisiveness.  
However, for these young women, such government and popular discourses on 
Islamic knowledge are irrelevant, if not a source of ridicule; a “good imam” is not 
necessarily one who promotes integration and community cohesion. What constitutes 
authoritative and “proper knowledge” is contested and negotiable. Maryam’s 
comment, “I’m not stupid, I can choose for myself, think with my own head”, was a 
direct challenge to a public discourse that treats Muslims as passive receptors of 
extremist rhetoric by radical foreign Sheikhs. Maryam pointed out how her critical 
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intellect enabled her to “decide” and judge what she desired to take away from the 
class, and she could, therefore, ignore some of the more “extreme opinions”. 
Most importantly, this incident is indicative of how these young women establish 
what constitutes authoritative knowledge. Maryam’s comment “I can choose for 
myself, think with my own head” points to the way in which she understands herself 
as being able to dissect different aspects of knowledge: facts, emotions, 
interpretations, and modes of reasoning can be differentiated from one another. It is 
her knowledge of Islamic scriptures and correct modes of reasoning that enables her 
to choose amongst these different aspects of knowledge. A liberal emphasis on choice 
is curtailed and delimited by the Islamic tradition. Affect has no place here, precisely 
because, as Maryam suggests, although the Sheikh’s “facts” might be “good”, his 
interpretations are dubious. Affect can only be experienced if scriptural knowledge 
and the correct Islamic modes of reasoning are in place. Similarly, choice is 
dependent on an understanding of the Islamic discursive tradition, as the following 
incident demonstrates. 
A few weeks later, following the “bad imam” incident, I learnt that Ardo, who had 
kept silent throughout the previous debate, had decided to abandon these classes and 
had recommended the same to her friends. Her brother-in-law, who she claimed had 
superior knowledge to herself, had explained how these courses were most likely 
affiliated with al-muhajiroun (a banned Islamist organisation based in the UK). They 
had a hidden political agenda and even though she could ignore their opinions, 
slowly, he explained to her, they would influence the way she thought:  
 “He doesn’t think I have the tools to argue back yet. And he was right. I 
went to another class and the Sheikh kept going off course and bringing in 
his opinions, so I stopped going. I’m going to enrol on the online Islamic 
University run by Bilal Phillips and others.”  
According to Ardo, her insufficient religious knowledge made it difficult for her to 
dissect the teaching appropriately and hence choose in an informed way. Ardo began 
informing her friends about the problems she had with these classes and slowly, 
following her suggestions, her friends decided to abandon the institute. 
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Ardo’s example demonstrates the fact that choice, as a liberal mode of 
subjectification, should only be exercised within the boundaries of the Islamic 
discursive tradition, according to these young women. The ultimate aim is self-
fashioning as pious subjects, and the establishment of a connection with God. Yet, as 
I have demonstrated in the previous sections, a long-term sustained commitment to a 
particular Sheikh or source of knowledge is ultimately determined by a personalised 
experience of affect, and a potential for self-transformation. These young women 
constantly revise and reassess, debate and negotiate, ideas of knowledge but, 
ultimately, rely on personal feelings and choices in determining whether they take on 
board any particular lesson. As Nadifa summarised,  
 “I listen to everyone, then do my own research and take what I feel is 
good, what my heart feels is right. Ultimately it is a personal thing. You 
need to think about what fits you as a person; you need to judge your 
intuition. I don’t get myself bogged down with things too much and just 
think: does this feel right to me?” 
Reasoning and choosing are not exercised in isolation, but, as I have demonstrated, 
arise through, and are shaped by, debates and contestations with friends. These heated 
discussions amongst themselves are, in fact, crucial to their quests for knowledge and 
for self-transformation. Should knowledge simply engender a spiritual feeling and 
connection, or should it motivate or scare believers into action? Should it be political 
and seek to Islamise the environment, as Sheikh Faisal suggests? These questions 
remain unresolved for these young women, as they experiment with, and seek out, 
different forms of knowledge. 
These networks of friends play a crucial role in supporting, discussing, and sharing 
the process of practising. They replace the support previously provided by kin, which 
diminishes in importance when these young women distance themselves from Somali 
mosques, and their mothers’ ideas of learning and knowledge. Following one of 
Sheikh Ibrahim’s classes, during which he discussed the rights and obligations of 
neighbours, Layla reinterpreted his teachings: “Maybe we should create our idea of 
who counts as a neighbour, by including friends and acquaintances and creating a 
community in that way. Treating our friends as neighbours.” By creating a 
community based on friendships and acquaintances, Layla was advocating for a 
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Muslim umma, based on faith and structured around egalitarian, intimate, relations of 
trust, to replace the structured hierarchies of kinship relations.  
Most of my informants became close friends throughout their quests for knowledge. 
In fact, it was only by “hopping around” with them to various classes, and through 
sharing books and DVDs, that I was able to become intimate with them and share 
their emotional turmoil and relentless quests for knowledge. These processes of 
sharing emotions, debating, advising and ultimately hoping, are not only constitutive 
of their processes of learning and engaging with knowledge, but also connect them, as 
a network of friends, to a larger community of believers.  
5.7 Conclusion  
 “Knowledge is meant to be a transformative means to seek the pleasure 
of Allah. Sometimes young people complain that Sunday school is a form 
of torture. Why? Because they find no meaning in it. It’s just a bunch of 
points of information that have no meaning in their lives. We seek 
knowledge for Allah – the knowledge that you need to get ahead with 
your relation with Allah. This is something we need to think about when 
we educate our children. We say: learn this, learn this!! And the kid is 
probably thinking: oh no oh no! Rather, if you look at what the early 
Muslims used to say: raise your children with love of Allah, love of the 
Messenger, love of his companions and family, and love of the righteous. 
If you have this love, your knowledge will have direction.” (Sheikh Faraz 
Rabbani: 2009) 
I began this chapter by contrasting Layla’s “mosque hopping” attitude to religious 
knowledge with her mother’s preference for local Somali mosques. I suggested these 
differences pointed to generational changes in understandings of where, and how, 
Islamic knowledge is sought, what constitutes authoritative knowledge, and how it is 
established. Older Somali women are moving from a focus on enacting obligations to 
a personal engagement with the meaning of texts, with the aim of applying it to their 
practices. On the one hand, they are participating in processes of reform through an 
increased rationalisation and objectification of knowledge (Eickelman 1992), but on 
the other, for many older women, religious knowledge remains constitutive of their 
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understanding of Somali culture. Young second-generation Somali women argue that, 
unlike their mothers, knowledge is not associated with culture, but with a personal 
relationship to God and the umma. It is not an uncritical enactment of practices but 
instead assists a more profound transformation in the ways they understand 
themselves. As Sheikh Rabbani puts it, knowledge for these young women constitutes 
a “transformative means”. 
This chapter has detailed the importance attached to “seeking knowledge”, by young 
practising women, reflecting a range of sources, modes of argumentations, and 
interpretations. In addition, I have explored the interconnections of three ways of 
relating to knowledge: a liberal concept of choice, a submission to an Islamic mode of 
reasoning and to structures of authority, and an experience of affect. These young 
women engage with knowledge, and also determine what constitutes authoritative 
knowledge, in these three ways. A submission to the Islamic structures of authority, 
with the ultimate aim of fashioning oneself into a pious subject, is central to my 
informants’ engagements with knowledge. Yet this mode of subjectification, as I have 
demonstrated, intersects with both choice and affect. 
The literature on Islam in Europe has emphasised the importance of choice, and the 
individualisation of practices, amongst young Muslims as a consequence of 
movement to the West (Peter 2006; Roy 2004). In contrast, I treat choice, as well as 
submission and affect, as a dimension of subjectivity – as the ethical valorisation of 
certain features of the self (Jacobsen 2011b: 375). My informants’ emphasis on choice 
therefore becomes an attitude involved in the making of subjects, but one that exists 
in constant tension with obedience and submission (ibid 2011b: 373). As I have 
shown, structures of authority remain crucial, and delimit any choice of Islamic 
knowledge. This particular theoretical emphasis on choice, as Jacobsen (2011b) 
points out, enables us to explore choice not as a sociological explanation of how 
young Muslims act, but as a mode of engagement, and a condition for self-realisation 
through which they come to understand themselves at a particular historical moment 
in time. 
Whether knowledge is able to engender potentiality – an experience of affect – is 
fundamental in determining my informants’ long-term commitments to a particular 
source of knowledge. The importance attached within the Islamic tradition to a 
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scholar’s ability to transmit virtuous emotions of fear, love, and hope, has been 
explored at length in the literature on Islamic piety (Hirschkind 2006; Mahmood 
2005). I have brought to the fore how my informants experience these emotions as a 
form of excitement, intensity, and potentiality. I emphasise that authoritative 
knowledge engenders affect, a feeling described as “iman boosts” or “high iman”, and 
which captures the potentiality of these young women’s processes of self-making, and 
their newly established connections with others, including God. It is the struggle of 
sustaining a feeling of “iman” that further fuels this continuous quest for knowledge, 
resulting in this “hopping around”, and choosing between various interpretations, 
opinions, and schools of thought. I have suggested that although a commitment to 
structures of authority is crucial to their engagement with knowledge, ultimately, what 
dictates whether they continue to seek knowledge by any given scholar is if they feel 
that this source is assisting their own personal transformations – whether they feel that 
a scholar is enabling them to think of themselves, and their relations with others, in 
radically different ways.  
However, this feeling of excitement and potentiality is difficult to sustain in the long 
run. It is precisely for these reasons that engagements with knowledge are often 
fleeting; there is always the possibility that these young women may turn elsewhere 
for knowledge. As we have seen, interest and commitment to a particular source of 
knowledge was not always sustained over a long period of time. Disagreements 
amongst my informants, regarding authority, frequently ensued, forcing these young 
women to question their commitment to a particular class or course. For example, as 
the winter months approached, attendance and enthusiasm for Sheikh Ibrahim’s 
classes slowly waned. One Monday evening Maryam announced in a text message, 
“No more CEI, I’m free! Not doing it for me!” The classes no longer inspired some of 
the young women and others noticed little improvement in their everyday actions. 
Gradually, they turned elsewhere for knowledge and guidance. 
Finally, these generational changes also point to different understandings of what 
knowledge is, and what ought to do. For older women, Islamic knowledge is 
predominately understood as a set of facts that inform proper conduct, whilst for 
younger women authoritative knowledge not only encompasses facts, but also enables 
ways of thinking, reasoning, and feeling. These differences highlight historical shifts 
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and a reworking of the meaning of knowledge – from a set of facts guiding action, 
towards a means of transforming cognitive and affective states. 
At the same time, these young women’s younger siblings are engaging with 
knowledge in much the same way as their mothers; they are learning religious 
obligations as – in Sheikh Rabbani’s words – “a bunch of points of information.” 
These divergences reveal contrasting ideas of what constitutes “proper” or 
authoritative knowledge. What interests me is the way they are indicative of how 
processes of Islamic reform play out unevenly between generations, but also across 
individual lifecycles. The reform of Islamic knowledge, therefore, cannot be said to 
coincide with a particular moment in time. 
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Figure 11: Al-Huda Mosque, Stepney Green 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 12: Mother and son, East London Mosque, Whitechapel, 2013 
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Chapter 6: Temporalities of self-transformation 
6.1 Pondering Paradise 
This final chapter draws together some of the themes developed throughout the thesis 
by exploring the complex relationship that self-making has to temporality, that is, to 
my informants’ sense of being in time. I show how practising Islam involves 
predominantly two interconnected temporal orientations: a focus on the self-God 
relationship in the immediate present, and an imaginary process of self-making in the 
distant-future. I argue that understanding these temporalities reveals the ways in 
which hope animates their quests for self-transformation. I begin with a vignette in 
order to situate this argument. 
On a late summer evening in 2010, I was sitting in Layla’s small, cluttered bedroom 
in the flat where she lived with her family of six in Bromley-by-bow. Maryam was 
snacking on khimis (chapatti type pancakes), and lounging on the bed, her head 
resting on her palm, whilst Layla had her eyes glued to the screen of her laptop. 
Maryam raised her head, interrupting the silence: “Ifrah was really worried the other 
day. She worries that she’ll be married to her ex-husband in Paradise… But surely 
God wants everyone to be happy? I told her she probably won’t be forced to put up 
with him!” 
Ifrah, a close Somali friend who was very devout, had spent the last few months 
listening to lectures and watching DVDs about death and the afterlife. She frequently 
discussed her findings with her friends. Initially, her new-found preoccupation struck 
me as peculiar, and I tentatively asked my friends, “So do you have husbands in 
Paradise?” “Oh, Maryam wants to marry Trey Songz!” Layla joked, referring to 
Maryam’s love of RnB and her occasional allusions to the “hot” rapper. To which 
Maryam quipped: “I don’t know cause I’m not married yet but I probably won’t want 
to be with just one person!” 
Intrigued by my friends’ references to American popular culture in the context of 
Islamic eschatological debates, I pursued the point, “But will there be marriage?” 
Layla, who was always more informed than her friends on theological matters 
explained, “Not in the contractual sense probably, there’s no need for that. The 
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reason we have it here is to protect the people involved. Also, Paradise will not have 
restrictions. We can’t even imagine it. Maybe you can choose whatever you want.” 
Maryam nodded in agreement but then with a shy, yet mischievous, face commented: 
“I once asked someone if you could have sexual relationships with lots of different 
people in Paradise! But maybe I don’t want sexual relationships but just intimate 
relationships with different people, not only your husband. It gets boring you know!” 
Layla interjected: “You have intimacies with friends, you get close to them on 
earth…” To which Maryam replied: “Yeah but it’s different, we’re not allowed to be 
intimate with men, so that might be allowed in Paradise. To sit around chat, like 
we’re doing now, that kinda thing.” 
I had known the young women for over a year at this point, and this was the first time 
they had openly shared their thoughts about intimacies with men. I was curious to 
hear more and so I said, “But does sex exist in Paradise?” Layla explained: “No, not 
in the same way… you have to imagine everything will be different, relations with 
people will be different, with your husband, friends…” At this point, Maryam burst 
out: “Of course sex will exist! It’s one of the pleasures that we’ll be able to enjoy 
freely in paradise. Like food, sex is really important. Not that I know, but we should 
be able to enjoy it!” Layla responded: “Yeah they say men can have up to four wives, 
and loads of virgins, but they don’t really say what women get… I think anything 
could be possible to be honest.” 
6.2 Self-making, time and hope  
This chapter is concerned with the temporalities involved in practising Islam, and 
particularly in these forms of exchanges between these young women on the nature of 
Paradise (janna in Arabic).103 What do we learn when we take seriously their practices 
of discussing and imagining themselves in Paradise, and how can we make sense of 
the temporalities and the processes of self-making that are implicated in these 
conversations? I suggest that the piety literature (Hirschkind 2006; Mahmood 2005), 
                                                
103 Whilst sacred time has been explored at length in the anthropology of Christianity, this has been less 
true of the anthropology of Islam (with the exception of Deeb 2009; Smid 2010; Schielke 2012). 
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which I reviewed in Chapter One, has neglected the ways in which processes of self-
making take place in the temporal domain of the distant-future. Here, I elaborate on 
how my informants’ relation to God in the present moment, and their understandings 
of themselves and their relations with others in the distant-future of the hereafter, 
provide an insight into the complexities of their engagements with the ethical 
imagination (Moore 2011). 
As I noted in the previous chapter, Hirschkind (2006) addresses these questions 
relating to the distant-future in his ethnography of cassette sermons in Cairo. He 
explores the ways in which sermons encourage believers to cultivate a sensibility 
towards death, through a series of techniques and practices of “death remembrance” 
(ibid 2006: 184-8). Although Hirschkind argues that the fear of death and hell are 
considered to have the greatest effect on moral behaviour, he also mentions that the 
hope of acceptance into Paradise can encourage believers to mind their actions. In 
relation to temporality, Hirschkind (2006: 184) suggests that these practices revivify 
an awareness and experience of death in daily life, and serve to fashion a virtuous self 
by constantly bringing the future into the present. Life is not only undertaken as a 
preparation for death, but also actions in the present are geared towards the hereafter. 
My own material, however, complicates this analysis somewhat. First, “death 
remembrance” which, according to Hirschkind, cultivates a sensibility towards death, 
is based on the teachings delivered mostly through sermons, which are closely tied to 
scriptural evidence. As we have seen, my informants draw on teachings and 
scriptures, but they also elaborate on, and discuss these amongst themselves. In doing 
so, they introduce and explore issues that are not necessarily defined within the 
Islamic tradition, and they grapple with concepts that are thought to be unimaginable 
to the human mind. The nature of Paradise in Islamic eschatology is defined as the 
“unseen” and should not be subjected to reasoned speculation and analogy. 
Nonetheless, these young women speculate about these issues, and most importantly, 
fantasise about their own selves and their relationships with others in Paradise.  
Second, according to Hirschkind, this practice of creating a sensibility towards death 
takes place in the present moment; for his informants “the present is always figured as 
collapsing toward the future”, as they strive to fashion themselves into pious subjects 
in present time (ibid 2006: 190). Although Hirschkind does take his informants’ 
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claims that there will be an afterlife seriously, he does not explore their actual 
experiences of time. According to his analysis, self-fashioning takes place in a single 
temporal domain. For my informants, in contrast, these discussions both serve to 
orient themselves towards death in the present, but also involve another experience of 
time. By imagining themselves in Paradise, they are engaging in projects of self-
making in the time dimension of the distant-future. 
In Chapter One, I outlined the connections between self-making, time, and hope 
(section 1.7). I conceptualised hope as a form of temporal orientation (Miyazaki 
2004), and drawing on Moore (2011: 144) I suggested that hope is created in “shifts 
in forms of subjectification”; it animates the ethical imagination by projecting the self 
forward in time. Throughout this thesis, I have explored how practising Islam 
involves reconfiguring new relations to self and others, as these young women engage 
with a range of different discourses, practices, and forms of knowledge. In what 
follows, I analyse the temporal dimensions and related potentialities of these young 
women’s shifts in forms of subjectification and processes of self-fashioning. 
The following has been inspired by the work of Jane Guyer (2007), but in it, I also 
reformulate her discussion in terms of my own material. In a stimulating essay, Guyer 
details a recent shift in temporal framing within both monetary theory and evangelical 
Christianity. Both emphasise the immediate present and the distant future, leading to 
the systematic evacuation of the near-past and the near-future – the middle range. As 
a period of time that “fills the gap” between the enforced presentism and the distant 
horizon, the near-future has become “punctuated”, rather than enduring, and eroded of 
mid-term reasoning. Building on this insight, and reflecting on Christian 
fundamentalists’ everyday experiences of time, Crapanzano (2007) elaborates that for 
his informants the near-future has not been entirely evacuated, but instead has rather 
become devalued.  
My argument is two-fold. First, drawing on Guyer, I explore how practising Islam 
involves, on the one hand, a process of self-making that renders the self and its 
relationship with God permanently present. This experience of time involves 
distancing the self from the past, and simultaneously devaluing the near-future. On 
the other hand, practising also entails imagining the afterlife as another time 
dimension in which to pursue further projects of self-making. I am not suggesting that 
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the near-past and near-future are devoid of activity. As we have seen in Chapter Four, 
practices and debates around marriage are one indication that this temporal realm is 
teeming with activities. Rather, I show how for many of these women, the near-future 
is devalued, and is cognitively and discursively assumed to be less important in their 
lives. My interest in this Chapter is primarily in the dominant ways in which these 
young women experience religious time. Building on Guyer’s work, however, I argue 
that these temporal frames are hardly ever fully embraced in practice, and require 
constant work to sustain. In the final section of this chapter, I explore the ways my 
informants experience and negotiate multiple, conflicting, and contradictory 
temporalities, that coexist with their experiences of sacred time. 
Second, I suggest that analysing the relationship between self-making and time 
provides an insight into the experiences of excitement and potentiality that, I have 
argued throughout the thesis, energise the practice of Islam. As I described in the 
previous chapter, this affective experience of hope as a reorientation of the self in 
time, is captured by my informants’ references to “high iman”. Building on this 
insight, I also explore the ways in which “low iman” is employed to denote a 
temporary hesitation and an experience of doubt that results from these women’s 
engagements with multiple temporalities. 
I now turn to consider two narratives of young, practising Somali women: Maryam, 
whom I introduced in the original vignette, and her close friend Zaynab. I draw 
attention to the ways in which these narratives, which resemble the experiences of 
Muneera, the young practising woman with whom I opened this thesis, are 
“techniques of the self”. These narratives produce a sense of rupture with the past and 
of God's immediacy in the present.  
6.3 Breaking with the past, enforcing the present  
Maryam first shared her story with me a few months after I met her, during a long 
tube journey to a mosque in North London. Most of her close friends had already 
heard her story several times and, later, I too overheard her reiterate sections of it to 
others during the course of my fieldwork. Maryam had started practising Islam in the 
last two years, following months of panic attacks and bouts of depression.  
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 “That’s when it all started. I’d be sitting on the train, and my heart 
would start thumping so hard, as if it was exploding out of my body, my 
head spinning, and I felt dizzy. I felt something had taken hold of my body 
and it was killing me. I actually felt like I was going to die.” 
She decided to drop out of university and began working in retail hoping she might 
recover, but her panic attacks became more frequent and intense. Sessions with a 
psychologist proved fruitless and soon her family suspected she might have a jinn (in 
this case a bad spirit). Her uncle proposed reading the Quran to her, and slowly she 
witnessed some improvement in her condition. Eventually, he referred her to a 
specialist Sheikh who helped her “flush out” the jinn. “Whenever they read the Quran, 
I got this feeling inside me, a good feeling that took over my body, inside. I had no 
control over it”, she explained. 
She frequently depicted her spiritual change as a drastic and sudden bodily 
experience, and intimated that she had been “chosen by God”, for which she felt 
fortunate. Prior to her transformation, she had labelled herself as “anti-religious” and 
claimed her change had been unexpected and “against [her] will”, as God had taken 
her over and she had had very little choice in the matter. “I hated religion before that. 
Yes I believed in God deep down, but I didn’t like religion and I hated all religious 
people, I thought they were ruining their lives. So I definitely didn’t think this would 
work.” 
Her lifestyle before the panic attack, in contrast to her current pious disposition, was a 
brew of clubbing, partying, and aspiring to financial success.  
 “I was so different. Those were my heydays! Back in the day, I’d go out 
clubbing, partying... I was actually really ambitious. I’d signed up to a 
few modelling agencies, I wanted to do so many things. Mostly cause of 
the lifestyle, I wanted that lifestyle of money, celebrities, having a car, 
nice house, success... I didn’t care about anything else”. 
As we drove around London, she would often point out the nightclubs and high street 
shops that she used to frequent with her non-practising Somali friends. "I had so much 
fun. Sometimes I really miss those days!” Maryam explained, revealing her 
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ambivalence about the past and the difficulties she had encountered in making a 
complete break. Her narrative of her “heydays” was torn between nostalgic memories 
of carelessness and enjoyment, and a period of depression, with neither meaning nor 
purpose. 
 “I started thinking about the purpose of life, why I was here, all these 
questions. And I started reading loads on Islam. I had nothing at that 
point: I’d stopped studying and working; I was just at home, so really 
there was nothing. Life was going nowhere, I stopped seeing a purpose in 
all the things I used to do.” 
Like Maryam, her friend Zaynab also frequently shared her experience of becoming a 
practising Muslim with close friends. I heard it for the first time during a car journey 
to West London, and I observed her repeat it to a newly practising acquaintance 
months later over dinner and on several other occasions. Zaynab had studied IT at 
university during the 1990s Internet boom and lived and worked as a consultant in 
West London. She explained, “I used to think all I wanted was a good job, loads of 
money, a car, and beautiful clothes. I was living in Kensington at the time, I’d saved 
some money!” 
It was during one of her Harrods shopping trips that she had suddenly felt faint and 
collapsed:  
 “That morning I went out with my sunglasses, capris, I was meeting a 
friend in Harrods, and we were picking out a dress for a party. We were 
going round the designer section… suddenly I felt dizzy and I collapsed… 
I thought I was going to die”, she explained. “They called an ambulance 
and everything. But at exactly the same time in the shop, a woman who 
was eating an ice cream collapsed, and whereas I woke up fine, she was 
taken away in an ambulance. I had been saved, I’d been given a second 
chance.”  
It was following what Zaynab thought was a near-death experience that she began to 
reflect on herself and she moved back to live with her mother in East London. Soon 
afterwards, she began praying and donning the hijab. Interestingly, however, her 
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“break” happened to coincide with the burst of the Internet bubble, job loss and the 
ensuing difficulties of securing an alternative stable income. “I had to give up my 
friends, my life, things… I changed completely, you wouldn’t recognise me. I used to 
think success was working hard, making money. My idea of success is completely 
different now. But I don’t regret a thing and I don’t miss it at all!”  
At that point, the two young women had been practising Islam for just two years, but 
these types of narratives were also common amongst women who had been practising 
for a longer period of time. Within reformist Islam there is a preponderance of 
personal testimonies and narratives of religious experiences and conversions, 
available on the Internet, on YouTube, and in the pedagogical literature (Jacobsen 
2011b: 299). Although they are presented as personal and intimate stories of 
transformation, what is striking is not only the frequency with which they are 
repeated, but also the similarities in structure and religious rhetoric. For example, both 
narratives follow a similar sequence of events starting with a trigger, usually a near-
death or similarly traumatic event. This is followed by a period of awakening, self-
discovery and realisation; often, the individual presents herself as seeking answers to 
existential questions. A break with the past and a process of self-transformation 
ensues, as a consequence of learning and reading about Islam and adopting virtuous 
practices and dispositions. These testimonies also employ the language of self-
realisation, but emphasise the importance of God as the ultimate agent: Maryam 
suggests that her change was “against her will” and solely God’s doing and Zaynab 
points to the fact that she was “given a second chance” – presumably by God. 
These narratives provide a framework for understanding, but most importantly 
shaping themselves as subjects in relation to the past, present and future. The past is 
positioned as a period “before practising”; practising involves a rupture in the 
timeline of a person’s life that severs it into a “before and after between which there is 
a moment of disconnection” (Robbins 2007: 11). Drawing out the details of their past 
“heydays”, for example, serves to performatively recreate and reinforce disjuncture 
and a distancing from their old selves. It also objectifies the past as a time of 
ignorance and immorality. For example, the presence of a jinn in Maryam’s narrative 
indicates the ways she has begun to reconceptualise her past life as immoral, 
governed as it was by Satanic forces. 
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But what and whom are these young women breaking away from? As in many 
accounts of conversion, their attempts to “break with the past” are simultaneously 
attempts to reconfigure the determinations of a particular social context, and relations 
with kin and traditional others (Meyer 1998; Keane 2007). For these young women 
this “break” and reorientation signals a move towards a self who is free from what 
they perceived to be Western and Somali cultural and social obligations and restraints. 
I elaborate on each in turn. 
Young women frequently recount their lives prior to practising as a time of youthful 
enjoyment, as well as a period characterised and determined by superficial 
attachments to worldly pleasures. Consumerism, immediate pleasure and gratification, 
material success, and an aspiration for social mobility are now problematic and 
unsatisfactory, precisely because they are seen as being immoral, unfulfilling and as 
having no progression and no defined endpoint. “Life was going nowhere” Maryam 
commented retrospectively. For both women the recent past is presented as dominated 
by the promises offered by capitalism and consumerism, and is therefore bereft of any 
long-term fulfilling future.  
This rupture is associated with a distancing from non-practising friends, and is 
frequently described as a movement away from some of the negative dictates of 
“Western culture”. Although my informants employ the term Western in complex, 
polyvalent ways, here it is used to refer to an immoral and excessive attachment to, 
and dependence on, “wordly” desires and pleasures. My informants feel that 
associating with other non-practising young women risks drawing them back towards 
their old selves and threatening their new-found sense of discontinuity. These friends 
are positioned in the past; they have not yet undergone this process of self-
transformation since they remain constrained by Western culture.  
The past, however, is also governed by traditional or cultural attitudes and practices. 
Cultural Somalis, as I have elaborated at length throughout the thesis, are considered 
incapable of separating themselves from social constraints, traditions and practices. 
The performance of these narratives has, therefore, the effect of constantly pushing 
away the past, and simultaneously constituting the new and the now (Coleman 2011). 
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The present is characterised by newly forged friendships, based on care, responsibility 
and control, with other practising women.104 It is within these new contexts that these 
intimate stories are voiced and shared. Through these performances of “self-
accounting”, young women insert their own personal narratives within a larger 
collective narrative of the umma. By partaking in this experience of self-
transformation with like-minded Muslims, they constitute a shared experience of 
time, and also imagine themselves as connected to a transnational community of 
believers. 
However, there is also another dimension I wish to stress here. Webb Keane (2006) 
notes that language, thanks to its characteristics of being both embedded in context 
but always capable of being extracted and inserted into another, is able to bridge the 
gap between visible and invisible worlds. For example, prayers and chants “that are 
stripped of contextualization cues can make a particular moment in which they are 
used seem to stand beyond a particular time and place” (ibid 2006: 312). The 
relatively stable structure and therefore abstractable nature of these narratives has a 
similar effect in that they index the divine, as beyond time and space. A distant agent 
– God – stands as the ultimate agent structuring these narratives and therefore guiding 
these processes of self-transformation. The contextualization of these narratives in 
everyday settings and interactions has the effect of bringing the distant closer, of 
bringing “into the immediate context voices attributed not to the bodily speaker but to 
normally distant beings” (Keane 2006: 312). By performing these narratives emphasis 
is placed on the now, and on – to use Matthew Engelke’s (2008) words – God’s 
immediacy and presence in their lives. As I have shown, this presentism is reinforced 
by the distancing from, and reworking of the past, but also, as the following section’s 
example illustrates, by a devaluing of the near-future.  
6.4 Devaluing the near-future, rethinking the present moment 
On a Friday evening in the spring of 2010, I attended a talk at East London Mosque 
with my practising friend Zaynab, whom I introduced above, entitled dunya vs akhira 
                                                
104 Although siblings are also important here, often because of age or differences in experiences, some 
practising women find they are not at the same stages of practising as their siblings.  
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(this world vs. the hereafter).105 As we walked in, the talk had already started and the 
women’s prayer room was crowded, yet hushed, except for the voice of the teacher, 
Ustadh Abdullah Hasan, which emanated from a loud speaker. Women young and 
old, mothers and children, sat on the ground listening attentively with their backs 
resting against the walls; some had note-pads on their laps, others were busy trying to 
keep their children silent. We tiptoed our way to the end of the room and sat cross-
legged on the carpet opening our notebooks as the scholar continued: “Life is a 
deceiving enjoyment, in the hereafter lies real enjoyment” he exclaimed. “[It is] as the 
likeness of vegetation after rain, thereof the growth is pleasing to the tillers, 
afterwards it dries up and you see it turning yellow, then it becomes straw.”  
Drawing on sura (chapter) Al-Hadeed (verse 20), he proceeded to outline the different 
stages of life on earth. First, he explained, we start as toddlers and life is immersed in 
play (la’ibun). When we get older, we need entertainment and amusement (lahwun) to 
keep us busy. Our teens are obsessed with pomp and appearance (zeenatun) and as we 
become independent and make money we are inclined to boast and show off 
(tafaakhur). Marriage and children produce rivalry and jealousy as we pile up wealth 
to leave for our children. These stages in life, he concluded, are analogous to the 
stages of a crop, as it grows, dries up, turns yellow and prepares for death. “The 
dunya is like a mirage, the dunya is like a station on a journey, we’ll have to give 
everything up eventually.” 
In Islamic eschatology dunya literally means closer or lower and refers to things 
relating to life in this world – to the now. It is juxtaposed to the akhira, the hereafter, 
which exists beyond and apart from the measure of time. However, the two are related 
to both time and space: dunya is a physical space and a time on earth, and akhira is 
both a place (i.e. Gardens) and eternity, or the hereafter (Smith & Haddad 1981: 6-7). 
In the Quran (7:172), time or life on earth is a period in between “pre-time” and 
eternity. During this period believers are encouraged to recognise and remember the 
divine truth they experienced in pre-time (Hermansen 2008: 310). Muslim theologians 
                                                
105 This was a very popular topic and my informants attended numerous talks that touched on the theme 
throughout my fieldwork. For example, one of the young women invited Suleiman Ghani’s wife to 
deliver a halaqa on dunya vs. akhira in March 2010. The young women also listened to, and 
recommended, online talks on the topic, for example, Hamza Yusuf on dunya vs akhira. 
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have described the life on earth as a path of return (ma-ad) – or a journey, as Ustadh 
Hassan describes it – towards God in the life to come (Quran 7:29).  
The Imam’s critique of consumerism and material accumulation resonates with many 
of the practising narratives shared amongst my informants. The present moment of 
life on earth is reduced to, and characterised by, the persistent and unending 
accumulation of material possessions, all of which cannot be considered “real” and 
cannot provide true fulfilment, because they do not last beyond the present. Life on 
earth is understood as a preparation for the afterlife, involving a detachment from the 
temporary and seductive gratifications of the near-future of life on earth - what 
Crapanzano (2007) has described as the “devaluing” of the near-future. Believers 
should not only recognise, but should also live the everyday in a state of constant 
awareness of the dream-like qualities of this world (dunya). Practising involves 
envisioning a self that is not distracted by this world, but acts in the immediate 
present whilst orienting itself towards the afterlife.106 For example, as I described in 
Chapter Four, young practising women are encouraged to prioritise their love for, and 
relationship with God. Their relationship with their husbands on earth should be an 
extension of, but also secondary to this self-God relation – something that is not 
always achieved in practice. Similarly, these young women perform virtuous actions 
towards their family, friends and acquaintances, but they almost always stress that 
these actions enable them to “please God” in the present moment. 
Following the talk, Zaynab and I stepped outside the mosque and walked down 
nearby Brick Lane. We passed the Bengali restaurateurs, enticing us with their curry 
deals, and clubs and pubs now teeming with partygoers. We settled for some 
Lebanese food and mint tea. Discussing some of the difficulties of focusing on the 
hereafter, Zaynab described how her atheist colleague challenged her at work. “The 
other day she came back to me and said: I've been thinking about you Zaynab and I 
just don't know how you do it. You've spent all your life preparing for death. Where 
                                                
106 Death is closer than the strap of your sandal” Sheikh Ibrahim repeated several times in one of his 
lessons. “Move swiftly to good deeds… don’t get hung up.” My informants often reminded themselves 
that they could easily die the next day and it was important to be prepared. “We’re not meant to be 
sitting on our ass all day… or spend our day praying… we should always be active, doing good deeds”, 
another young practising woman put it. 
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has your life gone? It’s been wasted! With a calm smile oozing of peace and self-
contentment, Zaynab pronounced, “ Life here is so insignificant compared to life after 
and if you know that, you see this life in a different way.” She might have renounced 
“success” in the dunya, but ultimately this period of time was short and insignificant, 
solely a journey towards the afterlife.  
This distancing from the present moment entails a devaluing of plans and aspirations 
for the near-future. This is what differentiates these young women from non-
practising others. Idil, for example, a 22-year-old Somali woman who I introduced in 
Chapter Two, was, in her words “un-interested” in practising. When I asked her about 
this, she clarified, 
 “I guess I’m just not at that stage… there are still so many things I want 
to do before. For example, I don’t want practising to get in the way of my 
future... I have so many other things to think about right now... I want to 
go travelling, partying, enjoy myself. I just want to get those out of the 
way before I start practising. 
Idil understood practising as an impediment because it required abandoning her 
aspirations for the near-future and understanding the present as a preparation for the 
afterlife. For young practising women, Idil’s attitude was “too Western”; it focused 
excessively on fulfilment on earth, and adopted an insufficiently expansive 
understanding of time. Idil was neither ready to put the past fully behind her, nor 
abandon her plans for the near-future on earth.  
6.5 Bringing God into the immediate present 
I have stressed how the repetition of narratives of self-transformation engenders a 
self-God relationship that is immediately present. This sense of immediacy, however, 
is also forged through my informants’ heightened concern with acts of “purification”. 
Frequently, these young women emphasised that the performance of acts of self-
discipline (Mahmood 2005), ought to be directed at exploring their “hearts” in order 
to “purify” their selves and instil a “connection with God” in the immediate present – 
a feeling of iman.  
 238 
Layla, who I introduced in the initial vignette, occasionally organised halaqa (Islamic 
circles) at her house or in the mosque for her close practising group of Somali, 
Bengali and English friends. In one of her sessions she explained to us the importance 
of developing a “healthy” and “pure” heart.107 A heart could be “purified” by worship 
(ibadat) and by performing good deeds with sincere (ikhlas) intentions (niyyah), she 
explained. This should be done by employing reason (‘aql) in order to discipline the 
self in the immediate present. She advised us all to examine our hearts and learn to 
recognise the signs of an unhealthy heart.  
 “We must pay attention to the twinges in the heart. It’s an organ that 
should feel and it should motivate us…our soul is in our heart… that’s the 
good part of us, it gives you signs... you should always base things and 
decisions on what your heart says to you… it should change the way you 
think... your brain depends on your heart.”  
Shaitan could be responsible for making a heart “impure” as could one’s own lower 
self (naf). Learning to identify evil thoughts and feelings as signs of an unhealthy 
heart was fundamental to spiritual success. 
On the day of the halaqa, one of the women present interrupted Layla and asked her 
to elaborate on the signs of a “healthy heart”. “If you’re doing something bad and you 
feel a twinge in your heart – a feeling you shouldn’t be doing something and that 
stops you – then you have a healthy heart. It’s more than guilt, it’s preventative’” 
Layla explained. According to Layla, “goodness” resides in the heart and learning to 
identify “corrupting forces” through constant self-scrutiny, reasoning and practice is 
an integral dimension to becoming a practising Muslim.  
Ifrah, who had been listening attentively, intervened in the discussion to relate her 
own experience to Layla’s explanation: 
                                                
107 Most of my informants were familiar with and often discussed ideas about the heart and the diseases 
of the heart, derived from al-Ghazali’s (1995) On disciplining the soul and breaking the two desires. 
Books XXII and XXIII of the revival of the religious sciences. Hamza Yusuf’s (2004) Purification of the 
heart: signs, symptoms, and cures of the spiritual diseases of the heart was also a popular source of 
information on these topics amongst the young women. 
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 “Recently I have spent a lot of time thinking about myself. I think I really 
know what part of me is me, and what part is being influenced by the 
Shaitan, or by jinns. When I feel like doing things and I’m positive and 
active, that’s me. But when I start saying: ooh I feel lazy, can’t be 
bothered, I’m not up for it… I just know that’s not really me.” 
Ifrah had scrutinised herself and begun to turn inwards in search of her true “natural” 
essence. According to my informants, a “pure” heart should lean towards God and His 
attributes and desire to perform “good” actions in order to seek His pleasure. 
Hesitations or feelings of laziness therefore can only be signs of an “impure” heart. 
Layla nodded in agreement with Ifrah and explained, “I always blame myself actually. 
If I don’t do something it’s my fault.” In this way, she reasoned, she would be 
motivated to discipline herself and work harder to “purify” her heart rather than place 
the blame on an external entity. “I think ultimately we are to blame. Because we’ve 
been given the tools to ward off evil. If you do enough du’a, enough worship then you 
should be fine. And you are the one in charge.” Ultimately, it was up to the women 
themselves to take charge; self-discipline ought to arise from individuals’ own desire 
to purify their souls and seek a connection with Allah.  
Similarly, on that day in the Lebanese restaurant, Zaynab elaborated on her concern 
with “thinking about the hereafter” with an example: 
 “The other day I had to give a halaqa (Islamic circle/talk). And I was 
doing it for myself, and for others, to be closer to God, to strengthen my 
iman. I was having coffee with friends [non-practising], chatting and 
laughing, and they were trying to keep me there, and I told them I had to 
go to work on myself, on my religion. I needed to accumulate brownie 
points for the hereafter! I could’ve stayed there and followed this world 
(dunya), not done the lecture, but I chose not to. And I felt my heart was 
pure as a consequence. It was clean, that’s why I could do it. It felt more 
important than anything else…. it’s about not caring too much about 
dunya. It’s about realising it’s not the most important thing”. 
Zaynab’s reference to “brownie points” indicates her awareness of the concept of 
reward in Islam. The performance of good or “commended” actions is thought to reap 
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rewards in the afterlife, and this utilitarian view on virtuous behaviour has become a 
dominant feature of reformist Islam (Schielke 2012: 138).  
Many of my informants, however, criticised it for being too concrete, utilitarian and 
materialistic in nature. Instead, they stressed a range of different motivations, desires 
and goals that informed their religious practices. Most importantly for Zaynab and 
many of the other young women, delivering the halaqa was important because it was 
a way of bringing the hereafter into the present, but also a means of connecting with 
God; having a clean “pure” heart and performing actions with the intention of feeling 
“closer to God”. A Facebook post of Zaynab’s succinctly captures her idea of self-
transformation: “The most important relationship is the one you have with yourself 
and with God!” By delivering the lecture, instead of having coffee with her friends, 
she was able to prioritise this relationship. 
Zaynab was drawing on ideas about the connections between her divine spirit/soul 
(ruh) and its “natural” inclination towards God. In understanding themselves, my 
informants draw on Islamic concepts of the self whereby the self is composed of three 
domains: the ruh (divine spirit), naf (will, soul or desiring principle) and ‘aql (reason, 
intellect, faculty of moral discrimination) (Smith & Haddad 1981; Metcalf 1984: 
10).108 Embodying pious dispositions entails employing reason to control emotions 
and desires by learning about, and learning to embody virtuous conduct. Therefore, a 
pious self is a self that is disciplined and controlled.  
The aspect of the self that requires disciplining is one that has been distracted from, or 
has forgotten its nature (al-fitra) (Jacobsen 2011a: 74). This natural self is found in 
the ruh (divine spirit), which resides in the heart. Believers are encouraged to follow 
their divine inspiration (ruh) or natural disposition in order to “purify” themselves and 
aim for unity with God. By looking inwards at their ruh, they can learn about and 
                                                
108 The relationship between the ruh and naf is left unelaborated in Islamic scriptures (Smith & Haddad 
1981). At times the soul is used interchangeably to refer to both. 
 241 
connect with God. A “pure” heart is one that has forged a connection to the 
transcendent.109  
Practising entails disciplining the self so as to experience a constant connection with 
God. This can be accomplished by acts of worship such as prayer, but also virtuous 
actions, as long as these are performed with sincere intentions, or with the aim of 
“pleasing Allah”. Believers are encouraged to avoid “delaying actions” and instead 
“move swiftly to good deeds” in the immediate present. Instilling virtuous 
dispositions through these bodily techniques is thought to make one more receptive to 
receiving the presence (or words) of God and drawing closer to Him. 
This is a point made in the extensive literature on prayer, which stresses the manner in 
which the embodied act constitutes a willing submission to God and forges an 
imaginative engagement with divinity (Simon 2009; Mahmood 2001; Parkin & 
Headley 2000; Bowen 1989). Bodily techniques such as prayers can work to evoke 
the presence of God within the believer. Similarly, the pronunciation and recitation of 
passages from the Quran, or the practice of dhikr (remembrance), which involves the 
repetitive invocation of God’s names, are similarly thought to fill the worshipper with 
Godliness. As we have seen, my informants described this experience of forging a 
connection with God as one of excitement, euphoria and potentiality captured by the 
term “high iman”. The importance of this connection is illustrated by the anxiety 
around the potential for disconnection. The latter is captured by the expression “low 
iman”, which I elaborate on below, and is used to denote a physical experience of 
doubt, laziness, lack of motivation, and depression. As I have discussed throughout 
(Chapters One, Three and Five), these preoccupations about one’s iman illustrate my 
informants’ concerns with maintaining this newly forged connection in their everyday 
practices of self-fashioning.  
For example, on one occasion Ifrah, a young practising Somali woman, defined 
“selfishness” as a spiritual disengagement from Allah – an inability to “connect” with 
God. She had been feeling low and had, as a consequence, isolated herself from her 
                                                
109 The self oscillates between two sets of parallels whereby God/akhira/ruh are juxtaposed to Shaitan/ 
dunya /nafs. Reason (‘aql) is the faculty responsible for shifting the self away from the latter set of 
parallels and towards the former. 
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practising friends, temporarily abandoned her prayer, and had begun listening to 
music as a response to her problems: “I’ve been selfish… I’m not used to turning to 
Allah… I always think about myself and then, separate, there’s my relationship with 
Allah, so I have to sort myself out first on my own before I connect, if you get what I 
mean… I’ve been in limbo this period.” 
Because she appreciated the importance of “connecting with Allah” and saw herself 
as inextricably bound to God, she interpreted this experience as one of “selfishness”, 
one in which she thought she could rely on her own means to recover from an 
experience of “limbo” rather than turning to Allah for help. Ifrah had temporarily felt 
a “disconnection” – an inability to understand herself as connected to the 
transcendent. This temporary severance manifested itself as a physical discomfort; it 
was experienced as a threat to self, indicating the significance of the self-God 
relationship. 
6.6 Rethinking the practice of pondering paradise  
Having outlined the first temporal dimension crucial to these young women’s 
processes of pious self-making, I return to the practice of pondering paradise that I 
described in the initial vignette in order to explore some of the limits of Hirschkind’s 
(2006) analysis (and the larger work on piety). As I mentioned earlier in relation to 
Hirschkind’s work, contemporary reformist teachings encourage believers to reflect 
on, and orient themselves towards death and the afterlife. As I elaborated in Chapter 
Five, scholars such as Sheikh Ibrahim often encourage my informants to develop an 
awareness of, and a sensibility towards, death in their everyday life, which includes 
cultivating fear of the afterlife, as well as hope for eternal bliss and love for God and 
His Prophet. 
Similarly, my informants often draw on these teachings and on Islamic scriptures in 
their discussions on death and the afterlife in both pedagogical settings and everyday 
conversations. They frequently describe the various punishments that will befall 
disbelievers and the various categories of sinners in Hellfire (Jahannam). Paradise, 
which is known as janna, or the Garden/s tends to feature less in formal teachings. 
Nonetheless, the scriptures provide a detailed description of this realm as seven-tiered, 
with the Garden of Eden at the top. Paradise is a physical realm: beautiful gardens are 
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depicted, flowing with rivers of honey, water, milk and wine, with celestial food and 
maidens (hur) who remain perpetually virginal (Hermansen 2008: 319). Things 
forbidden on earth, such as wine, will no longer have the same inebriating and 
corrupting effects in Paradise. Unlike the Fire (jahannam) where torture will be 
purely physical, joy in the Garden exceeds the flesh. The Quran states that the faithful 
will be “content, peaceful and secure”, their houses will have thick carpets and 
brocade sofas, the streets will be familiar and they will eat and drink abundantly but 
remain perpetually healthy, beautiful and young (Smith & Haddad 1981: 89).  
Textual knowledge regarding the afterlife should, according to the normative view 
held by my informants, be approached literally (not symbolically). However, what is 
not specified ought to be seen as inconceivable to the human mind; believers are thus 
discouraged from reasoning about it beyond the descriptions they find in the Quran.110 
The abodes of the hereafter are considered beyond time and history, and truths in the 
life to come are considered beyond comprehension. As I described in the original 
vignette of this chapter, Layla, who is considered more knowledgeable in religious 
matters than Maryam, describes the ways in which a believer ought to engage with the 
topic of Paradise. She intervenes as a reminder to Maryam to appreciate the limits of 
reason: “We can’t even imagine [Paradise]”. The afterlife is beyond reason and 
unimaginable to the human mind.111  
My informants’ reflections on Paradise can be understood by drawing on 
Hirschkind’s analysis as a pedagogical practice in which young women instil in 
themselves an “eschatological sensibility”. Pondering Paradise is similar to the 
techniques of “death remembrance” of thinking about other aspects of the eschaton; it 
is constitutive of a project of orientating the self towards death, of living in the 
immediate present and cultivating the correct virtues and emotions, so that they may 
arise naturally within the self (Hirschkind 2006; Mahmood 2005). Discussions about 
                                                
110 One’s fate in the hereafter is also a matter considered to be beyond the realms of reason. My 
informants understood their fate to lie in God’s mercy (rahma) and hence the efficacy of practice in 
securing salvation was ultimately understood as uncertain and unknowable. 
111 Contemporary writings in particular stress that it is better not to speculate on what the Quran does 
not explicate specifically and clearly (Smith & Haddad 1981: 131). However, diverse interpretations 
exist, with some scholars claiming the afterlife should be approached only literally and others arguing 
the afterlife should be seen as a spiritual state. 
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Paradise instil hope (raja) and motivate these young women to act in the present so 
that they may reap the rewards in the life to come.  
However, I suggest that Hirschkind’s analysis is limited as it does not fully capture 
what is happening in these settings. Whereas Paradise is not as important a topic in 
pedagogical settings, discussions such as the one I began this chapter with were very 
common amongst my informants. 112 These young women, I suggest, are not solely 
drawing on Islamic scriptures and orienting themselves towards death, but are 
positioning themselves within the afterlife, within the temporal dimension of the 
distant-future. They are also engaging in fantasies of self-making in relation to this 
next world, assuming that they will continue to be themselves in the afterlife. By 
speculating on the nature of their intimate relationships – sexual partners and so on in 
the heavenly realm – they imagine themselves in another temporal and spatial 
dimension. Simultaneously, they critically reflect on this new dimension, wondering, 
for example, whether one might have to remain married to one’s ex-husband in 
Paradise. In the absence of concrete knowledge they “fill the gaps” so that their lives 
in the hereafter become an inverted image of their current lives on earth.  
As I have shown, these novel forms of relating to kin, non-practising friends, God, 
and potential husbands, entail shifting and repositioning the self and self-other 
relations in time. Practising, therefore, unfolds within two temporal frameworks. 
These reorientations are experienced as affective, as demonstrated by the excitement 
and potentiality that circulated amongst the young women as they reasoned about, 
imagined, and forged these new relations. However, as I elaborate below, practising is 
fraught with inconsistencies and tensions. Temporal frameworks are embraced only 
partially and never fully capture my informants’ everyday experiences of practising 
Islam. Shifts in forms of subjectification involve constantly reorienting the self in 
time, but are never stable and never fully achieved in practice. Therefore, hope that is 
generated in these shifts and that energises these women’s quests, is also connected to 
doubt. 
                                                
112 In other instances I recorded their discussions on a range of topics including the nature of their 
homes, their bodies and leisure activities in Paradise. 
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6.7 Multidimensional temporalities 
I have argued that my informants learn to devalue the near-future by focusing on the 
immediacy of the present and projecting themselves forward in the distant-future. 
However this remains a desired ideal; in practice a devaluing of the near-future is 
rarely fully accomplished. As Chapter Four revealed, these young women are 
occasionally involved in seeking, reflecting and elaborating on their imaginary 
relationships with a future husband with whom to share their life on earth in the near-
future. In doing so, they not only negotiate a set of overlapping ideals of selfhood, but 
also contradictory temporal frameworks.  
This section reflects on the multiple, overlapping temporalities that permeate these 
young women’s experiences of practising Islam. It brings to the fore how the contrast 
between my informants’ experiences of multiple temporalities and Guyer’s (2007) 
ideal representations of time. These young women’s experiences of ambivalence and 
contradiction illustrate the ways in which practising is produced through cycles of 
hope and doubt, as doubt is always intrinsic to any forward projection of the self 
(Pelkmans 2013: 28-31). I return to Maryam, who imagined and laughed about the 
kinds of relationships and sexual intimacies she might have in Paradise. Her 
experience here is not unique, but merely indicative of the fragmentary processes 
involved in practising Islam. 
A few months following the conversation on intimacies in Paradise, Maryam and I 
were browsing the clothes aisles of New Look in Stratford Shopping Centre, and 
catching up on our weekend. In the previous week, Maryam had found the 
implementation of Islamic practices in her day-to-day life challenging. She blamed 
her difficulties on her non-practising friends with whom she had spent the last 
weekend. “I’ve just been having all these desires you know?” she explained. That 
afternoon I asked her whether she regretted becoming a practising Muslim – whether 
she missed her previous lifestyle? “God did it for me, so I can’t regret it.” I probed 
slightly further, “But do you miss it?” “Yes sometimes I do.” A brief silence ensued as 
we stepped outside the congested shopping centre, until she continued: 
 “You know what though? I'm freaked out paradise will have restrictions... 
I'm worried I'll be disappointed. I know I shouldn't be saying this but I've 
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given up so much stuff here and I just want to make sure it’s all worth 
something. I know they say there are no rules, no restrictions, but I’m not 
sure. I need to find the evidence for it. I’ve asked lots of people, but I 
haven’t really got a good answer for it, I’ve done a bit of searching myself 
but nothing.” 
Intrigued, I probed further, and she explained: 
 “Most people don’t care what’s in paradise. They love worshipping God 
so much it doesn’t matter to them and [for them] there’s no point thinking 
about it. But I’m giving up so much here. I just want to make sure it’s 
worth it. I shouldn’t be saying this I know... but I’m worried [that] I’ll be 
let down. Do you get what I mean?” 
It was clearly disconcerting for Maryam to even enunciate these thoughts out-loud, 
but I tentatively asked one final question as to which restriction was of most concern 
for her:  
 “Shame, I’m worried there will be shame in paradise. There is [shame] 
here and that’s why we cover up, be modest, not wear make-up, [don’t] 
listen to music, control desires, have to be careful with things... but what 
if paradise is like that too? I just don’t get how a place can work without 
rules... but they say paradise is completely different beyond imagination... 
I’m so bad, doubting all these things. I just want to make sure I’m 
rewarded for all the things I’ve given up.” 
The tone of the conversation shifted thereafter, as we pondered on what Paradise 
would look like without rules and regulations. Maryam’s thoughts drifted back to her 
love for R&B music and she pondered the types of songs she would have playing as 
she entered.   
Maryam was once again thinking about Paradise. This time however, she was 
worrying and questioning how self-making could continue in an unknown and 
undefined temporal domain. Would conditions allow her to fashion herself, as she 
desired? Would it be a sufficient reward for the sacrifices she felt she had made on 
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earth? Maryam sought a definite answer for something that could not be understood. 
Her search for “evidence” illustrates an almost involuntary desire to gain solid 
knowledge and to rationally understand that which cannot be experienced in this life.  
Maryam also doubted her commitment to a temporal frame that encouraged her to 
distance herself from the past and from experiences of the near-future on earth. 
Frequenting her non-practising friends illustrated she had not fully ruptured with her 
past, and reminded her of some of the practices of her earlier “heydays” that she had 
abandoned since practising Islam. This confrontation with her previous lifestyle 
placed her in an ambivalent and conflicting situation. The near-past and the near-
future had once again become relevant temporal dimensions in her life. Torn between 
her friends’ lifestyle and her commitment to her religion, she doubted her decision to 
devalue the present moment and abandon her worldly aspirations and gratifications. 
She had become drawn between different temporalities and models of selfhood (a 
practising self living in the immediate present and projected in the distant-future and a 
non-practising self committed to the near-future and near-past). This ambivalence led 
her to doubt her own commitment to practising.  
6.7.1 Managing doubt and a fluctuating iman 
A few months after these initial conversations about ambivalence, hesitation, and 
doubt, I met with Maryam again and asked her whether she had pursued her research 
on the topic. 
 “I’ve asked scholars and stuff and did some research but to be honest 
I’ve decided to stop looking into it. I think it’s the kind of thing that no 
matter how much you research we just don’t know. It’s probably bad for 
me to keep wanting to know more, you know? I shouldn’t be so keen to 
keep wanting to know, it’s a bit selfish maybe.” 
By answering in this way, Maryam asserted her own agency in the sense that it was 
up to her to either ask more impossible questions, or to accept the limits of human 
understanding and reasoning, as is deemed “correct” within Islamic discourses. As I 
was also intrigued by her suggestion that it would be selfish to want to know more, I 
asked her to reflect on that.  
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 “It’s bad. I should just accept and trust paradise will be as great as God 
says. That we can’t even imagine it... [Hesitating she added,] but you 
know… sometimes I feel like I really need to know. Especially when I hit 
rock bottom, I really need something to keep me going, when my iman is 
down.” 
I asked her when she was likely to “hit rock bottom” and experience “low iman” and 
she explained this normally occurred when she was neglecting her obligations, for 
example, when she was not concentrating during her prayer or praying at the required 
times. She continued: 
 “Or when I’m just thinking: why on earth am I doing all these things?! 
Sometimes it’s really bad, I feel I don’t want to do [all those things], like 
why am I bothering kinda thing. Sometimes Shaitan (Satan, devil) can 
whisper things to you... So I need motivation, something to make sure that 
it’s all worth it. If not it just feels so abstract sometimes, like I’m relying 
on something abstract that I can’t understand.” 
Maryam had grown accustomed to a fluctuating iman. The first couple of times she 
hit “rock bottom”, she failed to understand why God was punishing her despite all the 
sacrifices she had made. By conversing with others, she had learnt that uncertainties 
were common and constitutive of the nature of iman, and had realised she could 
interpret her situation differently. Her doubts were depersonalised and transformed 
into objects through her application of the concept of a fluctuating iman. 
 “I think it’s God’s way of giving me a push in the back… I’ve realised 
now, when I’m in the lowest of the lowest, I have to reflect on what God’s 
trying to tell me. I asked a Sheikh about this and he told me to do this, 
cause I used to doubt everything so much. He told me to use the time to 
reflect on myself, to think hard about what I could’ve done to displease 
God… so now I use it as a time to be self-critical, to analyse my actions. 
I’ve still a long way to go and these periods really teach me that, they 
make me a better person. I need those kicks!” 
The second conversation I had with Maryam about her uncertainties is illustrative of 
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the ways she sought to manage her doubt by seeking to map her experience onto an 
understanding of sacred time. Once her feelings had been expressed, she was driven 
to seek coherence, pull herself “out of doubt”, and learn to apply the appropriate 
religious linguistic tools. She learned to understand the “signs” of low iman and of 
Shaitan, and to interpret her experience through this lens. 
As Maryam recounted to me, Layla had advised her to stop worrying about heaven: 
“It’s true there will be no obligations in janna, but it’s impossible for us to even 
imagine what it will be like, it’s beyond our imagination. I really don’t understand 
why you’re concerned, you should just trust God that it will be amazing.” 
Instead of dwelling on the matter Maryam was advised to trust in God, to increase her 
acts of worship, recite the Quran daily, and reflect on God’s greatness and her 
relationship with Him in present time. Layla insisted prayer and other acts of worship 
would eventually work as self-disciplining techniques that would instil trust, an 
immediate connection with God and hence impact positively on her interior iman. She 
would eventually see these practices not as restrictions but as ways of “pleasing” and 
“connecting” with God. 
As Maryam confessed in our second conversation, having initially sought different 
opinions on the matter she had now decided to abandon her search. By conversing 
with others, she had learnt the limits of her intellect (‘aql) and that the nature of 
paradise was incomprehensible to a rational mind. For Maryam, this signified an 
interpretation of her “low iman” or periods of hesitation, as either interference from 
Satan and therefore external to her self, or as signs from God. If she was struggling it 
could be either Satan drawing her away from Islam or God punishing her for a bad 
deed, and warning her to practise. A fluctuating iman, Maryam learnt, was an integral 
dimension to faith, and one must learn how to recognise and manage it. Doubt could 
only be a sign of God’s dissatisfaction with one’s actions, and only through increasing 
“good actions” and acts of worship could this be resolved. By “reasoning correctly” 
and orienting her self towards God and the afterlife, Maryam was able to tackle her 
doubts. 
By consulting her practising friends such as Layla, Maryam had initiated a search for 
coping mechanisms to address her doubts, thereby turning uncertainty into an object 
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that required a practical solution. “My iman is so turbulent… it goes up a little, then 
down, but it’s never really high and stays there”, she described to me during the 
second conversation. Maryam had employed the idiom of “low iman” to interpret and 
conceptualise her experience of ambivalence, and had identified its signs: feelings of 
uncertainty, depression, loss of hope, lack of motivation, and laziness. These were all 
now treated as manifestations of a “low iman” that required specific counter-actions 
in order to re-establish a feeling of potentiality and “high iman”. However, in the 
process of interpreting her experience through a fluctuating iman – an understanding 
of faith as inconsistent – the doubts were marginalised and never fully addressed.  
A “fluctuating iman” served as a linguistic tool to objectify doubts but also as a 
conceptual device that allowed Maryam to reason about doubt in a particular manner 
and to reorient herself towards the transcendent, distant future. As I noted above, most 
of my informants complained about states of “low iman” as a way of expressing 
uncertainties and doubts and sharing their feelings, experiences and coping strategies.  
Recognition of the fluctuating nature of iman was essential in order to overcome these 
moments of feeling “low”. As Khadija, another young Somali friend who had been 
practising for several years explained to me,  
 “I think you have to realise it’s a process… you’ll evolve, you’ll mess up, 
sometimes you’ll go back on something you wish you hadn’t … but it’s always 
good to surround yourself with good people, good environment, and try to 
reconnect, increase your ibadat (worship), go to lessons and courses for an 
iman boost!”  
For example, Habibah, who often complained of “low iman”, explained her problem 
to Layla “My iman is really low – I don’t know what to do anymore. I can’t even 
pray… the last few months I’ve been praying late, missing my prayers, not feeling my 
prayers, listening to music, swearing, going places I shouldn’t… it’s gotten really 
bad.” Layla had, on that occasion, advised Habibah to start praying regularly in order 
to reconnect with God and re-instil a feeling of iman. Even if she did not “feel” like 
praying, Layla had advised her to “fake it” and repeat her prayers as this would 
ultimately help her generate sincerity and a willingness to act. As I pointed out in 
Chapter Five, advice from like-minded practising friends was crucial to the ways in 
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which my informants sought knowledge and direction in their everyday experiences 
of practising. These informal exchanges served to reinforce a commitment to 
normative practices and ideals but also created informal hierarchies amongst these 
young women. 
 “Low iman”, I suggest, is therefore used to express a lack of excitement and 
potentiality or hope. It signals the inability to successfully reorient oneself into the 
future by reconfiguring one’s relation to self and others. “Low iman” denotes an 
experience of disengagement that necessitates “reconnection”. It rests on the 
recognition of the cyclical nature of self-transformation, as a process of wavering 
between the correct/incorrect use of reason and between hope and doubt (Pelkmans 
2013: 28-31).  
As Khadija notes, getting oneself “out of doubt” requires limiting one’s exposure to 
un-Islamic contexts and engagement with un-pious individuals. In doing so, the model 
of a non-practising self, which is oriented towards the near-future, becomes “less 
socially relevant” and alternatives to practising Islam are discarded (Pelkmans 2013: 
22). Because uncertainties are objectified, depersonalised and naturalised as 
fundamental dimensions of faith, a believer no longer feels isolated; anxieties are 
shared with others and made sense of collectively.  
Interpreting one’s experience of doubt through the idiom and concept of a 
“fluctuating iman” enables my informants to temporally reorient themselves in the 
immediate present and project themselves into the future, thus repositioning their self-
other relations in time. Identifying doubts as “low iman” eventually works to re-
establish horizons of hope. Doubts in this way work to invigorate faith as they 
naturalise and rationalise – yet also marginalise – the unknowable, encouraging 
individuals to strive for consistent and continuous practice. Although doubts and the 
experiences of multiple temporalities may appear to steer individuals away from 
faith,113 if interpreted and rationalised “correctly” they may also invigorate their 
quests.  
                                                
113 Although this chapter focuses on practising Muslims who are able to manage their doubts in such a 
way so as to re-invigorate their quests, there are of course young Somali women whose doubts steer 
them away from faith altogether (see Fatima in Chapter Three for example). 
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Maryam, Habibah, and Khadija’s experiences highlight the ways in which the process 
of self-formation is, in fact, fragmentary, incoherent and unstable for most young 
practising women. Although Maryam aspired to be coherent in her practice, she was 
living in a context where multiple temporal dimensions (and models of selfhood) 
coexisted. I have shown how Guyer’s (2007) outline of a recent shift in temporal 
framing corresponds with one of the dominant ways in which some of these young 
women experience sacred time. These idealised ways of understanding time are 
prevalent amongst some of the Islamic teachings these young women encounter, and 
are taken up and reproduced in everyday practices and conversations. Through 
Guyer’s work, I have shown how the practices of these young women differ in 
relation to other anthropological accounts of Islam, where emphasis is placed on 
implementing projects of piety in the near-future (Deeb 2006; Mahmood 2005). I am 
not denying that these projects are not present amongst practising Somali women. For 
example, we have seen throughout how young women who seek to be “good Somali 
daughters”, or search for professional, practising, Somali husbands on earth, are 
involved in processes of self-fashioning that unfold in the near-future. Rather, my 
point is that these projects are most often devalued amongst many young practising 
women. 
My analysis also extends beyond Guyer’s (2007) work in several ways. Whereas 
Guyer’s account deals with abstractions, discourses and texts, this chapter has focused 
on how representations of time are experienced in everyday life. First, I explained 
how these young women, through the practise of Islam, position their novel relations 
with others within two interconnected temporal frameworks. Subsequently, through 
Maryam’s example, I illustrated the way in which these temporal frames are 
maintained through constant “work”, and suggested that these models of time are 
constantly being questioned and debated. I pointed to the presence of multiple 
temporalities within a single subject, and to the ways in which practising involves 
constantly oscillating between them. As we have seen throughout, my informants 
engage with multiple forms of knowledge in their projects of self-fashioning. Hence, 
their understandings of time are derived not solely through Islamic teachings, but also 
by engaging with Somali histories transmitted through their kin, public and political 
debates, or popular culture in the UK.  
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6.8 Conclusion 
In conclusion, I return to the initial questions about how to theorise the interaction 
outlined in the original vignette, and what it tells us about the complex relationship 
between self-making and time.  
I have argued that Hirschkind’s analysis, and, more broadly, the work on piety 
(sections 1.3 and 1.3.1) that has dominated the anthropological study of Islam in the 
last decade is limited in its understandings of temporality. As recent scholarship has 
pointed out, and as I argued in the introduction, this body of work tends to emphasis 
the coherence of an Islamic discursive tradition, rather than the everyday experiences 
of Muslims (Schielke 2010a; 2010b; Soares & Osella 2010; Marsden 2007b). This 
may explain why Hirschkind, as well as Mahmood’s analyses focus on how their 
informants reproduce this tradition, as opposed to their ideas about self-
transformation, and their dynamic experiences and engagements with Islam. As a 
consequence, Hirschkind depicts how Muslims in Cairo draw on contemporary 
teachings in order to orient themselves towards death and the afterlife in the present 
moment; he assumes that self-making occurs in a single temporal dimension.  
In contrast, my informants’ conversations indicate that they discuss these issues, and 
grapple with concepts that are not necessarily grounded in the scriptures and 
teachings. An analytical focus on their conversations in everyday settings, and their 
creative engagements with discursive traditions has brought to the fore the ways in 
which their perceptions of self-making are neither limited to textual reproduction, nor 
unfold solely within the present moment. Thus, the everyday experience of practising 
involves two dominant yet not determining, coexisting, and mutually reinforcing 
temporal dimensions: a presentism that focuses on establishing an immediate 
connection with God, and an imaginative engagement with and forward projection of 
the self into the distant-future. It is this last dimension that has not been given 
sufficient attention in the anthropological work on Islam.  
These different experiences of time map onto different ideas and imaginings of self-
making. The processes involved in self-making on earth have an endpoint and an aim 
– establishing a connection with God and preparing for the hereafter - and can be 
known to these young women through an investigation of Islamic scriptures and 
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teachings. On the other hand, self-making in the distant-future is eternal and 
transcendent. Whilst some guidance is provided in Islamic texts, the nature and 
ultimate aim of the afterlife remain uncertain and undefined. The young women only 
know that it will be radically different to life on earth, but they are asked to accept its 
existence and unspecified characteristics as an act of faith. It is for this reason that 
their ideas of self-fashioning in the distant-future are often imagined in opposition to 
their lives on earth. My informants are reflecting on self-making in a different 
temporal domain, which is, however, not known in its entirety.  
The question remains as to why these young women embrace these temporal frames. 
Why they have they become increasingly popular in the contemporary moment? In 
her essay, Guyer does not elaborate on the reasons why these temporal frames have 
become prevalent. She does, however, mention that they coincide with a historically 
specific period of uncertainty in 21st century America, but she purposely avoids 
making a causal argument between uncertainty and temporality. Moreover, she leaves 
unspecified to whom these temporal frames apply, precisely because her thesis is 
concerned with the content of texts rather than temporal experiences. Drawing on this 
point, I do not wish to suggest that it is my informants’ relative economic uncertainty, 
nor their socio-economic marginality that leads them to devalue the not-so-distant 
past and future. This would offer an overly simplistic explanation for the current 
popularity of reformist Islam in London and elsewhere. Rather, I suggest that these 
temporal frames are increasingly popular in the contemporary moment precisely 
because they enable new ways of being, and novel possibilities for self-
transformation. The forward projection of self-making, which takes place in different 
temporal dimensions, animates these young women’s commitments to these pious 
pursuits. In particular, the distant-future presents the potential for continuing a process 
of self-fashioning beyond death. An analytical focus on temporality and self-making, 
I would like to suggest, brings into sharp focus the hope that fuels these young 
people’s engagements in these projects of truth 
. 
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Chapter 7: Conclusions 
Ladan was about to make some drastic changes to her practice of Islam; but this was 
not the first time that she had embarked on a process of self-transformation. At 18, 
Ladan, a second-generation Somali woman, had become disenchanted with the “party 
scene”, and began to practise Islam “as a Salafi”, as she put it to me. This transition 
was a difficult period in her life. Spending increasingly more time attending Islamic 
classes and conferences, rather than socialising in bars and clubs, she had become 
distant from many of her school friends. “It taught me what I was made of”, she stated 
on one of our first encounters in 2010, “It showed I had real determination and 
stamina.” However, after a troubled marriage with a Somali man, Ladan became 
dissatisfied with what she called, the “rigid” or “black and white” ways of the Salafis. 
In contrast to both her previous engagement with Islam, and her mother’s, who she 
claimed practised Islam in the cultural way, Ladan now described herself as “more of 
a ‘Sufi’”. Subsequently, following her university classes, Ladan enrolled on a series of 
self-development courses, and started to experiment with different spiritual practices. 
She had also come to appreciate that she “Had to focus on the inner as much as the 
outer”. She explained: “I think people should decide for themselves… everyone has 
their own personal journey”. Three years after our initial meeting, while I was in the 
final stages of writing this thesis, Ladan told me that she had decided to remove her 
hijab as she felt it no longer had significance in her life. Her relationship with God 
was personal and spiritual, she reasoned, and did not need to be symbolised by what 
she wore on her head. In conjunction with this, she had also begun to engage 
differently with Islamic texts. Ladan now challenged many of the mainstream textual 
interpretations, which she had previously accepted unquestioningly. Invoking a 
discourse of liberal choice and autonomy, she commented, “Some of the statements, 
rules and obligations just don’t make sense to me”. Yet she did not want to renounce 
her commitment to these “truths” entirely. Furthermore, she had recently made friends 
with who she termed “non-practising, liberal Somalis”, and even more 
controversially, had started to date a non-Muslim – a decision with which she felt 
uneasy. If her mother found out, “That would be the end of it”, she joked. Torn 
between the opinions of her newly acquired friends, and Islamic textual authority, 
Ladan felt ambivalent about her decision, and her engagements with Islam.  
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 * * * * 
In the past decade, the scholarship on Islamic piety has dominated much of the 
anthropological study of Islam (Mahmood 2005; Hirschkind 2006). This work has 
been influential in denaturalising the secular-liberal subject and analysing the 
specificities and formations of religious subjectivities on their own terms. However, it 
has portrayed piety as a straightforward, coherent, and bounded project. Building on 
this work, this thesis has argued that the everyday experiences of piety cannot be 
captured solely through Islamic discursive models of piety. By developing an 
approach that reveals the multifaceted dimensions of practising Islam, this thesis has 
considered the importance of a range of intersecting discursive traditions and 
practices that present themselves to practising women in a given socio-political 
context, and in a range of places beyond the mosque. Alongside discourses, this thesis 
has stressed the importance of the somatic and affective experiences of young 
practising women, as well as their forms of reasoning and argumentation. Moreover, 
it has attended not only to self-fashioning, but also to the importance of historically 
specific self-other relations. 
I have argued that young Somali women’s practise of Islam is best approached by 
investigating the forms, and means, through which they imagine novel relations to 
themselves and others, including kin, friends, potential husbands, and God. My thesis 
contributes to the anthropological work on Islam by revealing the ways in which these 
ethical imaginations enable novel ways of approaching social change (Moore 2011). 
Drawing on the concepts of the ethical imagination, problematization, and hope, it 
unravels the broader dynamics of ethical change present in these young women’s 
pious pursuits. In what follows, I address the ways in which my ethnography has 
engaged with these concepts, concluding with a critical reflection on my contributions 
to the work on Islam and female Muslim subjectivities. 
First, I consider the ethical imagination, which has served as a site from which to 
observe processes of social and ethical change. Extending a Foucaultian (1985: 28-
29) understanding of ethics, this thesis has approached ethical change as a process 
that involves delimiting a part of oneself (the ethical substance), reconfiguring 
technologies of the self, and the modes of subjectification to a moral code, and 
imagining novel relations to others (Moore 2011). Throughout, I have traced these 
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changes by contrasting the ways in which two generations of Somali women imagine 
novel relations to themselves, and others. We have seen how first and second-
generation women engage differently with the ethical imagination as they relate to, 
and make sense of, notions of culture, Islamic practice, and knowledge. However, 
ethical change is rarely straightforward or coherent, but rather is a recursive and 
fluctuating process characterised by contention and disagreement. A cross-
generational perspective has avoided producing a linear trajectory of change and, 
instead, has brought to light the diversities across individual lifecycles, and between 
women from the same generation.  
Furthermore, my ethnography has revealed the multiple, and at times contradictory, 
ethical projects of second-generation practising women. By investigating the ethical 
imaginations of these women, it has provided a complex and multi-faceted account of 
subjectivity. These young women are not solely engaged in pious pursuits. Rather, 
they negotiate contrasting modes of subjectification (pleasing God, choice, affect, and 
respecting kin), and different teleologies of the subject (pious, autonomous, and good 
Somali daughter). For example, by drawing on reformist teachings alongside liberal 
discourses, young Somali women reconfigure their relations with Somali kin. The 
latter are discursively positioned in the past, as the young women emphasise that, 
unlike their traditional mothers, for whom Somali culture and religion are determining 
forces and inherited dimensions of their life-world, they are able to constitute a 
“choosing” relationship to culture. They claim that what they share with their kin are 
not inherited dispositions, but rather a set of objectified values, norms and objects, 
which they choose to embrace. Nonetheless, these young women also feel an 
obligation to respect and please their kin. Hence, as we saw in the example of 
marriage, being “a good Somali daughter” is one amongst many teleologies among, 
which coexists with, and often contradicts, these young women’s attempts to fashion 
themselves as autonomous subjects vis-à-vis a shared and objectified culture. 
Through their efforts to embody a pious self, these young women have begun to 
prioritise an internal, embodied, and affective relationship with God. Many emphasise 
how they seek to reconfigure themselves as inextricably bound to God in the 
immediate present. Through their engagements with practices such as prayer, the 
donning of the hijab, or seeking knowledge, they emphasise interiority as an ethical 
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substance, and stress the significance of “pleasing God”, or “submitting to God”, as a 
mode of subjectification which coexists alongside a liberal notion of “choice”. 
Similarly to Fadil (2008: 251), for these young women autonomy is achieved through 
their subjection to God. Their practising friends and the larger umma are crucial in 
assisting these young practising women’s quests to establish a self-God relationship, 
as they separate themselves from non-practising friends and Somali kin.  
These transformed relations with kin and God also impact on their aspirations for 
future husbands on earth. As we saw in Chapter Four, young practising women seek 
to position their idealised relations with future husbands somewhere in between their 
relations with kin and with God. A marital relationship ought to be one based on 
choice, equity and companionship, but at the same time, it should also be an extension 
of one’s spiritual love for God. Material and social aspirations, alongside attempts to 
“respect kin”, are often in conflict with these imagined relations with husbands. 
Finally, as shown in the last chapter, these relations with others on earth often stand in 
contrast with imagined relations with others in the distant-future of the afterlife. This 
temporal domain presents a further coexisting site of self-fashioning. 
By placing these women’s self-other relationships at the centre of my analysis, I have 
emphasised the importance of attending to the creative and intersubjective self. This 
approach has explored the manner in which the self interacts with others and 
negotiates discourses and practices, but is never fully determined by them (Jean-Klein 
2000; Sökefeld 1999). As we have seen, differences are internal to the subject, as 
these young women shift between and inhabit a range of subject positions within 
different discourses (Moore 1994). Hence, their practice of Islam cannot be fully 
captured by a single model of ethical self-fashioning (Mahmood 2005). Nor does it 
involve, as Jacobsen (2011b) suggests, a new kind of subjectivity, constituted at the 
intersection of the Islamic and liberal discursive traditions. Instead, my analysis builds 
on Fadil’s (2008: 250-251) claim that these young women’s subjectivities should be 
conceptualised in terms other than exception or idiosyncrasy to liberal standards. As 
her analysis of orthodox Muslim women reveals, different traditions coexist in non-
contradictory ways. They are employed differently depending on whether these 
women are engaging with God on a vertical axis, or relating to kin or other 
individuals on a horizontal axis (see section 3.8). My work complicates this analysis 
 259 
further, by investigating the unstable and variable nature of a range of self-other 
relations. As evidenced by these women’s refractory engagements with the notion of 
culture, they draw on a range of discourses and negotiate multiple modes of 
subjectification in their relations with Somali kin. In their processes of self-
fashioning, they draw on different forms of knowledge, acquired through Islamic 
scholarly texts, popular culture, and intimate discussions with friends. My work has 
brought to the fore the complex and unstable relational matrix which these women are 
constantly redrawing in their everyday experiences of practising Islam. What is 
particularly interesting is the way in which these different relationalities are connected 
with each other. As these women imagine novel relations with potential husbands, 
they simultaneously transform their relations vis-à-vis Somali kin, and God. Shifting 
one form of self-other relation involves transforming the entire matrix. Moreover, I 
have considered the ways in which the relation between self and other is not only 
historically specific, but also affective, imagined, and embodied (Moore 2011: 76). As 
I elaborate below, this should be understood and positioned within different temporal 
frameworks. These relationalities are shaped, but not fully determined, by 
contemporary forms of problematization.  
Therefore, Foucault’s notion of problematization furthers an analysis into how ethical 
change is initiated, how it unfolds, and the extent to which it is shaped by the 
intersections of Somali history and migration, as well as the Islamic tradition of 
reform and the recent history of public discourses and policies on migration in 
Britain. It enables us to link broader contexts of social, economic and political change 
with processes of self-fashioning, and to account for the workings of power. 
According to Foucault (2000: 117-118), transformations are not only the result of 
external socio-political factors, but also involve responses and solutions that take 
particular forms and emerge out of historically specific ethical problems. Foucault 
maintains that at a given moment in time, attention comes to rest on a set of questions 
or “problems” (ibid 2000: 114). This thesis has centred on two areas in particular 
which have become the object of scrutiny, analysis, and elaboration in contemporary 
Britain: the question of what constitutes culture, and an interrelated concern with what 
it means to be Muslim and British. These questions have become problematized 
through recent shifts in political rhetoric, popular culture, and policies around 
multiculturalism in the UK, which have connected multiculturalism, Islam, and 
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cultural diversity to a host of issues relating to integration, segregated cultures and 
communities, violence, and extremism. 
These questions have instigated a variety of responses and, at times, contradictory 
solutions, which themselves have developed out of these specific problematizations. 
For example, we have seen how policy makers have objectified and deployed culture 
as a form of governmentality, how popular culture has provided answers to the 
problems of being British and Muslim, how academics have similarly addressed these 
questions, and how Islamic reformist teachings have presented their own 
understandings of culture and religion. Throughout, I have positioned these discursive 
solutions alongside those proposed by young practising Somali women who, through 
their processes of self-fashioning, similarly intervene within, and contribute their own 
responses to these problematizations.  
In so doing, I have explored how young Somali women engage with different forms 
of knowledge, but also actively rework these from a different perspective, thus 
transforming and challenging these problematized notions in the process. For 
example, Somali culture has come to be understood as a set of values, objects, and 
practices distinct from religion. Whilst dominant discourses and policies construe 
minorities in the UK as determined by their culture, young practising women 
articulate a “choosing relationship” to their culture. On the one hand, Somali culture 
signifies a romanticised and reified notion of Somali pastoral society, while on the 
other, as we saw with the Miss Somali event, it has been appropriated, updated, and 
celebrated by second-generation Somali women.  
Chapters Three and Five pointed to the ways in which young practising women are 
transforming Islamic notions of faith, practice, and knowledge by problematizing the 
relation between exteriority and interiority. These transformations, I argued, should 
not be treated as illustrative of how Islam in Britain is becoming more “European”, 
“reflexive”, or “individualized” (Mandaville 2007; Roy 2004). Nor should change be 
conceptualised solely as the result of migration to the West, or of the increasing 
“translocality” of Islam. Rather, I have shown how changes are historically and 
contextually specific responses that draw on available discourses and practices. 
Problematizations serve as the “dynamic interface” (Faubion 2001: 97) between 
different intersecting discourses. They precipitate transformation from one ethical 
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field into another, and as we have seen, they nourish the elements – culture, Islam, 
and Britishness – that constitute ethical change, but do not determine the sorts of 
responses that emerge. My informants’ reworkings of faith, practice, and knowledge 
should be seen as particular forms of transformations that unfold within these 
problematizations, but are also challenging the Islamic discursive tradition from 
within (Amir-Moazami & Salvatore 2003). Furthermore, Layla and Ifrah’s contrasting 
attitudes to the jilbaab showed that these transformations are non-linear and 
fragmentary. Whilst interiority is prioritised amongst second-generation women, at 
the same time exteriority remains crucial to their practise of Islam, as they constantly 
experiment and engage with Islamic practices in multiple and complex ways. 
Throughout, I demonstrated that the Islamic reform cannot be captured by a single 
historical trajectory, nor does it necessarily correspond to a particular moment in time.  
In sum, young practising women employ historically specific Islamic and liberal 
discourses to address these problematized issues, but these discourses only provide 
points of reference in their processes of self-fashioning. As Moore (2011) 
demonstrates, there is always an element that remains undetermined and open to 
radical potentiality. Novel ways of imagining the self and its relation to others emerge 
in the gaps, through unclosed possibilities. It is for this reason that ethics, for 
Foucault, is the conscious exercise of “freedom”, as individuals always have the 
possibility of choosing the kind of self they wish to be, even though freedom is 
historically specific and shaped by existing discourses and practices (Laidlaw 2002: 
322-327). Whilst for Foucault it is an ability to stand back and reflect that constitutes 
ethical practice as “freedom”, for my informants it involves much more than the work 
of thought. It is not only through the processes of thinking, discussing, and 
implementing discursive traditions that young women transform themselves, but also 
through forms of attachments that are embodied, affective, and arise imaginatively 
(Moore 2011). What drives these young women’s ethical projects is not solely their 
ability to reflect and to creatively select a particular self which they wish to be 
amongst different available discourses, but most importantly the potentiality, 
excitement, and euphoria that comes with imagining novel ways of being. These 
moments of thinking, reasoning, and fantasising are reinforced by, and inseparable 
from, affective processes. Hence, it is not enough to focus on the discursive context 
(Mahmood 2005). An analysis of practising Islam needs to account for the 
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connections between the broader socio-political and economic context, and the 
affective, embodied, and cognitive dimensions of self-fashioning. 
Finally, an affective experience of potentiality, which is captured through the phrase 
“high iman”, is generated through the temporalities involved in these women’s 
attachments to novel understandings of self and self-other relations. These shifts in 
subjectification often involve “breaking with the past” and projecting the self forward 
in time. Indeed, any attempt to imagine novel ways of being involves repositioning 
oneself vis-à-vis others in time. As I explored in the previous chapter, many young 
practising women employ dominant Islamic representations of time in refashioning 
their relations with others, however, these coexist and conflict with other available 
representations of temporality. For example, their pursuits for suitable husbands, or 
their attempts to fashion themselves as “good Somali daughters”, involve pursuing 
ethical projects in the near-future, as well as negotiating dominant religious forms of 
temporality. As I suggested above, these women are not only negotiating multiple 
temporal frames, but their relational matrices are inseparable from their 
understandings of time. Therefore, following Miyazaki (2004), I have argued that 
because practising involves reorienting the self in time, it can be said to be “hopeful” 
in that it is animated by a forward-looking horizon. My work further contributes to the 
literature on hope, by exploring hope not only as a framing device for aspiration, but 
also as an affective and embodied orientation that animates processes of self-
fashioning. 
Yet this “prospective momentum”, as Miyazaki (2004: 8) points out, can only be 
sustained by a ceaseless repetition that maintains a constant anticipation of fulfilment. 
Hope can only be sustained if the self continuously reorients itself in time. For this 
reason, these novel imagined self-other relations are unstable, refractory, and in 
constant flux, as self-transformation is never complete. The temporality of practising 
Islam is exemplified by comparing Muneera, the recently practising young woman 
with whom I began this thesis, and Ladan, who, having experimented with a range of 
Islamic traditions began to abandon her commitment to Islamic forms of knowledge. 
These women capture two instances in the non-linear, and constantly shifting 
trajectory of practising Islam. But Ladan’s example is also illustrative of the manner 
in which a move away from practising Islam entails reconfiguring her relation with 
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herself but also with her mother, friends, and boyfriend – it shifts her entire relational 
matrix. Thus, she is experimenting with yet another way of engaging with what it 
means to be Somali, Muslim and British. The process of practising Islam only 
temporarily enables these young women to imagine themselves otherwise. In order to 
sustain a prospective momentum, these women need to constantly reposition 
themselves in time, and hence endlessly look elsewhere in order to sustain their quest 
for self-transformation. These young women’s relationalities are therefore in 
continuous fluctuation and transformation, and cannot be captured by a single static 
model, as discourses never fully determine how the self constitutes and transforms its 
relation to self and others. As we saw in Chapter Five, the majority of women 
constantly experiment with different Islamic traditions or teachings, meanwhile 
others, including Ladan, may seek forms of knowledge outside of the Islamic tradition 
in order to assist their self-transformations. 
Through drawing on the literature on subjectivity, ethics, and social change, this 
thesis has rendered intelligible the contextual and historical specificities of these 
young women’s pious subjectivities, and the mechanisms of, and driving forces 
behind, their ethical transformations, thus enriching the anthropological work on piety 
and Islam. This thesis, however, should also be read as a critical response to the 
contemporary problematization of the female Muslim subject in public debates and 
academic and policy writings. The Muslim woman in Britain has come to stand at the 
fulcrum of a range of interconnected, and politically charged issues. For example, 
debates around the retreat of multiculturalism have interlinked the Muslim woman 
with a determining view of culture, an understanding of Islamic practices as visible 
signs of difference, and of Islam’s incompatibility with British “values”. Islam has 
been rhetorically associated with the ensuing problems of migration, integration, and 
national security. My work has sought to challenge these understandings of religion 
and culture, and to deconstruct the ways in which connections between these disparate 
notions are often treated as self-evident (Foucault 2000: 201). By exposing the 
historical conditions that have made these understandings of religion and culture 
appear axiomatic, I have revealed their historical singularities – the ways they are 
shaped by problematizations that have arisen at this particular moment in time. 
Furthermore, I have pointed to the importance of exploring different understandings 
of these concepts in order to shift attention away from the “problem” of the Muslim 
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woman – to move beyond the current impasse in policy, political thought and public 
opinion, and to shift the terms of debate on which these discussions of 
multiculturalism have come to rest. By turning to the multiple perspectives and ethical 
imaginations of young Somali practising women, I have unravelled the ways in which 
they lead to novel forms of being and engaging with the world, thus providing 
alternative ways of thinking about these notions. Young Somali women’s practice of 
Islam should be seen as a form of intervention within current problematizations, but 
also as an effort to pluralise and transform contemporary debates on culture and Islam 
in the UK. 
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Appendix A: 1950s Somalia to the present diaspora 
The Somali presence in the UK, and the experiences of two generations of migrants, 
must be understood in light of a history of colonialism, nationalism, urbanisation and 
nation-state building, and the subsequent civil war and state collapse. This appendix 
traces key events throughout Somali history and migration from the 1950s to the 
present day and the formation of a global diaspora in the last 20-25 years. 
1. Post World War II: Urbanisation and Somali nationalism 
The earliest Somali migration to the UK dates back to the 19th century, during a 
period of British colonial rule in the former Protectorate of Somaliland. Following the 
Berlin Conference in 1885, colonial powers began to partition the Somali-speaking 
region, and in 1897, it became divided between four colonial powers. The UK 
possessed the Protectorate of British Somaliland (since 1991, the self-proclaimed 
Somaliland), and the Northern Frontier District (NFD, since 1963 the North-Eastern 
Province in Kenya), Italy seized La Somalia Italiana, France La Côte Française des 
Somalis (Djibouti since 1977), and Abyssinia (Ethiopia), the Ogaden and Haud areas 
(Lewis 2002: 40-62) (Map 2). It was during this period that migrants, predominantly 
from the British Protectorate of Somaliland, worked as sailors and traders with the 
British merchant navy and established communities around major UK ports such as 
London, Liverpool, Bristol, and Cardiff (De Montclos 2003: 44; Griffiths 2002). They 
were involved in the seafaring trade, which intensified following the opening of the 
Suez Canal in 1869, and generally worked as crew and boiler men on British ships 
throughout World War I (Kleist 2004; Holman & Holman 2003). The Somali 
community in the borough of Tower Hamlets in London originated from this period 
and consisted of males, mainly from the British Protectorate, who were automatically 
entitled to British citizenship (Map 1). Whilst some settled permanently, many 
continued to maintain economic and social ties with the Somali regions. With the 
expansion of the steel industry in the UK during the 1960s, Somalis who were already 
in the country began to settle in the midlands, and in the north, in order to take 
advantage of growing industrialisation. It was not until then that women and children 
began to join the men, and the communities were further expanded (Harris 2004: 22-
23).  
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In the period following World War II, Italy was forced to renounce its colonies in 
Africa, and La Somalia Italiana, was taken over by the United Nations and governed 
as a protectorate. In 1949 the British also gave up control of British Somaliland, and 
both territories were joined and governed as a protectorate. Throughout this late 
colonial period a large number of Somalis began to migrate to emerging cities or 
coastal towns within the protectorate in pursuit of education and employment. With 
the increasing commercialisation of the pastoral economy, and its incorporation into 
the world economy, clans began to lose control over the resources and means of rural 
production. This led to the disruption of traditional kin relations, and a growing 
exploitation of pastoralists by an emerging merchant and middle class in coastal and 
urban areas, who obtained revenues from exports of pastoral goods (Laitin & Samatar 
1984). These new developments resulted in the expansion of the coastal towns and 
interior townships of Somaliland and led to an increase in the number of people 
associated with the economic and administrative activities of the colonial state 
(Kapteijns 1999: 103).  
These new male urban classes were amongst the first generations to receive formal 
education, and worked as lorry-drivers, clerks, interpreters, traders, and teachers, for 
the colonial, and subsequently postcolonial state and economy. Somali men who had 
been educated in universities abroad, such as in Europe and the Middle East, returned 
to work as doctors, lawyers, teachers, and engineers. Together they participated in a 
new urban lifestyle, were active advocates of a modern, progressive agenda, and 
supporters of formal education and women’s rights (Kapteijns 1999: 101). 
Furthermore, they were fervent nationalists, many of who participated in the 1950s 
colonial resistance, and the struggle for political independence and unification of the 
Somali regions (ibid 1999: 155). They explicitly denounced clan identity and instead 
advocated a common Somali and Islamic identity calling for a Soomaalinimo (a 
national Somali communal identity), which would unite all five colonial Somali 
divisions. 
2. Independence and the regime of Siad Barre 
In July 1960 Somalia and Somaliland merged to form the new Somali Republic, with 
Mogadishu as its capital. Urbanisation continued to escalate as the population of 
Mogadishu went from less than half a million to more than two million between 1969 
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and 1990 (Lewis 2002: 265), and other major urban areas, including for example, 
Kismayo, Merka, Baidoa, Galkayo, Bosaso, Burao, Erigavo, Hargeysa, Berbera and 
Borama, grew rapidly in size (see Map 2).  
Many of the transformations I explore in relation to the experiences of first-generation 
Somali women (Chapters Two, Four and Five), originate in the post World War II 
period of rapid social change and rural-urban migration. I shall therefore examine this 
period in some depth. Following independence, Somalia joined in debates on 
modernity, freedom, development, exploitation and equality (Kapteijns 1999: 101). 
European lifestyles and clothing became increasingly popular throughout this period, 
and remained so until the 1980s-90s; fashionable clothing was sold in boutiques 
owned by British and Italian expatriates and was popular amongst urban Somalis 
(Akou 2011: 69). Urban women entered formal education and employment, and as we 
saw in Chapter Four, love and companionate marriages came to replace traditional 
marriages arranged by clan families (Kapteijns 1999). At the same time, there were 
attempts by both Somali citizens, and the government throughout the 1970s, to 
reimagine and valorise traditional Somali nomadic culture, and rethink the ways it 
might apply to modern life – a trend that was widespread throughout Africa and the 
Middle East in the 1960s and 70s (Akou 2011; Kapteijns 1999: 155). Women were 
often at the fulcrum of these debates on modernity, tradition, and culture.  
It was not long following independence until many Somalis became disillusioned with 
the new government as the country plunged into economic stagnation. Aid 
dependency increased, as did rural proletarianisation and corruption; nepotism 
became rampant and the gap between the lower and upper classes widened (Lewis 
2002: Chapter 10). In 1969 the government, under Prime Minister Egal, came under 
accusations of clientalism and neo-patrimonialism along clan lines, and President 
Shermaarke was shot dead in a military coup. Members of the Somali military, and 
police forces, announced the rise of a new revolutionary order, and the establishment 
of the Somali Democratic Republic. In January 1971, the Supreme Revolutionary 
Council (SRC) under general Siad Barre issued its policy programme 
The new SRC oversaw a period of nationalism and reform, which acquired an 
ideological edge with the adoption of Scientific Socialism in 1970 (Lewis 2008: 39). 
This led to a period of nationalisation of the economy; foreign banks, factories, 
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plantations and other businesses were seized in an attempt to reduce dependency on 
foreign imports. The Council embarked on a program of reform and progress, with the 
aim of fighting poverty, disease, and ignorance (Lewis 2008: 36; Lewis 2002: Chapter 
9). Amongst the SRC’s mandate were the aims of guaranteeing the right to work, 
promoting social justice, eradicating illiteracy, establishing orthography for the 
Somali language, and eliminating corruption and the tribal system (Samatar 1988: 84-
85).  
In terms of education, the SRC introduced an official Somali alphabet based on Latin 
orthography, and issued an intensive and extensive literacy programme. In 1971, all 
schools were nationalised and old school materials were replaced with Somali 
textbooks, as Somali became the official administrative and national language 
(Samatar 1988: 100-103). Following the success of an urban literacy campaign, a 
rural campaign was launched which sent 30,000 urban students and teachers into the 
countryside to teach reading and writing to the nomadic population (ibid 1988: 102). 
Revolutionary youth camps were set up for orphan children, who were housed, fed, 
taught, and clothed. By 1978, although most schools were in urban areas, student 
enrolment was on the rise in both primary and secondary schools, and the student 
university enrolment tripled (ibid 1988: 102-103). Adult literacy increased from 7-
10% in 1969, to 60% in the 1970s (ibid 1988: 103). However, despite the SRC’s 
commitment to boost employment, many of the jobs created were within state 
structures, and very little was done to tackle the agricultural sectors (ibid 1988).  
The SRC was also committed to furthering women’s rights, and many urban first-
generation women benefited from policies that encouraged women to go into 
education and employment. In 1975, a new family law was passed giving men and 
women equal rights in divorce and inheritance, and the diya practice (blood money) 
and other aspects of customary law (xeer), which were considered a traditional source 
of inequality between the genders, were outlawed (ibid 1988). This was part of a 
general assault on the traditional structures of society in the effort to secure 
modernisation (Lewis 2002: 209-223) (see Chapter Two). 
In February and March 1971 a general “Campaign against Tribalism”, officially 
named ololeh, and designed to "exorcize corruption and to resuscitate pan-Somalism 
and national unity", was launched (Samatar 1988: 107). Drawing on previous 
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nationalist struggles and promoting a pan-Somali identity, the aim was to appeal to a 
united Somalia across clans and lineages by diminishing the roles of clan-based 
institutions and practices. Somalis were encouraged to call each other “comrade” 
(jalle) instead of “kinsmen”, and weddings and burials were no longer to be clan-
based affairs. Instead, marriages were symbolically stripped of kinship and religious 
significance, taking place in Orientation Centres, and burials were to be conducted in 
local neighbourhoods, although the extent to which these took place is debatable. 
Emphasis was placed on local settlement as a unit of allegiance, rather than clan, as 
the SRC divided the country into eight 8 provinces that were further divided into 15 
regions and 78 districts (Lewis 2008: 40). Official lineage titles (e.g. duya, ‘aaqils) 
were renamed peace-makers (nabaad-doons) and clan alliances were banned (Samatar 
1988: 108; Lewis 2002: 209).  
Although religion was conflated with tradition and, in many cases, seen as an 
impediment to socialism and progress, Siad Barre sought, at least in rhetoric, to link 
fundamental values of Islam to socialist policies. In a speech in 1972, he declared 
that, "Ours is the religion of common man. It stands for equality and justice. 
Consequently, socialism as applied to our particular condition cannot identify religion 
as the obstacle to the progress of the working class and therefore cannot negate it" 
(cited in Samatar 1988: 108). However, this was only temporary and in 1974 the 
regime introduced sanctions on religious expression, and passed new family laws, 
arguing that previous arrangements, supported by religion, had resulted in the abuse 
and exploitation of women. The law that sought to equalise inheritance of both men 
and women provoked considerable protest, particularly amongst waddads (Somali 
ulema). It ultimately led to the execution of ten theologians in 1975, who were 
accused of counter-revolutionary activities (Samatar 1988: 109).  
Throughout the 1970s and 80s, much of the socialist rhetoric had not been translated 
into reality (Samatar 1988), and Barre had begun to exploit clan divisions to his 
advantage. The government became increasingly reliant on quashing political dissent 
through fear and violence. In 1971, two senior members of the SRC were arrested and 
accused of counter-revolutionary ideas and many others were imprisoned or forced 
into exile (Samatar 1988: 109). The novels of Nuruddin Farah, particularly the trilogy 
Variations on the theme of an African dictatorship capture the everyday realities 
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under an increasingly authoritarian military regime. Lewis (2002: 210-211) has 
described the ways in which Barre built a “Maoist cult” as he displayed statues of 
himself in front of public buildings, presented himself as the “Father of the Nation”, 
and controlled the two main radio stations. 
 3. Reformist movements 
The impact of Islamic reformist movements throughout the 1980s also began to be 
felt in the Somali regions. Somalis formed their own Islamist groups, such as Itaxaad 
al-Islamiya (Islamic Union), a Wahabi or Salafi influenced group (McGown 1999: 
36), which arose in opposition to the Barre regime. Like al-Islah al-Islamiya these 
groups were funded by Islamic associations in the Middle East, their leaders were 
trained in Saudi Arabia, and in Somalia, they set up Quranic schools and promoted 
Islamic education (Adan 1994). Jama’at al-Islah (Society of Reform), which 
identified with the Egyptian Muslim brotherhood (al-Ikhwan al-Muslimun) was 
actively involved in the provision of social services such as hospitals, clinics, food, 
housing, and education.114 
Reformist movements were especially popular in Somali urban areas amongst the 
young middle classes. They began to change the landscape across the region, as 
Islamic education and forms of dress originating in the Middle East, which had 
previously only been worn by Arab and Persian settlers, including the niqab, abaya, 
and jilbaab, spread across Somali-speaking territories (Akou 2011). Members of these 
reformist movements began criticising the approaches of their families, by attacking 
well-established Sufi practices within Somali Islam; they destroyed tombs, decried 
dancing and drums, and demanded that men grow beards and that women wear hijabs 
(McGown 1999: 35).  
Because of Somalia’s geographical position, relations with the Middle East have also 
been an important part of economic life across the Somali territories. In 1974 Somalia 
joined the League of Arab nations, as the only member where Arabic was not a first 
                                                
114 McGown (1999: chapter 1) argues that these Islamist movements continued to have a presence 
throughout the 1990s in both London – in Whitechapel and Regent’s Park mosques – as well as in 
Toronto. However, throughout my fieldwork I did not notice any affiliation to these movements 
amongst my female informants, although some of the women were familiar with the organisations.  
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language. Thanks to these new diplomatic ties, Somalis migrated to Saudi Arabia and 
to other countries in the Gulf. Increasingly they worked in the oil industry, a 
migratory pattern which increased following the rapid rise in oil prices throughout the 
1970s (Kleist 2004: 5). Others migrated to Gulf countries and further overseas for 
religious education, business, and family reunification (Kleist 2004: 7), and many sent 
money home through the informal hawaaalad transferring system (Lindley 2010).  
4. Civil War and State collapse 
By the early 1980s, following an intense period of drought, dwindling aid, a shrinking 
economy, and a costly counter-insurgency, Somali society was on the verge of 
collapse. The Ogaden War of 1977, which caused an influx of thousands of Somali 
and Oromo refugees into Somalia, coupled with the end of the 1974 friendship treaty 
with the Soviet Union, which had brought money, weapons and administrative and 
organisational support to Somalia, further impoverished the country and weakened the 
regime (Lewis 2002: Chapter 10). In 1980, following the Soviet Union’s backing of 
Ethiopia, Somalia signed a deal with the US, exchanging their use of airbases for 
military support (Samatar 1988: 141).  
Resistance to the regime was intensifying in the North, as the Barre regime, which 
had centralised much of the Somali economy, had further enhanced the political, 
economic, and social differences between the North and South. Barre sought to crush 
opposition through imprisonments, executions, confiscations of businesses, and other 
forms of abuse (Adan 1994). Two major opposition groups formed: the Somali 
Salvation Democratic Front (SSDF), which was largely dominated by the Majarteen 
clan based in Ethiopia, and the Somali National Movement (SNM), led by the Isaq 
clan and based in London. As these resistance militias took hold of the city of 
Hargeysa in 1988, Siad Barre ordered a series of aerial strikes killing thousands and 
forcing many to claim asylum abroad. Many Isaq clan members joined already-
established relatives or settled in London. In 1991 the United Somali Congress 
(USC), which aimed to unite all opposition groups and take hold of the government, 
ousted Barre from Mogadishu. However, the other groups refused to accept the USC 
authority, thus leading to the collapse of the State. 
Throughout the early 1990s, civil war spread across the country and following a 
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general uprising, Siad Barre fled Mogadishu in 1991, and sought exile in Nigeria, 
until his death. In the same year the Republic of Somaliland, the former British 
Protectorate, building on the struggles of the Isaq-led SNM, declared independence. 
Despite inter-clan fighting continued throughout the 1990s, Somaliland has witnessed 
relative peace since 1996 (Kleist 2004: 7).115 The civil war, throughout the 1990s, 
produced another cohort of asylum seekers and refugees in the UK (Kleist 2004: 7-8).  
Until 2000, following the failure of the 1991 US led intervention Operation Restore 
Hope, Somalia remained without a central government and large numbers of Somalis 
were internally displaced, with many migrating to refugee camps in neighbouring 
Ethiopia, Djibouti, Kenya, and Yemen (Harris 2004: 24). Throughout this period the 
Somali population in the UK changed significantly. A higher proportion of single 
women, children, and young people were forced to migrate, and family reunifications 
increased.116 Furthermore, migration intensified from the southern areas of Somalia, 
particularly amongst those sub-clans, who had been persecuted by the Barre 
government (Port Cities London: n.d). Many who migrated to the UK were 
recognised as refugees and granted British citizenship.  
5. Diaspora and Somalis in London 
In recent years Somalis have spread across a “global diaspora” ranging from Canada, 
New Zealand, Australia, Italy, France, Germany, Switzerland, Norway, Denmark, 
Finland, and Sweden, to Zambia and Tanzania (Kusow & Bjork 2007).117 The cost of 
migrating has, at times, meant that family reunification has been a scattered process, 
whereby a small number of family members have migrated alone, in the hope that the 
rest of the family would join later (Kleist 2004: 10). Some Somalis came directly, but 
                                                
115 Puntland declared itself an autonomous region in 1998.  
116 Between 1988-1994 a special concession from the British government allowed UK Somalis to apply 
for family reunions for relatives, rather than the relatives having to go through the embassy in Ethiopia 
(Griffiths 2002). However, throughout the 1990s Parliament passed several immigration and asylum 
laws that made it harder for people to claim asylum. For example, applications could only be made 
once the claimant had reached the country of destination which, coupled with stringent visa 
requirements and the Immigration (Carriers Liability) Act of 1987, made this difficult without the use 
of illegal means (Lindley 2010: 117). 
117 For recent work on the formation of the Somali Diaspora see Horst 2007; Kleist & Hansen 2007; 
Kusow 2007; Kusow & Bjork 2007. 
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often the process of migration was not straightforward and many spent time in refugee 
camps or in transit in Ethiopia or Kenya prior to their relocation, with others still 
arriving through a smuggling process (Lindley 2010: 118). 
The UK now hosts the largest Somali community outside of the Somali regions 
(Harris 2004: 24) with an estimated 70,000 Somalis residing in London.118 Whereas 
many Somalis followed kin, countrymen or social networks, others were drawn in by 
language or a reputation for religious tolerance (Harris 2004: 24). Today, Somalis 
who arrive in the UK are mostly secondary migrants from the wider diaspora who 
hold refugee status or citizenship in another EU country (Van Liempt 2011; Lindley 
& Van Hear 2007; Nielsen 2004). Many avail of their transnational connections to 
move to the UK, so as to pursue education and employment opportunities, as well as 
to join families and settle in already established communities (Nielsen 2004). In 
recent years, there has also been a rise in return migration to Somali-speaking 
territories, particularly to more stable areas of the North. Some, who spend half the 
year in Somali regions, are part of what Hammond et al (2011) has described as the 
“part-time diaspora”. Somalis also maintain close ties with their home country, 
through the sending of remittances and regular contributions to kin, household, or 
community projects (Lindley 2010; Horst 2008; Hassan & Chalmers 2008; Kleist 
2008; Hammond 2007; Al Sharmani 2006; 2010).119 However, the latest drought and 
famine and continued political crisis in Somalia, has meant that Somalis have 
continued to migrate into neighbouring countries and across the diaspora. 
                                                
118 This estimate is made by community organisations in London. The 2001 UK Census recorded 43,373 
persons born in Somalia and residing in the UK, with 33,831 (78%) in London alone. There are a vast 
number of policy-based studies on Somalis in the UK (e.g. Harris 2004; Change Institute 2009). For studies 
of Somalis in the boroughs of Camden, Tower Hamlets and Hackney, see Hemmings 2010; Holman & 
Holman 2003; Khan & Jones 2003; Griffiths 1997; CSC 1998.  
119 Lindley (2010) offers an in-depth account of the Somali remittance process based on fieldwork 
conducted in London, Hargeysa, and Nairobi.  
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Appendix B: The Multiculturalism debates in Britain 
In what follows, I trace a series of shifts in policies, and in public and political 
perceptions on multiculturalism, that have been unfolding in the last decade in the 
UK.120 Following a brief summary of the origins of multicultural discourses and 
legislative and policy frameworks, I show how multiculturalism has, in recent years, 
come under attack in a wide range of public and political debates across the political 
spectrum. I suggest that both defenders and opponents of the concept have contributed 
to the problematization of the “multicultural society” (Bracke & Fadil 2012).121 
Within these debates, the place of Islam in Britain has become inseparable from the 
issues of integration, cohesion, and national identity.  
1. The rise of multicultural policies and discourse in Britain 
Discussions of multiculturalism and ethnicity first arose in the late 1960s and 70s, 
following on from the race-relations paradigm of previous years, and as a 
consequence of a growing surge of migrants, particularly from South Asia and the 
former colonies (Modood 2010: 9). In 1966 Home Secretary Roy Jenkins’ speech 
marked a turning point for minority issues in the country. He described integration 
“not [as] a flattening process of assimilation, but as equal opportunity, coupled with 
cultural diversity, in an atmosphere of mutual tolerance”. Although not universally or 
uniformly accepted, mainstream politics and public opinion increasingly recognised 
the claims made by minorities to be accepted as “different”, and to challenge negative 
discrimination (Grillo 2007: 980). 
Throughout the 1990s and early 2000s, the legal and policy framework with respect to 
minorities included ethnicity (but not religion) as a recognised group. This paradigm 
                                                
120 Multiculturalism has been employed to define a host of different things, including a demographic 
condition, a set of institutional accommodations or state principles, or a set of objectives of a political 
theory (Vertovec 1998; 2007). This thesis, however, does not approach these debates from a normative 
perspective, nor does it treat multiculturalism as a descriptive term. Rather, similarly to Grillo (2010) 
and Lentin & Titley (2011), it documents these rhetorical shifts, but also treats them as “fields of 
problematization” (see Chapter One). 
121 For recent multicultural theories in Britain see McGhee 2008; Kundani 2007; Phillips 2007. For 
political theory on multiculturalism see Baumann & Vertovec 2010; Kymlicka 2007; Modood 2007; 
Taylor 1994.  
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had developed throughout the 1970s and was to a large extent exported from the US 
(Modood 2010). The Race Relations Act (1976) recognised the rights of ethnic and 
racial minorities and created the Commission for Racial Equality (CRE), now the 
Equality and Human Rights Commission (EHRC), which monitors the 
implementation of the Act. Many of the multicultural public policies in the UK have 
been implemented at the local level (LEA). For example, the Swan Report (1985) 
Education for All was responsible for introducing multicultural education in schools 
and educating children with the idea that Britain is a multicultural society. 
Government support was also extended to ethnic minority organisations to provide 
advice, representation, or facilities, catering for the local needs of minority groups.  
The publishing of the Parekh Report (2000) marked another defining moment of 
political engagement with multicultural policies, representing New Labour’s 
commitment to multiculturalism. Produced by the Commission on the Future of 
Multi-Ethnic Britain (CMEB) in 2000, and sponsored by the Runnymede Trust, the 
report was chaired by political philosopher, Bhikhu Parekh. Emphasising pluralism 
and diversity as an asset to the UK, it sought to simultaneously promote a meta-
narrative of “Britishness” under which diversity could flourish (Meer & Modood 
2009: 477). According to the report, Britishness was not something individuals 
possessed, nor a single view of history, but being British entailed “learning the 
grammar, vocabulary and syntax of the prevailing form of life and knowing how to 
participate in its on-going dialogue intelligently and intelligibly”. This New Labour 
commitment marked a “policy recognition of Britain’s historical multi-national 
diversity” and a sustained attempt at furthering awareness of cultural diversity across 
public institutions, particularly at the local level (Parekh 2000: 71-3).122 However, 
despite initial political backing, the Parekh report quickly came under a series of 
criticisms including, for example, the claim that it contravened universal values and 
political equality in the public sphere (McLaughlin & Neal 2004). 
2. The demise of multiculturalism  
                                                
122 Many of the existing Somali youth clubs and community organisations were set up throughout the 
1990s and early 2000s, to provide advice and support to recent asylum seekers and refugees on local 
services, and to support the educational and professional development of Somali youth. 
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Since the early 2000s, there has been a widespread attack on multiculturalism and a 
growing scepticism towards what has been seen as the prevailing liberal ideologies 
that have dominated policies since the 1970s. Across Europe, politicians and media 
pundits have begun to promote a “post-multicultural” approach, and to reassert ideas 
of integration, cohesion, and common values (Vertovec 2010). Although anti-
multiculturalism attitudes had existed prior to this moment, the “backlash” in recent 
years employs new language, rhetoric, and images, which converge across the 
political spectrum (Vertovec & Wessendorf 2010). As Vertovec and Wessendorf 
(2010) demonstrate in their analysis of public discourse, and local and national 
policies in Europe, multiculturalism has been treated as a fixed ideology or dogma, 
accused of promoting separatism, and of rejecting common national values. By 
developing values at odds with those of Western (secular society), so the dominant 
argument goes, multiculturalism has been seen as a threat to social cohesion and has 
thus provided the conditions for the growth of extremism (Grillo 2007: 980).  
Since the beginning of the 21st century, this rhetoric has proliferated in the UK in the 
speeches of politicians, religious leaders, and in the media, as well as in policy 
statements and strategies, and public and popular opinion. These interventions have 
“moved disjointly, influencing one another” and have often revolved around highly 
politicised events that have sparked a series of debates in government and in the 
media (Vertovec & Wessendorf 2010: 27). Partly driven by a majority opinion that 
maintains that accommodations to diversity had “gone too far” (Kymlicka 2010), 
these mainstream debates have also come to converge and interact in complex ways 
with the xenophobic rhetoric of populist minority right-wing movements, such as the 
BNP, EDL, and UKIP (Grillo 2007).  
Opposition from progressives and centre-left commentators has also been particularly 
vocal and has similarly taken a number of forms. Amongst academics, 
multiculturalism has been blamed for failing to address social, economic, and political 
inequalities, reifying culture, forcing “communities” to compete for resources, 
privileging patriarchy, and threatening liberal democracy (Alibhai-Brown 2001; 2004; 
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Okin 1999).123 In the media, debates have been equally fervent. For example, in 2004 
the editor of the left-leaning Prospect magazine, David Goodhart, published an article 
entitled “Too diverse?” in which he explores the existing tensions, amongst liberals, 
between the concepts of solidarity and diversity. The article concludes with a series of 
policy recommendations to promote greater integration in British society. Reprinted 
in The Guardian, this essay sparked a series of critical responses and debates amongst 
a range of academics, journalists, and policy makers (e.g. Parekh, Rattansi, Younge, 
Kimlicka and Blunkett).124  
An overarching concern throughout these debates has been a belief in the “divisive 
character” of multiculturalism (Grillo 2007: 985), which separates communities, 
undermines social cohesion, and fractures national identity. For example, Trevor 
Phillips, chair of the Equality and Human Rights Commission (EHRC) and co-author 
of the Parekh Report, has been amongst its most vocal critics. In an interview with 
The Times in 2004, he infamously alleged Britain was “sleep-walking towards 
segregation” and he called for the British government to stop its support for 
multiculturalism, claiming it fuelled “separateness”.  
Islam has come to occupy centre stage within these debates around diversity, as the 
“problem” of multiculturalism has become inseparably linked to the “Muslim 
problem” (Ghannoushi 2006). As Grillo (2010) notes, this has coincided with a 
change in British discourses on minorities that has mutated from “race” to “ethnicity” 
in the 1990s, and “religion” in the present period. The catalyst for this in the UK was 
the 1989 Rushdie Affair, which marked the first time religion entered British public 
and political debates around multiculturalism (Modood 1990; 2010; Werbner 2002). 
Rushdie’s Satanic Verses was considered offensive by a large majority of Muslim 
youth in the UK who, backed by major Islamic organisations,125 took to the streets in 
                                                
123 Defenders of multiculturalism include Rattansi 2012; Modood 2007; Vertovec 2007; Giddens 2006; 
Parekh 2000; and Grillo 2005; 2007. 
124 In a similar vein, in 2010, Munira Mirza, Deputy Major for Education and Culture for London, 
edited a special feature for Prospect magazine entitled Rethinking Race, that explored some of the 
failings of multiculturalist policies. 
125 This includes the OIC (Organisation of the Islamic Conference), the lobbying branch of the 
UKACIA (UK Action Committee on Islamic affairs) (see Lewis. P.1994).  
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protest, demanding the withdrawal of the book from public circulation, and 
campaigning for the extension of blasphemy laws to cover Islam. The reluctance of 
the government to respond further infuriated the protesters. Although responses 
amongst British Muslims varied widely, particularly with regard to the issued fatwa 
(ruling) by Ayatollah Khomeini sentencing Rushdie to death for apostasy, the crisis 
marked the first time that British Muslims articulated a political identity, made 
demands for recognition, and looked to the British establishment to intervene on their 
behalf (Modood 1990; 2010; Werbner 2002). It marked the first internationalisation 
of their struggles through sharing their frustrations, and campaigning with others 
across the global umma (Geaves 2005; Modood 1990). It also signalled an important 
moment in which young Muslims mobilised along religious, rather than ethnic or 
racial, lines, and responded to an attack which they felt had left them marginalised 
and insulted (Modood 1990).  
Following the Rushdie Affair, criticisms of Islam as an intolerant and oppressive 
religion erupted in the media, and amongst a range of commentators across the 
political spectrum. Throughout the 1990s, the UK witnessed an intensification of anti-
Muslim sentiment (Allen 2005: 54-55)126, as the authorities further failed to respond 
to the marginalisation and discrimination faced by the Muslim community. 
Comparing the incident to the July 2005 bombings, Werbner (2009: 29) notes how, 
for mainstream public opinion, the event “seemed to underline an unbridgeable chasm 
between European values of citizenship and the rule of law, and Muslims’ vengeful 
transnational politics”. Liberal commentators struggled to reconcile their support for 
what they saw as a fight against oppression with the challenge posed to the liberal 
principle of freedom of speech (Jacobson 1998: 39). The framing of the issue, in 
terms of a supposed incommensurability between Muslims’ concern with blasphemy, 
and the liberal concepts of freedom, has continued to permeate public discourses on 
Muslims in Europe, as evidenced more recently by the Danish cartoon controversy 
(see Mahmood 2009; Asad 2009).  
                                                
126 In 1997 the Runnymede trust published a report on Islamophobia, one of the first major reports to 
document the discriminations faced by Muslims in Britain and to popularise the word Islamophobia. It 
published a follow-up report in 2004 
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The summer riots of 2001 in the cities of Bradford, Burley, and Oldham,127 further 
intensified the linkage between multiculturalism and Muslims in Britain. These 
convergences were compounded by 9/11 and, in 2005, by the 7/7 bombings in 
London. Attacks on multiculturalism intensified as “diversity” was blamed for 
fuelling segregation, violence, and Islamic extremism. For example, in the aftermath 
of 9/11, the former Chancellor of the Exchequer, Norman Lamont wrote an article, 
Down with multiculturalism, book-burning and fatwas, published in The Telegraph, 
blaming Muslims, and their defiance of liberal values of freedom of speech, for the 
failures of multiculturalism (Allen 2005: 62). Similar reactions erupted in the media, 
exemplified by Melanie Phillips’ (2006) book Londonistan: How Britain is Creating 
a Terror State Within, which described the rise of “Islamism” in the UK and the 
policies and attitudes, including multiculturalism, that had enabled “terrorism” to 
flourish.  
These arguments were echoed in the Home Office Community Cohesion Report 
(2001), which set out to investigate the causes of the disturbances in the Northern 
cities. It suggested that “multiculturalism’s allegedly divisive character stems from a 
supposed institutionalization of difference and undermining of “cohesion”, [and] 
“common values”” (Grillo 2007: 986). 128  It was the lack of cohesiveness and 
leadership that was blamed for the riots, not economic deprivation or racism (Werbner 
2005: 748). As Werbner notes, by blaming economic and political problems, on 
politically neutral cultural issues, the government strategically depoliticised the notion 
of multiculturalism. “What was thus racialised, pathologised, and indeed criminalized 
was the internal social cohesiveness and cultural distinctiveness of the ethnic 
community, and secondarily, of the white working class communities” (Werbner 
2005: 748). Islam or Muslim culture was positioned as a threat to British values and 
                                                
127 See Allen (2003) and The Home Office (2001) Community Cohesion Report (also known as the 
Cantle Report), which investigated the background to the riots that took place between the majority 
white population, backed by extreme-right parties such as the BNP, and South Asian youth. 
128 The Report was written by the Community Cohesion Review Team and chaired by Professor Ted 
Cantle, founder of the Institute for Community Cohesion, which was set up in 2005: 
http://www.cohesioninstitute.org.uk/home 
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identity.129 As Lentin and Titley (2011: 14) note, “community cohesion” emerged 
within this report as a “technology among many put to work in fostering social 
cohesion on the terrain of culture” (Chapter Two-Three).  
As I explained in Chapter Three, these rhetorical transformations culminated with 
Cameron’s 2011 speech at the Munich security conference, during which he blamed 
“state multiculturalism” for an increase in segregation, violence, the development of 
conflicting values, and a loss of national identity. Coinciding with an English Defence 
League (EDL) protest in Luton, his speech stirred up controversy, particularly 
amongst Muslim groups and commentators.130 Rehearsing the rhetoric of separatism 
and extremism, Cameron (2011) stated, “Under the doctrine of state multiculturalism, 
we have encouraged different cultures to live separate lives, apart from each other and 
the mainstream… We have even tolerated these segregated communities behaving in 
ways that run counter to our values…” Although Cameron made a clear distinction 
between Islam and extremism, suggesting that only certain isolated Muslim groups 
were promoting extremism, he argued against the passive tolerance of previous years 
in favour of “an active, muscular liberalism”. 131 The latter, he claimed, actively 
promotes certain values such as freedom of speech, freedom of worship, democracy, 
the rule of law and equality of race, sex, or sexuality. The event sparked predictable 
reactions from mainstream media, as well as Muslim commentators. Farooq Murad, 
Secretary General of the MCB, criticised Cameron’s decision to approach 
multiculturalism through the lens of security and denounced his omission of any 
reference to the EDL and its violence against Muslims in the UK. A few months later, 
the New Statesman featured a special issue entitled Who are the English? A nation in 
the grip of identity crisis. On the front cover the magazine published a cartoon 
drawing of Cameron’s face, but with the addition of a long beard and a Muslim prayer 
                                                
129 Further anxieties around Muslims’ loyalties to the UK, were raised following the 7/7 attacks, when 
it emerged that the bombers were in fact British-born. 
130 See the Muslim News (25/02/11) for various articles in response to Cameron’s speech. 
131 Interestingly, in a strategically political move in 2007, four years prior to his speech, Cameron had 
stayed with a Muslim family in Birmingham, following a visit of Sparkbrook ward, a deprived, inner-
city ward in Birmingham. He wrote a column in the Observer, praising the ward for its community 
cohesion and suggesting “we cannot bully people into feeling British” (Cameron 2007). 
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hat. 132  The figure of Muslim Cameron captured the contrast and supposed 
incompatibility between Islam, and the Conservative government and (elite) British 
society. 
The extent to which these discursive shifts have actually impacted on the 
multicultural policy frameworks, has been a topic of academic debate. On the one 
hand, Vertovec and Wessendorf (2010) argue that this backlash against 
multiculturalism has significantly reworked only the terminology politicians and 
journalists employ to talk about minority issues. They suggest that multicultural 
policies, particularly those implemented on a local level relating to education and 
religious accommodations, have remained largely unchanged. As McGhee notes 
(2008: 85), hostility to multiculturalism has been “an exercise in avoiding using the 
term ‘multiculturalism’ rather than moving away from the principles of 
multiculturalism”. In fact, the early 2000s witnessed the proliferation of a series of 
reports accommodating of religious diversity (Home Office 2001; Ansari 2002). In 
the last two decades, practical and financial provisions for Muslims, including the 
provision of halal meals in schools, uniforms that accommodate the donning of the 
hijab, or the right for parents to withdraw children from some aspects of sex 
education, have also been introduced and implemented at the local level in recent 
years. Although Muslim schools’ requests to establish voluntary aided schools were 
rejected throughout the 1980s and 90s, in 1998 funding was extended to the first 
Muslim schools, the Islamia Primary School in London and Al Furqan in 
Birmingham. Legal changes have, in recent years, also sought to address forms of 
religious discrimination. The 2001 census introduced the question of religion, an issue 
the Muslim Council of Britain (MCB) had campaigned for throughout the previous 
decade. In 2000 the European Employment Directive (2000) was passed, which 
prohibited direct and indirect discrimination in employment, and was implemented in 
2003. In 2006 the Racial and Religious Hatred Act extended the crime of incitement 
to racial hatred, to religious hatred, and the Equality Act of 2006133 protected 
                                                
132 Articles included an intervention by Jon Cruddas MP for Dagenham and Rainham, arguing for the 
British to “rediscover tradition and English virtue”, and an article by journalist Mehdi Hassan, in 
favour of multiculturalism. 
133 The Equality Act of 2010 consolidated previous anti-discrimination legislation. 
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individuals from discrimination on the grounds of religion or belief, in employment, 
education, when providing goods, facilities, and services, using or disposing of 
premises, and exercising public functions.  
On the other hand, Grillo (2007: 988) notes how a shift in language has also had an 
impact at the policy level, which has moved towards a greater emphasis on civic 
integration (Joppke 2004). Through an analysis of a series of reports published in the 
early 2000s, Grillo (2007) shows that policies stressed the need to address economic 
and social exclusion and simultaneously emphasised greater cohesion and identity.134 
He terms this a shift towards “cohesion with diversity” with an emphasis on common 
values, and a civic notion of Britishness. The Crick Commission, which was 
established in 2002 to oversee the implementation of policies from the Nationality, 
Immigration and Asylum Act, introduced, amongst other things, a series of reforms 
intended for those seeking citizenship, including the English language test, Life in the 
UK: A Journey to Citizenship, and the ceremonial oath. The Home Office (2004) 
Strength in Diversity consultation paper stressed the need for common civic values 
and an inclusive notion of Britishness. In contrast to Parekh’s (2000) notion of 
multiculturalism, this paper views diversity as both a “source of strength”, yet a 
possible force of “segregation” and “fear and conflict” (Grillo 2007: 991). Similarly, 
in 2007 the Commission on Integration and Cohesion published Our Shared Future, 
which included recommendations on mainstreaming integration and cohesion at the 
local level (Grillo 2010: 55). 
More recently, the controversial updated version of the Prevent Strategy 2011 is the 
clearest indication of a shift in government policy. The strategy aims to address 
“extremist thinking”, and to support groups who promote counter-terrorism and 
integration, whilst cutting funding to “extremist” – including non-violent extremist – 
groups. Public money has been directed only to organisations that support 
“fundamental and universal” British values. Mainstream Muslim organisations such 
as the Muslim Council of Britain, which had, under New Labour acquired a quasi-
official status as the voice of Muslims in Britain, and the Federation of Student 
                                                
134 These reports include for example, the Strength in Diversity consultation (2004), the community 
cohesion panel final report (2004), Improving opportunity, Strengthening society (Home Office 2005). 
See also David Blunkett’s (2002) white paper, Secure Borders, Safe Haven.  
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Islamic Societies (FoSIS), have been accused of not doing enough to tackle 
extremism.  
The backlash against multiculturalism, which has dominated contemporary politics in 
Britain since the mid-1990s, provides the historical backdrop to this thesis. In the first 
three chapters I show how this shift in academic and political rhetoric, and policy, has 
served to question, problematize, and mould in particular ways, understandings of 
culture, Islamic practice, and faith. In turn, as this thesis makes clear throughout, 
these debates have also partly shaped my informants’ own processes of ethical self-
fashioning. 
 
